- slander as "right wing radical"
- a. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
- b. Referat 204 (Amerika Referat)
- c. Dr. Fenster, Schnelle, Pieck
- 2. German Embassy in Washington: Karl Prinz
- 3. German Defense Ministry, Bonn
  - a. General Genschel, Fue I3
  - b. Lothar Ruehl
  - c. Dr. Wagenlehner

#### 4. Secret services

- a. Euskirchen, school for Psychological Warfare slanders SI as "KGB"
- MAD (Militärischer Abschirmsdienst—military counterintelligence) internal report slanders as "political cult"
- c. Office for the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia (under SPD control—see Parties) slander as "right-wing cultural group"
- German Family, Youth and Health Ministry: Mrs. Krawatski slander as "youth cult" (under court order to desist since early 1984)

#### B. German political parties

- 1. SPD (Social Democratic Party)
  - a. Willy Brandt (party chairman)
  - b. (Hesse Prime Minister) Holger Börner physical attacks, slander as "cult-like"
- CDU (Christian Democratic Union)
   Mrs. Krawatski
   slanders in leading CDU circles as "KGB, East
   German communist," "youth cult"
- FDP (Free Democratic Party)
   Hans-Dietrich Genscher (see West German gov't)
- C. Other German institutions, universities, associations
  - 1. German American Clubs: Mrs. Rittelmeyer
  - 2. Aspen Institute-Berlin: S. Stone; D Hamilton
  - 3. Social Science Institute at the Berlin University: Mr. M. Fichter
  - 4. DGHS (German Society for Humane Death) "cult, Nazi methods"; physical/legal threats
  - 5. Action Psychocult-danger

#### D. Media

- Der Spiegel (newsweekly): Mettke, Boelsche, Degler repeated slanders as "crazy," cult-like, linked to Western intelligence agencies
- 2. Frankfurter Rundschau (daily): U. Knapp
- 3. Die Tagespost (daily): Paul Langenberg
- 4. Stuttgarter Zeitung (daily) slander article Aug. 31
- 5. Süddeutsche Zeitung (daily) slander article August 1984

## Soviets make move for

### by Thierry Lalevée

When Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meets with President Reagan on Sept. 28, the Middle East situation will definitely not be a major agenda item. Yet, the recent changes in the region will have great bearing upon their talks. Benefiting from America's repeated policy failures since 1979 and the recent Lebanese debacle, Moscow has been able to position itself as the leading power in the Middle East, toward which all countries are looking, willingly or not. There is little doubt that in the weeks before the American presidential election, Moscow will do its utmost to consolidate that position.

In the immediate days preceding his meeting with Reagan, Gromyko has a full schedule of meetings with Middle Eastern foreign ministers. On Sept. 24, he will receive the newly appointed Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdel Meguid, less than a month after the arrival in Moscow of the new Egyptian ambassador, Salah Bassiouny, and the arrival in Cairo of Ambassador Alexander V. Belogonov. This exchange was negotiated with the Egyptians by the last Soviet representative in Cairo, Vladimir P. Polyakov, now the director of the Near East department of the Soviet foreign ministry, who has made frequent visits to the region in recent months.

Also during September, Gromyko will make an official visit to the highly conservative state of Kuwait, the first such trip by a high Soviet official. The visit comes after the ratification in August of a military agreement between the two countries, which included everything "short of a mutual defense cooperation treaty," in the words of Kuwaiti officials.

No one will be really surprised, then, if Gromyko also finds the time to meet with Israeli representatives. Paving the way for such a meeting were the careful statements by the Chief of the Israeli General Staff, Gen. Moshe Levy, who told an American journalist in Washington on Sept. 8 that "Israel does not consider the Soviet Union as an enemy of Israel"—a direct answer to President Reagan's Sept. 6 address, in which he had characterized the U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation agreement as "aimed at reducing Soviet influence in the Middle East."

