Fight escalates in Washington on the beam-weapons program

by Lonnie Wolfe

With the submission of the Reagan defense budget to Congress on Feb. 1, a public brawl is under way over the President's plans to build a beam-weapons strategic defense for the United States, announced last March 23.

While the Eastern Establishment is throwing everything it has against the program, President Reagan and his clever advisers plan to keep the issue low-keyed during the campaign, for "practical, political reasons." This "campaign pragmatism," Reagan's Achilles heel in 1984, threatens to force the President into election-year compromises with the Henry Kissinger faction, such as the new quest for an armscontrol agreement with a Soviet Union which in truth is now preparing for war.

The program goes to Congress

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger took a defense budget to Capitol Hill Feb. 1 that was crafted to conceal the administration's full commitment to beam-weapons defense. It called for an increase of less than \$300 million in the beam-weapons program itself and a total of \$1.8 billion on ballistic-missile defense overall. All of it was earmarked for "research," with no statements about deployment.

This was played off against an official defense posture statement that cited a "bold new effort to develop a reliable defense against ballistic missiles." The thermonuclear balance of terror, the essence of the mutually assured destruction doctrine of the U.S.-Anglo-Soviet Pugwash Conference circles, must be eliminated. "Removing this horror from the future is one of our highest priorities," says the statement. These latter statements sent the alarm bells ringing in the arms-control lobby in Congress and the media: the President is serious about the beam program, regardless of how much or how little he plans to publicly allocate.

In his press conference, questions were fired at the defense secretary about what the media derisively terms the "Star Wars" program. "The program is very much alive," he stated, but it is "only" a research program. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Weinberger was asked by committee chairman Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.)

whether the United States had rejected the idea that ballistic-missile defense was destabilizing. "I hope so. To rely on a theoretical concept that we would be safe if we had no defensive systems and maintained an equality of offensive weapons without paying attention to the reality of Soviet actions was a tragic mistake," declared Weinberger.

"The Soviets have been heavily engaged in ABM research since at least 1967. You can imagine what the world would be like if they deployed this capability before we do," Weinberger concluded.

In his remarks to the press on the budget, White House science adviser George Keyworth downplayed discussion of the Strategic Defense Initiative, as it is termed in the budget. That the beam program is under way was understood, but the administration is too afraid of the arms-controllers to say so.

NSDD No. 119

It was leaked to the press the last week of January that on Jan. 6 President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive that officially launches the beam program. It is this directive, whose full contents remain classified and the classified sections of the Defense Department's five-year strategic guidance that will govern the beam development program.

The directive, NSDD No. 119, is said by White House sources to represent an "irrevocable" decision to proceed with the program through the development and initial deployment phases. The directive reorganizes the apparatus within the Defense Department and the White House which will coordinate the effort, creating a new post in Defense responsible for overseeing "the Strategic Defense Initiative."

At the same time, publication in the January issue of *Pro Pace* magazine of remarks by Maurice Eisenstein, a U.S. arms-control negotiator, reveals that the United States has been negotiating from the perspective of the March 23 speech and its rejection of MAD (see box).

According to EIR's sources, the directive will mean that the full \$27 billion recommended by the Fletcher Commission, the special panel established by the President to study the implications of his March 23 speech, will be spent on

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beam-weapons development. Defense intelligence sources say that the White House is fully prepared to spend double that sum and has confidence that a first-stage beam weapon defense could be in place within five years.

The systems under development, these sources say, have nothing to do with the incompetent scheme known as "High Frontier" proposed by Gen. Danny Graham. The directive is said to refer to the development of a system based not on antiquated and inadequate technologies, but on "new physical principles"; that is the beam-weapons system proposed by Dr. Edward Teller and *EIR* founder Lyndon LaRouche, Jr.

The manned space station proposed by President Reagan in his Jan. 25 State of the Union address is crucial for the development of the system. The President envisions a permanent space station within five years—half the timetable in his speech, defense sources report. Hence the attacks from media such as the *New York Times* on the space-station plan.

