

'We need a profound crisis'

Two interviews reveal NATO's shock treatment for Europe

As we near Jan. 1, at which time the first phase of the new European Monetary System is scheduled to begin operations, it was predictable that Europe would be stricken by a new round of upheavals, crises, and destabilizations, including terrorism. Behind these counter-EMS destabilizations lie the international politico-economic forces whose power base will collapse as the new monetary system is successfully put in place.

The Financial Times, for example, has repeatedly emphasized that the International Monetary Fund and its adjunct World Bank, whose dominant policies are set in London, will be made obsolete by the New European Monetary Fund and its complex of interrelated political treaties and agreements. Similarly, West German Defense Minister Hans Apel has made clear in numerous public statements over the past weeks that West Germany will either successfully take over control from NATO from Britain, thereby ensuring the nullification of the Alliance's current-role as an in-place organ of British-dominated intelligence and operations capability, or consider some more suitable arrangement for ensuring West Germany's strategic safety.

NATO, which is supposed to be protecting Western Europe, kicked off the last few weeks' countdown to the Jan. 1 EMS inauguration date with destabilizations across Europe's "southern flank," including a coup plot in Spain (see THIS WEEK). Italian Senator Massimo De Carolis gave an exceptionally frank interview to the *Executive Intelligence Review's* Milan correspondent Muriel Mirak indicating that that wasn't all NATO's Secretary-General Luns had in mind. De Carolis, who functions effectively as the voice of NATO in Italy, declared that what Italy needs is "a profound national crisis," stressed the possibility of one coming from the current unrest in Iran in the form of a new world oil crisis, and attacked the Andreotti government's economic plans.

De Carolis is no minor publicity seeker. He heads the Christian-Democratic Party's right-wing "100" faction, a group funded by Fiat's Agnelli family and close to Italy's overtly fascist party, the MSI. Although only just on this side of political respectability, he travels frequently to the United States and

enjoys easy access to Henry Kissinger and his inner circle at Georgetown and to leading figures at the New York Council on Foreign Relations. De Carolis's authority to speak on NATO comes from his ties with Agnelli in a country where Agnelli and NATO have long been synonymous. He is the leading apologist in Italy for the Lebanese Falange and is a trusted retainer of the "black noble" Pallavicini family — a member of which is now being sought by the police for the kidnapping of ex-Premier Aldo Moro. In this interview, he brings all of his credentials to bear in his remarks on the European Monetary System, the Middle East, and Italy's internal political situation.

De Carolis's "predictions" are borne out not only by the heightened tension around the implementation of the European Monetary System and the pace of events in the southern flank, but by the related "prophecies" from "terrorism expert" H.H.A. Cooper, who remarks we feature in a second exclusive interview.

De Carolis on terror and other political methods

Executive Intelligence Review Milan correspondent Muriel Mirak's interview with Italian Senator Massimo De Carolis provides useful insights into the methods and perspectives of political destabilizers. Most extraordinary was the Senator's freewheeling discussion of the uses certain interests could make of terrorism, and why they should frequently wish to en-

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courage it. De Carolis is a Christian Democratic deputy from Milan. The interview took place two weeks ago, but De Carolis has proved to be ominously prescient.

EIR: What do you think of the European Monetary System?

De Carolis: Well, the widespread attitude in Italy is

divided between those who are favorable to the new monetary system for political reasons, and those who are against it for economic reasons. That is, the somewhat unique aspect of this question is that from the political point of view, there are many favorable positions because the EMS is seen as a way to better realize the political integration of Europe. Therefore those for whom motivations of a political character prevail are, in general, favorable. Those, on the other hand, who by mental set or because their work is mainly purely economic - the case of the Bank of Italy for example, or Confindustria or the big firms pay more attention to strictly economic questions and make political decisions on the basis of economic considerations, are generally hostile. Therefore it seems to me that already this first beginning of the debate has demonstrated that there are political reasons that argue for the EMS and economic reasons that argue against it.

