
Book Review

Part II: Ronald Reagan should read *The Price of Power*

by Carol White

The Price of Power

by Seymour Hersh

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In July, 1982 Henry Kissinger addressed a group of fellow cultists at the Bohemian Grove in California. At that time he asserted the policy guidelines on which he had operated during the Nixon presidency. Said Kissinger, the United States once produced 50 percent of the world's product; today it produces half of that. We must accept that we can no longer operate as a great power in the military and political sphere. It was the Kissinger doctrine he sold to Richard Nixon which became known as the Nixon Doctrine.

Under Nixon, the United States would systematically withdraw its military presence from Asia, while seeking to manipulate the region by playing the China Card. The war in Vietnam would continue until 1973. While North Vietnam repeatedly expressed willingness to accept a settlement which would have left the country at least temporarily divided, every opportunity was sabotaged by Henry Kissinger at the same time that he endorsed the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops. The United States became less and less able to carry out its policy, except by indiscriminate bombing of population centers.

The Nixon presidency

By 1969, when Richard Nixon came to power, the Vietnam war had already had a devastating effect on the United States. Nixon saw himself following in the footsteps of Dwight Eisenhower. He too would combine toughness with negotiations to end the war. But he reckoned without Kissinger's manipulations. Nixon allowed himself to be convinced that

the U.S. record in the war was so dismal that Washington could only wield a credible threat by assuming the appearance of incalculability.

Although President Johnson had declared a halt on all bombing of North Vietnam in 1968, Nixon was persuaded by Kissinger to begin surreptitiously bombing Cambodia. Initially this was justified as a means of knocking out the North Vietnamese strategic headquarters, located in Cambodia. Step by step this bombing was escalated and ultimately extended to a renewed bombing assault on North Vietnam. Despite the fact that Kissinger knew from Rand studies that strategic bombing not only does not win wars, indeed, it has the effect of stiffening the morale of the victim population, he convinced Nixon to go ahead with the bombing to prove that he had the ruthlessness to deploy nuclear weapons if necessary. Nixon would use the appearance of irrationality in making command decisions as a way of forcing the North Vietnamese to terms. This was Kissinger's madness doctrine.

While at first the bombing of neutral Cambodia could be defended under the doctrine of hot pursuit, since North Vietnamese troops used border areas for sanctuary, increasingly Nixon got locked into bombing as his only possible strategy because of the policy of Vietnamization which he accepted. The solution offered by Kissinger and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird to the pressure generated by the peace movement was to remove U.S. troops and substitute South Vietnamese troops. Since this was a unilateral withdrawal, the U.S. position was systematically weakened. Finally Nixon's only card would be genocidal population bombing.

Targets for the bombings in Cambodia were selected by staffs under the direct supervision of Henry Kissinger. Not surprisingly, considering the security situation at the NSC and the nature of the war, these raids failed to accomplish their nominal purpose—to interdict the movement of supplies and men. Further, the Vietnamese appeared to have advance warning. This reached tragic proportions in the spring of 1970 when Kissinger convinced Nixon that Vietnamization was so successful that South Vietnamese troops would be

able to carry off ground operations in Cambodia without U.S. assistance. Plans for the raid were made known to the North Vietnamese, who massacred the invading troops and carried the day. As a result, the air war was again stepped up.

The pro-American government of Lon Nol, which had replaced the officially neutral Prince Sihanouk, was itself systematically undermined as the bombing destroyed more and more of Cambodia. Ultimately Lon Nol was defeated, to be replaced, not by the North Vietnamese, but by the Chinese puppet regime of Pol Pot, who subjected 3 million of his fellow countrymen to mass murder.

Nixon was very bitter about the intelligence misestimates and the information leaks which led to the failure of the invasion. Perhaps he was suspicious of Kissinger's role, but Kissinger was still allowed free rein. As a result, not only was America's ally, Lon Nol, betrayed, but a chance for an honorable peace in Vietnam was thrown away.

