The revised Carter policy toward Korea, rather than being a "victory" for the antiwithdrawal "Georgetown faction," is more accurately seen to be a combination of the Brookings and Georgetown views. The maintenance of American troops in Korea is not designed as a deterrent to a very possible North Korean attack on South Korea, but rather is designed to bolster South Korea as a "geopolitical" cornerstone in a stepped-up campaign of pressure against Moscow. Simultaneously, the White House plans to maintain a Brookings-oriented stance against the government of Park Chunghee, a stance which, it is hoped, will keep North Korea interested in the Washington-Tokyo-Peking Axis.

The recent flurry of talks between North and South Korea, which had been suspended for several years largely due to North Korean stalling, were entered into by the South under heavy pressure from Washington that Seoul respond to Pyongyang's "genuine" peacetalk offers. This is perhaps the best example of the way the joint Brookings-Georgetown policy will work.

With the North Koreans leaning in the direction of the Axis powers, the South Korean government sticks out like the proverbial "sore thumb" as the only nation in the region not cooperating. For this reason, heavy pressure is expected to soon come down on Seoul—including during the Carter visit—to actively work against Moscow as well.

The South Koreans, who are genuinely concerned about threats to their security from their unstable North Korean neighbor, are known to oppose the idea of a "second front" in Asia against Moscow as, in the words of one Korean official, "vulgar Machiavellianism." Rather, in the view of Seoul, efforts must be made to reduce tensions in the region through broadbased economic cooperation among the nations of the region, including the Soviet Union.

The South Koreans will be particularly vulnerable to Washington's pressure, due to the continuing possibility of resumed withdrawal of American troops.

Moreover, the vulnerability of the Koreans to American pressure is heightened by the refusal of Moscow thus far to respond to Seoul's many offers for economic and other forms of cooperation. While limited contacts are known to exist between the two countries, the Soviets have thus far proven to be unwilling to risk total rupture in relations with its nominal ally North Korea, which open relations with Seoul could bring.

Short of open discussions with the Soviet Union, there appear to be several other options available to the South Koreans to reduce the pressure from Washington. Most important would be discussions with the governments of West Germany and France, both of which have made clear in recent months their firm commitment to policies, especially East-West economic cooperation, favorable to detente.

Kissinger: militarized Japan can counter USSR

The following are excerpts from an April 19 article appearing in the Japanese daily Yomiuri, reporting on an exclusive interview granted by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the Nippon Television Network Corporation.

On the growing Soviet military presence in the Pacific, Kissinger said Japan "must play a greater role in the defense of the western Pacific." And the U.S. must stay strong in this part of the world, he added.

He said Moscow cannot be allowed to continue encouraging every conflict by Soviet arms, Soviet friendship treaties and protecting a nation involved by means of Soviet veto in the UN.

"The Soviet Union will have to choose between expansion and relaxation of tension," he said.

Asked about the so-called "China card," and a possible tripartite alliance involving Japan, China and the U.S. against the Soviet Union, Kissinger said, "Soviet expansion must be stopped, because if the Soviet expansion continues there will be a confrontation."

Indicating the possibility of a trilateral alliance, he said, "China will cooperate with countries like the U.S. and Japan for its own reasons."

Kissinger said China attacked Vietnam because of its growing concern over what was going on next to its borders. China did not want to see a Soviet-backed empire being created next to it, he added.

On the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, Kissinger said he didn't think the agreement will bring a "true peace" to the area by itself. He called it an important step toward peace.

Kissinger said that since Iran was no longer a balancing factor in the Middle East, the U.S. would have to conduct a more active diplomacy in the area and introduce some other force to supply the balance.

He said there was a need of "more visible American military power in the Indian Ocean" to assure the protection of Saudi Arabia and Jordan which "have become less sure" of U.S. support following the Islamic revolution in Iran and the growing Soviet presence in Ethiopia.

Kissinger said that the Islamic revival, in the long run, has also serious consequences for the Soviet Union, because by the year 2000 more than 100 million Soviet citizens out of a total population of about 250 million will be Moslems. "And this revival cannot be confined by national borders," he said.

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