

ing the Soviet Union a very effective, modern anti-aircraft and anti-cruise missile capability, as well as a partial anti-missile capability through the most recently installed SAM types, which have both anti-aircraft and anti-missile capabilities. The Soviets also have "the only ABM system (a conventional one) in the world against ICBMs . . . which is now being modernized."

Seeking soft spots in the alliance

The Kremlin, unable to break the U.S. commitment to the SDI through either negotiations or threats, is now renewing and escalating the campaign to utilize European political opponents of the American program to exacerbate the threat of U.S.-European strategic decoupling. The SDI itself is being used as the pretext to mount the renewed decoupling offensive. If the Soviets cannot stop the SDI per se, they intend, in compensation, to try to strip the United States of as many overseas allies and as much overseas influence as possible.

The maximum goal remains stopping the SDI, at all costs, as was again stressed as late as Jan. 23 by Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko in a message to an ongoing "Congress of Peace Activists" in Moscow: "There is no task more important today than to prevent nuclear war. The start of a successful solution of this task would be the prevention of an arms race in space." The converse of this statement would be that failure to prevent "an arms race in space" would probably lead to nuclear war. Not very "peace-loving."

On the same day, Jan. 23, *Pravda* stated in the most explicit manner to date that a decoupling offensive is under way, saying that President Reagan's "excessive emphasis on space weapons" could "cause a political separation in the NATO camp" and "rock the foundation of so-called 'Atlantic Solidarity.'" Then, to intimidate Western Europe to the maximum, *Pravda* adds, "The Star Wars program will increase the probability of war being waged on the European continent."

To further the decoupling drive, the Soviet Union will definitely increase its intimidation policy against Western Europe. In this regard, it ought to be viewed as no coincidence that on both occasions where Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov has publicly or semi-publicly reappeared after his early September disappearance from public view, the reappearance has occurred in East Germany, on the front line, so to speak, where most of the first-echelon Soviet "blitzkrieg" armies facing the West are stationed.

Even former Inspector General of the West German Armed Forces Gerd Schmückle, not exactly known (to be charitable) for being an alarmist on the Soviet threat, said in a *Die Welt* interview on Jan. 25, "The greatest danger is without question the military threat." Schmückle subsequently added: "We must not fall into the appeasement policy of the 1930s. . . . That must serve as a lesson for us."

Ogarkov's policy address the third week of January makes that point more starkly than ever.

Are Russians serious about arms talks?

by Rachel Douglas

The Soviet official press now admits that President Ronald Reagan is totally committed to his Strategic Defense Initiative, that it was not offered up as a "bargaining chip" for the arms talks agreed upon by Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and that it has the potential to uncork a revolution in science and technology. Moscow would still like to put the genie back in the bottle.

The Communist Party daily *Pravda* now grudgingly refers to the SDI as "the so-called Presidential Strategic Defense Initiative," instead of just "Star Wars," but *Pravda* complained Jan. 20 that "proponents of [the SDI] have not given up their stand. There is still an opportunity to reach an agreement about the non-militarization of space and to . . . prevent the decline of mankind into the nuclear abyss," warned *Pravda*, "Tomorrow might be too late."

Radio Moscow's Yuri Saltov broadcast on Jan. 21 that if the anti-missile defense program is not stopped "now," "it will cancel out everything previously agreed on" and "the situation will become more complicated later.

"*The world is on the threshold of a new stage of the technological and scientific revolution, [which] can get out of human control,*" said Saltov. But, "There is still the possibility to reach an agreement now."

This objection to the SDI, blurted out by Saltov, gets to the heart of the matter. The Kremlin realizes that the game is up, whereby the U.S.S.R. intended to pursue its own strategic defense program—based on the much-advertised Soviet "scientific and technological revolution"—while the United States slumped into a dark age of economic collapse. If the United States fully mobilizes for the SDI, Moscow fears, it will outstrip the Soviets in science, technology, and industry in no time.

Moscow's quandary

The first-hand evidence obtained at the Gromyko-Shultz meeting that Reagan has no plans to bargain away the SDI has thrown the Soviet command into turmoil. The Kremlin's bluff, the threat to walk out on the talks if Reagan didn't drop the SDI, has been called. If the Soviets are serious about the arms negotiations, they will have to talk on Reagan's terms. If they do not, the danger of their launching war zooms.

Moscow's quandary is aggravated by developments in Europe, where in one country after another politicians on whom the Soviets were counting to oppose the United States are lining up behind the SDI. (See articles, pages 34, 41.)