In 1971, forces in the military negotiated an arrangement which was acceptable to the North Vietnamese. It would have put the pro-American General, Duong Van Minh, into power in South Vietnam, in place of the corrupt and universally hated President Thieu. Kissinger lied to Nixon, telling him the preposterous lie that "Big" Minh was a North Vietnamese tool. Not only would a Minh government have been the basis for a settlement of the war, but it would also have stabilized the Cambodian government, which was to have been included in the peace. A Minh government would also have made honest elections possible in the south. As it was, Kissinger backed Thieu's disenfranchisement of his opposition, ending any possibility for a settlement.

Kissinger rejected the solution because by this time he was negotiating with the Chinese and had promised Cambodia to his good friend, Chinese leader Chou En-lai. The game plan was to continue a war of attrition which would destroy Vietnam while destabilizing the Lon Nol regime. As the North Vietnamese wryly put it, the Chinese were willing to support them until every Vietnamese was dead. Ultimately, of course, the war was settled by U.S. withdrawal, and millions of Cambodians were to fall victim to the Chinese puppet Pol Pot.

In 1972, Hersh reports, Kissinger decided that he had to have a peace in Vietnam before the elections, in order to re-establish his position with Nixon, who was moving to fire him. The indications were that Nixon would be re-elected by such a large margin of popular support that he might feel free to get rid of Kissinger. Kissinger needed a public success.

At that point Kissinger went for the kind of compromise solution which he had rejected the year before. But whereas in 1971, the political solution would have been easy, this was no longer the case. In 1971, there were elections in South Vietnam. Only extreme U.S. pressure maintained President Thieu in power. Without this intervention, Minh would have won the election. In 1972 Thieu was "legally" back in power. Kissinger negotiated a separate peace with the North Viet-



Philip Ulanovsky/NSIPS

namese which he then sought to impose on Thieu. Nixon refused to back him by forcing Thieu to accede, and the peace blew up. Kissinger, of course, never forgave Nixon for this public humiliation, and Watergate soon followed.

A peace settlement was negotiated in 1973 which did not extend to a cease-fire in Cambodia. By now the Khmer Rouge had sufficient strength to be independent of North Vietnamese control in any case. By 1975, the Vietnamese had been reunited. Kissinger was then Secretary of State. The following incident occurred, as reported in the Sept. 29, 1981 issue of *EIR* by Daniel Sneider, on location in Cambodia.

"In March 1975, not long before the end of the Lon Nol regime, P. was a witness to goings-on between senior army officers of the regime and the American advisers who were pulling out. In March he attended a special briefing given by an American colonel to top Lon Nol officers. They were told that the U.S. was pulling out but that they should not worry, as there would soon be peace in Kampuchea—*peace between the regime and its Khmer Rouge opponents.*

"P. said that one of his friends was told something still more explicit in private. Those assurances, one U.S. officer confided to a Kampuchean officer, were based on the fact that the United States was in touch with both sides of the

conflict. Even more, he was informed that the United States had been funneling funds to Khieu Samphan, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, through a Khmer Rouge support group in Paris. Something P. also suspects, which I have heard elsewhere before, is that the United States had a deal with the Chinese to let the Khmer Rouge win."

Shuttle diplomacy and the back channel

Nixon's suspicions had been aroused by the misfired Cambodian invasion. By February 1972, when Nixon himself got to China and learned that Kissinger had bargained away Taiwan during negotiations for the summit, his suspicions were increased. There followed a last-minute scramble to change the wording of the final communiqué to remove the promise of immediate withdrawal of American troops from the island.

By the May Moscow summit, Nixon was more than suspicious. Despite explicit orders from Nixon to refrain from discussing arms limitation, Kissinger linked the summit to arms negotiations and began to bargain away America's defensive capabilities. He negotiated an antiballistic missile defense treaty which overlooked the Soviet ABM defense perimeter then in place, as well as their published plans to develop laser and electron beam defense systems, all of which were known to him. (Oddly, Hersh accepts Kissinger's ignorance on these questions despite the fact that Kissinger was a consultant on arms questions during the Kennedy and Johnson era and attended several Pugwash conferences.)

