Trist quickly obtained a leadership post in the Division's Experimental War Office Selection Board which worked off the model provided by Hitler's Gestapo to develop officer selection techniques used by British and American Intelligence. An important facet of Trist's work with the Board was the selection and brainwashing of troops for kamikazesytle, suicide raids.

Immediately after the war, Trist was involved with the Civil Resettlement Scheme which relocated Nazis concentration camp personnel, lock, stock, and kapos to industrial centers in Europe and North America. As a part of this task Trist helped to recycle former Nazis into leadership positions in the synthetic West German Government.

Trist's first major job as a labor counterinsurgent was a project director for the Tavistock Clinic's campaign to bust-up the striking British Coal Miners Union. Using Mussolini's corporatist practices as his model, Trist developed a scheme whereby miners were divided into teams whose pay was tied to the production of the whole group. Competition was encouraged within teams until workers pushed each other to the breaking point. When management fired the resulting "excess labor," miners were so brainwashed there was barely a whimper of protest.

In the early 1960s Trist was sent from Tavistock to spread these corporatist policies throughout all of Sweden at the request of ruling Swedish Social Democrats. Starting at the Saab and Volvo plants, he created an entire fascist ideology, known as the "Swedish Way," to support his team competition method.

In weekly team brainwashing sessions, Nazi-like phrases — "You have to work together" and "We all have to be happy here" — are drummed into workers minds. Any hard-core militant who refuses to be "happy" as he is worked to death is assigned to one of a network of "community mental health centers" which Trist helped establish where drugs and electro-shock treatments may be used to break his resistance.

After Sweden, Trist was deployed to the U.S. where he created a parallel to the "Swedish Way," known as "Organizational Development," for U.S. auto plants. In 1970, Trist's former Tavistockian associate Russell Akoff invited him to the Wharton School of Business.

From Wharton, Trist ran two major social-engineering projects. The first was to break-up the United Mine Workers using techniques similar to those he developed in Britain.

Trist's second major project was to create a network of mental health clinics and terrorist youth gangs to control the black, ghetto communities of Philadelphia, the city where the Wharton School is located. Under this program the Domestic Branch of the CIA and Lt. Fencl of the local Police Intelligence Division ("Red Squad") fostered an elaborate gun-running and drugs to "pacify" black youth.

The ensuing violence harmlessly channeled ghetto residents' rage over poverty conditions against one another and gave an excuse for police state crack-downs on any serious revolutionary organization. Drugs were massively distribued to residents via the clinics and black Mafioso attached to the gangs in order to complete the ghettoes pacification.

The Argentine Model Falls Apart

NEW YORK, April 22 (IPS) — Four weeks ago, the international Atlanticist press was heaping praise on the new Argentine military government as a choice model for the Third World. Today, that government is in the throes of a violent factional battle; economic disintegration is preceeding at breakneck speed, and the labor movement, perhaps the best organized of all of Latin America, has begun to resist the fascist austerity policies of the junta. The junta's Atlanticist patrons are now having understandably nervous second thoughts.

One day after the March 24th Argentine coup which deposed Peronism for the last time, the New York Times was approvingly noting junta chief General Videla's "moderation," his "Christian virtues" and his "profound hatred of corruption." Equally prominent was the New York Times' admiration for Videla's committment to "austerity and sacrifice" and to "the fulfillment of Argentina's international obligations." Only three weeks ago, the Washington Post commented enthusiastically on the "popularity" of the new austerity regimen in Argentina. Everybody agreed that, with a "realistic" government at the helm, Argentina could now solve her economic and social woes.

While the junta's Wall Street backers publicly praised the regime, privately those same bankers were also targetting Europe, and particularly Italy, for "Argentinization" as an

intended final solution to their problems of debt collection and working class resistance.

But only one month later, these same Wall Street mouthpieces are now nervously advising caution to their political
and financial associates as they watch their "model" for
austerity turn into a model for chaos. The North American
financial daily The Journal of Commerce on April 14th openly
questioned the capacity of the new regime to enforce
austerity: "...even though we feel encouraged by Economic
Minister De Hoz's intentions, we will understand the reasons
if investors are in no hurry until the intentions are supported
by decisive measures." The U.S. weekly business journal,
Forbes, is even more explicit: "The key to the government's
economic plan is the ordinary Argentine citizen. If he rises en
masse against the economic discipline, like he did in 1969 in
Cordoba, the Army is neither sufficiently large nor sufficiently hard to put him in line..."

