The fall-winter U.S.-Soviet 'missiles crisis' negotiations from the standpoint of the new strategic doctrine

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During the last months of President Richard Nixon's term of office, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger led public sponsorship of a marked shift in the strategic policy of the Atlantic Alliance, called "Forward Nuclear Defense," and sometimes called "Flexible Response." Had the Soviet Union any earlier hesitation over building and deploying new generations of thermonuclear missiles, and enlarged nuclear-submarine capabilities, after Secretary Schlesinger's announcements, the simple calculus of Nuclear Deterrence obliged them to escalate in response. So, among other pleasant things of the same general nature, we contemplate possibly 400 to 500 nuclear warheads launched by Soviet SS-20s targeting Western Europe. Nothing would be left of Western Europe afterwards; France's *Force de Frappe* is now reduced to a relic of the past.

We of the United States rightly argued that we could not tolerate these SS-20s. We said, and rightly so, that Soviet promises to move some SS-20s behind the Urals meant little, since they were mobile missile-systems which could be airlifted back to target Europe by helicopters. So, we decided to escalate in 1979. We announced that we were going to deploy third-generation versions of the Nazis' V-1 and V-2, the so-called cruise and Pershing II missiles. The cruise missiles are a rotten weapon for land-based deployment, easily defeated in limited numbers, but with hundreds of them launched simultaneously they are a costly nuisance for Warsaw Pact forces. The Pershing IIs are a more serious proposition, highly accurate missiles bringing strategic warheads within minutes from Soviet homeland territory. The Soviet Union could never tolerate that.

So, we and the Soviet Union entered a countdown toward a new missile crisis, to erupt sometime during the period between October 1983 and March 1984. If we proceeded to deploy the Pershing IIs, the Soviet leadership would escalate with new qualities of direct threat to the U.S. homeland, possibly by relays of submarines off our Pacific and Atlantic coasts. That we could never tolerate. So, it seemed the new missile-crisis, potentially more dangerous than that of 1962, was inevitable for the coming winter months.

Someone must back down. Yet, as long as the military strategic interests of both superpowers are defined in terms of nuclear-deterrence capabilities, neither superpower's vital interests would permit it to back down. We tried a way out, with the so-called zero option; let both the United States and Soviet Union remove such missiles from the European theater. The Soviets replied: The British and French missiles must be counted together with the U.S. missiles. The French said, and loudly, "No." We proposed a broad formula for a transitional step toward a zero-option, but we could not accept the Soviet proposition that highly mobile missiles moved to beyond the Urals could not be moved back again as quickly.

In this circumstance, President Reagan on March 23 established a new operational strategic doctrine of the United States. The strategic policy of the United States is now the rapid development and deployment of strategic anti-ballistic missile defense-systems intended to render all strategic nuclear missiles technologically obsolete. Inevitably, not long after the President's televised address was noted in Moscow, the Soviet Union upgraded its ongoing development of beam-weapon anti-missile systems, with a commitment to match or exceed everything the United States might do. Now, whether anyone likes the fact or not, both superpowers are locked into a commitment to high rates of development and deployment of directed-beam anti-ballistic-missile defense systems.

I predict that the Soviet Union will have a first-generation strategic ABM defense system in place during the period 1988-90, and possibly earlier. We can match that performance; if we fail to match it, we have the alternative of learning to say, "Yes, Comrade Commissar" in passable Russian. Those who argue that this is something down the pike for 20 years from now obviously have no comprehension of where

relevant technologies stand. In terms of existing technologies, we are much, much closer to a full-scale strategic ABM defense system than we were to a fission bomb in 1939 or 1940. Directed-beam systems which can be engineered and deployed to kill ballistic missiles presently exist. What is technologically out-of-reach today, can be brought within reach as laboratory models or development prototypes within ranges of two to five years. The Soviet Union has that capability; we have that capability, on condition we commit ourselves to develop it.

The question to which I address attention now is whether the fact that the United States is operating on the basis of a new strategic doctrine can have any significantly beneficial effect on those deadly missile-crisis negotiations which are still awaiting our attention beginning not much later than this coming October? How can a strategic ABM defense-system, which clearly will not be in place this coming winter, change the way in which the two superpowers negotiate over the relics of the Nuclear Deterrence Age?

My argument is that the mere fact of commitment to development of directed-beam ABM defense-systems changes the conditions of the coming missile-crisis negotiations in a fundamental way. If you are determined to reach Omaha, Nebraska by Friday, and if you decide to reach Omaha by plane rather than bus, you would not be terribly offended if someone attempted to prevent you from going by bus. Unless one of the superpowers is absolutely committed to conduct intercontinental thermonuclear war against the other before 1987, the most vital military-strategic interests of both involve the strategic balance which will exist during and after 1987. If we and the Soviet Union were continuing to rely solely on thermonuclear missiles into and beyond 1987, we would have fundamentally different strategic interests at stake in the coming winter missile-crisis discussions, than if we know we are both relying on the superiority of the defense against ballistic missiles beyond 1987. True, 1987 is not 1983 or 1984, but the way in which the two powers judge their vital interests during 1984, 1985, and 1986, will be fundamentally different if we are both committed to strategic ABM systems, than if we were still committed to Nuclear Deterrence.

