Mussolini." And Richard Gardner heartily agrees.

When Craxi and his Venetian stringpullers put the finishing touches on a coup plan, they were acting under enormous time pressure. Internally, their Preamble group was unraveling, and Reagan's victory sounded a potential death knell for their whole faction.

The Andreotti option

For that very reason, Giulio Andreotti, who had thrown his entire political weight behind Reagan, felt encouraged to make a move toward consolidating his own power base. But Andreotti faces a problem. Although his DC has been reorganized, the bad seeds having been sifted out, the process of social disintegration and erosion of public confidence in parliament has advanced so rapidly as to make the "old" approach to a "historical compromise" coalition unviable. The only way that Italy's economy can be salvaged from the technetronic nightmare Craxi plans for it, is through a far-ranging reform of the currency, credit and tax structures along the lines of the heavy lira proposal introduced by Lyndon LaRouche. And the only way such a policy can be implemented in the current crisis is through a top-down "Gaullist" reorganization, something Andreotti could readily achieve from the position of president, not of the Christian Democracy, but of the Italian Republic.

Among Andreotti intimates, it is no secret that the experienced statesman is fixing his sights on the presidential Quirinale palace currently occupied by the senile Pertini. But what will Washington do? If President-elect Reagan recognizes the Craxi danger, he cannot fail to grasp the urgency of providing Mr. Andreotti the political support due to a faithful U.S. ally.

The most immediate signal for such support would be Reagan's choice of a close personal associate from the business world to occupy Ambassador Gardner's position on Via Veneto in Rome. The danger is that Mr. Reagan will submit to pressure from the Kissinger camp and send someone to Rome with an anachronistic anticommunist profile. That grave error would play into the hands of the dangerous Craxi and virtually endorse an Argentinian-style coup, endangering European security and blackening Reagan's foreign policy image internationally.

If Reagan follows his better instincts and wiser advisers, he will provide Andreotti a diplomatic representative worth his salt. Andreotti, who was educated to politics by the great Pope Paul VI and postwar Prime Minister Alcide DeGasperi, is Italy's ablest statesman, as well as being one of Europe's foremost leaders. If Italy is to find the road that leads to a renewed republic and a future of economic and political stability, Giulio Andreotti must be the man in charge. In the current crisis, he is the man who knows what makes Italy tick.

Italian terrorism: a political weapon

by Muriel Mirak

Red Brigades terrorist Franco Piperno told a nationwide TV audience in Italy last week that "terrorism is not common criminality, it is political." Piperno knows what he is talking about. The young protégé of Italian Socialist Party (PSI) mafioso Giacomo Mancini was extradited last year from France on charges of involvement in the kidnap murder of Italian statesman Aldo Moro. During Moro's captivity, Piperno and his partner in crime Lanfranco Pace served as go-betweens for Moro's terrorist jailers and PSI party boss Bettino Craxi.

Today a repeat performance of the Moro affair, staged by the Red Brigades and kidnap victim Judge Giovanni D'Urso, has all the qualities of déjà vu.

D'Urso was kidnaped by the Red Brigades on Dec. 16. The terrorists' aim was to force the weak Forlani government to the bargaining table and thus rip up the last shreds of credibility retained by Italy's postwar republican institutions. This process would lead to strongman Craxi's stepping in to take dictatorial power.

But why Judge D'Urso? And why make the attack that day? The answers to these questions shed light on the wholly political character of the brutal terrorism wielded against the Italian state over the last decade.

In the first week of December, two crucial gatherings took place signaling a tip in the political balance in favor of Giulio Andreotti. At the Christian Democracy's national council meeting, Andreotti's open dialogue policy towards the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was officially endorsed and five regional governments—in Sardinia, Campania, Liguria, the Marches, and Calabria—were slated to host "historical compromise" coalitions between the DC and PCI. At the same time, EIR held a well-attended conference in Rome to present Lyndon LaRouche's heavy lira proposal for currency and credit reform. Both Andreotti's DC and his allies around Berlinguer in the PCI studied the proposal carefully, with an eye to implementing it once a national coalition government could be put together.

