Click here for Full Issue of EIR Volume 7, Number 37, September 23, 1980 statement from the army in Iran is totally unprecedented since the revolution.

Meanwhile, perhaps significantly, the prime minister and President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr managed to agree on the naming of a defense minister, Col. Javad Fakuri, to head the government's military command. Immediately after being named, Col. Fakuri and Gen. Fallahi left on an extended visit to Kurdistan, the scene of the fighting.

The extent of the fighting in Kurdistan indicates that Iran's once decimated armed forces may be fairly advanced in the process of rebuilding. For the first time since the start of the Iran-Iraq clashes that began immediately after the Islamic revolution, both Iran and Iraq reported aerial duels and the downing of some jet fighters on each side. Iran also reported aerial bombardment of Iraqi tank concentrations in the border region, and the Iraqis reported that for the first time Iran made use of ground-to-ground missiles to attack Iraqi border posts.

A dispatch from Iraq reported that Iran was using "rockets, armored vehicles, and sophisticated rifles," and Iraqi television showed large quantities of "American-made" weapons captured from the Iranian forces.

Nevertheless, it is still generally believed that the Iraqi armed forces are far superior to those of Iran, and that if a major war should erupt, Iraq would win handily. Iraq is issuing ominous warnings to Iran should the Khomeini madmen pursue the course of confrontation in the area. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, while stating that Iraq "does not want war," said on Sept. 10 that Iran was occupying Iraqi territory illegally and that Baghdad intends to "recoup every bit of Iraqi territory now occupied by Iran." President Hussein noted that Iraq has a great deal of popular support inside Iran.

Iraq, of course, has become the base of operations for Iranian exiles who seek to topple the Khomeini regime.

## Why Sullivan is protecting Brezezinski

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Contributing Editor

William H. Sullivan, President Jimmy Carter's former ambassador to Iran, has published a series of unpardonable lies and distortions of the truth concerning the Iranian revolution that cannot be allowed to go unanswered.

Writing in the current issue of the magazine Foreign Policy, Ambassador Sullivan purports to present his personal account of the events in which he participated during the rise of the Khomeini dictatorship in Iran. Although the article is filled with a string of witting falsehoods, the ambassador's lies break down roughly into two categories. First, those designed to protect Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski from criticism of his central role in installing the Khomeini regime; and second, those designed to facilitate what appears to be an imminent consolidation of a public U.S.-Iranian alliance.

Let us consider these two issues separately.

Among those even casually familiar with the background to the Khomeini revolution, it is generally recognized that Brzezinski's National Security Council was instrumental in coordinating almost every dimension of the so-called "Islamic revolution." On several occasions during 1978 and 1979, Dr. Brzezinski stated his belief that "Islamic fundamentalism" is a "bulwark against communism." Yet Ambassador Sullivan, in his account, maintains that Brzezinski was working to oppose the Khomeini takeover, that Brzezinski was in favor of supporting the government of Prime Minister Shahpour

## Administration overtures to Khomeini regime

The White House, Justice Department, State Department, and Treasury Department have made significant gestures over the past two weeks toward Iran. The first gesture occurred on Aug. 29, when the Justice Department ordered the release from federal detention of Horace Butler, one of the defendants in the late-July slaying of Iran Freedom Foundation head Ali Tabatabai. By insisting that Butler could

only be tried in a *local* court, Justice prevented the creation of a federal grand jury.

On the same day, the Justice Department filed "suggestions of intent" with American courts to try to prevent these courts from hearing cases of claims made by American firms for compensation of business lost when Carter froze Iranian assets earlier this year.

On Sept. 5, in response to a question from EIR, the State Department noted that "the Justice Department, after consulting with the Departments of State and Treasury and receiving supporting factual statements from Messrs. Miller [of Treasury] and Christopher [of State], filed 'suggestions of intent' in cases

44 International EIR September 23, 1980

Bakhtiar, and that Brzezinski finally tried to precipitate a military coup by the Iranian armed forces against Khomeini's revolutionary government!