There is another point to be made directly in that connection. Perhaps some Soviet representatives will stoutly deny this today, and for the next six-to-twelve weeks, but it is true nonetheless. The Soviet leadership's objections to the presently operational strategic doctrine of the United States does not arise out of purely military considerations. One has but to read Marshal Sokolovskii's famous and brilliant text on Soviet military doctrine. President Reagan has, in effect, adopted a U.S. version of the Sokolovskii doctrine. From a purely military standpoint, the President's strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Survival makes complete sense to a Soviet military traditionalist, just as it does to our own military traditionalists. Soviet objections arise not from the military side of the new doctrine as such, but from the longer-term economic and political implications of the adoption of such a policy by the United States.

What negotiated solutions the United States and Soviet Union reach during the coming missile-crisis negotiations, I do not presume to foretell in detail. My duty here is to indicate the range of options available to both. Others, not I, will direct those negotiations from the side of our nation. My duty is to serve as a source of relevant ideas to those circles of our government which make and influence policy in such matters, to give them the benefit of my best thinking on the subject. It is their responsibility to examine my recommendations critically, and to compare my conceptions with others submitted to the general process of discussion preparatory to negotiation of the nasty missile-crisis we face this autumn or winter. In other words, my duty is to provide an outline of the strategic parameters of the problem to be solved.

It is also my duty to report this matter publicly, in such a fashion that my thinking on this matter reaches appropriate places in Moscow and Novosibirsk. Let some Soviet spokesman publish some critical Soviet appreciation of my arguments in some location; it will not escape the attention of proper persons in my own government. Let them, perhaps challenge me to reply rigorously to their criticisms of points of my argument here. While we still have some weeks ahead to think about these matters, let us debate the issues of strategic parameters which might prove to have useful bearing on the preparation of those negotiations by the respective parties.

To this purpose, I look out of the eyes of memory toward the great von Schlieffen, among others of those qualifications, to attempt to show the mobile development of the long-term vital strategic interests of the two superpowers into the late 1990s. I shall do this by pointing first to three matters bearing upon the military side of the new U.S. strategic doctrine. I shall then examine summarily the past 20 years of Soviet versus U.S. strategic doctrines prior to March 23. I shall put myself mentally into the shoes of a strategic planner in Moscow, indicating how I, were I such a person, might imagine the Soviet Union achieving unchallengable strategic hegemony during the 1990s. On that basis, I shall indicate how the President's March 23 irreversible change in both U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrines, throws most of the leading strategic assumptions of the past 20 years into the scrapheap. More importantly, I show how the President's decision has changed in a fundamental way the respective, most-vital military strategic interests of the respective powers. It is my final argument, that if both powers understand what those new strategic-military interests are, this understanding points the way to the needed negotiated solution.

I. Outline of a strategic ABM system

If I were asked to develop a strategic ABM defense system today, I would put the following model of reference into an appropriate sort of computer system, and then assemble a task-force of qualified professionals to make suitable correc-

tions in the parameters of my original design. The basic strategic ABM system would have four categories of assignments: (1) A space-based ABM system, assigned to destroy between 93 percent and 95 percent of the maximum salvo of ballistic missiles and their deployed warheads entering the stratosphere; (2) A network of point-defense systems, defending all major military targets, population centers, and other logistical targets, using directed-beam technologies to replace the assignments of a *Spartan-Sprint* point-defense complex; (3) A general terminal defense system, to take out warheads escaping the space-based defense-system, and falling between the cracks of the point-defense system.

1. *Space-Based Defense*. I would start my design of a space-based component of the strategic-defense system by posing a hypothetical model-of-reference. I would assume, as hypothetical case of first-approximation, that I must destroy the functioning of the missiles and warhead complement of 5,000 missiles passing through the stratosphere over an interval as short as 15 minutes, moving at velocities in the order of three kilometers per second. To destroy such missiles I would have target-acquisition and aiming systems adequate to hitting and destroying a missile at a range of approximately 5,000 kilometers. I would place in space four echelons of batteries of such missile-killer systems, each assigned to destroy 50 percent of the missiles and deployed warheads surviving attacks by the preceding echelons. I would develop my first-approximation model of the space-based deployment in that way, because I happen to know personally that the basic technologies for this development presently exist, including the technologies to deliver a system capable of delivering 50,000 or more well-aimed missile-killer shots during the time-span alloted, and as many more as might be required. Experts who know of things I do not would be able to add improvements I am not presently qualified to suggest

2. *Point-defense systems*. Models of lasers presently exist which can be developed for such assignments. The decisive advantage of adequate directed-beam systems over ABM countermissile systems is that directed-beam systems have far greater firepower than is possible for a counter-missile system, and the bullets are much cheaper and quieter. There is the little problem of tuning lasers to penetrate the atmosphere efficiently for variable weather conditions, and such considerations, but within a reasonably short span of time a crash program could develop a system which would do the job, and would not be slow and saturatable as countermissile systems are.

