must tend to force drastic shifts in priorities within Soviet policy-making, as was reflected in part in the proceedings of the most recent conference.

Under conditions in which external strategic pressures catalyze a military-tinged shift toward emphasis upon "command" in economic policy-making, especially in face of threatened technological boycotts, the potential improvements in Soviet economic management will be forced through by "command."

The unfortunate feature of much strategic thinking in the United States today, is that the habit of "positive anti-communist thinking" impels analysts to overestimate the relative viability of our own economy and to underestimate both the resilience and potentials of the Soviet economy. In this way, it is usually overlooked or even foolishly denied, that as long as we continue our foolish policies of monetarism and toleration of "environmentalism," the medium-term prospects for the U.S. economy are far worse than for the Soviet sector.

What frightens me most today is the fear that the truth of my analysis will be recognized too late. Later down the road, the sense of the need to crush the monetarist and environmentalist policies will probably incline some to impose dictatorship upon our nation, out of contempt for a rotted-out political system, rotted with marijuana and environmentalism. Unless our political system can muster the capability of changing our policies democratically today, not many years from now the result of refusing to do this democratically will be dictatorship, defeat or both.

In the Soviet-Bloc case, the rise of the nationalist military in Poland and echoes of similar tendencies in Moscow, shows that the East-Bloc economies are readily susceptible of developing new forms of institutional response through which to sort out some of the most obvious aspects of mismanagement of those economies. In the Soviet case, this shift in institutionalized response will tend to take the form of a neo-Stalinist war-economy, a form which works—whether one likes it or not.

If we can change our policies democratically now, dump Volcker, opt for "Hamiltonian" methods, and restore priority to science and technology in schools and investment, the advantage will be on our side. Otherwise, not. This choice will become clearer over the coming months.

This is the reality the *Times* so far hysterically refuses to face. The Times still nurtures Malthusian fantasies of a world in which nation-states have more or less ceased to exist, in which illiterate labor-intensive serfs drudge in the soil outside those places in which the ruling elite revels amid the Sodom and Gomorrah delights of a non-stop "Studio 54"-style orgy. The Polish military has thus spoiled the Times's dream of such a perpetual orgy.

The *Times* is naturally hysterical.

Chronology

Poland before and since December 13

by Irene Beaudry

On Dec. 13 Poland's Prime Minister Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski declared a state of martial law, a move he had vowed he would make only as a last resort. Weeks prior to the declaration Jaruzelski had been trying to put together a program of National Accord which would have brought together the government, the Church, and Solidarność. In fact, at the Nov. 4 meeting among Jaruzelski, Primate Jozef Glemp, and Lech Walesa the prospects for creating calm in Poland were quite favorable. Two events, however, forced Jaruzelski's hand and led to the declaration of martial law.

Dec. 4: The Solidarność National Commission, meeting in Radom, degenerated into a screaming match dominated by repeated calls for Walesa's ouster. With Walesa relegated to the sidelines, the radical protégés of the British intelligence-guided group KOR launched plans to overthrow the government. Two days before the declaration of martial law, Solidarność called for a national referendum to decide the government Poland was to have and whether Poland was to continue its military alliance with the Soviet Union. In one stroke, Solidarność overthrew basic provisions in the 1980 Gdansk agreement that brought the trade union into being.

Dec. 12: From the other side, Politburo member Stefan Olszowski and ousted member Tadeusz Grabski reportedly made a bid for power against Jaruzelski. Sources described the bid as a hardliners' coup slated for Dec. 16. Both Olszowski and Grabski have reputations as orthodox Marxist-Leninists with close links to the KGB. Grabski, although ousted from the Central Committee in the summer during the party congress, recently began to surface in the press of the synthetic chauvinist Grunwald Union.

Dec. 13: Jaruzelski's speech declaring martial law changed the entire geometry. With evident Soviet backing from the Brezhnev leadership majority, Jaruzelski moved swiftly and decisively to crush his opposition. Addressing the nation "as a soldier and head of the Polish government," and omitting any mention of the party, which he also heads, Jaruzelski laid stress on the anarchy and chaos sweeping Poland. He posed martial law as a question of "national salvation."



A Polish checkpoint.

Jaruzelski said, "Our country has found itself at the edge of an abyss. The achievements of many generations, the house erected from Polish ashes, is being ruined. . . . Chaos and demoralization have assumed the proportions of a disaster. The nation has come to the end of its psychological endurance . . . We must recognize the hard realities of today. We must understand the necessity of making sacrifices. I would like to attain one thing: calm. This is the fundamental condition from which a better future should begin. We are a sovereign country. From this crisis, therefore, we must emerge on our own. It is with our own hands that we must remove the threat. If this chance were to be wasted, history would not forgive the present generation."

Immediately following the imposition of martial law, Solidarność radicals mounted a campaign of "passive resistance," calling for the occupation of factories and mines. Strikes and sit-ins erupted at shipyards in Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szcecin, at the Nowa Huta iron and steel plant outside Krakow, and in the Silesian coal-mining region. At the Ursus tractor plant, workers sabotaged production, producing one tractor in the first week of martial law. The Warsaw Solidarność branch issued a clandestine news bulletin. "Every action of protest, even the most insignificant, strikes a blow and hastens the time of returning the army to the barracks," it said, and

urged workers to emulate the model of the workers at the Ursus plant. Other clandestine leaflets followed, calling for more and more unrest.

