EIRSpecialReport

The surfacing of Holy Mother Rus: a documentary report

by Criton Zoakos, Director of Intelligence

During March 1983, and in reaction to President Reagan's March 23rd speech announcing the new U.S. Strategic Doctrine based on high energy laser beam weapons for anti-missile defense, the Soviet Union underwent a qualitative "paradigm shift," in its military, foreign, and domestic policy into what is best characterized as a "Third and Final Rome" messianic orientation. EIR contributing editor Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. presented this conclusion in "Yuri Andropov: 'Czar of Holy Mother Russia,' " published in these pages on June 14, 1983. Soviet policy at this time is determined by imperial messianic motivations shaped by the "Blood and Soil" ideology of "Holy Mother Rus," whose foreign policy component is the establishment of an imperial world hegemony known in Russian policy traditions as the "Third and Final Rome." With this Special Report we begin to present the documentation of events and processes which led to this astonishing but comprehensible result. All four main institutional sources of power of the U.S.S.R.—Mr. Andropov's KGB, Mr. Chernenko's CPSU, Marshal Ogarkov's Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R., and Patriarch Pimen's Russian Orthodox Church share this "Holy Mother Rus" perspective. Patriarch Pimen, however, because of the character of the process in question, plays the dominant if less visible role. This first documentary report focuses on the processes by which the Soviet General Staff arrived at its present "Holy Mother Rus" orientation. Subsequent reports will present the parallel processes which occurred over the years within the KGB establishment of Mr. Andropov, within Otto Kuusinen's, Eugen Varga's and Anastas Mikoyan's Communist Party, and within the Russian Orthodox Church.

Until 1961, the works of **Fyodor Dostoievsky** were illegal in the Soviet Union. During that year, the Soviet Communist Party started limited publication of Dostoievsky's work. Today, the Soviet book market is flooded with his works. Dostoievsky today is immensely popular—exactly because he represents the extreme form of Holy Rus chauvinism, expressed thusly in his book *The Possessed*:

If a great people doesn't believe that only in it is the truth (precisely in it and exlusively in it), if it doesn't believe that it alone is capable of



Yuri Gagarin, the first man in space, rendered as a Russian peasanthero, in this icon-like painting that appeared in the Soviet weekly Ogonyok in 1981. It was accompanied by crudely chauvinistic text, entitled "Son of Russia."

and called to resurrect and save everyone with its faith, then it instantly stops being a great people and instantly turns into ethnographic material. . . . A truly great people can never be reconciled to a secondary role in humanity, or even to a primary one, but absolutely and exclusively to the role of the first. Whoever loses this faith is already not a people. But there is a single truth, and it follows that only one of the peoples can have the true God.

Who this "true God" is, was explained by the Ukrainian Communist Party daily newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy* in a lengthy article on June 10, 1983:

Clerical-Ukrainian nationalist ideologists abroad and in the Vatican have raised a new wave of anticommunist propaganda in connection with the approaching [Russian Orthodox] Church jubilee, the millennium of Christianity in Rus. They are preaching the idea of an eternal religiosity among the Slavs and call Christianity in Kievan Rus the Catholic one.

The fabrications about the Catholic origins of Christianity in our country do not correspond to historical reality because Kievan Rus introduced Christianity from Byzantium, not from Rome. To spread Catholicism, Roman Popes, allied with lay feudal lords, repeatedly organized expeditions against Russian lands. However, their attempts failed to bring any success to the Catholic expansion.

Between the 1961 re-introduction of Dostoievsky and the 1983 Communist Party defense of Eastern Orthodoxy against Roman Catholicism, a tremendous cultural "paradigm shift" occurred in the moral, emotional, and intellectual life of the entire Soviet population, which has been ignored in the West by all except a very few astute but isolated observers. Most of our intelligence agencies and think tanks either ignored or misinterpreted the events. In recapitulating this process of cultural/affective transformation of the U.S.S.R., we shall limit our report to a certain number of selected events which, however, possess the characteristics of "crucial experiment," events whose occurrence proves the existence of large-scale processes at work.

Ageneration of Dostoievskians

First, the case of **Mikhail Lobanov**, staff member, from 1968 to the present time, of the Communist Party youth magazine *Molodaya Gvardiya*. For the past 15 years he has been indoctrinating the entire younger generation of the Soviet population, the generation which is just about now entering positions of responsibility and decision making in the government, in the spirit of Dostoievskianism, typified by his 1968 article "Prosveshchennoe meshchanstvo" ("Enlightened Philistinism"), published in the April 1968 issue of *Molodaya Gvardiya*.

The *meshchanstvo* [petty bourgeoisie, philistinism] goes about its business in a very up-to-date way. It considers itself abreast of all the latest developments in science and world progress. It just loves the piquant aspects of science—heart transplants, flying saucers. . . . It loves to talk about physics and lyrics,

about this or that electronic theory of immortality, and so on. . . .

Having no thoughts of its own, the meshchanstvo takes everything it can get hold of and turns it into something banal. Even great thoughts, great names are banalized. It tries to take individual genius and paste onto it a special little word to annihilate the significance of the heroic thought of the great man: Rousseau—"Rousseauism"; Tolstoy—"fatalism". . . .

The meshchanstvo has a "mini"-language, "mini"-thoughts, "mini"-feelings. Everything is "mini." And the Rodina [Motherland] for them is "mini". . . . They cannot imagine any other audience for themselves than mankind as a whole, no particular people [Russian: narod]. The people for them is something provincial.

Culture is an organic plant, unthinkable outside the soil of its own people. . . . In the history of peoples, one can recall periods when the oppressed, the as it were uneducated people gave birth through the organs of its self-consciousness—its national artistic geniuses—to the imperishable values of culture.

[They] have forgotten how to laugh. But look at a healthy *muzhik* [Russian peasant], his good-natured physiognomy—you think, how his open, good-natured laughter brightens up his soul. . . .

Imagine how [Alexander] Herzen felt, having left Russia for the sake of "freedom of speech" in Europe, and then beginning to suffocate in that Europe from the miasma of bourgeois banality. Then how Herzen burst out: "I began with a cry of joy as I crossed the border, and now I have completed my spiritual return to the Motherland. Faith in Russia saved me when I was on the verge of moral disaster."

Imagine Herzen's horror as he had fled across the border, full of hopes and faith in European spirital prosperity, and then it turned out that there is no spiritual flourishing, but only "a petty and dirty milieu of *meshchanstvo* which, like slime, covers all of France with its greenness"—shopkeepers, the bourgoisie, a faceless human paste.

One can imagine the question being posed to Herzen by an imaginary opponent: "So you talk about the Russian people, you sympathize with them for their sufferings. But what will happen when that people reach well-being, when it reaches prosperity? Are you sure that then, lacking that universal hunger without which a Russian cannot survive, our people will have any depth of spirit? Will it be prepared to deliver a shock for the renewal of mankind? Will not the bourgeoisness which you so despise devour the body of the people?" Herzen would have replied: "Bourgeois Russia?! May Russia be spared that curse!"

There is no more cruel enemy of a people than the trial of bourgeois prosperity. It is tantamount to paralysis for the creative genius of the people. And what then will be left of that people in the memory of mankind?

As long as a nation has not been paralysed into set forms, as long as its inner forces are still powerfully fermenting, albeit potentially—then there is historical hope. Can there be any such hope when the nation is brought down to the level of the simplest pragmatic ideals and needs? This simplification is infectious in the present world. Americanism of the spirit affects other peoples. National feelings are already being termed an anachronism. What can be the fate of peoples when, in the words of one foreign sociologist, Europe is nothing but a single industrial mechanism, where the interrelations between the many-tribed mass are wholly determined by technical and organizational factors? Integration is the word which these advocates of a "unified organism" use to spiritually enlighten the peoples who have been contaminated by the national "anachronism." Integrate in order to scrape clean that wild remnant of the nation, the people, in order to move everyone around in a universal industrial dance. So that neither the spirit, nor the memory of the past, nor language itself will remain from these peoples unburdened by all these relics, how much more successful will not the regulation of this "unified organism" be. No matter that this "integration" in the peoples leads to the disappearance of the Atlantis of original culture, that instead of a beautiful meadow dotted with flowers there stretches out some sort of naked asphalt highway, that the leveling leads to a standardization that is disastrous for creativity.