3. *General terminal-defense systems*. I am not certain where we stand in this area, except to know that the assignment is within the capability of known principles of coherent hydrodynamic directed-beam systems. I am certain that some of our people in appropriate positions do know of laboratory or more advanced technologies best-suited for a first-generation approach.

4. *Anti-submarine warfare*. On this, I prefer not to speak of my knowledge as to techniques, except to indicate that this can be successfully mastered during the years ahead. Suppose the United States had such a system now. Suppose the Soviet Union had such a system and we did not. The answers to those questions ought to be clear.

Both superpowers have the scientific and production capabilities, either presently existing or which can be developed within five years or more, to create and deploy such a strategic ABM system. On condition that we send the systems analysts off to some useful occupation, such as picking fruit, and approach this task in the way we mobilized our way out of the depression over the 1939-43 period, with some memories of pre-1967 NASA research-and-development added, something far better than my first-approximation model would be operating within this decade, and both powers would have it.

II. Tactical beam-weapons

If we remember the Exocet missiles from a year ago in the South Atlantic, and know what present generations of missiles can do to planes and armored vehicles, what powers will willingly deploy such expensive pieces of hardware over the coming period without the fire-power of beam-weapons as missile-killers, shortly, our military branches' spokesmen will be pounding doors around this city demanding that the latest and best of this sort of thing be developed sooner than possible.

Broadly speaking, the tactical implications of directed-beam and related technologies will make a more profound transformation in the design and battle-deployments of arms of warfare than was effected, beginning 1793, by Lazare Carnot.

This may appear to be a departure from the theme of strategic ABM defense. It is not. Inform any strategist that we are eliminating missiles as a weapon of warfare during the coming decade, and in the Atlantic Alliance the gentlemen in question will launch into an agitated discussion of the matter of Soviet tanks. For 20 years, many of us have lived with and assimilated the delusion that terrible thermonuclear weapons made general warfare "unthinkable." That delusion led the world into the deadly missile-crisis we must face the coming fall and winter months, made thermonuclear warfare almost certain for the second half of this present decade. Under the influence of these delusions, we have variously fostered and tolerated attrition in in-depth capabilities for conducting general warfare, and have relied only upon weapons-systems of deterrence, at one extreme, and military capabilities for fighting local colonial-style wars in the developing sector, at the other. Then, one morning, we awaken to discover that Nuclear Deterrence leads not to "détente," but to thermonuclear holocaust. We act to make thermonuclear missiles obsolete. Suddenly, we hear men speaking of those awful Soviet tanks. Suddenly, strategy demands those in-depth capabilities associated with technological progress in developing the productive powers of labor of our economy. Suddenly, we must scrap the policy of drifting into a "post-

industrial society," and base strategy on the principles we foolishly scrapped 20 years ago.

I am not proposing that such developments in tactical capabilities will lead to general warfare. However, the technological implications of the indicated in-depth changes in parameters of defense will have a powerful, almost revolutionary cultural impact upon our society in general, and upon all features of national policy-making, governmental and private.

III. Effects upon the economy

Five days after the President announced the adoption of our new strategic doctrine, the Soviet weekly whose name translates as *Economic Gazette* came off the press. This issue, Number 14 for 1983, contains on page two a featured article written by the head of the Soviet laser program, Academician Velikhov, entitled "The Laser Beam Is Working." A few quotations from the article give the flavor of the matter. It begins:

> The development of laser technology is convincing confirmation of the determining influence of fundamental scientific discoveries on the economy. The laser effect, predicted, discovered and researched with the decisive participation of Soviet scientists, has, in a comparatively short period—a little more than two decades—gone through all the stages of development, and emerged into the open range of multi-purpose utilization in the national economy.

He summarizes the present picture of applications of lasers to the Soviet economy:

> Lasers can be applied effectively in mass production in the chemicals industry. They are very promising also for such areas as biology, environmental protection, construction and irrigation, communications, computer technology, printing, recording, and graphics processing. The potentialities of lasers serve as one of the paths toward solution of the problem of the controlled thermonuclear reaction.

To provide you a general sense of how important these economic spin-offs of military laser technology are, and to demonstrate why these economic spin-offs will be a critical part of Soviet thinking about the coming missile-crisis negotiations, you must have the following parts of the overall picture.

If we of the United States are not morally a collection of crazy lemmings jumping over a cliff of "post-industrial" collapse, we shall probably spend, in terms of today's purchasing-power, about $1 trillion, more or less, on combined strategic and tactical applications of lasers and laser-like devices during the remaining years of this century. For the edification of spies from the *New York Times*, let it be clearly understood that I am not leaking some highly secret fact of our government's present policy-planning. Anyone who understands the logic of the U.S.-Soviet laser arms race and also knows a few basic facts about the situation, will recognize that my estimation of about $1 trillion is a safely conservative figure. Perhaps no one in our government is presently thinking in terms of such large figures, but by early 1985 the majority of members of our Congress will be racing ahead of one another to prove they are not slackers when it comes to supporting our national defense in this area. The best comparison is found by looking back to the 1939-43 period of our leap upward out of a long economic depression. What the Congress was willing to spend in 1938, as compared with what it was willing to spend in 1940, is a bit of our history to bear in mind on this point.

