# **EIRSpecialReport**

# How U.S.-European cooperation on the SDI can improve

by Lyndon Hermyle LaRouche, Jr.


The following speech, "Prospects for Improvements in U.S.A. Cooperation with Europe on SDI Development," was delivered to the conference of the Schiller Institute in Düsseldorf, Federal Republic of Germany, on May 12.

A few days ago, most of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany met the real President Ronald Reagan for the first time. In the dignified ceremony at the Bitburg cemetery, in the statements the President made at Bergen-Belsen, and, most important, in the address which the President delivered at Hambach Castle, the citizens of Germany saw the real Ronald Reagan. I am as pleased with the way President Reagan addressed the German nation, as I was a little more than two years ago, on March 23, 1983, when the President broadcast his announcement of a new military doctrine for the United States, the Strategic Defense Initiative.

A few months before the President first announced his Strategic Defense Initiative, I participated in a presentation of the SDI policy to an audience in Munich. During the question and answer period that night, one member of the audience stated that since I could not expect much support for my proposals inside the United States, why was I so confident that the United States would adopt such a policy? I replied, that I had to convince only one man, President Ronald Reagan. Obviously, my confidence that the United States would adopt the new strategic doctrine I was proposing, was fully justified.

During the 12 months before the President's announcement on March 23, 1983, I spoke with officials of European governments, and others, to explain the Strategic Defense Initiative to them. I explained to all of them, over and over again, that the SDI could not be implemented properly without full cooperation in research and development among the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. I said three things repeatedly to those government officials and others, as I say them to you again today.

Over the recent 20 years, the level of scientific and industrial development, has collapsed so much, in both the United States and Western Europe, that the new defensive system could be built only with very high levels of scientific and



Cooperation among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan to develop directed-energy technology is indispensable for the military and economic survival of the Alliance. Here the author (center) and Fusion Energy Foundation Research Director Uwe Henke v. Parpart (left) are shown touring a high-energy physics laboratory in Tsukuba City, Japan, in September 1984.

NSIPS/Carlos de Hoyos

industrial collaboration among these nations, and in cooperation with Japan. I explained that fact to many back during 1982; the U.S. and European economies, are in much worse condition today, than they were in 1982. The United States today leads the world in rate of collapse of its industrial and agricultural potential.

I also said then, and it is still a fact today, that, compared to the costs of not developing such a defensive system, it would cost the United States and Europe absolutely nothing to develop such a system. I explained then, and I say again today, that the technological spill-overs of SDI's development, would transform the civilian economies of our nations, unleashing the greatest explosion of technological progress and production of wealth in the history of mankind. The benefits of those technological advances in our economies would more than pay the full costs of building and maintaining a strategic and tactical defense for the NATO allies.

The third point I made then, is that there is no difference between protecting the United States and its allies from Soviet thermonuclear missiles, and revolutionizing the defensive capabilities of Western Europe in general, and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. The same technologies required to stop a Soviet intercontinental missile in midflight, are the technologies needed to stop Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's planned 1988 military assault into Western Europe, through Germany, Greece, and the Baltic.

I confess, that there are influential supporters of the SDI inside the United States, who believe that the United States should not share the most advanced parts of its SDI technologies with European partners. Many of these people say, that

if those technologies are given to European nations, that U.S. military technology will be leaked to Moscow. I believe that some of the people who propose limited technological cooperation with Europe, are sincere in what they say. Sincere or not, their proposals have caused legitimate anger in Europe.

I believe that President Reagan will offer Europe full cooperation in all aspects of SDI-related research. I say this to you today, on the same grounds that I predicted to that Munich audience, that the President would adopt the SDI. Most of my remarks to you today, identify those fundamental self-interests of the United States, which the President must take into consideration, in making his decision on cooperation with Europe and Japan.

### The danger of nuclear war

Quite naturally, in Europe and the United States, it is the politicians who say that defensive weapons are "destabilizing," who are the Western politicians most admired by Moscow. Some such politicians argue, that Nuclear Deterrence has prevented nuclear war for 40 years. Therefore, they argue, replacing Nuclear Deterrence with defensive weapons, "destabilizes" peace. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is among the politicians who have repeated that strange bit of rhetoric recently.

I'll tell you a very short story. Two fellows jumped out of a plane at about 10,000 feet elevation. When they reached 2,000 feet above the earth, the first fellow said to his companion, "Let's open our parachutes." The second fellow became very angry, and said: "We must never open our parachutes; it would destabilize our descent!"

If that second fellow were still alive today, he would be one of Helmut Schmidt's most enthusiastic supporters.

