

spokesmen as well as by Edward Teller in Erice, Sicily, but the Soviets rejected it.”

Instead, said Zoakos, the Soviets shot down a Korean jet, perpetrated a massacre of South Korean leaders in Burma, and caused 200 U.S. marines to be blown up. Then some people in Washington began to wake up, and the U.S. moved against the Soviet operation in Grenada. “There is no doubt that we are headed for a confrontation. We are concerned that we have the right kind of response, that we do not capitulate to the Soviet blackmail and that we do not blow up the world. The essential epistemological miscalculation of the Soviets is their miscalculation of the American nation. Having seen the post-Vietnam mind in America, the Soviets are expecting capitulation. But there is something about the nature of the American nation: We have never been defeated in any major war, and we won’t just lie down and die. In a certain sense, we are incapable of capitulation to nuclear blackmail. . . .

“As of late summer, the Soviet political process has been in the hands of the military. The Soviets have no military objection to developing beam weapons. They are horrified of *our* developing them, particularly in the civilian applications. Beam technologies would give us a 400-500 percent increase in industrial productivity. The Soviet system cannot assimilate such economic applications. This will leave them behind. They are not economically or technically capable of taking advantage of beam technologies.”

The United States is entering this crisis with dangerous delusions, Zoakos warned. Our strategists do not even understand the Soviet order of battle, and have based hopes for peace on arms control agreements which do not respond in any way to the realities of Soviet military doctrine. Take the SS-20 missiles: These are not needed to cover continental Western European targets, but we are systematically suppressing the suspicion that the SS-20s are actually assigned an antisubmarine mission.

“If the Soviets go for a first strike, 90 percent of our land ICBMs will be destroyed. This is the universally accepted judgment. The answer our military people give to this is that we have a sea-based deterrent. But our submarines cannot shoot at a serious Soviet target from most of our submarine ports. . . . In a first strike, the Soviets just need to identify and destroy 15 American submarines in well-known areas, that’s it.”

“Our delusions,” Zoakos concluded, “are based on MAD. Our analysts assume that the Soviets have structured their analysis the same way. The net effect is that ‘we don’t know from nothin’ about the Soviet order of battle. In the 1960s, Gen. Danny Graham and others deliberately misestimated the number of Vietcong fighting the Vietnam war. Their rationale was that the political reaction in the country would be outrage if people knew the truth. The result of this lying was the Tet offensive. Are we going to be caught with another Tet offensive, simply because certain people won’t disabuse

themselves of MAD? If a realistic picture were put together, everyone would realize that we have a colossal failure on our hands. But careers have been built on MAD. Henry Kissinger, for example, wrote the book on MAD, and his reputation would go.

“What is the answer? How do we proceed now that we are inside this mess? The Soviets will probably respond with another act of terror. When this happens, Congress will have to change. How many KALs, Beiruts, can we take? This is not something of our own choosing. We have been bullied into this. But we have to select the agenda now. We have to force the Soviets to back down. We have to go with a multifaceted program for antimissile defense. We have to break out of our self-imposed box of scientific and technological containment.”

INTERVIEW: Colonel Marc Geneste

‘France and United States must cooperate on beam defense’

*Colonel Marc Geneste was interviewed for EIR on Oct. 31 by Marjorie Hecht, Managing Editor of Fusion magazine. Geneste is a 25-year career officer with the French Army who served in World War II, Indochina, and Algeria. Currently vice president of the Center for the Study of Total Strategy in Paris, Geneste is known as the father of the neutron bomb, which he developed while working for the French Atomic Energy Commission. He is co-author, with U.S. neutron bomb expert Sam Cohen, of *Echec à la Guerre: La bombe à neutron*, published by Copernic Press, Paris.*

EIR: You have been concerned with Europe’s defense for many years now. Can you describe how you approached the problem at the end of World War II, and how things have changed since then?

Geneste: Just after World War II, how many nuclear weapons did the United States have? Just a few. When World War II ended in Japan, I think you had really one nuclear weapon left—you blew up one in the desert to see if it worked, and then one on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—thank God the Japanese gave up, because when they gave up, you had only one. And when you had so few weapons, what was the logical target? Certainly not the Japanese armies; with all your arsenals you might have destroyed two companies and this would not have harmed the Japanese. A good idea was to use these things against civilians. Now this has been referred to as the crime of Hiroshima. This is the “original sin” of the

atom. It was a really strange “crime,” indeed, since it saved at least 1 million American soldiers’ lives, and perhaps 2 or 3 million Japanese lives [that would have been lost] if you had been forced to conquer Japan the way you conquered Europe. Conventional weapons are terribly destructive, so this crime of Hiroshima saved many lives, finally, although naturally there were many casualties.

The West has this famous strategy of massive retaliation, massive terror, which proposed coldly to solve military problems through the mass slaughter of civilians. This was not a very charitable, or very Christian approach to warfare, but it was dictated by the technology of the time. What happened later? In NATO the idea was to replace manpower by this nuclear firepower. But the Soviets kept their land forces three to one, *and* had equality in nuclear weapons.

This had been occurring since about 1955. And this beautiful [nuclear] umbrella of yours, under which the Europeans were sleeping happily in the 1950s, had its first breach with Sputnik. There was the missile gap that Kennedy and McNamara wanted to close by a massive program of strategic weapons: 1,000 Minutemen, and 41 Polaris submarines. These equaled the Russian potential in terms of mass destruction. In the 1960s, you were so sure that you would keep this strategic superiority forever, McNamara said: “The Russians will never catch up with us, so let’s have arms control.”