The importance of this projected figure of $1 trillion is seen by asking ourselves not only what Congress will become willing to spend over the successive years 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987. We must also think of what a trillion rubles of added arms-spending means for the Soviet economy. We must throw into the wastebasket everything Robert McNamara and his Whiz Kids have said over the past 20 years, and go back to the way of thinking of General Douglas MacArthur, and Lazare Carnot and General Scharnhorst before him.

I am certain that the program I am projecting will cause the greatest economic boom in world-history in the United States. What Academician Velikhov wrote in the indicated issue of the *Economic Gazette* is only a hint of the sweeping revolution in medical science, as well as agricultural and industrial technologies, which should begin to hit the civilian sector of our economy by 1985, or even as early as 1984. This effect will be felt, first, through increased applications of existing laser technologies, technologies which have existed as off-the-shelf technologies for some time, but which we simply have not been using in anything approximating proper emphasis. During the later part of this decade, some of the effects of military R&D will spin off into the economy generally, somewhat as the case of the 1939-43 period indicates.

I predict that spending $1 trillion for military hardware of this type will not cost the U.S. economy a single penny. I mean that the increases in average level of income per person will rise by a much greater amount, as benefits of technological spin-offs, than we spend on military items which produce those beneficial spin-offs. It is true that military spending as such is economic waste; however, if we think of everything we spend for advanced military technologies of this kind as like money invested in a gigantic research-and-development laboratory, we begin to see in what way military R&D will pay back the economy many times for every nickel the Congress allocates to this $1 trillion program over the coming 15 years. It is not unrealistic to project that our national per-capita output in terms of tangible goods produced will rise by two or three times between now and the end of this century. This increase will

be effected in two interconnected ways. First, we shall reverse the post-1955 trends in employment in our economy. The percentile of our national labor-force employed either in production or transportation of tangible goods has dropped from 62 percent in 1946 to less than 28 percent today. Simply by reversing this drift into "post-industrial" ruin and rubble, as a 1939-43 type of mobilization will require us to do, could double our national per capita output and income over the coming 15 years. Second, once the effects of the new military technologies begin to spill over into the economy, we should begin to reach rates of annual increase in productivity of not less than 5 percent per year, slightly above those of the early 1960s expansion in aerospace R&D.

From Moscow, this easily seen potential recovery of the U.S. economy has the highest order of strategic significance. During the coming three to four years, the Soviet military sector can match almost anything we would presently project as reasonable progress in strategic ABM systems. But, could they still match us after 1986 or 1987?

If we compare the two superpowers' economies in terms of the misleading yardstick of Gross National Product, we have one picture. If we treat selling costs, and costs of administration and services as "overhead expense," the Soviet economy's performance looks much better than by GNP standards. The Soviet economy wastes much less than we do, but has a much poorer performance in agriculture and a lower productivity per operative employed in industry on the average. Except in the military sector of their economy, the ratio of Soviet investment in capital-goods production is poor. So, despite the fact that the performance of the Soviet economy is vastly greater than GNP comparisons suggest, their economy has still critical bottlenecks in the capital-goods-production sector. Our strategic advantage is our higher potential for generating spin-offs from the military R&D sector into the civilian economy. By 1986, at the latest, we should be able to afford rates of advancement in expenditures for R&D which would appear presently to be beyond Soviet capabilities at that point.

There is nothing which is properly describable as mysterious about either the military or civilian-economy feasibility of this program. A few observations on the scientific principles involved help to make this clear. Dr. Bardwell and others will, I am certain, address this matter in greater detail.

It is true that many voices, such as the *New York Times*, insist that this is all unworkable "star wars" technology; it should be remembered that the *New York Times* said the electric-light bulb should not be developed, and that people of the same views said such silly things as that it would be ten years after World War II before the Soviet Union could develop a fission-weapon, and that thermonuclear fusion was impossible. Others say this is all music of the future, no earlier than 20 years ahead. In some cases, these people are outrightly liars; in other cases, they could know the facts, but refuse to discover those facts; in other cases, even among some professionals, they are sincerely ignorant of some basic principles of Riemannian physics. We limit our brief discussion of the point here to the case of lasers and laser-like directed-beams of particles, and briefly indicate both the military and civilian-economy feasibilities involved.

There are two broadest relevant features of lasers and laser-like systems. First, if we concentrate even a fairly small quantity of wattage on a sufficiently small area, the concentration of energy, which we call its energy-flux density, can be made sufficient to "boil," so to speak, any material. This much seems to be explainable in terms of widely acceptable theory of heat; the second principle cannot be so explained. Second, lasers have a property which is sometimes called "self-focusing." This is described more accurately by reporting that each range of the upper electromagnetic spectrum has very distinct qualities of harmonic resonance. In one case, this focuses the energy on the molecular scale, in another the atomic scale, in another the nuclear scale, and in higher ranges, the subnuclear scale. To cause a laser to work as desired, one must tune the laser to monochromatic frequencies such that very little of the laser's beam is absorbed by the medium through which it is transmitted, and the beam is tuned at the same time to the part of the spectrum of matter of the target selected. Thus, what is called "self-focusing" of lasers at the point of their contact with targets, is actually a reflection of the indicated harmonic-resonance principles.