The facts of the matter are quite different. First, it is a matter of public record that Brzezinski's NSC in fall 1978 secured the services of George Ball to conduct a top-secret official task force on the crisis in Iran and the Persian Gulf, and that Ball's task force recommended that the United States abandon the Shah and throw its unequivocal support behind the Khomeini-led opposition. Furthermore, during this period Brzezinski commissioned a special team of the Special Coordinating Committee of the NSC to prepare a worldwide study of the potential for an alliance between the United States and Islamic fundamentalism throughout the so-called "arc of crisis," a term coined by Brzezinski in December 1978.

In addition, in the months before the Iranian revolution the NSC, under Brzezinski, ordered the CIA to begin a vastly stepped-up program of radio broadcasts into the Muslim regions of the U.S.S.R. in the belief that the Islamic "resurgence"—which Brzezinski announced publicly that he "welcomed"—would penetrate inside the Soviet borders and weaken Moscow's control in central Asia.

Then, again with Brzezinski's approval, David Aaron of the NSC, working with Vice-President Mondale, assembled a team of specialists in Islamic affairs to oversee approximately 100 field operatives sent to Iran for the denouement of the policy commitment to overthrow the Shah. The Shah, in his recently published memoirs, wrote unequivocally: "The United States wanted me out."

In fact, as early as 1977 Brzezinski had begun making contacts with the anti-Shah religious opposition and British intelligence-controlled factions of the armed forces and the secular National Front. Known U.S. Iran specialists with an anti-Shah bias—such as Dr. Marvin Zonis of the University of Chicago, Dr. James Bill of the University of Texas, and Dr. Richard Cottem of the University of Pittsburgh—were brought into a consultant relationship with Brzezinski's NSC.

Finally, it is also generally recognized now that Brzezinski's loud public declarations during this period in favor of the Shah were designed primarily to undercut the Shah by making him appear to be an American puppet in the eyes of Iranians, and the Shah sent numerous requests to Washington asking Carter and Brzezinski not to issue such statements in the crisis! (Despite public statements of support, in fact, in late 1978 the NSC refused to approve Iran's routine request for tear gas and riotcontrol equipment for the new martial law government.)

Concerning the second part of Sullivan's report, the lies are equally numerous but more subtle.

Sullivan asserts in his article that Prime Minister Bakhtiar, whose brief government in January and February 1979 represented the only chance to preserve Iran from the hideous Khomeini horde, "had no popular support." Instead, Sullivan reports that he had worked out an arrangement by which the Iranian general staff and armed forces would enter into an alliance with the "revolutionary forces" that would "have Khomeini's blessing."

What Sullivan does not say is that during January 1979 he and certain members of the U.S. embassy staff in Teheran worked overtime to bribe and otherwise persuade and blackmail prominent Iranians not to support Bakhtiar, and thereby probably contributed the marginal force that prevented Bakhtiar from succeeding in stopping Khomeini.

As far as the armed forces is concerned, except for a select group of traitors such as General Hossein Fardoust and General Abbas Gharabaghi, the general staff was irrevocably opposed to Khomeini and was only restrained from unleashing a bloody counterrevolution by the ultimatums from Sullivan and NATO General Robert Huyser of the U.S. Air Force. No such alliance between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood clergy of Khomeini was otherwise possible.

against Iran. These suggestions request the courts to stay proceedings in those cases temporarily in order to avoid any risk of prejudicing the continuing efforts of the United States Government to resolve the hostage crisis."

On Sept. 8, the White House itself released a statement asking attorneys and local judges to stop legal suits against Iran.

Justice, after consulting with State, has also filed a request for a stay of proceedings in a case being heard in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in which the Iranian government is trying to "recover" assets from the late Shah's estate. This case was on the

verge of being tossed out of court because the papers presented to the Shah's lawyers had been improperly submitted.

Again in response to an EIR query, State noted that it had consulted with Justice to make the request for temporary stays "in order to avoid any risk of prejudicing the continuing efforts of the U.S. government to resolve the hostage crisis."

Finally, on Sept. 9, Civiletti's Justice Department acceeded to demands by lawyers representing the Iranian government that the Washington police be investigated for being "excessively brutal" in clamping down on pro-Khomeini demonstrators July 27.