Pragmatism takes over

Yet the White House refuses to try to reap the political benefits of a campaign to finally end the threat of nuclear war by making nuclear missiles "obsolete," as the President put it last March 23.

Sources report that the man responsible in large part for this is White House Chief of Staff James Baker III, the Kissinger ally who is now steering the 1984 campaign. Baker got Reagan to delete any mention of the beam program from the State of the Union message and to avoid public discussion of the effort during the campaign. So while Reagan talks about America's great strength, it has been left to Democratic candidate Lyndon LaRouche, Jr. to call on Americans, as he did in his Jan. 21 nationwide broadcast, to mobilize behind an emergency defense mobilization to meet the Soviet threat—including a Manhattan Project for beam weapons. Sources close to the White House privately admire what LaRouche is doing, but worry that talk of the Soviet threat might make the American public jittery!

If Reagan relinquishes forceful leadership on behalf of the program, the treasonous national media will determine what the public knows about the beam program. Statements by Weinberger, to the extent they are reported at all, have been distorted to make it appear that the White House is pursuing a trillion-dollar pipedream that will make the world more dangerous. This gives Kissinger, Baker, et al. time to maneuver against the program.

"Campaign pragmatism" works as follows: At the end of January, a Soviet official whispered in the ear of a *Boston Globe* commentator, William Beecher, that the Soviets might be interested in a simple "interim" arms control agreement, one that could be reached before the election. This news was then handed to the campaign strategists, with appropriate analysis from Kissinger's friends in the State Department. The Soviets might indeed be interested, claimed State with

the support of Baker and company, and if we can reach an agreement, the President's re-election is a "sure thing."

The order went out from the campaign pragmatists: work up a tentative interim program. A ranking administration spokesman whispered the contents of such a proposal to the *Globe*. Next, arms-control negotiator Ed Rowney made a foolish statement that a "breakthrough is possible." There is talk of merging the strategic arms talks with the talks on theatre nuclear forces, the so-called Euromissile talks, as the Soviets have demanded.

There is a problem with all this. The Soviets are not even back at the bargaining table and have given no signs that they will come back. The probable price for them in return is for Reagan to award larger chunks of strategic policy to the GOP Eastern Establishment—the enemies of the beam defense program. In the meantime, the White House looks as if it is playing politics with "arms control," with no results, except to give the Democrats something to jabber about.

Does the White House believe the CIA estimate, leaked in the Jan. 16 issue of Aviation Week magazine, that the Soviet Union might deploy a first-generation total ABM system by as early as this year? If this might be the case, the only answer as columnist Pat Buchanan and candidate La-Rouche have warned separately, is to tell the American people the truth, go with a crash program—and hope that it isn't too late.

Buchanan echoes confrontation alert

Former Nixon speechwriter Patrick Buchanan, a conservative syndicated columnist who in December called for a Manhattan-style program for beam weapons, wrote in a Washington Times column Jan. 27 that the cause of the Soviet arms control violations is their war-winning strategy. Buchanan warns that as a result of the challenge presented to the Soviets by U.S. beam-weapon development, "Not too far ahead, probably lies the greatest confrontation of the Cold War, with Moscow holding the high cards." Excerpts from the article, titled "Why Soviets Cheat," follow:

The U.S. arms control lobby—Paul Warnke, Gerard Smith, Herbert Scoville, Jr.—has implored President Reagan not to make a scene about Soviet cheating on the strategic arms agreements... whether Reagan goes public is academic. The Soviet Union is not going to back down... Seen from the standpoint of the Soviet high command, SALT cheating and SALT treaties are of a single piece. Both are tailored to meet Moscow's desire for a nuclear war fighting and war winning capability.

The first problem the Soviets faced 15 years ago was to halt, permanently, expansion of the U.S. missile force . . .

this was accomplished with SALTI. . . . The latter replacing SS9s with SS19s required the cheating Henry Kissinger, who had specifically been assured the SS11s would be replaced with a light missile. The payoff for swindling Mr. Kissinger was tremendous. [i.e., overwhelming superiority in the number of war-heads].