There is a precise analogy for this from bel canto methods of singing. A master of bel canto methods should be able to break a glass, but at the same time, the singer's breath will not disturb the flame of a candle in front of his mouth.

By aid of these self-focusing properties of lasers and laser-like particle-beams we are able, in effect, to concentrate the wattage of a beam into areas measurable, in some instances, in fractions of Angstrom units. No material can withstand such impact for even microseconds. There is nothing properly mysterious about particle-beams. The harmonic intervals of the electromagnetic spectrum above the gamma-ray range occur in the form of what we call in geometry "singularities," or what are more loosely described commonly as particles. A properly tuned particle-beam, accelerated close to the speed of light, is the indicated tool to be developed to the effect that a skilled workman of the future will be able to produce mutations in matter as a regular practice of production. Such tools are the ideal repertoire for anti-missile weapons. Until we have such tools developed for deployment, we shall make do with ordinary sorts of high-powered lasers, hopefully tunable lasers, x-ray lasers, and, hopefully, gamma-ray lasers.

The principles governing the way in which a coherent, directed beam does work on its target are, most immediately, the principles defined by Bernhard Riemann's 1859 paper, "On The Propagation of Plane Air Waves of Finite Magnitude," Riemann's proof of Leonardo da Vinci's earlier definition of the hydrodynamic generation of accoustical

shock-waves. The principles of this 1859 paper apply not only to such things as the "sonic boom" of a supersonic projectile; they are a universal principle of action in our universe, a principle which the Soviet literature terms "Riemann waves."

The slide [not available] shows two views of a plastic model of the mathematics of Riemann's 1859 paper. As you see, the model shows, at one end, the top half of an ordinary sine-wave, the ideal form of an electromagnetic beam's coherent, monochromatic wave. In the process leading to the production of the shock-wave, the upper part of the wave overtakes the mid-point of the wave, creating a steep front, which is the shock-wave. The greater the ratio of the height of the wave to the length of the wave, the greater the tendency to produce shock. Obviously, the shorter the wave-length, the more work we get out of the beam used, which is why the upper ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum are so attractive for us.

When such shock-effects occur at a boundary-condition in the geometry of the physical space being considered, a condition of singularity is generated, like the Mach cone generated by a supersonic projectile. A new degree of freedom appears in the physical space concerned, to the effect that the local laws of that space appear to be different after than before this event.

Although this is adequately described in Riemann's 1859 paper, the 1859 paper is merely what Riemann defined earlier, in 1854, as a "unique experiment." Briefly, a unique experiment is what we call an experiment whose subject is a relativistic change in the local laws of physical space. The significance of such experiments—and I limit myself merely to naming the point here—is that they are the only kinds of experiments by which we are able to prove experimentally hypotheses which pertain to the lawful behavior of that continuous manifold where are generated the effects we see as the phenomena of visible or discrete-manifold space. This kind of physics is obviously crucial for mastering those aspects of physical processes which by their nature cannot be seen as phenomena of visible space.

This 1859 "unique experiment," the shock-wave experiment, was designed by Riemann as a crucial test of his entire system of mathematical physics. Therefore, the significance of the experiment is, that once it has been proven repeatedly, as it has been proven in many branches of physical phenomena during this century, what has been proven is that Riemann's mathematical physics as a whole is the only competent variety of mathematical physics.

If we examine the kinds of processes which lasers and laser-like beams involve from any standpoint but Riemann's, progress in this field is not altogether impossible, but is very cumbersome, and is a succession of fits and starts, as one attempts to interpret the phenomena by varieties of mathematical-physics doctrines which are not the most appropriate for this work. From Riemann's standpoint, the whole domain is wonderfully simple to understand.

Therefore, we may say, that while great progress in the field will occur on both sides, no matter whether the best or poorer mathematical-physics doctrine is used, the power which wins the race for supremacy in beam-weapons will be that power which wins the race for mastery of Riemannian physics in depth.

Otherwise, the principal problem-area in which we must make rapid improvements is the matter of supplying the power to the lasers and laser-like beams. The best results demand large amounts of power at very high energy-flux density, organized in a way required for this application. This is the solution to making certain kinds of very good laser-systems operate within something less than a house-sized structure in support of the beam-generation itself. In space, nuclear fission offers an obvious aid in attacking this problem. Ideal, for both space-based and ground or sea-based high-powered systems, would be very small, controlled thermonuclear explosions.

Looking at both problems from the standpoint of Riemannian physics, it is clear that we have adequate systems available at the present moment, or will have them during two to five years ahead within the context of a crash-program effort. Some further developments are perhaps ten years ahead, some 15, and so forth. We have a general idea of the directions in which fundamental and developmental work for future systems must be aimed, and can estimate with fair accuracy how much time will be required to make such breakthroughs.

For reasons I have already indicated, we must not make the mistake of limiting research and development to military objectives only. Our ability to sustain and to accelerate progress in the military assignments depends upon directing benefits as early as possible to the civilian economy. It is in the injection of such technologies into the civilian economy that the race will be won.

