

# Brzezinski Kowtows To Chinese

Kowtowing to his Chinese hosts in Peking last week, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski delivered a series of diatribes against the Soviets and expressions of support for China's foreign policy. The Chinese were clearly pleased that Brzezinski, in his attacks against Moscow, abandoned the official U.S. policy of treating relations with the Soviet Union and China as bilateral issues and not "using" one against the other.

---

## FOREIGN POLICY

---

The degree of Brzezinski's endorsement of Chinese foreign policy and actions was revealed in his toast May 19 at a welcoming banquet: "We recognize—and share—China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony." Not only is the word "hegemony" China's stock reference to the Soviet Union, but "regional hegemony" is Chinese code for Vietnam, indicating Brzezinski's certainly unauthorized support for China against Vietnam.

In his farewell toast May 21, Brzezinski implied sanction for China's own "hegemonistic" actions. When he said, "Neither of us dispatches international marauders who masquerade as nonaligned to advance big-power ambitions in Africa. Neither of us seeks to enforce the political obedience of our neighbors through military force." Apparently Brzezinski saw nothing distasteful in China's projection of force beyond its own borders such as its full military and economic support for Cambodia, the most barbarous régime in the world today; in its deprivations against Vietnam and Thailand, the latter an American ally; or in its training and support for guerrillas operating in its neighbor states of India and Burma.

Clearly succumbing to what one foreign diplomat described as "the Chinese genius for overwhelming guests with hospitality and getting them to make exorbitant statements," Brzezinski allowed all diplomatic restraint to fall away in his excursion to the Great Wall. From his jibe about the Soviets being "barbarians" to his reported challenge to the Chinese while climbing to the top of the Great Wall—"If we get to the top first, you fight the Russians in Ethiopia; if you get to the top first, we fight the Russians in Ethiopia"—Brzezinski displayed a grotesque partisanship for an alliance with China against the Soviet Union. Brzezinski even suggested building a great wall in the U.S., since, as he put it, the Chinese version had been so successful in keeping the Soviets out.

All of this talk, however, did not obscure the fact that

Brzezinski could not give his Chinese hosts what they were most looking for: a solid commitment on the part of the United States to adopt an aggressive posture against the Soviet Union. For this, the Chinese could only hope that "their" agent Brzezinski could use the favorable reception accorded him to push the Carter Administration. There were already signs, as Brzezinski left, that China thought the time was ripe to coax Carter himself to China within the year. The pro-Peking press in Hong Kong reported what amounts to an invitation from Chinese vice-premier Teng Hsiao-ping for a visit, and the *Christian Science Monitor* said that Carter might be open to a visit.

If Brzezinski's behavior in Peking shocked the diplomatic community, his efforts in Tokyo on behalf of Peking were even more outrageous. Brzezinski butted in on a very delicate internal matter in Japan, that nation's negotiations for a peace treaty with China, to relay the message that China very much wants to conclude the treaty—and reportedly pressured Japan to sign. The treaty contains an "antihegemony" clause directed against the Soviet Union. China is actively attempting to topple the Fukuda government, an enterprise which Brzezinski endeavored to further.

## Brzezinski's Toast to Peking

*Excerpts from Brzezinski's May 19 toast at welcoming banquet in Peking:*

As reflected in the Shanghai Communique, our commitment to friendship with China is based on shared concerns and is derived from a long-term strategic view. The United States does not view its relationship with China as a tactical expedient. We recognize — and share — China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony.

We approach our relations with three fundamental beliefs: that friendship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is vital and beneficial to world peace; that a secure and strong China is in America's interest; that a powerful, confident, and globally engaged United States is in China's interest.

The world today is politically awakened and the peoples of the world desire national sovereignty and human rights. We are therefore historically confident that any effort to establish hegemony in such a world will not succeed. Our strength and our resolve also provide a solid basis for such confidence.

We are confident that Sino-American cooperation is not only in our mutual interest but is in keeping with the thrust of history. Our relationship is dedicated to peace. Only those aspiring to dominate others have any reason to fear the further development of American-Chinese relations.

The President of the United States desires friendly relations with a strong China. He is determined to join you in overcoming the remaining obstacles in the way to full normalization of our relations within the framework of the Shanghai Communiqué. The United States has made up its mind on this issue.