The terror attack was unleashed, exactly as in 1978, to bust up this embryonic PCI-DC agreement. This was absolutely clear in the shooting death of DC Mayor Marcello Torri on Dec. 11 in the small southern town of Pagani. Torri had been a "historical compromise" DCer,

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and had been fought tooth and claw by his factional enemy, Fanfanian deputy D'Arezzo. D'Arezzo had tried to run Torri out of politics, and, when the latter mooted running for office with the PCI, the D'Arezzo machine sent telephone threats into Torri's home. In the wake of the earthquake rescue effort, Torri had exposed Mafia efforts to pocket relief funds and had named the names of D'Arezzo's and Fanfani's Mafiosi involved. Torri was committed to rebuilding the devastated region through DC-PCI cooperation; the disaster area of Campania, in his view, was to become the model for similar such fruitful coalitions elsewhere.

Just days later came the D'Urso kidnapping. Judge D'Urso, responsible for security in Italy's top security prisons which house terrorists, was targeted because of the information he could divulge to his jailors, thus allowing many violent terrorists to be loosed. Just hours after he was kidnapped, Judge D'Urso's wife appeared on television to beg government negotiation with the Red Brigades. PSI boss Craxi immediately seconded her call, stating that "since Moro's life had not been saved, this time D'Urso's life must be spared." Although saner DC spokesmen, such as Interior Minister Rognoni, along with the entire PCI, rejected negotiations on principle, Craxi's maneuvering succeeded in bending the government to capitulate. On Christmas Day, the Forlani cabinet announced that it would vacate and close down one top security prison, the Asinara. This established the point Craxi was pursuing: the state would give in to a band of criminals.

Three days later the Red Brigades showed how they would deal with a government willing to get on its knees. On Dec. 28, a band of 70 armed men descended on the top security prison in Trani and kidnapped 19 security guards as hostages. It was only through the prompt intervention of a Carabinieri crack team that the guards were freed and the prison returned to normal. Responsible for leading the Carabinieri against the terrorists was Gen. Enrico Galvarigi, the right-hand man of antiterrorist General Dalla Chiesa.

On New Year's Eve, when Gen. Galvarigi was returning home from church with his wife, two young terrorists disguised as delivery boys with a gift package, filled him with bullets and fled. As if shaken out of a stupor, the government reversed itself and came down hard on any and all terrorist demands. No concessions would be made to D'Urso's jailors; no terrorist communiqués would be aired by the media.

Again the scene shifted. The terrorists and their patrons in the PSI were thrown on the defensive, while the DC, the PCI, and the country's police forces regained control of the situation. An important, however tragic lesson has been learned, and it is not likely that further concessions will be made to the Red Brigades.

Italy's growing awareness of just how political terrorism is, was underlined by another explosive development around the Galvarigi murder. This brought to light the central role certain proterrorist press organs have played in the entire affair.

The Espresso affair

Galvarigi, like D'Urso, was not a public figure. In fact, the extremely sensitive nature of his work as head of security coordination for the nation's prisons forced him to keep a low profile and lead the life of a simple Carabiniere. The facts of Galvarigi's job were known to very few inside the prison system. But his name appeared just days before his death in the Milanese daily La Repubblica, which is owned by the Caracciolo family of Italy's "black nobility." There Galvarigi was identified as "Dalla Chiesa's right-hand man"—exactly the same formulation later used by the terrorists who claimed responsibility for his death.

Simultaneously, another Caracciolo press organ, the widely read weekly *Espresso*, announced publication of an exclusive interview with D'Urso's terrorist jailors, including passages from the "confessions" the Red Brigades had extracted from their kidnapped victim. Allegedly Galvarigi was among those mentioned.

The magistracy was convinced there was no coincidence, and Roman Judge Sica issued an arrest warrant for Mario Scialoja and Gianpaulo Bultrini, the two *Espresso* journalists responsible for the featured articles. The publishers quickly took 40,000 copies of the magazine off the presses and sent them to the shredder while preparations were afoot to drastically revise the contents. Editorial board member Ripa de Meana, a nobleman and a leading PSI exponent, quickly presented his resignation from *Espresso*.

The Espresso affair, though not yet concluded, could prove to be a turning point in the Italian republic's war against PSI-supported terrorism. For the first time, the press organs controlled by the Caracciolo oligarchical interests, have been identified positively as witting tools of the terrorist apparatus. Mario Scialoja had been identified in an explosive dossier on the Moro case published by the European Labor Party in later 1978, as the man who sent out information and marching orders to terrorists in the field; but this is the first time Scialoja has been charged with aiding and abetting terrorists. At the same time, the government's toughened stance after Galvarigi's murder has encouraged other press empires to close their pages to the Red Brigades messages and documents. Already the three major national dailies have refused to print further terrorist material.

If current trends of this sort continue, by cutting off access to the press and exposing the oligarchic masterminds of terror, the spiral of violence can be halted.