## Ethnic passions in the Balkans can trigger international crisis

by Criton Zoakos, Editor-in-Chief

Relations among the Balkan nations are fast deteriorating, thanks to efforts by the drug-connected Propaganda-2 political networks and their financial controllers. The crisis might well come to a head by the end of April, when Israel is supposed to complete its withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula; there is a close relationship between the tense Middle East situation and the advancing destabilization of the Balkans.

The parameters for a superpower confrontation in that region are as follows:

- 1) The Cyprus crisis, in a status of flare-up at this time;
- 2) A military confrontation between Greece and Turkey:
- 3) Greece, militarily weaker than Turkey, seeking aid and succor from the Warsaw Pact;
- 4) NATO, through Turkey and Crete, "bottling up" the Soviet navy in the Black Sea;
- 5) The Soviets gaining access to naval facilities in the Adriatic Sea as a result of supporting the appropriate ethnic sides in the Yugoslav and Albanian ethnic crises.

Any combination of the above situations would leave no choice to either of the two superpowers other than to escalate to generalized confrontation. One must therefore ask whether the capability to create any one of these preconditions already exists or not.

In today's circumstances, a militarily weak Greece, faced by a powerful Turkey, and an ethnically endangered Yugoslavia would tend to draw together. Soviet concern for the Dardanelles would tend to impel Bulgaria on the side of Greece against Turkey. American concern for Turkey's flanks in Eastern Anatolia and Kurdistan would orient the United States and Israel against Iran, Syria, etc.

Ethnic disputes among Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria have been revived after 30 years of calm, centered around Albania's decision to continue support for the separatist movement among ethnic Albanians living in Yugoslavia's Kosovo province. The Yugoslav govern-

ment, which is also concerned about separatist tendencies among Croats and ethnic Hungarians of Vojvodina, has been complaining publicly about Bulgaria's meddling in the affairs of Yugoslavia's Macedonian minority in the South; Bulgaria has a large Macedonian population.


In Yugoslavia, Gen. Nikola Ljubicic, the Serbianborn Minister of National Defense, unveiled on Dec. 22 a new National Defense Bill to be ratified in April 1982, declaring that "the independence of our country may be endangered," and the law is needed for "better regulation of the constitutional role of the republics and autonomous provinces and other socio-political communities, as well as the rights and duties of the federal organs." The new law stipulates that any ethnic disputes (such as those in Kosovo) would be viewed as threats to the independence of Yugoslavia of the same seriousness as external aggression. Such eruptions would automatically invoke declaration of a state of war, in which the executive power passes to the supreme military commander.

Thus, by the end of the spring, Yugoslavia will be either at the throes of an ethnic civil war in which Albanians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Slovenians both inside and outside the communist party will be fighting off the assertive Serbians, or it will be ruled by Serbian-dominated and Army-dominated institutions refitted primarily to fight off ethnic disintegration

As these disputes move rapidly in the direction of a crisis, a crucial turning-point for the worse was the Greek elections of October 1981, which brought to power a Berkeley, California-trained radical socialist, Andreas G. Papandreou, who holds the office of Defense Minister as well as Prime Minister. Mr. Papandreou has carried out a policy of confrontation with neighboring Turkey over a long-standing dispute regarding the Republic of Cyprus.

A military or near-military confrontation between Greece and Turkey would occur under circumstances in which Greece is militarily by far inferior to Turkey and

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out of favor with official NATO policy; the Papandreou government, to compensate for this disadvantage, has adopted a policy of a quick expansion of relations with Libya, Syria, Cuba, and the Soviet bloc countries. This has resulted in commercial and maritime treaties with the U.S.S.R., according to which Greece is now 40 percent dependent upon the Soviet Union for its energy supplies, and the Soviet navy has been given conditional access to Greek ports and shipyards.

Most intelligence analysts are making the mistake of dismissing the potential for a Greek-Turkish conflict. The forces promoting such a conflict—the controllers of international terrorism and narcotics who also control the Socialist International and elements of NATO's Southern Command, as the Italian investigations into the Propaganda-2 and the Italian Socialist Party have shown—have a very compelling reason to remove Gen. Kenan Evren, the Turkish head of state. And, as every student of the region knows, the most efficient way of changing regimes in Greece or Turkey is to incite a military crisis between the two countries, preferably over the long-standing Cyprus issue.

General Evren, an officer in Turkey's Kemalist republican tradition, took power reluctantly for the avowed purpose of ridding his nation of terrorism and drug trafficking. There had been scores of "left" and "right" terror victims in Turkey, and the country was a major crossroads of the heroin traffic. Evren has thus far succeeded in practically eliminating the drug traffic; the crackdown against terrorism resulted in 200,000 arrests in 18 months, 40,000 trials, and a demand by the Public

Prosecutor for capital punishment in about 300 cases. Since the assassination attempt against the Pope, the Turkish authorities have been threatening to make a major contribution in the fight against international terrorism.