## Teng Reveals Chinese View Of Brzezinski's Position

*In an unpublished speech delivered July 20, 1977 to China's Central Committee plenum, Teng Hsiao-ping, vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, revealed the cynical manner in which China views the United States. The following excerpts are reprinted from a Chinese Information Service release of a version of the speech acquired in Taipei.*

The focus of our diplomacy at the present stage is to firmly oppose the hegemonies of the Soviet Union and the United States. However, we must not assume that in the world today whoever opposes the Soviet Union and the United States is our friend, for at best, they could only be a friend for the time being. We must mobilize all positive and favorable factors internationally that can be used to check and resist the foremost danger of the moment—mainly, the danger of another world war. The eruption of World War III is inevitable. However, if the time of its eruption can be delayed after the turn of this century, we would then be able to take the initiative, and it would be most beneficial.

In the application of a struggle for an international united front, one of the most important rules is that there must be not only unity, but also struggle. Wouldn't this be a kind of contradiction? Actually, this is not contradictory, and is, in fact, Chairman Mao's greatest

invention with insuperable prowess. Notwithstanding that the science and technology of U.S. imperialism may be called the first in the world, they have no understanding of this at all. Our method is to seek unity and coalition from struggle...

Being Marxists, we would never be so stupid as to be incapable of distinguishing friend from foe. Whether it is Nixon, Ford, Carter or any future leader of U.S. imperialism, none of them can climb out of the same merry-go-round. Their purpose is to exploit the split between the Chinese and the Soviet Communist Parties to bring about the downfall of world socialism as well as to checkmate the Soviet threat to them. Then why could we not take advantage of their contradictions and the gaps between their positions of adopting a policy advantageous to us? We will not be controlled by others; we should instead control them. Excessive dependence often leads to passiveness, thus making it impossible to assume any initiative. This we must never do, and what we must do is to grasp the opportunity and bring in what we want conditionally, mainly knowhow and equipment in the scientific and technological fields which would be most beneficial to our realization of the four modernizations.

The president of two succeeding administrations of U.S. imperialism, its secretary of state, members of Congress, and a number of other influential persons in military and political circles have come to visit China. . . . At present, they have something to ask from us, and we hold the complete initiative in dealing with them. . . . It would be impossible for the Carter administration to dream about killing two birds with one stone. They are really pitifully naive. If it were not on conditions favorable to us, we would not even agree to the adoption of the "Japan formula."

# Developing America's Monetarist Elite

*An interview with Fritz Kraemer*

*Fritz Kraemer has been in the Department of Defense for 30 years — officially in a relatively insignificant post incommensurate with the influence he is known to have. It is commonly said that Kraemer spends his time reading every cable that the department receives, and formulating advice for his network of contacts.*

*In addition to his role as the discoverer and mentor of Henry Kissinger, Kraemer maintains close contact with many Administration officials. The following interview with Kraemer occurred earlier this month and was made available to Executive Intelligence Review by a freelance journalist.*

*Q: What are your perceptions of the issue of U.S.-China relations?*

*A: The damnable bourgeoisie will never understand the Chinese—China has for us only one use: to be a counterweight against the one real threat to the U.S., the Soviet Union. The Chinese are very realistic and brilliant—the*

brilliance in terms of realism of a Kissinger or a Brzezinski is nothing compared to the Chinese. So the idea that we must be on good terms with China is excellent, but not at the expense of Taiwan. You know, before Vance went to China, the Chinese told us they would not even bring up Taiwan, but Vance brought it up. He offered to have a full embassy in Peking and a simple mission on Taiwan, but the Chinese rejected this—so Vance came back to the U.S. and announced that the Chinese are very "flexible"—the next day, Teng (who, by the way, is the *real* ruler of China, not Hua) denied that they are "flexible"—I know, what the Chinese meant is, "How stupid can you be—we are not really interested in Taiwan, but for public relations reasons we cannot say we are 'flexible.'" The stupid bourgeoisie thinks it is a compliment to call someone "flexible"—but people like the Chinese, and like me, we know a real man is not "flexible" but rigid—he knows what he wants and is not "flexible."