What is my opinion? I think it would be very good if Italy could adhere to the EMS without damage; from a political point of view this would be the optimum solution. But probably Italy is destined to suffer serious damage. It is somewhat the same problem that occurred on the theme of the enlargement of the European Community to include Portugal and Spain. It would be very good if one could quickly achieve the enlargement of the Community to Portugal and Spain. And Italy from the political viewpoint has an interest. From the economic point of view, however, it would take a loss from it, a very serious loss.

So the question is to find a way between these two exigencies, which at this point are, regarding Italy, very much opposed. We run the risk of being crushed, in the EMS, by the greater force of the German monetary system; the European system would in reality be an alignment of the European structure upon that of Germany, which is the strongest. Therefore we would risk putting Italy on the sidelines.

EIR: If you consider the EMS, then, as a pivot of a new world monetary system, including the dollar, on the basis of which to massively expand world trade, it is clear that, as many have said, it also involves the question of coordination of European economic policy, and not only monetary stabilization measures as such. In the United States the promoters of "free enterprise" try to project into this perspective the danger of a new "dirigism." Do you think that this question would be in the minds of the Italians who are against the EMS?

De Carolis: Well, I think that whoever is in favor of a "free enterprise" economic system could of course be worried by a solution of this type. That is, there is no doubt that the creation of a common system of this kind increases the importance of the political levers of the system; in other words, there is no doubt that we are getting close to a more controlled system — an economic system more controlled by the political system.

EIR: Do you mean that it would be controlled on a European scale by West German political power?

De Carolis: Yes. I think that the new European organisms that should control this mechanism, if there is an agreement, would be strongly conditioned by the German presence, because it is clear that it is the strongest nation. Germany would be determinant in this new context. Now is this good or bad? I think that the risks are very grave for Italy today. That is, in my opinion we are not now sufficiently strong to be able to resist the new pressures which will dominate in the new system.

So I have to say that I do not share the relatively optimistic position of the Italian government on the state of the Italian economy. Even recently (Prime Minister) Andreotti has maintained that our situation is on the way to a clear improvement; that the evening-out of the balance of payments is now definitive, that the lira is strong, demonstrated by the fall of the dollar, according to Andreotti, that our economy has overcome the worst moment. I really don't share this optimistic position.

EIR: Why?

De Carolis: Because in my opinion even if certain things are going better, above all the balance of payments, we have accumulated contradictions, structural weaknesses in our economic system which in a short time will produce serious negative effects.

For example, the balance of payments today is in surplus. Why? Mainly because there have been strong reductions of imports and because all the Italian companies, finding the internal market ever more difficult, have turned to exports. For example, the shrinking of imports in the long term, for a changing country like Italy, will produce an economic crisis. Therefore even if in the short term we could have a good situation in the balance of payments, this can't go on forever, in a situation like ours.

EIR: But isn't this restriction of imports determined by conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund?

De Carolis: I wouldn't say so. It has been a decision by Italian businessmen, especially in the last months. That is, business executives have decided on a policy of austerity even within the companies. For example, they have reduced their inventory, they have imported less because they could pay less, they could invest less. They have, for example, reduced investments . . . All of this has resulted in a diminution of imports. I think that this cannot go on for long without an economic crisis.

Crisis in Italy, crisis in Iran

EIR: Don't you think that the general monetary instability has had an influence on the shrinking of imports?

De Carolis: You could say so, one could say that everyone is betting on the weakness of the dollar. Yes, yes. But there are also clouds on the horizon that for a weak country like Italy could produce very negative effects.

