

Castro, USSR Warn Carter:

U.S.—China Second Front Means Nuclear War

CHINA

“We have received very reliable information that the Chinese secret service works in closest collaboration with France, the U.S., West Germany and NATO,” Cuba’s Fidel Castro charged in print last week. Two days later, the Soviet Politburo issued the same charge.

The two statements follow numerous recent indications that the Carter Administration is attempting to conclude a U.S.-Japan-China entente and covert military alliance against the USSR, in a deal that might even involve some arrangement between the U.S. and China concerning the disposition of the Korean Peninsula. They also coincide with heightened anti-Soviet polemics in Peking, and follow China’s collaboration with several NATO powers in Zaire, and its coordination with the U.S. in attempted destabilization of the Bhutto government in Pakistan.

From within China, riven by a deep factional and policy dispute, there appeared signs this week of a compromise which seems to have unified most of the military high command behind an arms buildup directed at the Soviet Union.

Castro’s attack appeared as an interview in the weekly *Afrique-Asie* May 12. The Cuban President charged that China’s current foreign policy was not the product of “errors,” but “a policy conscious of its treason to the principles of internationalism . . . an alliance with imperialism.” The Soviet Politburo statement appeared two days later in *Pravda* (see excerpts below), and claimed that “the leaders of the military industrial complexes of the U.S.A., West Germany, Japan and some other capitalist countries are actively discussing the possibility of supplying China with arms and military equipment. *Pravda* warned the Western circles so implicated of the dangers inherent in forming a military alliance with the Chinese, reminding them that Chinese Han chauvinist policy envisions a world war in which the superpowers destroy one another and China emerges the paramount world power; therefore if China allies militarily with the West now, it is only to threaten what’s left of it later.

Far from heralding a mere *resumption* of full-fledged

anti-Chinese polemics on the part of the Soviets, as reported in the West, the Politburo statement is *stronger* than any pre-Maoist polemics, and confirms that the Soviets perceive the conclusion of a U.S.-China military alliance as an operational policy in imminent danger of being consummated. The statement is aimed far more toward the West than toward China, indicating the strategic concern felt in Moscow.

Multiplying examples of military and intelligence collaboration or apparent collaboration between China and Carter-allied circles in the West substantiate the Cuban-Soviet charges. The direct collaboration of the Chinese with Belgium and the Giscard regime in France in shipping arms to Zaire for intended use against Soviet-supported Angola is an open secret. The significance of the visit of the two Japanese military delegations to China in the last month — sanctioned by pro-Carter Japanese prime minister Takeo Fukuda — has also not been lost on Moscow. The Japanese military, closely tied to the U.S., has not set foot in China since World War II. A military and intelligence interface between the U.S., NATO and China has been the avowed policy of the Rockefeller circles behind Carter, including James Schlesinger, since at least 1975, as the Soviets know.

Recently, China’s Premier and party chairman Hua Kuo-feng, in apparent direct coordination with State Department and National Security Council operations to destabilize the Bhutto government of Pakistan, sent a note to Bhutto threatening to “hold him responsible” if any harm should come to several thousand Chinese road workers in Pakistan held hostage by anti-Bhutto tribesmen, according to a well-informed source fresh from confidential talks with representatives of the People’s Republic of China in Washington. The tribesmen failed to carry out their threat to kill all the Chinese, after Bhutto refused to capitulate to their demands and sent the Pakistan army to the rescue instead.

China Prepares for War

Hua Kuo-feng, engaged in a factional war with the supporters of the twice-ousted Teng Hsiao-ping and those who wish to see an open repudiation of Maoism in China, is staking his political future on a full defense of the Maoist myth and political style domestically, and renewal of the Maoist alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union in foreign affairs. The latest

indications are that he may have succeeded in buying off or coopting at least a major portion of the military elite formerly supporting Teng by shifting his own stance on the question of military procurement, and directing a campaign for military buildup against the Soviet Union.

Following Teng's failure to reappear in public in early April, when his return was widely expected within China, a mass campaign to glorify Hua Kuo-feng as Mao's true successor was launched in the Peking press. This was followed by a spate of warnings about Soviet intentions to invade China. In late April, Hua Kuo-feng toured the Chinese border with Siberia; he railed that "the wild ambition of Soviet revisionism to subjugate China will not die," and rallied the Chinese army to the anti-Soviet cause.