Nuclear Deterrence has not given the world 40 years of peace. The Nuclear Deterrence agreements, which were reached between Nikita Khrushchev and Henry Kissinger's sponsors, over the period between the years 1955 and 1972, have given the world 40 years of Soviet preparations for launching total thermonuclear war. They have also given us 20 years of tearing down the industrial and military potentialities of Western Europe and North America. If present trends in Soviet build-up and NATO tear-down continue, by about 1988 the Soviet forces will have a margin of superiority sufficient to guarantee in advance that Moscow could launch, survive, and win general thermonuclear war.

The first thing which Helmut Schmidt, and fellows like him, overlook, is the fact that the Soviet dictators may be crazy, but they are not stupid. Since the first edition of Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii's book, *Soviet Military Strategy*, appeared, in 1962, Soviet military doctrine has been, "Don't start thermonuclear attack on the West, until the Soviet forces have the margin of superiority needed to guarantee that the Soviet empire would not only win, but would survive that war."

If present military and economic trends in the United States and Western Europe continue another two years, the Soviet forces will have reached their goals of war-readiness, according to existing Soviet war-plans for conducting such a war, by approximately 1988.

The latest version of the Soviet Sokolovskii doctrine, is the updated war-plans, which were completed by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov by 1983. Like any competent general staff's war-plan, the Ogarkov Plan provides several different options for fighting war, up to the maximum level of combined assault on the United States and Western Europe. The maximum level of assault, under the Ogarkov Plan, is a design for maximum surprise: total war launched on signal from a cold, standing start.

To help you defeat the foolish arguments of fellows such as Helmut Schmidt, I shall indicate some of the features of the maximum-level operation of the Ogarkov Plan.

World War III begins with a Soviet general strategic bombardment against all principal military targets, and certain major logistical targets, within NATO areas. The only warning given will be terrorist actions of selective assassinations and sabotage within the period just before the missiles are launched against both the United States and Western Europe. The Soviet logistical targets include certain key U.S. coastal cities, including New York City, the city of Philadelphia, the city of Baltimore, the area of the state of Virginia around Hampton Roads, Savannah, and the city of New Orleans.

In Europe, a general nuclear and bacteriological and chemical-warfare bombardment erupts, at the same time as the general missile attack against the United States. The first, second, and deeper echelons of military defense and logistics within Europe will be more or less saturated by the opening barrages. As those salvoes are launched, the general land, sea-borne, and air-borne assaults against the territory of Western Europe begin, bringing Soviet troops into occupation of Bristol, England within about two weeks of Soviet mopping-up operations.

The Soviet ability to survive NATO countermeasures depends chiefly upon three factors: First, elimination of most of the NATO missile-capability by the initial Soviet missile-attacks. Second, rapid completion of presently ongoing deployment of Soviet ballistic missile defense by 1988. Third, Soviet civilian defense measures of a type non-existent in NATO countries at this time.

The designer of this war-plan, Marshal Ogarkov, is presently in command of the entire combination, of Soviet land,



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sea, and air forces which would be deployed from the Soviet Western Command. The first actions of the new Soviet General Secretary, Gorbachov, have been to launch the massive purges in the Soviet economic management demanded under the Ogarkov Plan.

Has 40 years of Nuclear Deterrence, actually prevented war, as Helmut Schmidt and others have insisted? Or, as the facts show, is it not the truth, that 40 years of Western reliance upon Nuclear Deterrence have been a step-by-step preparation for that global thermonuclear war which the peace-loving Soviets are preparing to launch approximately 1988? It is no exaggeration to say, that 40 years of Nuclear Deterrence, is a successful descent of a parachutist without a parachute, up to the point he reaches the ground!

When we look at the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine for the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, any German citizen who is not a member of some reincarnation-cult, must agree that Nuclear Deterrence is simply insane. The assumption has been, that Soviet forces invading Germany, will begin the assault using only conventional weapons. It is assumed, that thermonuclear war will begin with a convention-

al assault in the European theater, and will escalate the level of tactical-nuclear weapons' use inside the European Theater. Then, if one of the superpowers fears it is losing the war in the European Theater, it might resort to a step-by-step escalation with thermonuclear weapons, to full-scale intercontinental warfare. NATO forces in Germany, are forced back to the west side of the Rhine, and counterattack with nuclear missiles against Soviet-occupied Germany.