Sooner or later, these two irreconcilable forces—moral originality and Americanism of the spirit—will come into a conflict to the death.

Lobanov ended his essay with the story of how he recently returned to his own rural home village and was sitting in a small hut with local villagers. One of them had been a highly decorated soldier in the War, but he said nothing himself.

And that heroic Russian man sat unobtrusively there in the corner, with only the trace of a shy smile. . . . Later, as we were returning through the woods in a snowstorm, it occurred to me: **Leo Tolstoy** knew his people. No wonder he loved his Tushin. These were the people who saved Russia. And are they not the embodiment of the historical and moral potential of the people? Are they not our faith and hope?

Chalmayev: epic Russian soap opera

Second, the case of **Victor Chalmayev**, regular writer of *Molodaya Gvardiya* and author of at least eight major novels reeking of Mother Rus chauvinism between 1970 and 1982.

Chalmayev, in whose honor the term "Chalmayevism" was coined in Soviet literary circles, wrote the article "Inevitability" in the September 1968 issue of *Molodaya Gvardiya*, whose essence is characterized by the following:

The modern-day young person is probably surprised to see that in the historical novels of recent years such a prominent role is played by . . . tsars, great princes, and along with them—but by no means below them—patriarchs and other princes of the Church, Raskolniki [Old Believers], and anchorites. Of course, this is not an idealization of monarchism, even though Aleksei Mikhailovich in the works of Vs. Ivanov, and Prince Yaroslav the Bold in Val. Ivanov, and the founder of Tbilisi Vakhtang Gorgasal, the Georgian Tsar of the 5th century and the hero of G. Leonidze's poem "Samgori" are shown in the full majesty of their patriotic feats, their State reason, and their personal courage. . . .

This is the history of a people which sometimes by evolutionary means and sometimes by means of revolutionary outburst proceeded from one form of State and social consciousness, created by the concrete conditions of its historical existence, to another, more progressive form, until it reaches the highest form of social and State organisation of society—scientific communism and socialist democracy. But that does not mean that the entirety of centuries-long pre-history, the spiritual life of the Russian people and the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. should be condemned to oblivion. Alongside the temporary, the transitory, there is also in the efforts of Peter the First, Ivan Groznyi, and in the attempts of the reformers of the Church to change, for the sake of the Motherland, the Byzantine idea of renunciation of the world as the main feat of man, something majestic, which inspires us too with the thoughts of feats of historical creativity.

A great country cannot live without deep pathos, without inner enthusiasm; otherwise, it becomes overwhelmed by flabbiness and torpidity. What was needed was the all-overshadowing idea which leads minds to fiery passion—the unifying Rus.

What unique characters—pearls of the spirit of the people—were produced by the epoch of the Raskol [the late-17th century schism in Russian Orthodoxy].

In essence there was a historical paradox: the Raskolniki burned in the fires, and Russia seemed in the eyes of Europeans to be the counterpole of Reason. It had sunk into unfathomable sectarianism, wild fanaticism, and, after two or three decades, it then surges forward, catches up with and surpasses Europe, and the moderate and prudent inhabitants of the German settlement [the foreign quarter in Moscow] began to tremble like cockroaches in the cracks.

The popular organism sort of "stores up" these

spiritual forces which nurtured [Raskolnik leader, the fanatical Archpriest] Avvakum and [his contemporary, Patriarch] Nikon, these fiery surges and dreams. From them it forges the foundation for feats on behalf of the State. Once in a hundred years the Russian People emerges for a Poltava or a Stalingrad, but it takes a century to prepare for it. One must never be flippant towards the Motherland—a soul made empty by lack of faith will never one day become a Donskoi or a Bagration or a Matrosov. And even the religious energy of the Russians—perhaps not always, but very frequently—was in the past transformed into a feat of arms, into creative inspiration, in other words, into goals which were far from religious.

A review of Soviet published sources during the 1970s and up to 1983 leaves no doubt that systems analysis has now officially replaced 'Marxism-Leninism' as the state doctrine of the U.S.S.R. In fact, numerous books and 'scientific treatises' have been published throughout the U.S.S.R. which justify 'Marxism-Leninism's' right to exist on grounds that it is a reasonable 'subset' of systems analysis.

With genuine historicism, Vs. Ivanov depicts all the phases of the Raskolniki movement, portraying them not as something deliberately dark, savage, and sinister, but as naive, spontaneous attempts of the people to create an ideal Russia, a beacon of goodness and humanity.

Undoubtedly [the suicide of the Raskolniki] is far from a universal solution to life, but there is in it a considerate, filial attitude towards the Motherland which is completely lacking in the "logical" arguments of the traitor.

Both serfdom and capitalism are a sliver which does not have room for the thousand year-old, renewing Rus of the People.

This mentality is by no means typical only for the Kom-

somol or only for Molodaya Gvardiya magazine, which we singled out because of the special role it has played in indoctrinating the current generation of young adults in the Soviet Union. This chauvinist spirit also pervades the mass circulation Literaturnaya Gazeta, the mass circulation weekly Ogonyok, the prestige mass circulation "fat journals" Nash Sovremennik, Moskva, and others. The hegemony of the Dostoievskian-Mother Rus chauvinist spirit is exemplified by the fact that the 7,000-member-plus Russian Union of Writers is dominated by the cultural mafia around the current "dean" of Russian chauvinist fictional writing, Sergei Mikhalkov and his son Nikita Mikhalkov. Mikhalkov was the man who in 1943 wrote the lyrics for the new Soviet national anthem which, during that time replaced the "Internationale." It is Mikhalkov's Soviet national anthem, performed today, which characterizes the Soviet Union as "an unbreakable union of free republics forged by Great Russia."

Glazunov: 'The Mystery of the Twentieth Century'

The "Mikhalkov Mafia" starting from its hegemony in the field of fictional writing has also established hegemony in painting and the cinematic arts. As of 1982, "Socialist Realism" has been officially dropped as the state-approved style of art and, by means of a government-announced policy article, has been replaced by "Glazunovism." Ilya Glazunov is the chauvinist painter sponsored by the Mikhalkovs, who for years has been producing enormous canvasses of military and chauvinistic themes executed in the Byzantine-iconographic style of the Kievan Rus period. One of his most atrocious works—a large, complex canvass dominated by the haunting portrait of Dostoievsky and originally titled "The Mystery of the Twentieth Century"—was donated by the Soviet government to UNESCO. Izvestia's V. Novikov published the following on Feb. 7, 1982 in bestowing official state blessings on Glazunov:

In contemporary Soviet depictive art, it would be hard to name another artist, whose work has attracted such interested attention and such stable interest as that of Ilya Sergeyevich Glazunov. . . .

It is now impossible to imagine our depictive art without Glazunov's paintings "Russian Icarus," "Two Princes," "Prince Igor," "A Russian Beauty," "The Motherland," the series of canvases dedicated to the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo Field, without his brilliant illustrations for the works of Dostoievsky, Leskov, Goncharov, Nekrasov and other Russian writers.

The work of I. Glazunov is illuminated by the truth of life, by a lofty feeling of the Motherland.

In its breadth, this feeling is comparable with the endlessness of Russia's expanses, and its depth is commensurate with the age-old depths of the being of the Russian people, its glorious history. This is the source of the artist's consistent and inexhaustible in-

terest in historical themes and his striving to resurrect and visibly incarnate the decisive moments in the fate of the Motherland. For, as the well-known truth says, to love means to know, and it is impossible to love what you don't know.

But knowledge of the history, philosophy, and culture of the past is necessary not only for work on historical themes. Philosophical comprehension of reality, historical method of thought, and consideration of the moral and aesthetical experience of the past are all necessary conditions for creating artistic works on contemporary subjects as well. I. Glazunov's work fulfills these requirements with enviable fullness. He does not allow himself merely to "respond to" one or another phenomenon of contemporary life by focussing on its external aspects. He uncovers the inner tension of action and creates each work on the basis of spiritual values accumulated by many generations. assessing the affairs and actions of today by lofty ideological, moral, and aesthetic criteria. Therefore his heroes who are contemporary people building a new life, in a sense stand facing the past, the present and the future at once. . . .

