# USSR Military Slams Door On Vance-Gromyko Meet

A meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to discuss strategic arms limitation, scheduled for September 7 in Vienna, was abruptly put off on Aug. 31 by simultaneous announcements in Moscow and Washington. The postponement (the two will confer in the U.S. during the United Nations session later this month) was the Soviet military leaders' flat "no" to Henry Kissinger and National Security chief Zbigniew Brzezinski. Each of the men had been in discussion with Soviet Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin in order to swing a new strategic arms agreement (SALT II) before SALT I expires early next month.

For Henry Kissinger, the Soviet refusal to see Vance now is a personal defeat. A recent New York Times editorial under the title "New Season for SALT" had revealed Kissinger's hope (which the Times claimed Soviet President Brezhnev shared) that "bloodletting" in the Pentagon and the Soviet General Staff would clear the way to a SALT deal. The Soviets, however, made known that there is no deal to be had as long as the U.S. demands "unilateral advantages," that is, the junking of Soviet research and development programs and substantial arsenal reductions not matched by the U.S.

Vance's official excuse of having to attend the Panama Canal treaty-signing ceremonies notwithstanding, CBS news commented that Vance simply could not afford to return from another mission empty-handed. A spokesman for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency admitted it is generally recognized that there will be no SALT II agreement. Moscow has given no sign of being prepared to extend the lapsed SALT I agreement, either.

The uncompromising Soviet stand on SALT belies

recent signal-flag articles in the Soviet press, including a *Pravda* feature by U.S. monetarist agent Georgii Arbatov, suggesting that the Carter Administration had become more "positive" in Soviet eyes. Clearly Soviet hard liners are calling the shots on SALT, from the standpoint of perceived basic military-strategic interests of the USSR, no matter what Arbatov is allowed to say for purposes of deception. Gromyko laid down the line in a Sept. 5 speech — SALT II remains "attainable," but only if the U.S. shifts its unacceptable approach.

### Eyes On Europe

Following cancellation of the Vienna meeting, the Soviet press again began to cover European opposition to U.S. policies in a straightforward manner not seen in the past two months. The government daily *Izvestia* reported that Western Europe will resist U.S. orders "not only because it doesn't believe in a mythical 'Soviet threat,' but because it is more and more concerned over the far from mythical American threat to its security." *Izvestia* cited not only "public opinion," but official policy "especially in Bonn" — again, contradicting deceptive Soviet propaganda which has portrayed West Germany as all but lost forever to a plague of "neo-Nazis" and the "right-wing military-industrial complex."

According to reports from Paris, Brezhnev has solicited French initiatives for international disarmament and his request will be satisfied by a French presentation at the United Nations this month. Reportedly, French proposals will supersede SALT in scope, but they also coincide with renewed coverage in West Germany of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's intention to move for a breakthrough at the long-stalled Central Europe troop cut talks (MBFR).

## U.S. Military Faction Hits War-Provoking 'Utopians'

Members of the U.S. military's intelligence establishment are beginning to get the word out that the strategic intelligence estimate currently endorsed by the Carter Administration could get this country into World War III. Recent criticisms by these military men of the reputation of Georgii Arbatov, the often-quoted head of the USSR's USA Institute, and of Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner's latest report on the Soviet economy have hit directly at the credibility of the incompetent "Utopians" who now dominate the nation's defense-intelligence community.

It is the Utopians and their sponsors - notably in-

cluding Energy Secretary Schlesinger, Defense Secretary Brown, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and the Rockefeller family — who believe that the Soviets can be beaten if they can be induced to negotiate or "trade away" strategic interests, a process which includes trading nuclear missile salvoes in a so-called theatre-limited nuclear war. The Soviets have consistently rejected even a hint of this maniacal approach, and made it clear that any strategic encroachment would trigger a full atomic-biological-chemical response on U.S. and allied territories.

Since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter, the Utopians

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have come out with one self-deluding line after another, all claiming that the Soviet Union is desperate economically, is becoming increasingly willing to negotiate, and is ready to play the "theatre-limited nuclear war" game. Throughout there has been the citation of Arbatov — a known agent of the Rockefeller family — as a sign that the USSR is cracking under Carter pressure, and therefore should be pushed more.