For example, this situation in Iran (where a military government had just been formed in response to an oil workers' strike and widespread unrest — ed.). It threatens to mean blackmail above all for Italy, because these days there is already a tendency for increase in the price of diesel oil. So even if the official OPEC prices are maintained without change — as you know these are the prices of reference — still if you must go to the market to buy tons of diesel oil, you must pay the price that is asked. In the last few days there has already been an increase in the price of diesel oil. Italy is the world's biggest supplier of petrochemical products to Iran. If Iran has a crisis. Italy and its chemical industry find themselves in a double danger, both as sellers to Iran and as buyers of Iranian oil. Now this is a difficulty that will hit all the industrialized countries, but Italy is the weakest of the industrialized nations. That is how it happened in the 1973 oil crisis — it hit the whole world, but more in Italy than in the other countries.

EIR: Speaking of Iran, today a military Government was created, and it is thought that the Shah will succeed in getting this uprising under control, this

uprising which very much seems to . . .

De Carolis: . . . to be organized by someone from the outside . . .

EIR: Even the Shah has said so. But who do you think is behind it?

De Carolis: It's easy to imagine: the Soviet Union. That is, I think the most immediate interest would be the Soviet Union. In politics it is always difficult and risky to reason on the basis of the role of who benefits, which is talked about so much in Italy regarding terrorism. However, there is no doubt that a destabilization, or better, a coup d'etat in Iran, would be to the advantage of the USSR. I don't know if this is enough to say that therefore it is the USSR behind the revolt in Iran, but that the advantage is to the Soviets is clear.

EIR: I don't agree.

De Carolis: Then who is behind it, the West?

EIR: The political situation is a good deal more complex than the old saws about the West versus the Soviet Union, and...

De Carolis: This I agree with, but in my opinion today the opposition of Iran makes trouble above all for the Soviet Union.

Camp David and the Mideast

EIR: Surely you know that in the opinion of many American politicians it is the Carter Administration's Camp David policy that has created a situation in the Middle East favorable to the Soviet Union, in as much as all the Arab countries, even the most pro-American, have denounced or criticized the separate peace. We are seeing Syria and Iraq, which are overcoming disagreements lasting years, Iran and even Saudi Arabia distancing themselves from the Carter policy.

Since I know that you have close contacts with the Christian community in Lebanon and have traveled in Lebanon often, I would like to ask you what you think of the separate peace about to be signed. What do you think will be the repercussions in the region and the world of this accord, seen globally — that is, considering that Israeli Prime Minister Begin continues to announce settlements, etc.?

De Carolis: Camp David has had one fundamendal result, that is, of closing the most dangerous of the Israeli fronts, that with Egypt; and to reach an accord — because there undoubtedly is an accord on this — to resolve the problem with the Egyptians, making many other problems worse, that is, severely exacerbating the conflict between Sadat and the other Arab leaders. This was seen a few days ago in Baghdad (at the summit of Arab nations — ed.). Therefore I think that this is enough to say that Camp David has been a great Israeli success.

The Israelis have had the greater advantage in the game between Egypt and Israel. Egypt also has substantial advantage, I think, because evidently one part of these accords are not well known, but evidently they have reached an understanding with the U.S. and have a promise of very substantial aid from America — financial and military. Therefore I think that while the advantages for Israel are primarily in relations with Egypt, the advantages for Egypt are above all in relations with the Americans . . . Egypt would get economic and military aid from the U.S. as compensation for peace with Israel. So the most striking result of Camp David is that Egypt has come to be part of the group of countries under the influence of America.

EIR: But doesn't that leave it the only country apart from Israel under American influence?

De Carolis: There is also Saudi Arabia.

EIR: Which however does not support Camp David, in fact.

De Carolis: But it does not agree with Camp David because Saudi Arabia cannot forget that it is the spiritual head of the Arabs, and therefore cannot align itself in a pro-Israel position. But I would say that the Saudi position is very delicate — it has not declared itself in agreement, but it would not be able to declare itself in agreement without provoking a reaction from the Arabs. It has done what could be done, that is, it has the most moderate attitude possible...

EIR: Do you think the Camp David accord will get on its feet?