With what love and knowledge the artist speaks about the events of the fatherland's history, about monuments of national culture!...

Ilya Glazunov is an artist who takes an active position in life. He travels a lot in our country and visits the hottest spots on the planet. . . . A great creative achievement of this artist was his monumental painting "The Contribution of the Peoples of the Soviet Union to World Culture and Civilization," given to UNESCO by the Soviet Union.

The *Izvestia* item was published barely two weeks after the death of **Mikhail Suslov**.

Cinema: Rasputin as national hero

The "Mikhalkov Mafia," also exerts control over Soviet cinema as well. Two films known to the West are typical of Holy Mother Rus chauvinism: Siberiade, an epic about the resiliency of the ancient Russian starik, the eternal wise "Ancient of the Days" who typefies the mentality of raskol'nikism; secondly, the scandalous Agonia, an epic film which glorifies and rehabilitates to full historical justification none other than the monk Rasputin, the mystic manipulator of the last Romanov Czar, Nikolai II! The film portrays Rasputin as the passionate personification of the resilient, passionate, mystical, patriotic Russian peasant who shall never cease struggle to save his beloved Mother Rus, who shall persist in his endeavors to save her despite all odds, despite the fact that her Czar, before the great crisis, is weak and irresolute. Czar Nicholas II is portrayed in the film as merely a king not experienced enough and not resolute enough for the circumstances: a pathetic actor in the great drama of history who,

however, is good enough to allow the heroic peasant mystic to try to save Mother Rus. This film was produced during 1972-73 but was not shown to the Soviet public until 1981. In 1982 it was shown at the Venice Film Festival and was the "shocker" of the year.

What happened to 'Marxism-Leninism'?

At the end of the 1960s, there was still serious official Soviet opposition to this new Dostoievskian-chauvinist trend. Alexander Yanov of Berkeley University, an immigrant from the U.S.S.R., describes in his book The Russian New Right how Leonid Brezhnev, then at the height of his power was in fact defeated by the "Chalmayevist" tendency. After numerous complaints from Brezhnev, one Vasilii Shauro, chief of the Central Committee's Culture Division, sent the Director of Molodaya Gvardiya, Yu. Melentsev, to a meeting with Brezhnev to explain his policies of cultural chauvinism and seek further support. Reportedly, Brezhnev answered: "There is no place for you, not even in the Party, let alone the Central Committee." The following day, Melentsev was dropped from the Central Committee but he was made Deputy Culture Minister of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. By 1978 he was the Minister of Culture of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic; and Shauro remained in his powerful Central Committee staff job, working in tandem with government Minister of Culture Petr Demichev, a patron of the Holy Mother Rus movement.

Subsequent to Brezhnev's defeat by Melentsev, a second attempt was made by the Central Committee's Marxist opponents of the new trend. An official of the Central Committee, A. N. Yakovlev, launched an attack against *Molodaya Gvardiya* and "Chalmayevism" in late 1972 and early 1973. He had an article published against *Molodaya Gvardiya* in the monthly *Kommunist*, organ of the Central Committee; and he caused a special session of the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be held to discuss the fate of the *Molodaya Gvardiya*'s editorial board. The Cultural Division of the Central Committee protected *Molodaya Gvardiya*, and its editorial board was not touched. Yakovlev was politely thrown out of the Central Committee and sent to Canada as ambassador.

Today, the ideology of the Holy Mother Rus is dominant in the U.S.S.R. It pervades every institution of the Social Sciences Division of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, providing the "scientific" justification for this dramatic abandonment of "Marxism-Leninism," "Proletarian Internationalism," "Socialist Realism," and "Dialectical Materialism." As we shall document below, this "scientific" justification is based on the introduction, on a large scale throughout the 1970s, of "systems analysis" as the officially accepted scientific methodology in Soviet scientific organizations. Subsequently, systems analysis was extensively employed to

rationalize the shift into chauvinism. However, rationalization or not, the massive outbreak of Holy Mother Rus chauvinism was proceeding by great strides. The inspirator was the Russian Orthodox Church, which today claims 60 million believers—a membership three times as great as that of the Communist Party. The secular brand of this chauvinism is organized by the Rossiya Society, whose official name is the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Monuments of History and of Culture. In 1982 its membership stood at 14 million. From 1981 to 1982 that membership grew by two million. Its leading inspirator and second ranking official is Academician D. Likhachev, who, in his voluminous historical works, has been arguing for adoption of the ideal of the "Third and Final Rome" since 1947.

The rise of systems analysis

A review of Soviet published sources during the 1970s and up to 1983 leaves no doubt that systems analysis has now officially replaced "Marxism-Leninism" as the state doctrine of the U.S.S.R. In fact, numerous books and "scientific treatises" have been published throughout the U.S.S.R. which justify "Marxism-Leninism's" right to exist on grounds that it is a reasonable "subset" of systems analysis. All of these items have been authored by prominent leaders of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, most of whom are also members of the Central Committee of the CPSU. For example, the current editor in chief of Pravda, V. Afanasyev, a member of the Philosophy Department of the Academy of Sciences and prolific writer of books on systems analysis, summarizes his philosophical world outlook in the following sentence: "The advances of modern science and its practical application conclusively show that the surrounding world—both material and ideal—is comprised not of individual isolated objects, phenomena and processes, but by sets of interconnected and interacting objects—systemic, integral formations of a certain kind."

Among the three-hundred members of the Soviet Central Committee, the single largest identifiable bloc of leaders is the military leadership. And conversely, the Soviet Defense Ministry has more Central Committee members in it than any other ministry. The second largest group or well-defined bloc in the Central Committee is those members and associates of the Academy of Sciences who are proponents of the systems analysis approach. Their ranks in the Central Committee include Leonid Zamyatin, Vadim Zagladin, Georgi Arbatov, Pyotr Fedoseyev (vice president of the Academy under Anatoly Alexandrov and chief of the Social Sciences Division of the Academy), V. Afanasyev of Pravda, and others close to the Central Committee and the Politburo by family and other relation: Julian Bromley (president of the Academy's Ethnology Institute), Boris Lomov (president of the Psychology Institute of the Academy), Ivan Frolov (chief of the Philosophy Department's Scientific and Technological Revolution section), Dzhermen Gvishiani, Anatolii Gromyko (Africa Institute), Yuri Kosygin, Igor Andropov,

Ye. Primakov (Geidar Aliyev's right-hand man), D. Likhachev (Mr. Third Rome himself), Vitalii Kobysh (a regular on the Soviet "peace" movement circuit), and Holy-Cowboy Alexander Bovin, China-card chief M. Kapitsa, chief of the Soviet Pugwash Committee Academician M. Markov, and others.

Systems analysis was introduced into the Soviet Union as an official state cult at the same time as **Yuri Andropov** was made chief of the KGB and member of the Politburo: 1967-68. It first appeared in the form of the Systems Analysis Research Institute run jointly by the Science and Technology Committee of Gvishiani and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, P. Fedoseyev's Social Sciences division. From there, it gradually became hegemonic in every policy institution starting from the State Planning Commission of **N. Baiba-kov**, to the Institute of Ethnography of Julian Bromley, to the Institute of Psychology of Boris Lomov, to *Pravda* itself under Afanasyev. Its application to so-called ethnology and psychology led, ultimately, to the adoption of the Third Rome paradigm shift.