General Evren's position within the ruling military group is vulnerable, however; in the matter of relations with Greece, especially over Cyprus, he has resisted the strident chauvinism of his colleagues and subordinates. As the crisis worsens, the supporters of Col. Alparslan Türkes, the Dope, Inc.-controlled Franz-Josef Strauss of Turkey, will make political gains. In the event of all-out hostilities, the Türkes clique, invoking a national emergency, will point to Evren's moderate record and throw him out.

In Greece, Papandreou is working full time to exacerbate the Cyprus crisis (see page 30). As Prime Minister, he has given great latitude to drug-running and terrorist elements to operate in Greece. His appointee as Governor of the Bank of Greece will safeguard the secrets of drug-money laundering and weapons-traffic financing in the eastern Mediterranean. Papandreou himself has longstanding personal relations with Italian Socialist Party leaders who are connected with Propaganda-2, starting with Bettino Craxi, the party's Chairman.

During the first week of January, in his capacity as Defense Minister, Papandreou carried out sweeping changes in the top ranks of the Greek Officers Corps. All top field and general staff commands were handed over to officers whose loyalties are with the exiled King Constantine; officers with no known royalist sympathies

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who were included in the new appointments are known to be closely tied to NATO's Southern Command. In short, the Socialist leader has put in place a capability which can be called into action on orders from NATO—and topple his own government if need be. In terms of power, Greece is under the full control of NATO officers who have in place the means to carry out a royalist coup. The Papandreou government is merely the public theatrical prop useful in engineering the projected strategic crisis.

If two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, engage in a military conflict, or if their policy is determined by the threat of conflict and Greece seeks the assistance of its Balkan neighbors against Turkey in a climate of ethnic upheavals, a strategic crisis will erupt. That crisis will resemble the Balkan crises of 1875, 1882, 1908, and 1912-13, and the disputes which caused the outbreak of World War I. All those crises involved the methodical manipulation of ethnic passions in the service of a great

strategic gameplan, (as documented in this Special Report) whose objective was to dismember the Ottoman Empire without giving any advantage to Russia.

After the Second World War, ethnic passions persisted, as did the old Venetian intelligence channels and family connections. The borders of the existing states are arranged so that any state can raise ethnic claims against any other; Greek schoolchildren are taught to this day that the southern half of Albania ought to be called Epirus, a Greek province. Albania can claim ethnic minorities living just outside Athens. Yugoslavia is made up of at least eight ethnic homelands: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Macedonia is a special mess, the Kurdistan of Europe: Greeks claim it for historical reasons, Bulgarians for ethnic reasons, and Slavs for "reasons of state." Macedonians, living in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, have ideas of their own; their dream of a Macedonian state has never died.

## Cyprus: the history of a British plaything

Cyprus, a British Crown colony until 1960, is a republic within the British Commonwealth. Its constitution, drafted jointly by Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain in a February 1959 Zürich conference, provides for a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, a council of Ministers of seven Greek and three Turkish Cypriots, and a House of Representatives mandated to have 70 percent Greek and 30 percent Turkish Cypriot members. Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain have the status of "guarantor powers" over the Republic of Cyprus. The Zürich constitution, needless to say, has never functioned.

The major power on the island is the presence of two British military bases which encompass 100 square miles of the island's total surface of some 3,000 square miles. Those bases are sovereign British territory. Since June 1974, there is a second major military presence on the island, a Turkish Army of Occupation which controls the northern half of Cyprus, from which it has expelled most of the Greek-Cypriot inhabitants. The central government of President Spyros Kyprianou possesses virtually no instruments for exercising state power in the face of these two comparatively overwhelming military forces. As a result, the strategically located island of Cyprus, a prized possession of the Republic of Venice for over four centuries, is an international center of espionage activities, gun-

and drug-running.

The Turkish military force on the island, led by officers loyal to the fanatic Col. Alparslan Türkes, is a hotbed of opposition to the Turkish government of Gen. Kenan Evren and therefore has an interest in promoting an aggravation of Greek-Turkish relations. The British military bases are centers from which various types of operations are planned and could be planned to provoke ethnic strife. Israeli intelligence, which maintains a large presence on the island, has been involved in the aggravation of Greek-Turkish relations during this past December to January period. As a result, there has been a massive reinforcement of the Turkish occupation force by about 10,000 new troops. The Socialist International, which has a strong presence on the Greek-Cypriot side through the party of Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, a long-term asset of British intelligence, has been active during December and January on the side of the Greeks and against the Turks. Willy Brandt spent two weeks in Cyprus around Christmas; during January. the British Labour Party's Lord Caradon, formerly Sir Hugh Foot, held numerous demonstrations protesting the Turkish presence in northern Cyprus. Sir Hugh Foot was British Governor of Cyprus from 1957 to 1960.

In retaliation for Socialist International support for the Greek side, the Turkish Cypriot community has been mobilized by the chauvinist firebrand Rauf Denktas, into preparing for annexation of certain historical Greek Cypriot urban centers, especially Famagusta.

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