De Carolis: With Egypt, yes; with Egypt, yes, and the Camp David accord is with Egypt. The other hypothetical parts of Camp David, on the other hand, are probably not in any way convincing . . . there remains the problem with Syria, with Jordan, with the Palestinians. Therefore the Camp David accord is not an agreement between Israel and the Arab countries, it is an agreement between Israel and Egypt, and that's what it is. The accord between Israel and Egypt itself has caused more serious problems with the Palestinians, with Syria and Jordan. On the whole, therefore, the situation can be considered worsened, but the Israelis now have at least one secure frontier, and it was the most dangerous, because the greatest military power in the Middle East is Egypt, certainly not Syria or Jordan.

EIR: Numerically, you mean?

De Carolis: Also in terms of armaments. The Syrians are not particularly efficient.

EIR: And the military accord that the Syrians have with the Soviets?

De Carolis: But the problem of military efficiency is not only that of having supplies of arms. To make an army is a very complex thing.

EIR: Perhaps in making reference to the secret clauses of the Camp David accord you are referring precisely to the creation of a NATO in the Mideast, that is to the Middle East Treaty Organization, or METO, proposal of Edgar Bronfman?

De Carolis: It is an idea that was circulating . . . yes, I've read it. That is, look, I haven't been in the USA after Camp David, I haven't had direct contact with the USA, therefore I don't know exactly . . . I know what I read in the papers. However the news, the idea (of METO) was circulated in the American papers.

EIR: But the idea is extremely dangerous, don't you agree? It would create a grave crisis . . .

De Carolis: Yes, that is, in fact this would be like creating a kind of Warsaw Pact, that is it would serve to create a crisis of the Warsaw Pact immediately, at this moment; in sum, it would create tension...

EIR: What about the situation in Lebanon?

De Carolis: In Lebanon certainly Syria is trying to annex Lebanon, and the road by which it should arrive at this result is the neutralization of the Christian majority; that is the Lebanese Christians who are the majority, are 54 percent of Lebanon, become isolated, destroyed, killed; that is, this Syrian pressure has by this time been going forward for some months. There is a very weak president, Sarkis, who does not react. The solution for Lebanon, I think, is the replacement of the Arab deterrent force with a United Nations corps. It doesn't make sense that the UN would send soldiers to Namibia, Southwest Africa, and on the other hand does not send them to Lebanon where the situation is much more serious.

EIR: You pin the blame completely on the Syrians?

De Carolis: I was in Beirut during the bombardment, and the cannon shells came from the Syrians.

EIR: And the role of the Israelis, and of Chamoun? You know the position taken recently by France; French Foreign Minister Guiringaud condemned Chamoun as responsible for the fighting in the south...

De Carolis: Israel helps the Christians in the south of Lebanon and now and then pulls some pressure action in Lebanese territory. But what happens in Beirut is something that does not concern Israel. There is no doubt that the Israelis are not in Beirut; it's the Syrians that are in Beirut. The Christians, that is Chamoun and Gemayel, sometimes also make provocations, have an overly hard attitude, but there is no doubt that the aggressive intention is that of Syria. Who has destroyed Beirut? The Syrians. Is that too hasty a conclusion? But it is the case.

EIR: Therefore the French position . . . ?

De Carolis: The French moved themselves very late.

EIR: I refer to naming Chamoun as responsible for the fighting.

De Carolis: This is an absolutely absurd position. It's like saying that I meet someone on the street who steps on my toes, and I shoot him and kill him, and then I say, "But the fault is his because he stepped on my toes." Chamoun is a very difficult person to negotiate with, and hard, fastidious, and sometimes he has taken questionable initiatives, on this there is no doubt. But that this would be a justification for a foreign army to militarily occupy the country and destroy the Christian quarters . . . what are the Christians to do? Chamoun is in his territory, and the Syrians? Why are the Syrians there?

EIR: To repulse the Falange.

De Carolis: But on whose account? The Arab minority? If we Christian Democrats were to begin to murder Communists on the street, would it be just for the army of the Soviet Union to arrive? I don't think so. That is, I am for non-interference. Why does Syria intervene in Lebanon?