IV. Soviet military doctrine

It is not necessary here, to go into the details of the Sokolovskii doctrine as such. A well-known translation was produced in 1975 by Stanford, which must be studied carefully by all persons concerned with such matters, and must be mastered by anyone preparing for the business of missile-crisis negotiations—whether in our Executive Branch or in the Senate.

The essential point of the doctrine is its insistence that general warfare can still be won in the age of thermonuclear strategic missiles. So-called civilian defense, by itself, does not make fighting such wars possible. As Sokolovskii insists, fighting such wars depends upon developing the capabilities for destroying salvoes of strategic missiles while those missiles are in flight. He notes that the United States had developed rockets as countermissile

ning of the 1960s, but insists that the Soviet Union has something much better in mind. He indicates lasers and other relativistic-physics technologies being developed by Soviet

scientists. This is clearly stated in the first two editions of *Soviet Military Doctrine,* although a crucial paragraph was edited out of the third edition.

Some Western specialists have insisted, and sometimes have insisted very hysterically, that the Soviets have dropped Sokolovskii, and have come over to the doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence. I, and many others, have insisted that this argument is rubbish. The Soviet Union could never drop Sokolovskii; to imagine otherwise is to show utter ignorance of the Soviet system and Soviet world-outlook. It has been the case that, during the late 1960s, we entered into a strategic geometry in which the nuclear offense had clear preponderance, and it is also true that since approximately 1977, the Soviet Union has appeared to adapt to Nuclear Deterrence, has appeared to quietly shove Sokolovskii off into the world of lip-service. The arguments of Kissinger and others on this point have been nothing but hysterical wishful thinking; the evidence was that the Soviet Union's continued adherence to Sokolovskii would come back to the surface as soon as the Soviet Union had completed its ongoing work on development of beam-weapon strategic ABM systems.

The Soviet Union did make significant adjustments in strategic doctrine. They did not dump Sokolovskii's doctrine; they modified its application to the new political, scientific, and economic trends which erupted clearly in the West beginning President Johnson's launching of his "Great Society;" we began tearing-down the scientific research capabilities of the United States and our allies; we began transforming our nations into the pathetic rubble of "post-industrial society." If the Soviet Union could but wait out our work of destroying ourselves from within, perhaps by the 1990s, the Soviet Union would emerge as the world's single, unchallengeable strategic power by default.

In such a view from Moscow, there was necessarily one sour note. What would we do at that last, desperate moment, before our position as a great power flickered out of existence? Seeing unchallengeable Soviet strategic hegemony assured for just a few years ahead, what would our reaction be? Would we not say, "Better dead than Red," and risk everything, including nuclear warfare, rather than accept Soviet world-hegemony? Since we were destroying everything of strategic value, except our thermonuclear deterrent, we would have nothing left with which to attempt to blackmail our way out of submission, except risking one great act of radioactive *Götterdämmerung*.

So, the Soviet waiting-game strategy demanded three critical elements: (1) Preparing militarily for the possibility that we might throw a thermonuclear strategic salvo; (2) Doing nothing to alarm us into dumping MAD and our post-industrial policies; (3) Doing everything possible in the way of arms-control institutions and decoupling of Europe from the United States, to ensure that we slipped peacefully past the point of no-return, into the age that Soviet strategic supremacy was unchallengeable.

So, long-standing connections between Moscow and points such as London and Manhattan assumed the form of a virtual alliance between the Soviet leadership and the neo-Malthusians, such as the Club of Rome, Aspen Institute, the London Tavistock Institute, London's Chatham House, and the New York Council on Foreign Relations. I do not suggest that there was any great amount of love wasted between Moscow and our influential Malthusians. The Anglo-American neo-Malthusians drèam every night of the internal crumbling of the "Soviet Empire," by revolts spreading from Eastern Europe, through the Ukraine, into the Caucusus, and Central Asia. For a while, Henry Kissinger and others actually believed in the miracle of the so-called "China Card." Moscow hoped for much benefit from its quasi-allies among the "useful fools" of London and New York, but privately nourished the confident murmur, "We shall bury you."

In London and New York, our world-federalist dreamers were so fanatically attached to their "post-industrial" utopias, that they simply refused to acknowledge any facts which might warn them of the actual result of turning the West into a heap of stone-age wreckage. On its side, Moscow placed its confidence in the admittedly great influence of those "useful fools" among London's aristocrats and Manhattan's patricians.

Now, with the President's declaration of March 23, the world strategic situation has been changed fundamentally and irreversibly. The new U.S. strategic doctrine, is operational, unstoppable, and irreversible. To the extent its implementation might be sabotaged by action in the Congress, that action would not change the doctrine, but would tend only to ensure that the Soviet Union achieves qualitative strategic superiority. If misguided members of Congress do sabotage the effort during 1983 and 1984, they will come to be viewed with bitter tears of hatred by a growing portion of our citizenry.

This means a crisis in Soviet strategic doctrine. It does not change Sokolovskii. Nor does it resurrect Sokolovskii; Sokolovskii never died. Rather, it unmasks Sokolovskii; it removes the disguise. What is changed is Soviet strategic estimates for the 1990s. Instead of being a pathetic, virtually powerless heap of rubble during the 1990s, the United States will be again the most powerful, most powerfully growing economy in the world.