In the end of 1981, Academician Julian Bromley was decorated by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet with the Order of the October Revolution for his achievements in historical and ethnological science. He is director of the Institute of Ethnography of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, deputy chief academic secretary of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, chairman of the Scientific Council for Nationalities Problems, etc. Bromley's philosophy explains, in part, the root-causes of the "Third Rome" paradigm shift. In the beginning of 1983, he wrote in the magazine Social Sciences:

The human race today falls into a multitude of different historically formed communities, such as race, class, family, state, etc. Among these human communities a special place is occupied by units now customarily referred to as ethnic: tribe, nationality, nation, ethnic group, etc. According to very conservative estimates, the human race has inherited from the past at least two or three thousand of these units. They differ enormously—both in the level of development and in size-ranging from archaic by origin, nationalities, and even tribes which now have only thousands, if not hundreds of members, to nations of many millions. Characteristically, 11 peoples alone constitute almost 50 percent of mankind. The seven largest exceed 100 million each. They are: Chinese (938 million), Hindustanis (180.5 million), U.S. Americans (172.2 million), Bengalis (138.7 million), Russians (138.6 million), Japanese (115.7 million), and Brazilians (112 million). At the same time, the almost 1,500 small peoples numbering up to 100,000 each, account for less than one per cent of the world's population.

In a book published in 1981, entitled Contemporary

Problems of Ethnography. Essays on Theory and History, Bromley develops the following general theory: Ethnic units are of great variety ranging from tribes to nationalities to nations. Successful ethnic units are those which are carrying their "ethnic properties" in geographically compact locations; less successful are those which are scattered. The place of pride among "compact ethnic formations" is occupied by those nations which are capable of creating those types of "social organisms," (i.e., the state apparatus, economic apparatus, etc.) which ensure the successful reproduction of the nation. These "ethno-social organisms" which arise from within the successful nations "in many cases possess relative independence which ensures the most favorable conditions for the stability of the ethnos and its reproduction." (Social Sciences, 1982, 2 p. 240).

Thus, Soviet ethnography, as practiced by the scientific and political leaders who run the U.S.S.R.'s so-called nationalities policy, has provided a systematic rationalization for the revival of the Third Rome.

The context in which such ideas were formulated is the telltale: From the beginning of the 1970s, the Soviet leadership has been trying to come to grips with the two most pervasive and intractable problems of social and economic management: the so-called problem of motivation, which has pervaded every Party discussion including the June 14-16, 1983, Central Committee Plenum, and the problem of the so-called "technological bottlenecks" which prevents the Soviet economy from absorbing the kinds of advanced technological investments which Soviet science could supply on a scale sufficiently large to make any difference in the civilian economy. Every single solitary gimmick of incentives, motivation campaigns, etc. based on "Marxist-Leninist" appeals or "material incentives" has failed miserably. Neither Soviet workers, nor Soviet managers display the slightest interest in technological innovation and improvement of work in general. Hence, the systems analysis boys at the Academy of Sciences have been occupying themselves with the quest for a solution.

The psyche as belly-button

The slogan was presented by the Academy of Sciences that "anything goes" in the effort to supply "motivation" to the population. Revealing is an article by B. Lomov, director of the Institute of Psychology of the Academy of Sciences, published in the end of 1982, entitled: *The Study of the Laws of the Psyche*.

That article, which has to be read to be believed, essentially addresses the subject of "psychic phenomena" and "motivation" in the same context. Psychic phenomena, according to Lomov, do exist. The problem is that some people insist that "psychic phenomena" cannot be explained by "objective laws."


In the view of some scholars, man as a whole cannot be objectively cognized; there are essential aspects of his inner experiences which by their very nature cannot be objectively grasped and are only accessible to the intuition that replaced causal explanation. Failure to understand that the psychical is included in the universal interconnections of the material world's phenomena and is subject to objective laws, also leads to declarations that it is a world in itself existing in space of its own.

After this introductory assertion that hesychastic omphaloscopy is grounded on "objective laws," the director of the Psychology Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences proceeds to the problem of "motivation." The essential question: What is really, the relationship between the "individual" and the "environment"? What is the interaction between "environment" and "soul"? Why do different "individual personalities," stimulated by the same external environment, produce different kinds of "behavior"? It is evident, says Lomov, that even if you control the environment, you still cannot control the behavior of the individual within the controlled environment. So, "The external conditions can only act through the mediacy of man's psychological characteristics and properties. It is the psyche that constitutes the link necessarily mediating the connections between external influences and behavioral acts. Thus, the psychical is included in the integral series of cause-and-effect connections of the material world."

Then systems analysis is introduced in a grand way:

If the psyche did not play the functions of reflecting the environment and regulating behavior, it would simply be unnecessary; if behavior did not include these functions, it could not be an adequate response to the environment. Hence the need for considering the behavioral act and the psychical process involved in it as a single system. . . . Let us point out that this systems approach requires a somewhat different view from the frequently adopted one, of the events and external influences that are usually assessed as the causes of behavioral acts. Quite a few concepts and theoretical models have been worked out in modern psychology and contiguous sciences. Without going into the details of these models, let us note merely that all these concepts and models regard activity and behavior as a system with a complex structure. [emphasis in the original]. . . . An extremely difficult point about the analysis of determination of activity and behavior is the fact that this activity is a selfregulating system and, therefore, an extremely dynamic one. . . . The most comprehensive studies of the problem of self-regulation of activity have been made by O. A. Konopkin. He showed that the pos-

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NOW AVAILABLE

Will Moscow Become the Third Rome? How the KGB Controls the Peace Movement

On May 24, twenty-five high-level Soviet intelligence agents gathered in Minneapolis, Minnesota with leaders of the U.S. peace movement to plan how to use the arms-control movement to topple the Reagan administration and put an end to the strategy for defense against nuclear war the U.S. President announced March 23—a policy that would give the United States the power to stop Soviet leader Yuri Andropov's drive for world empire, making the Moscow the third and final Rome. One month later, "Briefingate" of Reagan erupts.

This report includes:

- Interviews with British and Swiss observers of the Eastern and Western churches on the current status of the Third Rome strategy.
- The speech by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Pimen in May 1982, attacking the policy of using beam-weapons for defense.
- A grid of the movements of Russian Orthodox, Anglican, and Roman Catholic figures over the past year, showing their collaboration in setting up the present "peace movement."
- An eyewitness report on the Minneapolis conference.
- A Who's Who of the Soviet and Western participants in the Minneapolis conference.
- Interviews with leading Soviet intelligence officials revealing their "peace" strategy for the United States.

The report is available from *EIR* for \$250.00.

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sibility of psychical reflection of the object, instruments, and conditions of activity enables man to regulate the reception and processing of information, the speed of responses, the tempo of work and, more broadly, the expenditure of the operator's resources. According to **Kovac**, personality self-regulation permits to some extent the overcoming of the effect of external determination. That strongly interferes, of course, with the analysis of cause-and-effect connections in behavior and activity. . . . A complicating factor is that in psychological studies we often run into situations where cause and effect are separated by a time interval, which may be quite long. . . . Let us indicate one more important point bearing on the relation between cause and effect in time. In analyzing behavioral acts, we often tend to regard a single event preceding a certain act as the cause of the latter. In actual fact, however, a whole series of events preceding the behavioral act in question may prove to be the real cause. Each of them taken singly does not produce an effect—only their accumulation does, as well as retaining the information about these acts in memory. As Sechenov wrote: "Any spiritual movement, no matter how elementary, is the result of all the past and present development of man." That is to say, psychological studies often deal with cause-andeffect relations which might be called *cumulative*. It should be added that man's psychic development as well as the process of formation of his activity is heterochronous in character. For this reason, one and the same cause produces one set of results with regard to certain constituents and quite a different set of results with regard to other constituents. [cf.: Third Rome for Great Russians, Islamic Marxism for Central Asians, etc.1

Then, Lomov continues:

Generally speaking, correlation of causes and effects in time has an exceptionally great significance for psychological research and so requires special methodological investigation. In studying behavior, we come up against facts that bear evidence of predetermination, simultaneous determination, and postdetermination. It may be assumed that the specificity of temporal determination of the psyche is essentially connected with its reflective nature. . . . Still, the question remains: why does one and the same person act in different ways under similar conditions? It is hardly satisfactory to assume that different cases are explained by different laws. This explanation does not eliminate the question, Why? Why is one case explained by this law and a different case by another law? We believe that the concept of system-forming factor suggested by P. Anokhin, is extremely important for revealing the cause and effect connections in the behavioral act. It is this factor that determines in each concrete case the specificity of the psychical reflection of the object, the instruments and conditions of activity, as well as the level of dynamics of its regulation. Depending on this factor, one and the same law may be manifested, and is inevitably manifested, in different ways. The *system-forming factor* sets the direction of the action of a law, as it were. The causes affecting the system may be similar or even identical, but the effects may be different and even contradictory, and vice versa. Their connections, however, may reveal one and the same law. The effects systematically produced by the given cause depend on the system-forming factors.