Problem Two was to prevent the U.S. from using its technology to protect its missile fields [the ABM treaty].

Problem Three . . . was the defense of the Soviet Union against a retaliatory strike. . . .

Problem Four was the most difficult: how to defend the Soviet Union against surviving U.S. land-based and seabased missiles. . . . [The Soviets] have built a huge ABM battle management radar . . . given the complexity of that radar, Moscow's decision to "break out" of the ABM Treaty was made before Reagan arrived. And, given the Soviet

investment here—some \$500 billion in offensive and defensive systems—and the gain to be realized—a nuclear warwinning capability—the Soviets are not going to dismantle because Ronald Reagan declares: "We caught you cheating!"

There is only one way to cancel the Soviet advantage. It is not with 100 MX missiles stuffed in silos targeted 10 years ago. It is for the U.S. to launch, with Manhattan Project urgency, a program for a land- and space-based defense of its strategic missile force, and of its homeland. The first question is whether Congress will permit Reagan to build it. The second is whether Moscow will allow the U.S. to build a defensive system that cancels out a generation's investment in strategic supremacy. Unless the Kremlin gets an historic case of cold feet, my guess is the answer is no. Thus, not too far ahead, probably lies the greatest confrontation of the Cold War, with Moscow holding the high cards.

The need to build advanced ABM defenses

For the past year, Henry Kissinger and U.S. Ambassador to Bonn Arthur Burns have been lying to America's Western European allies that President Reagan's March 23 speech did not represent a fundamental change in U.S. strategic policy away from the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Both Burns, privately, and Kissinger, in public and in private, have ridiculed the President's proposed strategic defense program as "pie in the sky."

Pro Pace, journal of the German Strategy Forum, has just published the speech which chief U.S. START negotiator Maurice Eisenstein gave at an elite military and foreign policy symposium sponsored by the Forum on Oct. 25-27, 1983, that shows those statements of Kissinger and Burns to be lies. Eisenstein's reported remarks at that time are as follows:

The question . . . which we must all ask ourselves . . . is whether deterrence, Mutually Assured Destruction, mutually assured retaliation with the horrifying perspective of holocaust, will be a viable and acceptable policy also for the next 40 years. I do not know what the President had in mind when he expressed his interest in what is known as the "Star War" in the United States. But it seems to me that he wanted to say that we should begin to think through what we can do in the future, when this concept of deterrence, Mutually Guaranteed Destruction, is no longer acceptable to the people of the West. The President referred to land- and space-based defense sys-

tems against ballistic missiles. For some of us, who have pondered over the problems of defense for many years, there is a good piece of wisdom in the President's proposal and in the research program which he initiated. . . .

We have begun to think out the defensive systems on a large scale, i.e.,

would attack our cities and our populations. The President spoke of Mutually Assured Survival [emphasis in original]. . . . If we succeed in building defense systems to destroy hundreds of attacking missiles, the problems for the aggressor would grow enormously. Were such systems possible, and deployed in the future, we would probably find that the interest in offensive weapons with a high destruction potential would recede. . . .

There may be some among you who believe that deployment of ABM systems would cause an arms race. I do not share this view. It is quite clear that the Soviet Union has implemented its own comprehensive ABM program over a period of years. Now it is high time that the United States caught up. . . .

Perhaps the most important point here is to recognize the fact that the strength of the West lies in its technological capacities, and that these technological capacities must be supported and promoted. It is probably these technological capacities of the U.S. and the West which the Soviet Union fears the most. We must nevertheless see to it that the most advanced technologies are available for military purposes if necessary, and that they will exist to deploy new weapons if this is necessary. . . . While our deterrence policy will remain in place for a number of years to come—and thus also the political fears which are the consequence of this policy will continue—we must energetically continue our search for the political and technological means to solve this dilemma.

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