Ask yourselves the simple questions. Since President Reagan offered Moscow Mutually Assured Survival, and an end to the worsening threat of Mutually Assured Destruction, why did Moscow not embrace the offer at once? If a neighbor had been arming to kill you for thirty years, and one day offered you a more or less fool-proof design for assuring that neither of you were destroyed, would you not think that a rather significant improvement in the situation? Ah, but what if you did not wish that neighbor himself to survive, and he said to you "Let us both survive," offering a fool-proof design for his own survival, as well as yours; might you not be a trifle displeased? Moreover, why do we not discover any substantive report of the President's address of March 23 in the leading Soviet press? There is certainly enough strong

reaction reported to the address; why no report of the address which prompts such violent rhetoric?

All the double-talk, the delusions, the deceptive games of the past 20 years are now ended. We are going to survive as a great world power, and our survival into the 1990s and beyond in such a condition, has made some gentlemen in the *New York Times* offices, in London, and in Moscow very, very unhappy for the moment. It will take time before Soviet officialdom generally becomes reconciled to this fact.

What alternative does the Soviet leadership have, but either to accept the terms of the new doctrine, or to go to thermonuclear war? There exists no middle ground. If they are not insane, they will accept the implications of the new doctrine. However, let us be reasonably patient about the matter. The President has given them a massive psychological shock; they feel themselves psychologically pushed around by a President who some New York patricians had positively assured Moscow was being turned into a "lame duck." Naturally they are about as happy about this development as a child who is informed his father just shot Santa Claus, two days before Christmas.

We have to face the simple fact that the Soviet leadership doesn't like us very much. They were nearly destroyed during World War II, and we planned to launch preemptive nuclear war against them, when peace-loving Bertrand Russell ordered us to make such plans during the post-war period. We have been stomping around the world, shouting about preparing to destroy them. For some mysterious reason, the thought occurred to them that they might be happier if we would simply destroy ourselves, as we have been doing since the 1967 launching of the "Great Society" program. Now, we announce that we are going to be around for a long time to come, and will be much stronger, much tougher as a potential adversary than ever before. For some mysterious reason, this latter news does not cause mass demonstrations of joyous celebration in the Red Square at Moscow.

If we both wish to avoid thermonuclear war, we are going to have to come to certain agreements. We are going to have to agree to deploy strategic ABM systems in such a fashion that no critical margin of strategic imbalance arises in the period of developing and deploying such systems. We are going to have to junk all the silly chattering about "détente" which began with Willy Brandt almost 15 years ago, and get down to some hard, unsentimental talks about planning to live peacefully on the same planet for a long time to come.

Let the Soviet Union keep Sokolovskii's doctrine as their military policy, and they must permit us to adhere to the irreversible doctrine our President enunciated on March 23. Let us situate those two doctrines within the general doctrine of Mutually Assured Survival. Let us use the coming negotiations of the Euromissile crisis as the first step in the process of rendering thermonuclear strategic missiles obsolete. I shall turn to that concluding point very shortly now. One more point must be interpolated here before turning to concentrate on that concluding point.

How shall we live together on the same planet? If we require help in clarifying our relations to one another on that point, I recommend that we turn for assistance to one of the greatest statesmen of this time, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Not only is she perhaps the most capable head of government in the world today, whatever Senator Daniel Moynihan may say to the contrary; she is the elected representative of the combined interests of 101 nations of this planet, nations and peoples whose fate depends upon the policies of the two superpowers. As we superpowers negotiate the future of this planet, let the voice of these nations—who also live on this planet—be heard.

For ourselves, we of the United States are heirs to the great, trans-atlantic conspiracy led by our own Dr. Benjamin Franklin. We are committed by that heritage to a certain order of affairs of our planet. We are committed by heritage to a system of nation-state republics equal in respect of their sovereignty, republics committed both to the development of the potentials of the individual in society, and to the individual's opportunities to contribute good to present and posterity through the exercise of those potentials. We are committed by heritage to a community of principle among such sovereign nation-state republics of the world. That is properly the higher purpose of the existence of our great republic. To the degree our nation as a whole, and our institutions of self-government may serve that purpose efficiently, the brief mortal lives of each of our citizens participates nobly in that higher purpose of our nation's existence.

For that order in the world's affairs, we must be prepared to live, and if necessary, to die.

Not overlooking the difference in composition of internal affairs and philosophical world-outlook between the Soviet Union and ourselves, let the Soviet Union as a sovereign nation-state join with us in what Dr. Edward Teller last October identified as the "common aims of mankind." Let us compact to defend the peace of the world, to assure the sovereignty of nation-states against aggression and subversion, especially the weaker powers of this world, and to make available to those weaker nations the wonderful power the weapons we are creating represent as tools of the work of peace.

Let us make the aspirations of the one-hundred-and-one nations for whom Mrs. Gandhi speaks our common conscience, as we deliberate the policies by which two great powers may live in peace for decades to come.