The first indication of compromise was the reappearance in public of Defense Minister and second-ranking Politburo member Yeh Chien-ying on May Day, accompanied by Hua. Yeh, one of Teng's strongest supporters for the past several years, had been out of sight for two months in probably protest at the blocking of Teng's return by Hua and his faction. It appears that the Hua faction's opposition to diverting substantial economic resources into modern armaments was dropped as the condition for Yeh's (and presumably others') support — at least for the time being. In a major theoretical article released on May Day and designed to establish his credentials as Mao's successor, Hua included in the midst of a generally carbon-copy rendition of Maoist platitudes the sentence: "In order to safeguard the socialist system, it is imperative to have a powerful national defense and therefore a powerful economic force." This linking of a strong economy with defense violates a Maoist precept on the primacy of men over modern weapons. Under Mao the military budget was kept relatively small, and the equipment quite backward.

On May 9 Yeh spelled this out explicitly in a speech to the nationwide conference on industry in Peking. "We must take steel as the key link and speed up the development of the basic industries so as to put our defense industries on a strong basis and enable them to make greater progress," he said. Such a policy has not been emphasized in China since the 1950s.

In the same speech, Yeh supported Hua's anti-Soviet ravings with a warning of likely early thermonuclear war: "At present, the Soviet Union and the United States are locked in an increasingly fierce struggle for hegemony; a war will break out some day. We must be clearly aware of this situation, keep war in mind and get prepared for it, for a big war that will break out at an early date."

The relation between the Yeh-Hua show of unity and the underlying factional struggle is not presently known. The Teng forces, based predominantly in the southern Chinese provinces, are known to want a general sweeping away of all aspects of Maoism, a move that would undermine Hua's claim to leadership. Recent broadcasts in two coastal Chinese provinces saying that the widespread denunciations of Maoism must cease testify to the undercurrent of support for the Teng faction's perspective. But the critical factor remains the Chinese military, and it appears for the moment that they are at least acquiescing in the anti-Soviet campaign.

Carter to Support Hua!

The chief obstacle to consummating the alliance between the Hua regime and the Carter Administration is the problem of Taiwan. It has been reiterated in numerous locations that Brzezinski, Schlesinger and other Atlanticist observers see Taiwan as just a bargaining chip for China; their real concern is the Soviet Union. So far, these U.S. circles have attempted to maneuver without acceding to China's demand for a total break with the Taiwan regime, including breaking the military security treaty. But it has recently become clear to these circles that Hua cannot afford to compromise on the Taiwan question for fear of giving his factional opponents the rallying cry that Hua "sold out Taiwan." On the other hand, if Hua can conclude the establishment of normal relations with the U.S. on China's terms, he will have a tremendous "victory" with which to consolidate his rule. If he can bring this about in the near future, before having to bring Teng back, he would command the leverage to insure that Teng never regained a powerful post from which to challenge his own authority.

A well-informed source has indicated to EIR that a policy discussion in the NSC is being conducted on just this question: should the U.S. throw its support to Hua against Teng by abandoning Taiwan, or not? The rationale for such a step is the presumed more pro-U.S. stance of Hua. Teng is generally thought to be harder to deal with, tougher on the U.S., and more open to an "even-handed" policy of equal opposition to both Washington and Moscow.

The question in Washington is ultimately not *whether*, but *how*, and at what price, to recognize Peking. For the moment, there is no indication of official policy to shift to the "abandon Taiwan" position, and it may have been in response to this perception in Peking that an unnamed top Chinese official recently gave the *Washington Post's* Hong Kong correspondent Jay Matthews an on-the-record interview in which the official laid out in no uncertain terms that no compromise on the Taiwan question is acceptable. Less an attack than a plea to Carter to bail out Hua, the interview nonetheless betrayed the Chinese worry about Carter — they are not quite sure who he is or what he will do.

The response in Washington was to say officially that the interview carried no particular significance, while trying to mollify the Chinese with statements from the Administration that an improvement in relations is strongly desired by Carter; and to publicize the now-ongoing talks about the problem of assets frozen in both countries. It remains to be seen whether this latest attempt to stall on the Taiwan question will meet any success in Peking. But the Chinese were reliably reported to have been greatly alarmed when the U.S. House of Representatives voted down aid to Vietnam despite Executive Branch support for it — because of the implications that when dealing with Asia, the Administration is subject to being overruled.

Japan and Korea

Perhaps because of the obstacles to official U.S.-China collaboration, China has made a strong push to make a deal with Japanese military circles. The latest story, reported by *Prensa Latina* May 18, is that Peking is

pressuring the visiting Japanese military delegation to form a Japanese version of the anti-Soviet "Committee on the Present Danger." Any collaboration with such circles is a subterfuge for direct U.S.-Chinese ties.