It is shocking to me, that any German public figure, such as former Chancellor Schmidt, should have any objections to "destabilizing" Nuclear Deterrence doctrine. I admit that a nation like my own, which puts a President Jimmy Carter in the White House, can not be entirely sane. After seeing Jimmy Carter, I am not shocked that such lunacy comes from certain influential circles in my own country. I am truly shocked, that a German public figure could prefer Nuclear Deterrence to efficient defense against nuclear arsenals of assault.

With the launching of the so-called Schlesinger Doctrine, in 1974, and the level of Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, which began to be undeniable by about 1979, the world had come to the threshold of general thermonuclear war. There was nothing in the Schlesinger Doctrine which was not already agreed upon between Khrushchev and Henry Kissinger's sponsors, back during the second half of the 1950s. Leo Szilard, one of the leading negotiators, had laid down limited nuclear warfare as an agreed option as early as 1958. The Schlesinger-Doctrine debate and the Soviet deployment of SS-20s, introduced nothing new to the Nuclear Deterrence agreements. It merely brought Nuclear Deterrence to the condition at which that doctrine had been consciously aimed, from the beginning.

### **Ballistic missile defense**

During 1981, I saw that the arms-negotiations between NATO and the Soviets were leading the world straight toward a thermonuclear war during the 1980s, unless the doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence were dumped. To find a way out of this danger of thermonuclear war, I spent much of the last part of 1981, working out a conception, now known as the Strategic Defense Initiative. As soon as I had completed all of the essential features of the new military doctrine, I arranged with some friends, to convene a two-day public seminar in Washington, D.C., during February 1982, at which I unveiled my proposed doctrine to an audience of several hundred dignitaries from an assortment of nations. By October of the same year, Dr. Edward Teller publicized a similar proposal, and, on March 23, 1983, our President announced the adoption of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

I wish to draw your attention to certain important differences between my proposals of 1982, and earlier versions of ballistic missile defense dating back to the early 1960s.

Modern military science, at least since Lazare Carnot and Gerhard Scharnhorst, has understood that there is no "ultimate weapon" in warfare. Whenever developments tilt the balance overwhelmingly in favor of the offense, it is possible to discover soon, other developments which can tilt the balance back to the advantage of the defense. It is true, that thermonuclear weapons have a destructive power orders of magnitude greater than any previous weapon, but even thermonuclear missiles are vulnerable to destruction before they reach their targets.

The group of U.S. rocket-designers centered around scientists and engineers from Peenemünde, produced high-speed anti-missile missiles, which could have provided a significant defense against thermonuclear weapons, which would have



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been significantly effective under conditions of the early 1960s.

Already, by 1962, Soviet Marshal Sokolovskii understood the reasons we must not continue to rely upon so-called "kinetic" weapons for ballistic missile defense. As assault missiles' systems became more sophisticated, the assaulting force could easily supersaturate the anti-missile defenses, by giving the defense one or two more missiles than the number of anti-missile missiles deployed to defend a target. Sokolovskii proposed that the Soviets concentrate on alternatives to anti-missile missiles, developing weapons such as lasers.

Kissinger killed U.S. work on ballistic missile defense, with the 1972 ABM treaty. The Soviets cheated on that treaty, as they always do, but the U.S. honored the treaty. Then, during the middle of the 1970s, a section of the U.S. military discovered that the Soviets were developing ballistic-missile-defense systems. It was discovered that these Soviet systems were based on advanced physical principles, rather than antimissile missiles alone. However, a group around Gen. Daniel

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Graham intervened to suppress the report of Soviet antimissile developments. Since then, Graham has opposed U.S. development of advanced physics technology, such as lasers, but has supported going back to anti-missile designs of the year 1962.

So, by 1981, no NATO country had an up-to-date policy of defense against nuclear missiles. Many scientists, and some military professionals, knew of certain methods which might be developed as part of a ballistic missile defense; but, no general policy of comprehensive strategic missile defense existed, until my presentations at the February 1982 seminar.

My design of a policy of strategic defensive initiative, was based on four major considerations. First, as I have indicated, it was clearly urgent to rid NATO of the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine, for reasons I have already indicated, here, this morning. Second, through my knowledge of the nature of certain developments in scientific laboratories, I knew that a workable strategic ballistic missile defense could be developed in as short a period as five years, if a "crash program" were launched to accomplish this result. Third, I knew that such a "crash program" was economically feasible. Fourth, finally, if NATO's defensive strength were built up in this way, the Soviet forces could not expect to survive and win a war against NATO in the foreseeable future. Therefore, provided that our growing defensive strength were used to push Moscow into agreements for parallel development of defensive capabilities, instead of offensive-thermonuclear capabilities, the danger of war could be postponed, perhaps for several decades.

### Misconceptions of SDI

One of the reasons, there has been so much confusion, on the subject of U.S. cooperation with Europe, is the fact that governments and large numbers of military professionals, have been conditioned to accept the idea of some absolute division between "strategic" and "conventional" warfare. Under the doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence, the use of the term "strategic," has been degraded by habit, to signify weapons and war-plans for fighting wars it is assumed could never actually be fought, wars that are "unthinkable." Similarly, "conventional," has been caused to signify weapons and plans for fighting non-nuclear wars, which one must not attempt actually to win. Nuclear Deterrence degrades war of all kinds, both so-called "strategic" and so-called "conventional," into auxiliary features of diplomacy. Nuclear Deterrence degrades military science into a disgusting parody of eighteenth-century set-piece warfare.

So, when President Reagan announced a strategic defense initiative, there was a general tendency to assume that this meant replacing offensive "strategic weapons" with defensive "strategic weapons," leaving "conventional weapons-systems" untouched. The mythological delusions of Nuclear Deterrence had so saturated both policy-making and popular opinion, that even many military professionals who learned better sense at military academies, blocked out the

simple fact, that one can not tilt the balance in favor of the strategic defense, unless this means a change in tactics all the way down to the level of equipping and training the non-commissioned officer's squad. It was widely assumed that the technologies of strategic-defensive systems, had nothing to do with equipping and deployment of ground, air, and naval forces generally; it was assumed, that expenditure for defensive capabilities, must come out of the budgets for maintaining so-called conventional capabilities.

Permit me to remind some of you, who heard or read my proposals, back during 1982 and 1983, that from the beginning, my collaborators and I have insisted that we organize the division of labor, between Europe and the United States, in the following way. Both Western European nations and the United States should engage in both bilateral and multilateral development of the basic scientific principles and general applications of the strategic defense as a whole. On the level of development and production of prototypes, Europe should take the lead in developing and producing the kinds of weapons which must be deployed by the military forces of each nation of Europe; the United States should concentrate on applications against longer-range offensive weapons, including anti-submarine warfare.

Although my collaborators and I have always encouraged as much cooperation within Western Europe as was feasible, it either was understood, or should have been understood, that we should never foster the kind of multilateral agreements under which a Labour Party government in Britain, for example, could prevent France or the Federal Republic of Germany from proceeding in bilateral or multilateral cooperation with the United States.

I am certain that you will find, among the leading U.S. circles responsible for implementing the Strategic Defense Initiative, that they see no contradiction between independent efforts in Western Europe, and various forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the United States. The broader and more diversified the forms of cooperation, the better the result will be.

In the development and deployment of SDI systems, highquality auxiliary instruments, such as computing devices, are indispensable, but they should be seen only as indispensable auxiliaries. The heart of the SDI is a range of frontier developments in science, centered upon three areas of fundamental research. The first, is the electromagnetic and other effects of isentropic compression of plasmas. Thermonuclear devices, including enhanced-radiation devices, such as neutron bombs, microwave bombs, and so forth, are merely part of this first area. The second area, is directed forms of coherent radiation of energy. Lasers and particle-beams, as well as more exotic forms of these, such as muon-beam actions and gamma-ray lasers, are typical of this area. The third area, is a special branch of biophysics, most often referred to as "nonlinear spectroscopy." This branch of biophysics touches upon defensive and offensive weapons of warfare; perhaps its most important role in SDI development, is that study of the optical

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electrodynamics of living processes, touches upon the most advanced principles of the universe as a whole.

The essence of the military significance of these branches of scientific work, is that these systems provide the greatest firepower and mobility ever conceived, firepower and mobility which is as much as orders of magnitude greater than the weapons in use over the past 40 years. Wherever a military problem exists, from destroying Soviet ICBMs, to the tactical problems faced by the squad, and wherever such technologies can solve that problem by increasing firepower and mobility; the technologies of the SDI ought to be applied.

### The economic 'spill-over'

From the beginning, since early 1982, my collaborators and I emphasized, that the possibility of conducting a "crash program" for deployment of SDI technologies depended upon the accelerating effect of SDI research and development, in spreading new, more powerful technologies throughout much of the economy in general. Beginning early 1983, my collaborators in the economics section of the *Executive Intelligence Review*, have prepared reports, showing some of the ways in which the new technologies of SDI would revolutionize the power and efficiency of production. By April and May of that year, the economic "spill-over" of SDI technology became an increasingly commonplace part of the discussions around the world.