Even given the anti-war climate in Congress, and the notorious pro-Pugwash proclivities of professional arms negotiators, Gerard Smith, the chief arms negotiator for SALT I, was appalled by the extent of the Kissinger giveaway to the Soviets. "My central concern," he wrote, "remained. . . [that] the free ride struck me as completely unacceptable. I knew of no way to justify such a bonus for them and recommended to the President that it not be accepted."

As Hersh recounts, "Smith later learned, to his dismay, that Nixon, in a letter delivered to the Soviets on the last day of the summit, had explicitly backed down on the 'right' to dismantle Titans for more submarines. Nixon's retreat was all the more distressing to the SALT delegation because it was unilateral; the United States was giving up a right to convert old missiles into additional submarines in exchange for nothing." As Hersh points out, Kissinger had fabricated the statistics to overstate the then current rate of Soviet military buildup in order to pretend that the treaty was actually restraining them. While Nixon did not understand this, the professional arms negotiators were aghast—not, it appears, at the consequences for U.S. military superiority, but rather at the grossness of the exaggerations.

Kissinger was able to sell Nixon on the ABM treaty because the peace movement had made it virtually impossible to get any defense spending through Congress. The idea was

that the United States didn't have to worry about arms limitations since Congress would prevent a serious military buildup in any case. Nixon was finally sold on a SALT treaty which deliberately overestimated figures on the rate of production of Soviet submarine and missile capabilities in order to allow the Soviets a major advantage in the armaments race. They are still cashing in on the advantage Kissinger gave them today.

Increasingly, Kissinger's brinkmanship dominated every area of U.S. foreign policy, creating crises where there were none. Hersh reports how Kissinger manufactured a new Cuban crisis, an instance where his incompetence was ludicrous. Intelligence reports showed the construction of soccer fields by the Cubans. Kissinger insisted, mistakenly, that the Cubans only played baseball; therefore the existence of these fields proved that the Soviets were developing a submarine base in Cuba. In another instance, he conspired to bring Hafez Assad, now president of Syria, to power: he claimed that a minor tank incursion by Syria into Jordan was a major invasion. Nixon was convinced that the invasion was inspired by the Soviets, and allowed Kissinger to threaten the Soviets. War was "averted"; Kissinger got the credit, and, as a by-product, the Syrian army was undermined.

The cowboy profile

Kissinger manipulated Nixon by tried and true Tavistock Institute methods, based upon Nixon's profile: the imperative was to act tough. This, of course, is the same profile which is used to manipulate the President today.

In November 1972, after Kissinger's peace effort was "sabotaged" by President Nixon, he gave an interview with Oriana Fallaci in which this gross little man said of himself: "The main point stems from the fact that I've always acted alone. Americans admire that enormously. Americans admire the cowboy leading the caravan alone astride his horse, the cowboy entering the village or city alone on his horse. Without even a pistol, maybe, because he doesn't go in for shooting. He acts, that's all: aiming at the right spot at the right time. A Wild West tale, if you like." This is not interesting as a revelation about Kissinger; it is interesting as a clear statement of the cowboy profile, and its appeal to the American population at large as well as their unfortunate presidents.

Kissinger justified his actions on the basis of a strategy for achieving a new global accord. The hidden assumption was that the Vietnam war had proved that the United States could no longer operate as a great power. The American Century was over. We must be willing to trade spheres of influence with the Soviets. In place of real power we must substitute brinkmanship and the aura of power.

Seymour Hersh describes Kissinger as a man corrupted by power, who acted against his better judgment, and many times showed poor judgment. Was this the case? If we look

back on the Kissinger years, they mark a turning point for the United States. Then began the process, which continued under the Carter regime, in which, one by one, America's allies were destroyed or alienated. Then began the process by which the Soviets were able to overtake the United States on the military front. Then was consolidated a cynicism about politics from which the nation has yet to recover. It was then that we finally lost the notion that the United States should be a positive moral force in the world.

If we look at the record dispassionately, it is here that we must part company with Hersh. In the period in which Kissinger was in power (which of course also spans the Ford presidency), under the guise of negotiating détente, Kissinger handed over more and more to the Soviets.