Last month came Stansfield Turner's report on the Soviet economy which claimed that the USSR was running out of oil — and would be pushed to contest with the USA over the Middle East oil fields — and was economically collapsing, thereby unleashing "free enterprise" forces within the country. In the most recent U.S. News and World Report, Secretary Brown lied that the Soviets are incapable of a devastating first strike against the USA and that, therefore, full-scale thermonuclear war is unlikely. (But, by implication, limited war is certainly "thinkable.")

On Aug. 29, the New York Times called for an incredible escalation in the trade-off process: a "bloodletting" of anti-Utopian officers in the Soviet General Staff and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as a prerequisite to a strategic arms agreement. The Times' demand for a replay of the famous Tukhachevskii purges of the 1930s — a British intelligence operation which virtually destroyed the Soviet officer corps on the eve of World War II — will only be taken as a further provocation, notwithstanding other articles in the same issue of the Times which rave about "Kremlin moderation" and the "remarkable change of atmosphere" in U.S.-Soviet relations.

### Conservatives Get the Truth Out

U.S. military men and conservatives linked to Gen. Daniel O. Graham, ex-head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, realizing fully that the Administration's mad policies will lead to the nuclear annihilation of the United States, are beginning to get the truth out. The St. Louis Globe Democrat became the first newspaper after this one to expose Arbatov as the frontman for a Soviet smokescreen operation, in a feature article Aug. 28. The paper quotes a report published by the University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies:

"The USA Institute generally and Arbatov personally have had remarkable success in influencing the opinions of many Americans concerned with foreign affairs, whose major contact with Soviet thinking comes from meeting with Arbatov and his staff rather than from a reading of open sources.

"Arbatov has also managed to publish articles in U.S. newspapers, thereby broadening his role beyond the U.S. elite. In many cases, the personal encounters are felt by American interlocutors to offer more authoritative, behind-the-scenes looks at Soviet views than official pronouncements."

In fact, the Miami report concludes, Soviet policy and doctrines are officially laid down by the Communist Party, and any American who thinks he is being told a

different "inside" story over a friendly drink is out of his wits.

A week ago, Hoover Institute fellow Richard Starr a'so took up the attack on Rockefeller's resident agent in the USSR, denouncing Arbatov as a "mouthpiece and a liar." The U.S. State Department's CPUSA west coast paper *People's World* editorialized that Starr was "pulling the stake out of the heart of John Fosten Dulles" and reviving the cold war. Obviously, Starr's reason for this uncalled-for attack, concludes the paper, is his "great personal dislike" for Arbatov.

#### Turner Lies

Direct refutation of the Administration's self-serving lies also became public last week upon the release of testimony by Army Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, the current head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, before a subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee. Challenging the claim made by CIA director Turner that the Soviet Union faced a looming oil shortage, Wilson and his economic aide, Mr. Michaud, stated:

"... The DIA's position at this time... is that we do not believe that the rate of flow will necessarily decline in the 1980s.

"There is very little information on this whole oil question at this time. There is a great deal of research going into these estimates as to the reservoirs that the Soviets are now exploiting. I think it will be some time before we can get a better fix on the whole situation...

"The Soviets are becoming a mature society. As a result, the amount of investment that goes into replacement capital is increasing, as opposed to new investment. Their productivity of that capital is contributing to the total output, therefore, is not increasing as fast as it has in the past...

"The Soviet economic performance generally is satisfying the Soviet people; however there are some areas that cause dissatisfaction. There are reports of food shortages, particularly in the outlying areas. The primary complaint at present is the lack of meat...

"The ordinary Russian is capable of some increased savings. He generally feels that in a relative sense his life is getting better. There are a few more consumer durables available than there were several years ago...although selection in the consumer area tends to be quite poor...

"At the moment, government stability does not appear to be threatened by these types of shortages which are not sufficiently severe to have an undue impact on the attitudes of the general populace."

In a further elucidation on what he believes the outlook of the Soviet military leadership to be, General Wilson spoke of a recent conversation that he had with Soviet officers:

"We reminisced a bit one particular evening with three general officers about how well we had made out as allies during World War II, and they said 'you know, what we really need is a common enemy.' I asked one senior general, 'would you accept a common goal instead?' He reflected for a moment and then said quietly, 'Of course, you are right. That is really what we ought to go for'."