EIR: One could respond, why does Israel intervene in Lebanon?

De Carolis: Yes, in fact Israel has also intervened in Lebanon. It seems to me that the Israelis intervened only in response to the Palestinian attacks, or to impede the destruction of Christian positions in the south. Therefore it is a question of limited intervention. Apart from the bombardment of some Palestinian positions in the south, the Israelis have never bombed Beirut, they have never debarked an expeditionary force. They have sent planes, artillery. If you go to Beirut, you will see that the Syrian presence is much more complex.

The uses of terrorism

EIR: Regarding the Palestinians: you said that some Italian magazines have made known links in Lebanon between Italian and German terrorists, with terrorist training camps. Can you say more, including from your own sources?

De Carolis: It is known that there are well-known Italian terrorists in Palestinian camps, especially in two, Sabra, south of Beirut, and the fort of Bofora in the south, on the Israeli border. It seems to me normal enough. I start from the presupposition that in Italy the Red Brigades are a political party; clandestine, but nonetheless a small political party. Like all political parties they need a foreign policy; that is, they would feel diminished if they did not have a foreign policy, would not exist as a party without a foreign policy. So you tell me, how one is to make a foreign policy for a clandestine terrorist political party like the Red Brigades? Who do they have contact with? What would they do, take a friendship trip to Holland? The only thing they can do is make contacts with the Germans, the Japanese, and the Palestinians. . . .

Therefore it seems to me normal that the Italian terrorists would have contact with the Middle Eastern terrorists. The Middle East today is the center, the focal point of the international terrorist presence, the change of course, all these things.

EIR: And the links with the Israelis? Do you exclude them?

De Carolis: What do you mean?

EIR: It is well known that the Arafat wing of the PLO, splitting from the terrorist extremists, has accused them of being linked to Israel. Then there are the various agents like the notorious Klein, that sprouted from the Israeli kubbutzim . . .

De Carolis: Listen, the normal mode of functioning of an efficient secret service is the infiltration of agents into adversary ranks. Any secret service, that is one that functions — in fact the Italian one doesn't do it, because it doesn't exist — but if a secret service is efficient, it cannot leave aside that particular operative technique of infiltrating an adversary; this

Italian Guelph scion is

The capture by the Italian carabiniere special police of Paolo Ceriani Sebregondi on charges of participation in the murder of a judge two weeks ago should be a warning to the rest of Italy's Black Nobility terrorists and terrorist-supporters.

Paolo is the 31 year-old scion of an alliance between a family of counts, the Ceriani-Sebregondi, and the Resta-Pallavicino family, which has contributed ladies-in-waiting to the House of Savoy (the family of the ex-king of Italy). Paolo's father, Giorgio Ceriani Sebregondi, has historical links with the Agnelli Foundation, and with the neofascist Fanfani grouping inside the Christian Democratic Party (DC); he entered the PCI (Italian Communist Party) in 1950 and was expelled a few years later. Sebregondi participated in the drawing-up of the "Vanoni Plan," the first economic austerity plan for Italy, and was the Italian representative to the EEC when he died in the mid-1950s.

Paolo's mother is the former Fulvia Dubini. Her mother was a Resta-Pallavicino, and a "Queen's Lady." Fulvia Dubini Sebregondi presided over the family's "left turn" in 1966.

Paolo is now in the hospital recovering from a police bullet wound and under arrest in a political assassination case; his brother Stefano, 25 years old is wanted in the Aldo Moro kidnap-murder case and has fled the country. Their younger sister,

is the primary aim of a secret service. So if you tell me, "Ah, so there are Israelis under false identities inside the Palestinian camps," I say that I would be amazed if there weren't, because the Israelis have an efficient secret service. So the first thing they must do is infiltrate agents into the Palestinian camps.

EIR: But doesn't this mean that the Israelis, having so many people infiltrated, would know the terrorist plans of the adversary, and therefore have the greatest possibility of preventing them?