Perhaps the classic example was his rejection of Egyptian President Sadat's overtures to the United States. Even when Sadat threw his Soviet advisers out of the country, Kissinger was unwilling to allow him to settle the Egyptian-Israeli dispute and reopen the Suez canal. Under the pretext that Egypt was a client state of the Soviets, he refused to deal with Egypt separately from the Soviets. Was this merely a tilt toward the Israelis? As Hersh himself documents, Kissinger insisted that Israel maintain a hard line toward Egypt even at times when they might have wished to bargain.

Kissinger did not serve the interests of the United States. The question is raised as to whose interests he sought to serve.

Who is Henry Kissinger?

In 1958, Kissinger's closest associate, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, was accused of leaking classified information to Israeli intelligence. In April 1973 he was appointed Undersecretary of the Treasury, only to again be charged before the Senate with being a security risk. The appointment was withdrawn and he was appointed by Kissinger as a counselor to the State Department. In April 1976 Ronald Reagan correctly attacked a speech by Sonnenfeldt in which Sonnenfeldt enunciated his and Kissinger's "détente" thesis of convergence. That speech sanctioned Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe on the basis that the grip of the communist parties in the East block was weakening in favor of new institutions which would act as power factors.

Kissinger's undergraduate dissertation at Harvard was on the same theme. In this 300-page paper, entitled "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee, and Kant," he put forward Toynbee's thesis on the resurgence of a Third Roman Empire which would be built upon the basis of a theosophically reworked Gnostic pseudo-Christianity. The decline of Western civilization would be the forcing ground for a new cultural spirituality.

As *EIR* has reported, both the Russians and the Western oligarchy have before them the Persian model of empire upon which the first Rome was based. Kissinger has remained a thorough disciple of Toynbee, even repeating his criticisms

of Gibbons's attacks upon Christianity, while accepting his basic thesis of empire.

Kissinger's personal history begins in Germany, from which his parents, as Jews, were forced to emigrate, first to London and then to New York. He joined the army from high school during World War II. At that time he only aspired to a career as an accountant, but like many other foreign-born GIs he was quickly assimilated into military intelligence. After the war he stayed on in active duty in occupied West Germany, where he was assigned to the 970th CIC Detachment. Its functions included support for the recruitment of ex-Nazi intelligence officers for anti-Soviet operations inside the Soviet block. As John Loftus documents in *The Belarus Secret*, this unit assimilated a section of the Ukrainian Waffen SS into U.S. intelligence functions as part of the OSS operations. The personnel in question had been directly involved in massive genocide against the Jews.

Not only were these people laundered through U.S. emigration, but through this operation, the Soviet KGB was able to launder a sizeable number of their own Ukrainian double agents, who were thereby placed at the center of U.S. anti-Soviet espionage operations. Not too surprisingly, these operations uniformly failed. Sonnenfeldt also worked in this unit.

Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt's sponsor at this time was Fritz Kraemer, a German who had been educated at the London School of Economics, and was subsequently a member of Nazi finance minister Hjalmar Schacht's party. Kraemer had also been an international leader of the Socialist International and a close associate of Jay Lovestone of the AFL-CIO, a one-time secretary general of the U.S. Communist Party. Thus Kraemer was involved with Nazi-communist links before he joined military intelligence.

After the war Kraemer helped Kissinger enroll at Harvard where he obtained his B.A. in 1950 and his Ph.D. in 1954. During his eight years at Harvard, Kissinger came under the influence of Prof. William Yandell Elliott, who had been a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford. Elliot worked closely with Arnold Toynbee's successor at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, John Wheeler-Bennett, who in turn, put Kissinger in touch with Sir Isaiah Berlin, a British expert on Russian studies at Oxford who was suspected of being the homosexual lover of Anglo-Soviet spy, Guy Burgess. Sonnenfeldt went to Johns Hopkins University and then into the Soviet affairs bureau of the Research and Analysis division of the State Department.

These are the facts that President Reagan should take into consideration. He should ponder long and hard bringing back to power as a Central American expert the man who in 1969 told the Chilean ambassador: "Nothing important can come from the South. History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo."