controllers among the deployed terrorists.

In the United States, Canada, and Wesern Europe, these Muslim Brotherhood assassins are under the overall command of Savama and the Anglo-Zionist intelligence community behind it. The assassination of Tabatabai, the attempted murder of Shahpour Bakhtiar, and other such acts—including the murder of Prince Shafik in Paris last year—have been carried out by this circle.

6. Since the departure of Setoudeh, part of the control of the U.S.-based operation has been taken over by Cyrus Hashemi, an Iranian businessman at 9 West 57th Street in New York, who heads the First Gulf Bank and Trust Co. Hashemi supplies the conduit for illegal funds transferred into the United States via the Bahamas and Switzerland for the activities of the MSA and the Iranian terrorists, according to sources.

Our authority

In the past 18 months, the Executive Intelligence Review has become the established authority in the field of counterintelligence concerning the Muslim Brotherhood. Extensive documentation has been provided to the U.S. law enforcement agencies, intelligence and security services of Western Europe, and to Arab governments and intelligence services. Published dossiers on the MSA and the Muslim Brotherhood are extensive.

If this information, all of which has previously been published, had been acted upon by the relevant authorities, the assassination of Tabatabai might have been prevented. But because of Carter-Brzezinski sabotage, law enforcment officers' work has been prevented from following EIR's leads.

Now, another coverup is underway.

The DNC's John White is subject to investigation. The actions of Attorney General Civiletti must come under the closest scrutiny. It is the duty of the Senate and House Judiciary and Armed Services committees to investigate the allegations made above to the fullest extent. To date, the Carter administration has given the Iranian hostage-takers a free license to carry out assassinations and terrorism within the borders of the United States itself.

Over the coming days, the EIR will provide a complete dossier on the activities of the MSA and the Muslim Brotherhood worldwide, incuding new evidence concerning the inside story of the financial and political organization of the MSA put together from information from defectors from the MSA and related organizations. Together with the Lyndon LaRouche presidential campaign, the EIR has already accomplished more than the entire investigative officialdom of the U.S. government. The information is there to put the MSA and the Muslim Brotherhood out of business.

Book review

Serving the national interest

Decent Interval, by Frank Snepp. Random House: New York, 1977.

Vintage: New York, 1978.

Shortly after Admiral Stansfield Turner and Vice-President Walter F. Mondale had completed their destruction of the Central Intelligence Agency, over the summer of 1977, one of the younger generation of ex-CIA employees, Frank Snepp, struck back at the CIA's wreckers with a book which made mincemeat of the political reputation of Henry A. Kissinger. The Trilateral Commissionowned government, the Carter administration, was not pleased. Snepp was successfully prosecuted for failing to permit pre-publication censorship of the manuscript.

Apart from the devastating job Snepp's Decent Interval does on Kissinger and others responsible, the lasting importance of the book for the U.S. today is the detailing of the coming-apart of the Thieu government, combined with the hysterical exertions of the entire U.S. intelligence community officialdom in the effort to conceal from itself the fact that such a collapse was occurring.

Was not the collapse of the Thieu government the collapse of a product created over a period of more than a decade by the leading policymaking thinktanks as well as the military and intelligence command of the United States? All glib, self-consoling excuses put on the one side, is that collapse not then a mirror of grave flaws within the U.S. command?

If one superimposes the principal features of Snepp's account on the United States today, like a map overlap, one has the immediate, eerie, frightening perception that our leading policymaking, military and intelligence commands are doing to the United States today precisely what they did to Vietnam over the course of the 1972-75 collapse of the Thieu government.

Perhaps the most frightening feature of the Saigon collapse, in these terms of reference, is the manner by

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which "Big Minh" was brought to nominal power at the last moment of the collapse. Snepp, who lets his anti-French prejudices run away with him at times, underestimates the impact a "Big Minh" replacement of Thieu would have had in Hanoi prior to the time total military victory was immediately in Hanoi's grasp. The frightening thing is not that this option was postponed until the point its deployment no longer had any worth. The point is that the combined structure of South Vietnamese society and U.S. policy precluded serious consideration of such an option at the time it might have had significant impact upon the situation.

Is this the present condition of the United States? Is the inertia of embedded commitment to self-destroying policies so much a part of our political, financial, military and intelligence situations, that those policies cannot be changed until the point we, like Saigon of April 1975, reach the point of futility that the collapse of our nation finally brings about the collapse of those institutions as well?

The case of the Carter nomination illustrates the point.

Most leading Democrats, and many other citizens besides, acknowledge that the nomination of Jimmy Carter means much worse than a devastating defeat of the party in the Congress and state offices. It means almost certain destruction of the party, at least for a long period to come, perhaps forever. This fact is plastered over the faces of leading news media. Even those delegates nominally supporting Carter blackmail and related hooliganism acknowledge this. Yet, having the power to act, they hesitate to act. How very much like Saigon 1975.

It is the same with "Camp David" policy. Most of the governments of the world, plus leading Zionists, now agree that both the Begin government and "Camp David" must be dumped. Yet, in Washington, this issue is treated in a way which reminds us again of Saigon 1975.

The China policy is worse. Yet, our political, financial, military and intelligence communities—for the most part—are clinging to this lunatic military alliance with Communist China in much the same manner Snepp outlines Washington's Vietnam delusions.

Our military policy—"flexible response" and related inanities—is premised on the assumption that the Soviet Union will agree to play by those gentlemen's sandbox rules of theater warfare. Yet, Washington continues to place the United States in jeopardy with repeated efforts to bluff a decisively superior Soviet military capability—even after the bluff has been successively called, in Afghanistan and subsequently. Now, the Carter administration proposes to "punish" Moscow with grain embargos and Olympic boycotts for Moscow's refusal to be bluffed! Saigon 1975's mentality all over again.