De Carolis: Very good. Look, this brings up another rule of the secret service: all efficient secret services are forced in certain circumstances to leave the initiative to the adversary to create favorable results. That is, to a certain point, I am an agent infiltrated in the Red Brigades. . . .

EIR: Oh, let's hope not!

De Carolis: I find out that the Red Brigades want to kidnap Fanfani (a leader of the Christian Democracy — ed.). It could be the case that the secret service for

jailed for terrorist murder

Maria, is married to Enzo Caputo, the Maoist "student leader" from the University of Milan.

Italy's Ma Barker

Fulvia Dubini Sebregondi is categorical on the matter of her son Paolo's innocence. She claims she had no idea what his political activities were and has no idea how the keys to a car, used in the murder of Judge Fedele Carvosa two weeks ago, ended up in Paolo's pocket. However, while British-controlled rags such as La Repubblica gush over her noble dignity and courage, even Corriere della Sera has to admit that Paolo lived in her house and that she was completely up-to-date on her boys' political activities.

Stefano, Paolo's brother, meanwhile, may have fled to Mexico. According to the Mexico City daily El Sol, on Nov. 16, Stefano Sebregondi telephoned the Italian press agency ANSA and protested his innocence of charges that he was part of the Moro hit team, and wrote letters to two Mexican newspapers on the subject. Stefano's presence in Mexico makes perfect sense, in that Mexico harbors a branch of the Pallavicini family rotating around Princess Beatriz of Savoy, who keep in touch with their Italian cousins through periodic visits by Amintore Fanfani, the DC head of the Italian Senate and destabilizer of the Andreotti government.

which I work thinks it would be useful to the country to let Fanfani be kidnapped. Likewise, let's suppose that the Israelis found out in advance about the last raid on Haifa, for example. It could be that they let it happen. Because sometimes the interests of the nation demand that even if they foresee the death of certain persons, it would be better to let it happen.

EIR: In order to permit reprisals?

De Carolis: For example, if it is in the interest of the country to make reprisals, it could be just to allow some terrorist act. That is, while normal police action should always prevent — that's the job of the police — the job of the secret service is different. The secret service has the job of guarding in the most general sense the interest of the state. Therefore if I am a policeman and I find out that tomorrow a bank is going to be robbed, it is my duty to stop it from being robbed. If I am a counterespionage agent and I find out that tomorrow Fanfani will be kidnapped, it could be in the interest of my secret service to let him be kidnapped. Therefore we cannot judge the secret service by the same criteria as the police.

EIR: Do you think that anyone knew about the kidnapping of Aldo Moro before it happened?

De Carolis: Known by the Italian secret service? I start from the premise that there is no secret service in Italy, therefore that's my answer, and that is enough.

EIR: By the police?

De Carolis: No, no, because the functioning of a good secret service is not possible if there is not a strong political power. If the Italian secret service had known about the kidnapping of Moro, even if they had known about it before — and they didn't know about it because they weren't competent to know it, because they aren't efficient enough to know it — but even if they had known before, they would not have been able to decide to let it happen, for example, because they could then not have withstood the wave of political opposition.

That is, a secret service functions only if there is a political power behind it that covers it, that assumes the responsibility for that which the secret service does, no? Now if I want to send a spy to Moscow, and I am the Italian government, comes the day when it is discovered that I have sent a spy to Moscow, then the government falls. The Communists say, "What, us send a spy to Moscow?" Therefore I cannot make a secret service. . . . In Italy there can not be a secret service because there is no political power.

EIR: But is that the fault of the Communist Party?

De Carolis: The fault? Bah, that is the strength of the Communist Party. The PCI has destabilized the country. Here in Italy we cannot have a president, we can't even nominate a president of a bank, it takes months to pick one person. . . . Figure out if we can

make such serious decisions as deploy a commando or infiltrate an agent or allow the kidnapping of a politician or send a spy.