## Moscow's diplomatic cards

At the core of Gromyko's meetings will be Moscow's July decision to reactivate its Middle East "peace plan" for a

# dominance in Mideast

U.N.-sponsored conference gathering all concerned parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Syria and the PLO. Complementing this proposal is Moscow's push for "nuclear-free zones" throughout the world, and the fact that a proposal along these lines was introduced and approved at the recent conference of the foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement in Malta. The introduction of the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean and Middle East region by the Egyptian foreign minister reveals a lot about the winds of change sweeping Cairo these days. Radio Moscow reported on Sept. 11 that a series of articles in the South Yemenite press had prepared the way for acceptance of such a proposal, by exposing the fact that Israel would be installing Pershing II nuclear missiles around Haifa!

Whether the "peace plan" and nuclear-free zone proposals are ever concretely realized is of little importance for the Soviets, whose main concern is to establish themselves as the leading power in the region. In the last year and a half, Moscow has called Washington's bluff, using diplomatic initiatives as well as the power of the most extremist of its client-states, such as Syria and Libya, whose terrorist activities have helped lure numerous countries toward Moscow's diplomatic bait.

Iranian-sponsored terrorism was quite successful in convincing the Gulf countries that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, much decried and denounced three years ago as a threat to Gulf stability, was a lesser evil than Iran's fundamentalist mullahs. Hence, while Gromyko is holding diplomatic talks in the comfortable offices of the United Nations in New York, Moscow is preparing new military explosions both in the Gulf and in Lebanon.

### The role of Iran and Syria

Key to such operations has been the tour, begun on Sept. 6, of Iranian President Ali Khamenei to Damascus, Algiers, and Tripoli—his first official visits outside Iran since his election several years ago. Khamenei was accompanied by Minister of the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) Mohsen Rafik Dust, Commander in Chief of the Ground Army General Sayyad Shirazi, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Valayati, the number-two man of the Iranian intelligence services (Savama), and the intelligence directors for the ground, air, and naval forces—an entourage which underlined that the sub-

jects of discussion were more military than diplomatic. Intelligence sources revealed that Khamenei's visit had two main aims: an increase in the military and intelligence cooperation between Iran and Syria, and asking the Syrians to mediate between Teheran and Moscow for better relations.

The Iranians are reported to have thrown in the balance an offer for easing the situation of the sometimes-persecuted Tudeh (communist) party in Iran, in exchange for more Soviet military help. As a gesture, Moscow had given the green light several weeks before to the sending to Iran of some 400 East German advisers, out of a group of 1,000 which had arrived in Syria in the middle of July to train the Syrians in police and intelligence work.

There is little doubt that, bolstered by such support, Iran will launch a new offensive against Iraq in the coming weeks. Khamenei's visit to Algiers was obviously concerned with the mediator role that Algeria has been playing for years now between Iraq and Iran (as well as with the United States); but, as our sources underlined, Iran's willingness to accept mediation does not mean the end of the war—far from it. Iran is expected to launch such an offensive, if only to increase its bargaining in future negotiations, as some inside Iran may see it. Others in the immediate circle of Khamenei and the Pasdarans are deadly serious about spreading Khomeini's revolution in the Gulf now and plan "to continue the war until the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein," as the final communiqué between Damascus and Teheran declared.

The communiqué made clear that very close coordination also exists between the two countries on such issues as the fight against Israel. They agreed on a joint resolution to be presented at the U.N. General Assembly for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations, as South Africa was expelled years before. More dangerous was the decision of Khamenei to receive in Damascus the representatives of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon. On Sept. 9, Nabil Berri, a minister in the Lebanese government and chairman of the Al Amal Shi'ite militias, announced that he had ready some 50 young Shi'ites, who represented the first group of Lebanese Shi'ite "kamikazes" ready to strike at Israel's interests in southern Lebanon.

This was followed by a tremendous increase in military attacks against Israeli soldiers south of the Awali river. The Syrian regime, which is backing such policies, may feel tempted by the lack of political cohesion inside Israel these days, the more so because Syria's own internal instability may prompt a foreign adventure again. And if this is the case, it will be discovered very soon that rumors about tension between Damascus, Teheran, and Tripoli over Colonel Qaddafi's recent union with Morocco, have been nothing but propaganda to confuse Morocco and some gullible Westerners. On Sept. 5, Qaddafi offered \$5 billion to Egypt if it were to break with the Camp David agreements, a proposal interpreted in Cairo as the first public sign of a new Libyan military provocation in the works against either Egypt or Sudan.