The system-forming factors of man's behavior and activity may be: motives, goals, tasks, attitudes, subjective personal relations, emotional states, etc. The question of what functions as a system forming factor in various kinds of behavioral acts and actions requires special analysis. The question naturally arises as to where the system-forming factor originates and how it is determined and formed? Briefly, it may be said to be formed and to develop in man's life in society. To understand the laws of formation of the system-forming factor, we have to go beyond the analysis of separate behavioral acts, turning to another level and another scale of consideration of man's vital activity. But that is a different task requiring special consideration.

Geidar Aliyev's 'new style of leadership'

General Secretary Andropov's and Secretary Konstantin Chernenko's speeches at the recent Central Committee meeting gave specific marching orders to 1) the "Social Sciences," and 2) the means of mass propaganda and education. These outfits are a finite, known quantity and so is their leadership. At the top, is the Social Sciences Division of the Academy of Sciences. Chief of Social Sciences at the Academy is Central Committee member Pyotr Fedoseyev, author of numerous works on the systems analysis nature of "Marxism-Leninism," recipient of many decorations, etc. Right under him are Julian Bromley's Institute of Ethnology, which runs the "nationalities policy"; B. Lomov's Institute of Psychology, which profiles both the labor force and various ethnic sectors of the population in search of "system-forming factors"; then comes Systems Analyst Academician V. Afanasyev's Pravda; Academician Boris Ponomaryov's International Section of the Central Committee; Geidar Aliyev's (and Ye. Primakov's) Oriental Institute; Georgi Arbatov's U.S.A.-Canada Institute; Anatolii Gromyko's Africa Institute; V. Volskii's Latin America Institute; the late Maj. Gen. Metropolitan Nikodim's Russian Orthodox Church; Djer-

men Gvishiani's Systems Analysis Research Institute; Academician M. Markov's Soviet Pugwash Committee; and Academician D. Likhachev's All Russia Society for the Protection of Monuments of History and Culture.

Institutions not listed in the above catalogue are of less than marginal significance (except, of course, the Armed Forces and the so-called Party, which in fact is not a political party but properly, the *Nomenklatura*, or Promotions List of the Imperial Bureaucracy).

The June 14-15, 1983, Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU will prove to be a watershed in Soviet postwar evolution of greater significance than the death of **Stalin** in March of 1953 for the following reasons: It was wholly dedicated to producing a series of marching orders to the "Social Sciences" and "spiritual mobilization" institutions of the Soviet Union. The objective set by the marching orders is to "solve the socio-political problems of 'mature socialist society' by means of spiritual mobilization of the Soviet people." The keynote call was given by Chernenko, the spokesman of all those who in the past had presented obstacles to the whole scheme of "spiritual mobilization" and other code words of the Soviet systems analysis establishment, thus signaling capitulation of the older, simpler souls of the *Nomenklatura* to the up and coming "new generation" of systems analysis.

Before presenting the rich background of political transformations in the U.S.S.R. during the 1970s, which shall give meaning to all this otherwise trite and boring mumbojumbo, let me begin by first presenting my conclusions:

During the 1967-68 period, i.e., Andropov's promotion to the KGB and Politburo, the Soviet Union's leading game-masters were fully aware that the single biggest problem of statecraft for them to crack was the problem of motivating the population and the institutional problem of "technological bottlenecks." They then evolved the Aesopian doctrine of "mature socialist society," which runs as follows: "The period of material construction of the socialist economic base has been completed in the Soviet Union and we have thus entered the era of 'mature socialist society,' which is governed by different laws. The main task of this period is to increase the growth rates of labor productivity and to focus on the quality of production. For this, the government must primarily provide 'moral-cultural' and 'socio-political' motivations for the population."

Under the umbrella of these official abstractions, the systems analysis penetration was given enough elbow room to prove its case. In 1967-68 Dzhermen Gvishiani and P.Fedoseyev created the All-Union Institute of Systems Research. From there they proceeded to dominate virtually every policy-making institution of the Academy of Sciences, the Ministries and the Communist Party. Today, they have the Central Council of Methodological Seminars, which acts as the country's central clearing house which approves the methodologies employed by every branch of science, especially the social sciences. This Central Council, which exerts de facto epistemological dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., is run

by Gvishiani, Y. Ovchinnikov, P. Fedoseyev, A. Alexandrov, et al. Its work is to direct the methodological approach of all the research centers and higher education institutions of the U.S.S.R., but especially that of the social science outfits such as the Institute of Sociology, the Institute of Psychology, Ethnography, History, etc.

How to 'motivate' the soul

Once "Systems Analysis" became the official frame of reference in which any policy proposal found its justification, then the policy proposals themselves were dished out. The Institute of Psychology laid the claim that, according to systems analysis, we must reject Pavlov, environmental psychology, and stimulus-response psychology, and admit the existence of soul and proceed from there if we are to solve the "motivation" problem of the Soviet economy. It was accepted unanimously by the entire leadership of the Academy, including the ancient hacks who had been the leading lights since Stalin's time, including Academician Boris Ponomarev. The Sociology Institute claimed that according to systems analysis, the "moral-cultural" factors are more powerful than "material incentives" in trying to raise productivity. This was also fully accepted. The various historical and archeological institutes, basing themselves on the new demands of the findings in sociology and psychology, unleashed an orgy of chauvinistic revivals and engulfed the country in deafening paeans to Mother Russia's grandeur. The ethnographic institutes proclaimed that the nation is the basic social unit; and such things as classes, states, and economic systems are merely convenient epiphenomena of the nation, which justify their existence only if they secure the "stability and reproduction of the nation." Thus, "socialism," and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" are acceptable because they ensure the "stability and reproduction" of the Russian nation. Just as "Marxism" is acceptable because it is a valid "special application" of "systems analysis."

The gamemasters at the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Academy imposed their "systems analysis" coup d'état. Then the Sociology, Psychology, Ethnography, History, Pedagogy, etc. institutes presented their new findings. Everybody was ordered to identify the "moral-cultural" and "socio-political" factors. All the local party organizations were instructed to establish "opinion polling" centers or, as in majority of cases, to cooperate with their local Sociological Research Society on the subject of researching the "opinions and feelings" of their constituency. Then the orders came down that local party bosses are from now on expected to "take into account" and "respect" the "feelings and opinions" of their local constituencies, as these feelings and opinions had been interpreted by the local Sociological Research Society and Opinion Survey Center. The "New Style of Leadership" was for the party hack to go out of his way and share the "feelings and opinions" of the population, organize "moral-cultural factor" events around issues which would genuinely excite the local population. This "New Style"



Khrushchev with General Malinovsky (left) in 1944. Twenty years later, it was the Red Army chiefs who dumped him.

of Leadership" was being pushed in a low-key way through most of the 1970s upon all the 50 or so Obkom Secretaries, while in the back woods of the Transcaucasus Republics, Geydar Aliyev's "Pilot Project" was going ahead with spectacular success. By 1981-1982, when the Aliyev project had become the indisputable success story of the decade, the "New Style of Leadership" was pushed all the way with largescale mass propaganda, purges, "anti-corruption" trials, etc., which stripped the dying Leonid Brezhnev of most of his friends. In September 1982, Leonid Brezhnev was taken to Canossa, as it were, to kneel before Geydar Aliyev. Two months later, Brezhnev was dead and Aliyev was in the Politburo. The "New Style of Leadership" had broken through. In June 14-15, 1983, Chernenko paid homage to the "New Style" by delivering the Central Committee keynote of "spiritual mobilization" and the central responsibility of "social sciences."

What was the Aliyev 'Pilot Project'?