If we of the United States make this common cause of mankind our efficient purpose in existing as a great power, where in the world shall we find enough men low enough in moral condition that any nation dare oppose us in this cause?

5. The October negotiations

1. Until the President changed U.S. strategic doctrine on March 23, the vital strategic military interest of both superpowers depended upon the margin of advantage we might achieve by aid of a bit of cheating in negotiation of levels and

forms of deployment of strategic thermonuclear arsenals. Now, the definition of vital military strategic interests has begun to shift. The mere existence of the doctrine itself means that the missile-deployments in question have a significantly different value this coming autumn than they had up to the moment of the President's televised address.

2. This means, implicitly, that the previous form of agenda of arms-control negotiations must be scrapped.

Every crisis-negotiation, or related negotiations under more relaxed circumstances, must now approach the tiniest details of the matter from the general standpoint of the new strategic doctrine. Instead of asking how a shift in detail of arms-control agreement affects the balance of deterrence, we must now ask how each detail affects the balance of Mutually Assured Survival. Therefore, if discussions are not to break down, we must begin negotiations of the Euromissiles matter by laying down a general doctrine of Mutually Assured Survival. Until we agree on that point, we have no yardstick to measure what is and what is not of vital strategic interest to either party. Without that first step, negotiations become in effect a dialogue of the deaf.

At the present moment, this week, I would expect that the Soviet government would reject any such change in form of agenda out of hand. They would reject it partly because they are still boiling with anger over a number of matters, in which connection the new U.S. strategic doctrine's promulgation is only the most important. There is the matter of the West Germany elections, in which I am certain, the Soviet leadership believes that perhaps Vice-President George Bush played some part. There is the matter of 47 Soviet nationals, including diplomats, recently expelled from France, in which I am certain some gentlemen in Moscow suspect our influence may have been present. At the moment, they like us not at all, and the prospect of negotiating a new general doctrine is not at all pleasing to them.

Still, the brutal reality persists: either we negotiate this matter soon, or we risk general warfare by miscalculation. I think that by September or October, the conditions will become mellower, unless some tomfoolery exacerbates the situation.

There is a second complication. Some local fellows, such as Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker, have been campaigning to sabotage implementation of the President's strategic doctrine. The British and some others have organized foot-dragging on the matter of the new strategic doctrine among our allies on the continent of Europe. AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland is not being exactly a raving patriot on this issue, and neither is Democratic National Committee Chairman Charley Manatt. I doubt that anyone in Moscow actually believes that these sour-mouths and foot-draggers will be able to keep up their exhibitions much longer, but if you were a man from Moscow, wouldn't you relish the last ounce of every harassment of the President by his opposition? This is not merely supposition. Moscow has been issuing comments on the President's doctrine which are just plain nonsense, at best. No responsible person in Moscow, who remembers the initialled memorandum on agreed interpretations of the 1972 ABM treaty, could seriously believe privately that the President has in any way violated that treaty. No competent military analyst could believe that the new doctrine means nuclear first-strike. Such nonsense does not originate in Moscow; Moscow's press merely echoes the babbling of nonsense from the *New York Times*, the British press, and Henry Kissinger. I don't consider Moscow's reactions on this point particularly productive, but I must admit I find the reaction rather natural under the circumstances. Moscow is simply giving moral support to the current antics of Averell Harriman's crowd. If Volcker, Manatt, Kirkland, and Kissinger would stop these silly antics, Moscow and Washington could get down to business sooner.

3. So, while the furor begins to fade away, let us prepare to negotiate. Let us prepare to each bring our general outline of a proposed development of strategic ABM defense systems, as a balanced development, to the inevitable negotiations of this matter. Let us prepare to negotiate some flexible guidelines, which permit us to complete the deployment of a first-generation system as soon as feasible for both powers, and let us look at the matter of these pesky missiles from that standpoint of reference.

4. We can't rid ourselves of the deterrents all at once, as the President has stated quite correctly. Let us, however, find new arrangements which eliminate from both sides the dangerous trigger-mechanisms of Forward Nuclear Defense. Let us draw back to homeland-based nuclear systems—provided our Congress understands its responsibility in that connection. Let us prepare a process of transition over the period from now into the point effective strategic ABM capabilities are deployed.

5. These parameters of negotiations are workable, on condition that we reverse the drift into post-industrial rubble and revive world-trade levels to the point that the economies of both powers benefit from that circumstance, and we accompany the necessary 1939-43-style revival of the U.S. economy with effective reorganization of defaulting masses of debt, and a system of Great Projects like that proposed by President Franklin Roosevelt for the post-war period.

6. Let it be clear to us, and to the Soviet leadership, that President Reagan's action of March 23 did not simply effect an immediate and irreversible change in strategic doctrines of both superpowers. The President's actions have changed the course of human history. It will be clear during the coming weeks, that the United States is going to assume a more important role in shaping the characteristic features of world affairs now, in the period ahead, than we did during World War II. The Soviet leadership must understand not only that this is true, but what kind of a world we are now bringing into being, a turn in the course of world history effected at the brink of the worst disaster in human history. Once that understanding is assimilated, the negotiations will proceed, and with eminent success.