The London-based Latin America newsletter of April 9 reveals the weakest link in the "Argentine model": "Despite the united voice of the (Argentine) government, it is the product of a delicate political balance...According to some observers...there is a danger of a "portugalization" of the Argentine armed forces."

Most glaring has been the junta's total failure to stem the rapid deterioration of the Argentine economy. The economic "program" of the junta is a return to the antiquated notion of

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"laissez faire" — all control over credit, production and price controls has been handed to the anarchic whims of profit-starved producers and private banks. Wages have been indefinitely frozen and the elementary right to strike and bargain collectively has been banned together with all trade unions and political parties.

A Failure

The government's appeal to the "responsibility" of the country's producers and manufacturers has, in the words of one bold Argentine newspaper, "failed in practice." Prices of basic foods and other commodities have risen as much as 500 per cent in the last three months; the price of meat alone, the staple of the Argentine diet, rose over 100 per cent within the first two weeks following the junta's price decontrol decree. The near 600 per cent inflation rate, highest in the world, has continued to soar since the junta took power and industrial production, despite the ban on strikes and the junta's "antiabsenteeism" measures, has continued to decline.

The junta's suggestion to producers that they "maintain reasonable price levels" by cutting production costs to increase profitability has met with little success. The junta's decision to liberate the exchange rate on imports and exports has catapulted the prices of critical industrial imports beyond the reach of the majority of the nation's industrialists which in turn has further aggravated the increasing "decapitalization" of the agricultural sector upon whose exports the junta is dependent for foreign exchange to pay off its \$12 billion foreign debt. "Cutting production costs" has translated into declaring bankruptcy for many Argentine firms.

The government's campaign against "swollen Peronist bureaucracies" has resulted in approximately 500,000 layoffs in the state sector over the last month, with another one million public employees soon to face the axe. Additional "trimming of the fat" is currently going on with the government's auctioning of some 200 state enterprises no longer considered "affordable" on the government's new austerity budget. With the junta's dumping of critical public service industries (electricity, transportation, etc) on the debt-strapped private sector, the rapid deterioration of living standards in Argentins's urban centers will soon begin to take their toll.

An article printed in the Buenos Aires newspaper Clarin this week described in detail the first unfailing symptom of advanced urban decay. As the result of mixed mating between the huge and voracious port rat and the hardy common mouse, the article reports, a new "more intelligent" breed of rat has begun to populate Buenos Aires. The "super rat", highly-resistant to common pesticides, has also emerged in the collapsing cities of Brazil which have a rat population on the average of 10 rats per person. In the densely-populated capitol of Argentina, there is an official estimate of eight rats for every one of its 10 million inhabitants, while unofficial sources have suggested the more likely figure of sixteen rats per human — or 160 million rats.

Labor Resists

The Argentine labor movement, with a highly-political class consciousness and a mass-based partisan army trained in guerrilla warfare, does not intend to follow the path of the "Brazilian Miracle." An escalating offensive on the part of the Montoneros resistance movement, including executions of top-ranking fascists in and around the junta and its security apparatus, has effectively shattered the webb of psychological terror that the military had attempted to weave around the working class. Nor have mass arrests of leading labor militants succeeded in paralyzing the workers. Seventeen labor leaders at an auto plant in the city of Cordoba walked off their jobs in the first strike protest since the coup, despite the threat of jail, while auto workers at a Chrysler Corp. plant in Buenos Aires also ignored the nostrike ban last week to protest illegal job reclassificationrecycling in their departments.

The threat of a mass working-class upsurge against the junta is the subject of a raging factional struggle within the Armed Forces themselves. "Moderates" like Videla are only temporarily at the helm, placed there by saner forces fully aware that to attempt to impose a "Chilean model" on the armed and organized Argentine working class would mean a prolonged and bitter civil war with the potential to spread beyond Argentina's border. The "extremists" are pro-Chile fanatics who already have military control over the key industrial center of Cordoba and are openly plotting to seize the presidency. The "chileans" are fully aware that a growing nationalist and pro-development movement within the ranks of the younger military officers, calling itself the Armed Forces Movement (on the Portuguese model), is moving increasingly closer to an open alliance with the prodebt moratorium Montoneros.