Upon becoming a full Politburo member, Geydar Aliyev gave his celebrated farewell speech to the Azerbaijan Communist Party in which he described his "Pilot Project":

Azerbaijan's economy, which in the fifties and sixties lagged sharply behind in terms of all indicators, for more than two 5-year plans now has been developing dynamically, at a consistently high, mounting rate that exceeds the all-union average. Not only the state plans but also the socialist pledges for all the main sectors of industrial and agricultural production and social development are fulfilled and overfulfilled each of the last 10 years. Fundamental changes have

taken place in the structure of industry, where a trend toward its faster development via the sectors determining scientific and technological progress has clearly emerged. Labor productivity, output quality and other extremely important indicators of social production are growing steadily. The results of the path we have traveled are eloquently shown by the statistics. I will quote just a few of them. Our national income increased by a factor of 2.5 during the ninth and tenth 5-Year Plans and the first two years of the eleventh. The increase alone in national income over the 13 years was R5.37 billion. Per capita national income almost doubled over this period. Per capita social product increased just as much. Industrial production in the republic increased 170 percent during this period. Consumer goods production trebled. Over the course of the 13 years labor productivity in industry doubled. . . . Gross agricultural output increased 170 percent in the 13 years. The yields of grain, cotton, grapes, fruits, vegetables and tobacco increased 80-160 percent and dairy livestock productivity increased 160 percent. During the 13 years, R21.3 billion of capital investments have been channeled into the development of the national economy-40 percent more than in the preceding 50 years. Fixed capital increased by R18.6 billion. That is 1.6 times the amount commissioned over the previous 25 years. The return on capital increased 30 percent.

Then, explaining how this whole success story started, Aliyev referred to the day when he was called from his KGB post to launch the "Pilot Project":

In the seventies the republic traveled a long and glorious path that was initiated by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party which has gone down in the history of our party organization as the "August 1969 Central Committee Plenum."... The enduring significance of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee August 1969 Plenum lies primarily in the fact that the principled decisions that it adopted and its critical, creative spirit inspired the communists and all the working people of Azerbaijan with faith, rallied all the healthy forces and mobilized the whole people in the struggle for purity in our ranks and for the Republic's sharp upsurge....

Then, explaining how it all was a special little experiment of the Moscow Politiburo:

Our achievements have been possible thanks to the constant attention and concern for Soviet Azerbaijan shown by the CPSU Central Committee, the Central Committe's Politburo and the Soviet Government and their tremendous everyday and multifaceted assistance to the republic. . . .

Then the clincher, how systems analysis made all this possible:

One of the decisive factors that predetermined our achievements was coordinated, scientifically substantiated party organizational work [i.e., the "New Style of Leadership"]. . . . The constant and profound study of public opinion, consideration of it in the practical activity of the party and Soviet organs and reliance on the masses' initiative and creativity occupy a leading place in all the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee's organizational, political, and ideological activity.

Aliyev, one month before the above-quoted speech had given more details of this

public opinion operation:

In this connection it should be noted that a large amount of work has been performed and considerable experience accumulated in Azerbaijan. As you know, we have a special Center for the Study of Public Opinion and Sociological Research attached to the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. Over one hundred organizations in the Republic have sociological services carrying out special research. In all raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, and primary party organizations a large amount of work is underway on the in-depth study of public opinion by carrying out special sociological measures. . . . The practice of the Azerbaijan party organization's work shows that here it is essential to skillfully combine various means,

that is, sociological research and polls of individual strata of the population on particular problems and to publicize extensively the measures which are carried out and in particular their results. . . . The implementation of profound sociological studies and opinion polls is of exceptionally important significance. . . . Another aspect of this problem is the effective use of the results of the study of public opinion. I want to stress that merely knowing public opinion is not an end in itself. Having subjected it to a good and genuine study, it is necessary to adjust measures which are being carried out and to implement additional measures. That is, it is necessary to build all one's subsequent work with a consideration for public opinion and a good knowledge of people's feelings and aspirations. . . .

Back to the farewell speech:

It is precisely via means of ideological influence that the Azerbaijan Communist Party has secured the widespread development of the population's initiative and production and socio-political activeness. . . . One of the main elements of our activity is moral education. . . . We mounted systematic, purposeful, comprehensive work to strengthen moral foundations and ideological and moral principles in the republic's life. . . . A harmonious system of moral education including all the organizations and services called upon to shape people's ideological and moral character has been formed in Azerbaijan. [This is the allusion to the integration of the entire Shi'ite clergy into the "Pilot Project"]. . . . Our wonderful culture possesses a tremendous force for people's ideological and moral and spiritual elevation. . . . The period of sharp upsurge of the Azerbaijani Republic has also been marked by major successes for Azerbaijani culture. Writers, poets and composers, painters and sculptors, theater and cinema figures, and representatives of all genres of art have made a fitting contribution to the republic's wonderful achievements, have created a considerable number of significant works and have enriched our people's spiritual treasure store with new achievements. . . . Azerbaijan's social scientists are called upon to improve the topicality and theoretical standard of their works. They must study more profoundly the history of our people and their successes and gains during the years. . . .

This is what the Psychology and Sociology institutes have been arguing: To improve productivity and the quality of work, the government must primarily focus on the underlying psychological needs of the population. Forget **Pavlov**, forget "stimulus-response" psychology and forget "material incentives." Admit people have souls which are shaped by great historical influences. Discover their deep-running

moral aspirations and adopt a paradigm shift in the administration of the country. The Aliyev case proved the point. From then on, it was all "paradigm shift" for the *Nomenklatura*. We have quoted above extensively from B. Lomov, the president of the Institute of Psychology, in which he argued in detail, basing himself of "systems analysis," that the way to motivate people is by discovering those types of "system-forming factors" to which people respond, and make government policy ally with such "system-forming factors." The term "system-forming factor" is the Russian equivalent of Stanford's "paradigm" and "paradigm shift."

In concluding the discussion of the Aliyev "Pilot Project," the following quotation deserves special note:

We have accumulated rich experience of the masses' patriotic education, of the propaganda of the combat traditions of the Soviet people and the republic's working people and of the collaboration between labor collectives and troop units of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla and the Red Banner Transcaucasus Border Military District. It is necessary to further develop this important direction of ideological work, to strengthen and deepen working people's ties with Army and Navy servicemen, to display constant concern for young people's pre-draft training and to educate them in a spirit of selfless devotion to the Soviet socialist motherland.

The Soviet marshals and the 'Third Rome'

Dzhermen Gvishiani is the indisputable and undisputed father of systems analysis in the Soviet Union. He is much more than merely the son-in-law of Alexei Kosygin. He is the son of a Georgian KGB general who was a close friend of Stalin. But he is more than that. He was the key player of the Oleg Penkovskii gambit, which the great Marshals of the Second World War played to get rid of Khrushchev. The Oleg Penkovskii gambit, when stripped from its popular romanticization, boils down to the following bare facts:

Oleg Penkovskii was a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) colonel who, from April 1961 to Oct. 22, 1962, provided vital information to President Kennedy with which to smash Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuba Missile Crisis of 1962. Penkovskii was an intimate of Marshal Malinovski, and closely aquainted with Marshals Sokolovskii, Rokossovski, Konev, and Zhukov. His father-in-law was a general in charge of the Main Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District; his adopted father, Gen. Sergei Sergeyevich Varentsov, was the commander in chief of the Soviet Union's Rocket Units and Artillery of the Land Forces in the 1961-63 period (the period of both the Cuba Missile Crisis and the Penkovskii Gambit); and his uncle, General of the Army Valentin Antonovich Penkovskii, was the com-

mander of the Byelorussian Military district at the time of the events.