EIR: The PCI has declared itself to be in favor of the formation of secret services.

De Carolis: Yes, but a secret service according to the notions of the Communists is no secret services. A secret service controlled by a parliamentary commission in which even the opposition participates, such as we have in Italy, is no secret service. We must understand terms. A secret service that is not secret is not a secret service.

EIR: Do you think it is possible to construct a secret service in Italy?

De Carolis: No, not until we construct a governing majority in Italy.

EIR: That is, with the PCI in the opposition?

De Carolis: Or with the PCI in power. If the PCI comes to power we will immediately have a secret service...a very efficient one.

Hoping for a crisis

EIR: Then your prediction for Italy? If the secret service doesn't exist, if there is no government that makes itself respected, if the economy collapses, as you say, then we are going to the slaughter...

De Carolis: Yes. But that's not to say that to go to the slaughter is always negative.

This means that we are heading toward a grave national crisis, first of all political and also economic. This crisis can lead in different directions. That is, it's not a given. In 1943, too, there was a grave national crisis, but fascism fell; it needed two more years, but then it fell. Therefore it is not a given that the national crisis will take us to communism. The national crisis could indeed save us from communism. It remains to be seen how the crisis will be conducted. That is, how the crisis will be maneuvered.

So the thing to be afraid of is not the crisis, the crisis could even be useful. I personally consider it very useful. Less useful than political stability, but more useful than the systematic destabilization that we have had in these last two years. I prefer a profound national crisis.

EIR: A political crisis, a crisis of government?

De Carolis: Even of government — I prefer this to the present situation which is not crisis, but neither is it government.

The crisis in itself doesn't worry me; what worries me is that the crisis might be managed badly, that we would come out of the crisis going in the wrong direction. Now what worries me is that the DC does not tell me exactly in what direction it wants to get out of the crisis, when we do. The DC pretends to believe

that the crisis that is coming can be put off until infinity. But sooner or later it will arrive. Then the problem is to prepare oneself to get out of it in the best possible way. That is what the DC is not doing. I was the only one holding this thesis up to a little while ago. Yesterday Forlani said it at the convention . . . Forlani said, "We don't have a political line." For two years I was the only one in Italy saying that. Forlani and Fanfani and others said that the emergency is not a political line. For two years only I said it. Now they are saying it too.

EIR: Are you saying that the DC should ignore the big chunk of society represented by the Communists' votes?

De Carolis: We pay too much attention to the Communists. For two years we have been talking about relations with the PCI. It seems to me that we have given the Communists all the attention that we mean to give them. More, in fact. We talk only about the Communists. Now we are discovering that there are also other parties, the Socialists and even the minor parties. This seems to me to be something positive.

EIR: You talked in Bruzzano about the role of Catholicism's "Pauline mystique" in politics. Can you explain it to me?

De Carolis: I spoke about the transposition of the Pauline conception of pluralism, that is of the Church as the mystical body with autonomous members, which however find the purpose of their unity in the supreme direction that is in Christ. This, which is the scheme of the Church according to St. Paul, transferred to politics, immediately becomes the Communists' democratic centralism. That is, autonomy, but the party is the supreme interpreter of all the social forces.

I am worried by the Catholic integralist question first of all because from the Catholic point of view I maintain that integralism is an error. But from the political point of view because the Catholic integralist immediately becomes disposed to an agreement with the Communists, because he takes into politics the same general conception of society that he has as a Catholic. It is true so much that the true inventor of the historical compromise is not so much Berlinguer as Rodano, who is a Catholic communist.

EIR: Or Paul VI?

De Carolis: No, I wouldn't say Paul VI.

EIR: I'm referring to the ecumenical policy of Paul VI.

De Carolis: Oh, the Ostpolitik (positive policy toward the East bloc —ed.). Well, that is a more complicated conversation. However, the Catholic Communists are the most favorable to the historical compromise (between the Communists and the Christian Democrats — ed.), and I understand the reason, which is that they have the same mental scheme.