for the deployment of the new missiles, similarly view the real issue as the "limited nuclear war" doctrine, a doctrine they emphatically reject. The disarmament spokesman of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's party said this month that "any [Soviet] counterattack [in Europe] would inevitably be accompanied by a counterattack against the North American continent."

## Criticism of Bonn

Yet despite Moscow's awareness of Bonn's commitment to a real detente in Europe—a commitment typified by the 1978 Schmidt-Brezhnev agreements that included both military detente moves and a 25-year economic cooperation program—the Soviets charge that Bonn is playing games with the dangerous NATO doctrines behind the 600-missile plan. Schmidt has repeatedly said that the NATO meeting in December should adopt a decision to begin the production of the new missiles, but should not deploy them unless negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on weapons reduction in Europe fail. Further, Schmidt insists that if the U.S. Senate does not ratify the SALT II treaty, West Germany will refuse to accept the NATO modernization at all.

Commentator Bovin in Izvestia treated the West German response to Brezhnev's proposals as better than the American one, but far from adequate.

In a domestic radio broadcast Oct. 16, Bovin went further, attacking as "pure sophistry" th idea that NATO might decide to produce the new weapons but not station them. He attributed this suggestion to Social Democratic Party official Egon Bahr, without mentioning that Schmidt and Apel, too, had drawn this specious distinction.

## The generals speak

The fare offered up on Soviet domestic TV and radio over the past week was still stronger testimony of the chilling mood in Moscow. A parade of top brass, past and present, appeared before Soviet viewers to explain that things are getting worse.

On an Oct. 20 program, Lieutenant General Chervov from the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces said that if NATO deploys the 600 rockets, "the approximate parity between [NATO and the Warsaw Pact] in Europe will doubtlessly be upset in favor of NATO. That will mean a circumvention of the treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. In such conditions our country, like any other one, would have to take necessary measures to ensure its security."

On Oct. 17, retired Marshall Vasilii Chuikov, hero of the battle of Stalingrad during World War II, appeared on a national television program to say how NATO policies look "to me, a military man, who went with the troops from Stalingrad to Berlin." Evoking powerful images of 40 years ago, Chuikov predicted the much worse horror of nuclear combat if NATO's "modernization" is carried to its natural conclusion.

—Rachel Douglas and Susan Welsh

## Using a peace treaty to prepare for war

Following Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's Oct. 5 offer of substantial disarmament steps on the part of Warsaw Pact forces, President Carter set the standard for a spate of proposals linking Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty to NATO "modernization" in Europe, a policy which the Soviets are now denouncing as preparation for "theater-limited" nuclear war on the continent. At an Oct. 9 press conference, Carter argued:

"Our allies and we are carefully assessing the significance of President Brezhnev's statement. However I'd like to point out that what he's offering, in effect, is to continue their own rate of modernization as it has been, provided we don't modernize at all.

"They have had actual reduction in launchers the last few years. They've been replacing their old SS-4's and SS-5's with the SS-20, not on a one-for-one basis; the old missiles only had one warhead. The SS-20 has a much greater range. ... They have also replaced all older airplanes with the Backfire bomber.

So it's not quite as constructive a proposal as at first blush it seems to be. I think it's an effort designed to disarm the willingness or eagerness of our allies adequately to defend themselves. In my judgment the decision ought to be made to modernize the Western allies' military strength and then negotiate with a full commitment and determination mutually to lower armaments on both sides. ...

"I might point out that Chancellor Schmidt said, I believe yesterday or the day before, that a prerequisite to a decision by our NATO allies to take these steps, which he considers to be vital for the security of NATO, is the passage of SALT II."

Henry Kissinger, on the same day that Carter spoke, told the American Bankers Association convention in New Orleans that Brezhnev's speech was "designed to split our allies from the United States."

For this reason, he said, the strategic arms limitation treaty must be coupled with "significant increases" in U.S. military spending.

54 Soviet Sector

## Ustinov views global **United States posture**

Exerpted from Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri F. Ustinov's article in Pravda, Oct. 25:

... There are forces who did not like the Soviet initiative. Leading circles, above all in the U.S., the Federal Republic of Germany, and Great Britain, are trying to avoid giving a concrete answer to it, and to belittle both the constructive steps taken and the proposals made by the Soviet Union. ... These circles are essentially trying to convince the international public, and above all the countries of Western Europe, that, no matter what, the NATO bloc should continue its senseless policy of arms buildup in Western Europe and move on to deploy there qualitatively new American missile systems....

We face a situation of growing aggressiveness on the part of NATO, with the U.S. calling the shots, and an activation of U.S. military preparations in various regions of the world.

The leaders of the U.S. verbally endorse the development of peaceful cooperation among states. ... But their practical actions often bear witness to the opposite; they heat up an atmosphere of fear, urge on the arms race, and openly conduct military preparations.

U.S. Defense Secretary H. Brown has openly declared that it is a goal of the U.S. to achieve military superiority of NATO over the Warsaw Treaty members by the mid-1980s. And it is specified that this means nuclear superiority, giving the U.S. "guaranteed annihilation potential."

Recently in the U.S. there have been lively discussions on the feasibility of inflicting a "preventive nuclear strike under certain circumstances," using strategic weapons against military targets in the Soviet Union. It is not very clear, given the present status of strategic nuclear arms ..., how responsible people can entertain the idea of such strikes, since it is completely obvious that a powerful counterstrike would inevitably follow.

How should the Soviet Union react to such statements? How should we take the assertions of highly placed U.S. representatives that "now the entire globe falls within NATO's sphere of interest?" It is clear even to people who are not military specialists, that these are not simply words. Behind them are concrete plans and scenarios for war against the USSR and its allies....

(In Europe) we see the forced rearming of all branches of the armed forces and types of troops with new weapons. There are huge stockpiles of arms and technology for U.S. troops being created in the Western European countries, for troops transported to Europe in so-called crisis situations. The combat capabilities of military transport aircraft and paratroops are being improved.

The Oct. 8 London Guardian responded by taking aim at West Germany: "After Mr. Brezhnev's latest intervention, the big question is whether Chancellor Schmidt will want to reopen West Germany's agreement to join in the modernization program before exploring the new Soviet proposals. ... But sources close to him suggest that he may be tempted to argue that, at a time of exceptionally weak American leadership, the European members of the NATO alliance must take seriously both Mr. Brezhnev's proposals and his threats. ... '

By last week, Anglo-American rejection of Mr. Brezhnev's proposals had hardened into openly linking treaty ratification and military buildup. From Oct. 22-26:

- Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously voted to adopt a decision that nothing in the SALT II treaty will prevent the United States from continuing to help NATO countries with conventional and nuclear military assistance;
- Senate majority leader Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia endorsed the treaty, issuing a 5,000-word statement on how rejection of the accord would

increase the possible hazards to U.S. security by removing any limitations on Soviet arms development. Byrd also declared that he had obtained a written assurance from President Carter that the United States will proceed with the development of the MX mobile missile.

- Defense Department officials report that the Carter administration is considering a \$20 billion increase in the military budget for fiscal year 1981. Part of the increase would go to development of a 100,000-man "rapid-deployment force" for use in the Middle East or other "hotspot" regions. A final decision on the budget increase is expected to be made early in November.
- The New York Times reported that the Carter administration is seeking approval from NATO allies to withdraw up to 1,000 old-generation nuclear weapons from Western Europe, in order to clear the way for NATO's adoption of the U.S.-backed "modernization" program. Officials said that this proposal was discussed by White House deputy assistant for national security David L. Aaron during his recent trip to Europe.