The strategy of the military regime was twofold. On the one hand, the army and the internal security forces moved rapidly to throw a cordon sanitaire around centers of protest in the city of Radom, the Piast coal mines and the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk. Radom was entirely sealed off until all protests were squelched. Army tanks surrounded occupied mines and plants until workers began to come out on their own because of hunger and the cold. Water cannons and smoke bombs were used to disperse demonstrators.

But at the same time the regime showed itself open to negotiations with the Church, permitting priests to meet with protesters and to celebrate Mass in places of occupation.

Dec. 19: Poland's Archbishop Jozef Glemp issued an appeal for calm. "We beg you in God's name, not to raise a hand full of hate against one another," he said. "Keep calm, do not cause our country to fall into a greater misfortune. Only self-control and the maintenance of calm can save the country and the Church, which is carrying out its mission in the country."

Dec. 20: Pope John Paul II's envoy Archbishop Poggi arrived in Warsaw for a six-day fact-finding mission. During his visit he met with Jaruzelski, and on Dec. 24 conducted midnight Mass in Warsaw's cathedral.

Dec. 22. Government spokesman Jerzy Urban publicly gave the Church credit for helping avert bloodshed. At a press conference he stated that "the government highly values all Church statements which promote the establishment in Poland of calm and respect by citizens for the law and the requirements of martial law. It is the government's view that this kind of attitude by the Church constitutes substantial help to the republic." At the same press conference Urban let it be known that Solidarność leader Lech Walesa, under house arrest, had had "several rounds of talks" with the Military Council and with Church representatives.

In spite of efforts by the British Broadcasting Corporation and Solidarność members abroad to escalate tensions through their descriptions of chaos and bloodbaths in Poland, the Church and the military regime's measures averted that which the British-KGB interface most strove for: civil war and a Soviet invasion.

Dec. 24: Polish authorities lifted the national curfew to permit Poles to attend midnight Mass. In the days following, travel restrictions were lifted, telephone services were restored, and Warsaw radio announced the beginnings of resumption of work throughout the nation.

Jan. 8: With the gradual easing of martial law restrictions, Jaruzelski began a systematic purge of Communist Party leaders associated with Gierek regime and those

26 Special Report EIR January 19, 1982

party leaders in key centers of Solidarność unrest, Gdansk and Katowice.

Both Party First Secretaries from those two regions were ousted Jan. 8. Gdansk party secretary Tadeusz Fiszbach had previously been ousted from the Central Committee during the Party Congress and was known as an arch-liberal close to Solidarność. The Katowice head, Andzej Zabinski, was from the other extreme, a staunch hard-liner in the Olszowski mold. The purge of the party put a seal on Jaruzelski's national leadership over whatever kinds of measures party factions would have wanted to take.

The presidium of the Polish Communist Party Commission for Party Control met in the first week of January to discuss tough new ethical guidelines for party members, including measures to ensure against the creation of cliques and financial scams. The Party committee of the Warsaw region issued a statement saying "that the conviction prevails in the Warsaw Communist Party committee of the necessity to exploit martial law to clean up the party's internal affairs. There should not be any place in the party for onlookers, for passive people or for those who have broken the Leninist norms. Those people who do not feel their strength is up to meeting party statutory and ethical duties are leaving the party ranks."

Together with the calls for purging party ranks came an article in the official party daily, *Trybuna Ludu*, titled

"Need for Consolidation" which warned that "the purging of party ranks of people with alien ideological and political convictions . . . is going to be difficult and perhaps painful. This is why the process should be not only swift but also principled and just, without harming anybody but showing no leniency as well."

At the same Jaruzelski ousted scores of managers and directors of enterprises for incompetence and for harboring sympathy for the Solidariność movement. Many of those factories and enterprises had been the sites of resistance and protest strikes by Solidarność members during the two-week period after martial law was declared.

Jan. 12: Deputy Prime Minister Jerzy Ozdowski announced at a press conference for Western reporters that Polish authorities "would like to end" martial law Feb. 1, and to include Lech Walesa in talks on any future negotiations. Ozdowksi, a Catholic parliamentarian, is the highest ranking member of the Polish government who is not a member of the Communist Party. He added that no timetable had been set for lifting the emergency state of war decree, but that this decision would be contingent upon the termination of labor unrest. The Polish authorities have yet to begin the process of economic reform, beyond emergency measures; this, too, will be a measure of stability on which the easing of martial law will depend.

U.S., Canada and Mexico only	3 months \$125 6 months \$225 1 year \$396
Foreign Rates Central America, West Indies, Venezuela, and Colombia: 3 mo. \$135, 6 mo. \$245, 1 yr. \$450 Western Europe, South America, Mediterranean, and North Africa: 3 mo. \$140, 6 mo. \$225, 1 yr. \$470 All other countries: 3 mo. \$145, 6 mo. \$265, 1 yr. \$490	
Please charge to my \Box 3 months	·
_	□ Visa No.
Interbank No.	Signature Expiration date
	money order
□ I enclose \$ check or	
Name	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

EIR January 19, 1982 Special Report 27