The fact is that you have today a rough parity in terms of terror, and still the same imbalance in land forces. Soviet land forces are the ones that threaten Europe, they don’t threaten America. So in Europe, there are two types of threat: land forces and rockets.

I have been personally involved in developing a solution to cope with superior land forces. The way to do this is either to raise mass armies (which we cannot afford because of our economic system, which cannot give more than say 5 percent of our GNP in defense—not enough), or we are forced to find another solution, and this is modern technology, which will capitalize on the fantastic vulnerability of man to nuclear radiation. My activity has been to develop techniques and tactics to cope with this land offense. To this end I have worked on the neutron bomb since 1960. . . .

EIR: There was a battle around the development of the neutron bomb in France, as there was in the United States. Who opposed you?

Geneste: The official party line, the *force de frappe*. The people who were sticking with the MAD strategy said: “We do not need weapons for battle, because thanks to our massive retaliation theories, our own small nuclear umbrella and the MAD strategy, there will not be any risk of invasion, so why do you bother us with these gadgets?”

Any new idea is always fought by people who are following the ideas they learned in their youth. When you have won a war, military men who have won a war want to repeat their victory. And as they say in France, to change military minds,



NSIPS/Philip Ulanowsky

Colonel Marc Geneste addressing an EIR seminar in New York Nov. 1.

it takes two generations or one defeat, whichever occurs first. And when I say two generations, I really don’t know about that, because the defeat has always occurred first.

EIR: I want to get back to the concept of deterrence. How did this take hold in Europe?

Geneste: Everyone, naturally, is for deterrence. Deterrence is a goal to attain. Deterrence means peace, and that no one will dare to attack. There are two ways to achieve that, as you say in America: punishment or denial. Earlier we were able, for the reason I told you in the beginning—lack of nuclear weapons—to rely on punishment, on terror. We had no other choice. But today, there is no longer a scarcity of weapons. So instead of aiming those weapons at civilians, in cities, the other deterrent will be as it used to be, before the atomic age: just destroy the armies, make them impotent to carry out their mission. And as you certainly know, the aim of war is control of population, goods, and enemy territory, which can be achieved only by land forces. If you can crush all of the land forces of the enemy, you can deny him victory.

And then came the neutron bomb. The vulnerability of men against these gadgets is such that no one could reasonably launch an attack against a defense backed by neutrons. What is the solution to this, from the Soviet vantage point? First, get rid of our nuclear batteries and nuclear launchers. This is why the Soviets developed the SS-20s, which aim to wipe out the means for launching our neutron bombs. . . . For us, the idea of knocking down incoming missiles thus becomes very important. Anti-projectile weapons can destroy SS-20s.

During my visit here I have insisted that you should, in America, never forget that warfare has two complements, generally speaking: infantry and artillery. Infantry means land forces; artillery means mainly rockets. In America you are concentrating only on that which directly threatens you: rockets. But in Europe we have to solve two problems: rockets and land forces.

EIR: Do you think the Soviets really accept MAD?

Geneste: Twenty years ago—up to 1967—the Russians were against MAD, they said that anyone has a right to be defended. You remember Kosygin saying, “I cannot understand how the Americans accuse Russia of defending our people, they say that defense is aggressive, destabilizing, things like that.” Today, apparently, they want us to keep this philosophy. Do you know why? Because this MAD philosophy is exactly the one which permits them to win without war! Because we are paralyzed by our vulnerability, to undertake anything militarily against them, so they can do anything they want, almost, without getting anything but verbal rebuffs. So that opens the way to their global strategy which is not only destruction, invasion, but which is also subversion.

EIR: Soviet leader Andropov has made disarmament proposals. What do you think of them?

Geneste: I think he is perfectly right to be for disarmament; who is not? What about disarming offensive weapons under the shield of defensive weapons? It is a matter of changing the priorities. The Russians and the West wanted the security of offensive weapons, because [at the end of World War II] there was no serious defense capability. And this has led our youngsters to question the mental sanity of their elders. . . . But there is another solution: It is to go to defense. . . .

EIR: To go back to beam technologies: What do you think the requirements are now for the most advanced kind of beam defense?

Geneste: I am not a physicist or a technical expert. I think we have to be careful in this area, because we have to go from MAD to MAS, from Mutually Assured Destruction to Mutually Assured Survival. And we have to be sure that until we reach MAS, that MAD still works. So to have MAD working, you have to have protection of your deterrent. So why don't we start by protecting our silos, military installations, submarine bases—military objectives which will work with MAD and which, when complemented by area defenses able to protect cities, will work with MAS. . . .

EIR: What do you see as the time frame for the move from MAD to MAS?

Geneste: I think the earlier the better. I don't know what the timetable is for beam weapons technology; what I do know is that we already have lasers, even in France, in the fusion programs, which are able to compress deuterium capsules

with pressure of implosion, millions of kilos per square centimeter. . . . But *something* can be done very fast, it seems to me.

EIR: The reaction in France to the idea of beam weapons has been highly skeptical. Why is that?

Geneste: The French have invested a lot of money in their own little MAD strategy. So when you propose to deal with rockets, the Russian will do the same thing—this is the end of the *force de frappe*, in their mind—so the French will try to delay this event. The French and the British were very happy about the SALT I ABM treaty, because this was a guarantee for their own strategic forces. . . . That's why the first reactions have been limited. But you cannot stop progress!

And the French had better cooperate, because they have the capability to participate in laser development, they are very good. And they have the know-how to participate in the common ballistic projectile defense of the West, if they want.

EIR: Are the French doing beam research despite the outward policy of opposing it?

Geneste: As far as I know. I read in a French magazine, just 15 days ago, an enormous article on laser research for military purposes in France, so indeed the government says one thing and behind the scenes there is something else.

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