Starting in April 1961, Col. Oleg Penkovskii established contact with British and American intelligence and started supplying them with a tremendous amount of military-political information in which were outlined the basic facts of the Soviet military leadership's disagreements with Khrushchev and, more importantly, the reasons for those disagreements. Those reasons, according to Penkovskii (and later substantiated by events) were as follows:

During 1955-57, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov tried to purge the Soviet Armed Forces of all Communist Party meddling; and in this he had the support of both the rank-and-file of the Armed Forces and the other victorious marshals of World War II—Sokolovskii, Rokossovskii, Konev, Malinovskii, et al. In 1957, he lost his fight to Khrushchev, and he, along with the other marshals, retreated to a series of special activities at the Military Academy of the General Staff, the single most important institution of the Soviet marshals from that date to the present. The Military Academy was then and is today an adjunct of the office of the chief of staff of the Armed Forces (Sokolovskii then, Ogarkov now). One of the unique powers of this Academy and its military faculty is their selection of every single officer of the Soviet Armed Forces who will be assigned to general staff functions in any military post—from the Defense Ministry to any divisional (and occasionally regimental) command. During 1957 and 1958, Zhukov and Sokolovskii gathered within this Academy an impressive group of military leaders. The Group included Marshals Rokossovskii and Konev, Gen. Maj. I.G. Zavyalov, Gen. Lt. M.I. Cherednichenko, Gen. Maj. V.V. Larionov, Gen. Col. Gastilovich (the commandant of the Academy), plus nine others not identified at this time. In addition, the following individuals were at the Academy during that time, as junior protégés of the above group: Nikolai Ogarkov (now Marshal Ogarkov, chief of staff), and Viktor Kulikov (now Marshal Kulikov of the Warsaw Pact Forces). Col. Oleg Penkovskii was also deployed at the general staff during that time and was close to its Academy.

From the Academy of the General Staff, the marshals launched a special project which had been taboo since 1936: to work out a military doctrine for the Soviet Armed Forces for the era of nuclear weapons. The above primary group of marshals, under the guidance of Zhukov and Sokolovskii, assigned themselves the task of working out a strategic doctrine for the era of nuclear weapons. The effort was signalled by the circulation of a private paper written by the commandant of the Academy, Gen. Col. A.I. Gastilovich. Entitled "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review." The paper outlined the tasks involved and, in a general way, distributed assignments to the remaining 14 members of the group. Over a period of 20 months, numerous papers were presented by the members of the group—initially circulating privately and known as the "Special Collection," and finally published in the Academy's magazine, Military Thought dur-

ing 1959.

The doctrine which took shape is known to us today as the **Sokolovskii Doctrine**. At the time, before January 1960, the doctrine boiled down to the following: "In the era of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Armed Forces must develop a nuclear missile force capable of crippling its adversary with one salvo, but, because nuclear war does not end but only begins with the first nuclear salvo, the Soviet Armed Forces must be organized in such a way as to be able to fight a prolonged war under nuclear conditions."

Khrushchev completely disagreed with this doctrine. In January 1960 he proclaimed his own strategic doctrine, the first time since **Tukhachevskii** that a Soviet spokesman had publicly addressed the subject of military doctrine. Khrushchev's idea was that in the nuclear age, the only thing which counts militarily is the nuclear missile force and nothing else. Therefore, according to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union should concentrate all its resources in developing a nuclear first strike capability against the United States and scrap its conventional forces to the level needed for domestic purposes. The Khrushchev announcement was accompanied by a demobilization order which drove approximately 30,000 officers of the Soviet Armed Forces, including hundreds of generals to retirement, penury, humiliation, and in, many instances, suicide.

This fed into an upsurge of massive discontent throughout the Soviet Armed Forces. The marshals tried to rescue what they could. One year later, in 1961, Marshal Sokolovskii himself lost his post as chief of staff. However, the Khrushchev-appointees to military posts were all backers of the Zhukov-Sokolovskii initiative, including Marshal Malinovskii, the new defense minister, wrongly reputed to be a tool of Khrushchev. (Every known pronouncement of Malinovskii's on strategic doctrine was the opposite of the Khrushchev Doctrine and, in general outline, coherent with the Sokolovskii Doctrine). The military opposition to Khrushchev was so enormous that every day it threatened Khushchev's stability as secretary general, thus forcing him to engage in two military adventures, the Berlin Wall and the Cuba Missile Crisis, for no other reason than to prove in practice to the marshals that his doctrine did in fact work.

This, at least, is what the marshals communicated to President Kennedy between April 1961 and Oct. 22, 1962 via the channel established by Colonel of the General Staff Oleg Penkovskii. Colonel Penkovskii, in coordination with Dzhermen Gvishiani, supplied the United States with copies of the secret "Special Collection" of the Sokolovskii study group at the Academy, along with other information making it clear that Khrushchev was preparing the confrontations over Berlin and Cuba for the purpose of imposing his doctrine of "first nuclear strike" over the Sokolovskii Doctrine. The Marshals, via Penkovskii, made it clear to Kennedy that Khrushchev's crisis-provocations were going to be based not on any realistic military strength, but on bluff. Penkovskii (a deputy chief of the predecessor of the State Committee on

Science and Technology) supplied the appropriate militarytechnical information to convince the West that Khrushchev's moves were indeed a bluff.

About a year after Penkovskii gave the "Special Collection" of the general staff Academy's strategic doctrine papers to the West, these very same documents, with only slight modifications were published in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1962, as a book with the title *Military Strategy*. Its preface explained that it was the collective work of 15 general officers under the editorial supervision of the (now sacked) Marshal Sokolovskii.

Dzhermen Gvishiani is the indisputable and undisputed father of systems analysis in the Soviet Union. He is much more than merely the son-in-law of Alexei Kosygin. He is the son of a Georgian KGB general who was a close friend of Stalin. But he is more than that. He was the key player of the Oleg Penkovskii gambit, which the great Marshals of the Second World War played to get rid of Khrushchev.

Despite Khrushchev, the Soviet marshals had proclaimed their **Sokolovskii Doctrine** to the world. Back in the United States, the appropriate agencies studying Penkovskii's materials, must have viewed the publication of *Military Strategy* as substantiation of the colonel's information. Under the circumstances, Khrushchev decided to go ahead with the Cuba Missile Crisis during the first week of October 1962. On Oct. 16, 1962 the White House had ascertained that the Cuba Missile Crisis was on. On Oct. 22, Colonel Penkovskii was arrested in Moscow.

After the Cuba Missile Crisis, the following events were of note: In the second week of May, a brief trial of Colonel Penkovskii was held in Moscow on charges of treason. The sentence was death but no information on the execution of that sentence was ever verified. The week following the Penkovskii trial, the Sokolovskii "Study Group" held a crucial conference—"The Essence and Content of Soviet Military Doctrine"—which was important for the future establishment of both IMEMO, and the U.S.A.-Canada Institute. The con-

ference was led by Gen. V.V. Larionov, Col. V.M. Kulish, Col. V.V. Glazov, Col. V.I. Vaneyev, Gen. Maj. N.S. Solodovnik, Col. A.M. Dudin, and Col. M. Shmelev. (Many of whom were later deployed to IMEMO and the U.S.A.-Canada Institute). During this conference, the Sokolovskii Study Group made the following argument:

"It is incorrect to see war merely as an armed struggle. The armed struggle only constitutes a specific and decisive sign of war. In an armed struggle all means are subordinated to the interests of victory: political and economic, ideological, diplomatic, and other means."

Right after the Penkovskii trial and the conference on the "Essence and Content of Soviet Military Doctrine," the second edition of Sokolovskii's book *Military Strategy* was made available to the public, this time with a preface that its contents had been studied and discussed by all the Officers Clubs of the Soviet Armed Forces and that those discussions had indicated that no editorial revisions were required. Khrushchev was already crumbling.

The next year saw the expulsion of Khrushchev in the month of October. Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov, then as now the czar of Soviet Military Industries, played the key role in keeping Khrushchev out of Moscow, and then in bringing him in for the Central Committee meeting which axed him.

Right after Khrushchev's collapse, Oleg Penkovskii's uncle, General of the Army Valentin Antonovich Penkovskii, was appointed deputy minister of defense for preparedness. General Penkovskii is important because, in addition to being Colonel Penkovskii's uncle, he was also a superior officer and promoter of the younger Nikolai Ogarkov who served under General Penkovskii when the latter was commander of the Far East Military District from 1956 to 1961 and commander of the Byelorussian Military District from 1961 to 1964.

Now what about Dzhermen Gvishiani, the son of Stalin's KGB general?

Dzhermen Gvishiani was Colonel Penkovskii's immediate superior during the time in which Penkovskii was passing his vital information to the United States. The outfit on which Penkovski worked at the time was called the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research Work. This State Committee had a Directorate of Foreign Affairs whose chief was Dzhermen Mikhailovich Gvishiani. Colonel of the GRU Oleg Penkovskii was his deputy. In Penkovskii's accounts, Gvishiani is described as an implacable enemy of Khrushchev, as was his father-in-law Alexei Kosygin, occasionally encouraging Penkovskii: "Don't worry, Oleg Vladimirovich, our time will come." After Khrushchev was disposed of, the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research Work was renamed the State Committee for Science and Technology, and Gvishiani was made its chief. From there, the offensive of Systems Analysis was launched, at approximately the same time as Yuri Andropov was made chief of the KGB and was inserted in the Politburo. Andropov, of course had his old connection to Otto Kuusinen of the Comintern but, equally important, he made his mark as a modern administrator as a result of his exceptional role in suppression the Hungarian uprising of 1956. During his tenure in Budapest, Andropov was working under the command of the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Kovev.

Military strategy as 'social science'

From Khrushchev's demise onward, Marshal Sokolovskii took matters into his own hands. As member of the Central Committee and inspector general of the Soviet Armed Forces, he was a dominant influence of the 23rd Party Congress of 1966. One week before the opening of the Party Congress. Sokolovskii and his Marshals struck again with another seminal article, this time entitled "On Contemporary Military Strategy," published in the Communist Of The Armed Forces. This article established two things:

- 1. The preponderance of the Soviet military in determining national economic policy and;
- 2. The establishment of "Social Sciences" as a branch of the Academy of the General Staff.

The article stated: "The range of problems of military strategy includes the determination of the bases of the building of the Armed Forces, its structure, the equipping of it with combat equipment and armaments and with materiel, the principles of using the Armed Forces as a whole and each service of the Armed Forces separately. . . . the determination of the composition of the Armed Forces for peacetime and especially for time of war, the making of a reserve of arms, military equipment and, primarily, nuclear rocket weapons as the main means of war, as well as material reserves, deploying strategic groups and organizing the all round security of the Armed Forces in time of war—this is the crucial task of military strategy."

The article further observed that the RAND Corporation and the Hudson Institute in the United States, and IISS in Great Britain, "are at work solving many military problems," together with a "technical center under the NATO Supreme Command," involving strategic planning. This work is being accomplished, the article emphasized, "by bringing together a huge army of scientific, military, and political figures who are formulating plans for an openly aggressive strategy." The article was written by Marshal Sokolovskii and Gen. Maj. M.I. Cherednichenko, his intimate collaborator from the 1958-59 days of the "Special Collection" at the Academy of the General Staff.

On the same day as this April 1966 issue of the *Communist of the Armed Forces* appeared in the bookstores, Leonid Brezhnev, now firmly in power, echoed Sokolovskii's argument in his keynote speech to the 23rd Party Congress. Brezhnev said:

"We have deficiencies in our studies of social sciences. Military science and its theory are component parts of military science. The working out of the theory of military strategy, in essence, represents specific social research. As in

other social sciences, the theory of military strategy is called on to expose pressing problems and tasks and to indicate the valid path to their solution, to serve as a scientific basis of Party policy in questions of protecting the country. It is fully understood that the deficiencies of social sciences, being published in our periodical press, are inherent in military strategy as well."

Subsequently, the Central Committee, on Brezhnev's instructions, adopted a resolution "On Measures for Further Developing The Social Sciences and Heightening Their Role in Communist Construction." The Social Sciences Division of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. was mobilized to implement the Sokolovskii-inspired Central Committee Resolution. Later, Vadim Zagladin popped up with an article in Communist, explaining the importance of this mobilization of the Social Sciences Division of the Academy, asserting: "That these problems need to be elaborated not only for purely scientific purposes but also for Party practical activity and for determining the most effective ways and means to ensure socialism's victory over capitalism."

The Academy's initial response to the Sokolovskii article and to the Central Committee Resolution was to establish, in 1967, the U.S.A.-Canada Institute and IMEMO. Marshal Sokolovskii sent the following personnel to the U.S.A.-Canada Institute: Col. V. V. Larionov, member of the original 1958-58 "Study Group" at the Academy of the General Staff which produced the "Special Collection," and co-editor of all three editions of Sokolovskii's Military Strategy book; Col. Lev Semeyko, author of Foresight of a Commander in Battle, Navy Capt. Georgii I. Svyatov, the submarine warfare specialist; Gen. Col. N.A. Lomov, author of the book Scientific-Technological Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs; and Gen. Lt. M.A. Milshtein, the chief of the Faculty at the Academy of the General Staff. From its inception, Arbatov's U.S.A.-Canada Institute has been controlled by and reports to the chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces who, from 1977 onward, has been Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov.

Marshal Sokolovskii sent the following officers into IM-EMO, the largest of the Soviet Academy's foreign policy think tanks: Gen. Maj. M.F. Goryainov; Col. V.M. Kulish; Col. D.M. Proektor; Gen. Maj. N.S. Solokovnik, Col. A.M. Dudin, Col. M. Shmelev, Col. V.V. Glazov, Col. V.I. Vaneyev, and Gen. V.V. Larionov—most of them original participants in the 1958-59 Study Group which authored Marshal Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy*.

During the same period, on the basis of the "Sokolovskii Resolution" of the Central Committee, the following additional Institutes were established: Institute of the Far East, Institute of Oriental Studies (headed by **Primakov**), Institute of Africa (headed by Anatolii Gromyko), Institute of Latin America, and Institute of Sociological Research (headed by **Rubyashkin**). Later, the Center for Methodological Control (title approximate) was established, to enforce uniform application of systems analysis methods.

The promotion of systems analysis through the vehicle of

the Soviet military, including Marshal Sokolovskii and the other marshals of the Soviet Union, occurred in the following way:

From Stalin's death in 1953 onward, and while Marshal Sokolovskii was chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, the general staff under him was obsessively interested in the use of cybernetics and computerized systems for the purpose of establishing instantaneous command-and-control for the general staff. The father of Soviet computer-cybernetics, Adm. Aksel Ivanovich Berg, was simultaneously deputy minister of defense for radio electronics and chairman of the Radio Physics and Radiotechnology Council of the Academy of Sciences during Sokolovskii's tenure as chief of staff, and overlapping Marshal Zhukov's term as defense minister. He subsequently moved on to become chairman of the Academy's Scientific Council On Programmed Learning and chief editor of the magazine Methodological Problems of Cybernetics. His successor as minister of defense for radio electronics was Gen. Col. A.V. Gerasimov, and his successor was Gen. Col. V. V. Druzhinin. This Druzhinin co-authored a book with Dr. D.S. Kontorov of the Radiotechnical Institute of the Academy of Sciences entitled "Concept, Algorithm, Decision," published by the Defense Ministry's Publishing House, with an introduction by General of the Army **S.M. Shtemenko**, who noted in the introduction, "The time has arrived for extensive adoption of automation in the entire chain of command." The entire book is a detailed "systemsanalytical" treatment of the subject of using computers in decision making and control of troops. The "systems-analysis" orientation of the Soviet General Staff is summarily presented in an entry in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, probably contributed by Marshal Ogarkov himself:

Increasing centralization of leadership combined with due regard for the initiative of subordinate direction agencies, a high degree of readiness, if necessary, rapidly to switch over to carrying out wartime functions, and scientific substantiation of proposals and decisions being prepared are characteristic of the work of the general staff. The broad introduction into the work of the General Staff of scientific organization work, mathematical methods and the creation of automatic systems of direction of weapons and troops permits the more operational solution of the complicated tasks of directing the Armed Forces in peacetime and in war.

Marshal Ogarkov was a known proponent of this systems analytical approach to integrated general staff command since the time of his service in the general staff of the Byelorussian Military District under General Penkovskii in the early 1960s, when systems analysis had not yet become the approved methodology of either the Social Sciences institutes of the Academy of Sciences, or the Communist Party, as is the case at the present time.