Massive cover-up, desperately clinging to policies

which have repeatedly failed, compounded with hysterical exercises in attempted self-delusion: This was U.S. Vietnam policy 1975, and is the character of the policy of the same institutions in the United States today.

As we noted, one has the eerie perception that Saigon 1975 may turn out to be the mirror of our own future. The detailed features of Washington policies have been altered since 1975 somewhat, but what remain are the characteristic features of the Saigon government created earlier by the same sort of policymaking.

It is consistent with the causes for the humiliating disgrace of Saigon 1975, that those responsible prose-

The misfeasance of Henry Kissinger and others, as reported in Snepp's book, is such a past and continuing danger to the vital interests of this nation that this book must be published to aid in exposing that misfeasance....

cuted Snepp for telling it as it was. Snepp was right; that crowd would rather cover up a blunder of policymaking method at any cost, than correct the error.

The law and Frank Snepp

Those who condone the judgement against Snepp have a simple, pat answer. Snepp violated his employment contract with the cookie factory by refusing to permit the agency to censor the manuscript before publication. "We must protect the Agency," they insist; "it is time ex-employees were forced to live up to the rules."

Once the name of Philip Agee is mentioned, there arises a certain stink of hypocrisy in the area of such pat arguments. The same administration which prosecuted Snepp has recently compounded the government's prolonged failure to prosecute Agee, by declaring Agee to be immune from prosecution in the United States. Agee, principal spokesman for an avowedly pro-terrorist organization, an ex-CIA employee who has targeted serving CIA officers for assassination, is not prosecuted. In the case of Snepp, whose book violated no security—according to the concessions of the prosecution—prosecution and judgement were swift.

Some defenders of the judgement against Snepp persist: "That is true, of course. However, the fact that

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Agee should have been prosecuted is not grounds for proposing that Snepp should not suffer judgement."

Snepp violated a contract. The contract was with a national security agency, and is therefore of more weight than an ordinary contract. If the national security rule embedded in the CIA's employee agreement is a valid implementation of the broad construction of the National Security Act, then a violator ought to be subject to prompt prosecution. So far, the matter is clear enough.

It is one thing to presume that a person should be prosecuted. It is another to presume that this is adequate grounds also to force conviction or evil judgement.

Our leading policymaking, military and intelligence commands are doing to the United States today precisely what they did to Vietnam over the course of the 1972-75 collapse of the Thieu government.

Generally speaking, the grand jury system in the United States has broken down. When that system functions properly, the grand jury is composed of relatively tough, influential and broadly experienced members of the community, of the sort who are not awed by the mere titles of federal attorney or district attorney. Unless the prosecutor can prove probable cause and clear and appropriate meaning for each portion of a proposed indictment, such a grand jury will throw out the case, or amend the proposed indictment considerably. Thus, proper juries protect citizens from subjection to unwarranted prosecution on important charges.

It is a travesty of justice that today the Carter Justice Department can walk concocted charges through pathetic grand juries made up of credulous persons awestricken by the supposed importance of the prosecuting attorney. How many innocent citizens are virtually framed up, or terrorized into confessing falsely to evidence against friends and others, or to accept conviction on a lesser count—of which they are innocent—because they lack the means to hire a five-thousand-dollar-a-day law firm to defend them in court, against a governmental agency willing to pour in millions of dollars worth of prosecution effort, in an effort to destroy a political enemy of the Carter administration through exploitation of some cooked-up charge walked

through an incompetent grand jury?

With that aside in mind, it should be understood that when I said that Snepp was liable to prosecution, if not necessarily judgement, I meant that the charges were of the quality which would be honored by one of those competent sorts of grand juries we seldom find any more. I am in no way endorsing the immoral doctrine that anyone accused by a prosecutor ought to have the charges jerked through a dumb grand jury so that the accused may have the five-thousand-dollar-aday "privilege" of proving his innocence in court. On the face of it, a competent grand jury would buy the proposal to indict Snepp, were the charge in question a criminal one. The contract is clear; the lack of presubmission according to contract is uncontested in point of fact. Although the issue is not one of criminal proceedings, the same logic applies.

Snepp willfully took that risk.

The issue of trial is essentially this. It is a principle that no provision of contract ought to be enforceable under law if the provision in question violates public policy. In the Snepp case, the province of public policy to be taken into account is constitutional law. To simplify the argument: Did Snepp's course of action represent efficiently his serving his oath to uphold the Constitution at the expense of an inferior obligation to fulfill the terms of his employment contract?

Were you a juror in a trial of Snepp, would you conclude that Snepp was acting in a manner consistent with his oath to uphold the Constitution in overriding his contractual obligation? Would you believe that the Carter administration's Central Intelligence Agency would have attempted bureaucratic subterfuges to prevent, significantly delay or considerably alter portions of the text which, as conceded, violated no security provisions? Would you believe that the misfeasance of Henry Kissinger and others, as reported in Snepp's book, are such a past and continuing danger to the vital interests of this nation, that this book must be published to aid in exposing that misfeasance? Was the position of the accused in the situation he reports of such an exceptional nature that he could have considered himself the only probable person both able and inclined to bring these facts to public attention with approximately equal authority?

Suppose you, as a juror, were sitting upon either the Snepp case or the Agee case. Would you not exonerate Snepp on grounds of your perception of constitutional law, and yet for equivalent nominal offense recommend judgement against Agee to the full extent of the law?

Is it not in our utmost vital national interest to cleanse our institutions of those policymaking practices which are responsible for the disgusting denouement in Vietnam, and which threaten to be responsible for the self-destruction of our nation itself?

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