There are visible indications of the Soviets' unsettled policy. On Thursday, Jan. 10, the Politburo heard Gromyko's report on his talks with Shultz. The next day's press carried an account of the Politburo session which differed from normal such accounts.

Pravda reported: "The Politburo heard the report of Comrade Andrei Gromyko. . . . A unanimous opinion was expressed about the importance of the agreement reached. . . ." The routine statement that the Politburo "heard and *approved*" the report was missing.

At a Jan. 13 press conference, Gromyko reported that Soviet policy on these questions was worked out in consultation with the U.S.S.R.'s "allies." The next day, a previously announced Sofia, Bulgaria summit of the Warsaw Pact countries was abruptly canceled.

What is Moscow to do, in the face of Reagan's SDI commitment? As is obvious from the history of the Soviet strategic defense program (See p. 35), the alternative to Mutually Assured Destruction is not only well defined in Soviet military literature; it is also Soviet practice to build it. So far, however, the Soviet command seeks this alternative for itself, but proposes not to tolerate the adoption of such an alternative by the West.

If the United States unleashes a deployment of ballistic missile defense based on "new physical principles," the Soviets know that the United States must, in effect, return to pre-1967 domestic and foreign economic policies. This means both a genuine economic recovery within the sphere of influence of the U.S. economy, and a pace of technological breakthroughs that many Soviet leaders are persuaded they could not match.

The beginnings of a solution to this objection are contained in the repeated offer by President Reagan to share strategic defensive technologies with the Soviet Union. That means, to accept the continued existence of the United States as a major power and surrender the design for Moscow to be the capital of a last "Roman" empire. In an era of Mutually Assured Survival and world economic development, then, there could be an approach to solving the fundamental problems of the Soviet economy.

The Soviet response to Reagan's inaugural speech, like Marshal Ogarkov's marching orders on "buying time" for a war mobilization, failed to manifest interest in such a path. TASS said that Reagan had "tried to justify the arms race" and had praised his "Star Wars" program, while he "did not specify whether the U.S. intended to take a constructive stand at the talks on space weapons."

On Jan. 18, TASS attacked Defense Secretary Weinberger, the foremost administration proponent of Mutually Assured Survival, as if he were a wayward Central Committee member deviating from the party line. Calling him a "reckless squabblor" creating obstacles to arms-control talks by advocating the SDI, TASS complained that he "is talking of his intention to make the Russians accept the plans for a militarization of outer space."

West Germany

Bonn warming up to space defense idea

by Rainer Apel

Friday, Jan. 17, was a day of surprise for many in Bonn. First, Dietrich Stobbe, a leading Social Democrat with long-time connections into U.S. policy-making circles, especially the Eastern Establishment, surprised his party colleagues with the remark that "under certain circumstances, that is, in the context of a mutual agreement between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the idea of space-based defense against nuclear missiles can be supported."

What made this statement important is that Stobbe made it on his return from a six-day visit to the United States which included meetings with some of the leading U.S. arms-control experts such as Ed Rowley, Paul Nitze, and the head of the State Department's European desk, Michael Armacost. Stobbe's statement did not at all fit with the general chorus of the Social Democrats in Bonn chanting that the SDI policy was bad and destabilizing. The remarks made by Stobbe provided more evidence that the Social Democratic front against the SDI is beginning to crumble.

Several hours after Stobbe's statements, the Social Democracy's arms-control mafia received an even greater shock: Gathering at a panel on disarmament policies in Bonn on Friday afternoon, Egon Bahr, Karsten Voigt, Horst Ehmke, and others almost fell off their chairs when German Minister of Defense Manfred Wörner endorsed the SDI.

Wörner said that, since there was no doubt of the U.S. administration's firmness on the SDI policy forced the Soviets back to the Geneva talks, it would be quite stupid to slow the program down now that the dialogue had been reopened between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The minute the Americans slowed down the program, Soviet interest in further talks would decrease drastically, said Wörner, and added: "Apart from that, Moscow also began research and development in this field long ago."

The Social Democrats around Egon Bahr did not believe their ears. Was this the same Manfred Wörner who, just nine months ago at the NATO defense ministers' meeting in Cesme, Turkey, functioned as the self-proclaimed "spokesman of European opposition to this program"? Before Jan. 15, Manfred Wörner had not come out once in public with a positive statement on the SDI, and was known for his deeply rooted scepticism of space-based defense. That was probably why the SPD had invited him to speak at the panel, and now this!

But that wasn't all: Wörner added a remark that Soviet