The basis for such ties is the regime of Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda, an ally of Carter. In addition to the military visits, Fukuda sent a top aide, Shinsaku Hogen, to hammer out the final details of a "peace treaty" desired by China that includes a clause attacking the Soviet Union as "hegemonist." On May 16, it was indicated that Fukuda himself is definitely considering a trip to China in August to sign the treaty, assuming it is ready to be signed by that time.

Fukuda's "China turn" is an attempt to revive the Kissinger "Peking-Tokyo-Washington axis" against the Soviet Union. But one sticking point has always been the Koreans, which remains a major point of global strategic confrontation. Some solution to the problem of the divided peninsula, which would place Peking, Tokyo and Washington on the same side of the issue — Peking now supports North Korea, Washington and Tokyo South Korea — is now sought. Kissinger had previously proposed the outlines for such a deal in a "four-power" agreement whereby China, the U.S., North and South Korea would concur on a formula guaranteeing the security of the peninsula and joint recognition of the two Koreas. Japan was to be included and the Soviets added on at some later date.

There are signs that discussions along these lines are again underway, with the Chinese being probed as to a possible Taiwan-for Korea tradeoff. A North Korean government delegation is presently making a first-ever official trip to Japan, with the express approval of Fukuda, and the delegation is headed by North Korea's long-time Ambassador to Peking, whom one Korea expert described as a virtual agent of the Peking regime. The same expert felt that Japan in this case was acting as a go-between for North Korea and the Carter Administration, with the Chinese and North Koreans both looking for firmer guarantees of the seriousness of the Carter Administration's plan for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. North Korea's bizarre imitation of Mao Tse-tung, President Kim Il-sung, recently gave an interview to the Japanese daily *Yomiuri* in which he praised Jimmy Carter and, Chinese-style, asked for a clear expression of Carter policy on Korea.

The one obvious roadblock in this byzantine course is South Korean President Park Chung-hee, who would resolutely oppose any such deal and is already resisting plans for the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from his country. President Park has been at the top of the National Security Council's "wanted list" for some time, and his removal via NSC machinations is becoming an increasing priority.

Fukuda's emphasis on developing closer relations with China has led to strained bilateral Japan-South Korean relations. In particular, the ruling LDP of Japan has thus far failed to push through the Diet ratification of a 1974 agreement with the Republic of Korea to jointly develop the oil reserves off their respective coasts, in large part out of deference to opposition to the accord voiced by China. China claims that it must be included in any discussions concerning the demarcation of the waters of the Yellow and China Seas.

While the Lower House of the Diet has ratified the accord, and Fukuda himself has nominally endorsed it, Fukuda's LDP has pursued a parliamentary "strategy" toward the ratification bill that will likely see the current Diet session end without the bill being passed — for the third year in a row. Fukuda has gone to great lengths to prevent his public endorsement of the bill from angering the Chinese, instructing his Ambassador in Peking to "explain" his position on the issue to Chinese officials.

The South Koreans, for their part, have strongly hit the filibustering by the LDP on the continental shelf bill and President Park has publicly committed the country to unilaterally begin development of the oil reserves on the shelf if the Diet fails to ratify. Park has threatened to abrogate the Japan-South Korea fishing accord if the bill does not go through.

In dealing with Park, the NSC also confronts considerable resistance to the implementation of Carter's "human rights" policy within the U.S. government itself — for example, in the State Department — and among conservative circles within Congress and elsewhere.

The lengths to which the National Security Council is willing to go to construct this edifice in the Korean peninsula signals their determined commitment to bring the Chinese "second-front" into play.

— Peter Rush
— Daniel Sneider

USSR: 'Western Circles Delude Themselves ...'

Below are excerpts from a 3,000 word article headlined "Peking: Course to Wreck International Détente Under the Cover of Anti-Sovietism" published in Pravda May 14. The article was signed by I. Aleksandrov, known as a pseudonym for the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party.

...The present leadership of China, jointly with the most reactionary forces of imperialism, is issuing attacks on the socialist countries, attempting to aggravate the international situation, to return humanity not only to the times of "cold" but also of "hot" war.

In Peking, an anti-Soviet campaign is continuing, taking on an ever more unruly character. The issue, however, is not only anti-Sovietism, but also the fact that, covering themselves with the flag of anti-Sovietism, the Chinese leaders are trying to undermine the international relaxation of tensions, to aggravate the situation in the world to the maximum.

Recently the fifth volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* was issued in China, and on May 1 the present chairman of the CCP, Hua Kuo-feng, wrote an article commemorating this volume. In this article Hua proclaims the loyalty of the new Chinese leadership to