In the offices of the Executive Intelligence Review, we are refining a global data-base on world-population, landuse, employment, energy, and production. We have jammedup the memory capacities of a few computers with this data, and spend a great deal of effort cross-checking and analyzing this data-base. Over the past 20 years, most of the economies of the world outside the Soviet empire, have been undergoing a collapse which is now at the edge of global catastrophe. Among the OECD nations, only Japan is a clear-cut exception to this collapse, and only the economy of the Federal Republic of Germany has resisted significantly the general economic collapse which has taken over the United States and continental Europe, to say nothing of the self-ruined, formerly industrial economy of Britain. The current quarterly economic report of the Executive Intelligence Review documents this general collapse of the world's economy.

At the same time, that we are measuring the degree of the ruin we of the OECD nations have brought upon ourselves, with our monetary policies and post-industrial drift, we are also studying the global patterns for another purpose. We are seeking to determine, where and how, with presently scarce resources, a general economic recovery might be set into motion.

Without increasing the average production of energy per capita, by two or three times present levels, over the coming 20 years, most of this planet will be plunged into the kind of famine, pandemics, and homicidal chaos, which nearly destroyed Europe during the fourteenth century. Even if we increase energy-supplies, that will not be enough. Civiliza-

tion will not survive the end of this present century, unless there is a crash program directed to force into production the kinds of technologies associated with the SDI. Political realities being as history instructs us on this point, unless there is a crash-program effort to develop and deploy strategic defense now, the needed technological revolutions in the civilian economy, simply will not occur.

The source of this transformation must come out of the cooperative efforts of Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. The economies of each of our nations, have been so greatly ruined over the past 20 years, that without putting together the Federal Republic's machine-tool industry with the electronics and other capabilities of Japan, and bringing the surviving pieces of basic industry of the rest of Europe and the United States into the same collaboration, civilization on this planet can not survive. There is no other part of the world which could replace what only our cooperation can accomplish.

To the degree each of our nations can be defined as a nation committed to scientific and technological progress in output of agriculture and industry, there is no conflict of national interests among us. Healthy competition, yes; but fundamental conflict in national economic interests, no. If we do not improve our scientific and economic cooperation, none of us will survive. We shall not survive either the ambitions of the Soviet empire, or the effects, such as famine, pandemics, and chaos, of a continuation of the past 20 years' downslide of our economies, into "post-industrial" scrapheaps.

Scientific and industrial cooperation in developing and deploying the SDI, is a question of military survival of each and all of our nations. That cooperation is also indispensable to our survival, even if the Soviet empire did not exist. If we can not learn to cooperate fully, both in science and in industrial development, some future Aeschylos will justly write over the graves of our dead nations, "These nations lost the moral fitness to survive."

This brings me to the last of the points included in this report to you this morning.

It is true, that over the past 40 years, the Soviets have stolen many top secrets from the United States. It is a simple matter of record, that, during most of those 40 years, the biggest chunk of these secrets was delivered to Moscow by British nationals, such as the famous cases of Philby and Maclean. Today, except what the Soviets obtain directly from their sources inside the United States, it is my best estimate that Switzerland and Trieste are two of the biggest pipelines for conveying U.S. technological secrets into Moscow. Soviet intelligence organization has penetrated so deeply into U.S. laboratories and other key points, that a few added leaks through continental Europe, would not increase the overall problem in any significant degree.

In any case, in terms of scientific knowledge as such, the Soviets probably have more military secrets to hide, today, than Western Europe, the United States, and Japan com-

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bined. During the past 20 years, the United States and Western Europe have systematically destroyed a great portion of not only their industrial potential, but also have fallen far below the levels of scientific potential which existed during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Ask yourselves, "Why has Moscow been far more panicstricken over the SDI, than over any other issue of the past 40 years?" Here we are, the mere industrial wreckage of our former power, our scientific potentialities systematically destroyed; the Soviets employ approximately twice the number of scientists as the United States. What have the Soviets to fear from such a collection of ruined and squabbling nations as we? I assure you, the reason is not any store of militaryscientific secrets we have.

What frightens Moscow, is that the United States might suddenly unleash a "crash program" of development of the SDI, and revive not only its own economy, but the economies of Western Europe, through the "spill-over" of SDI and related U.S. technologies. They fear, that despite our presently ruined condition, that if we launch such a "crash program," we would be able to overtake them militarily. They fear, even more profoundly, that if we make our nations once again nations committed to scientific and technological progress in advancement of productivity of labor in agriculture and industry, we would become so strong economically and morally, that we could never be destroyed.

Among true Europeans, including the peoples of the Americas, all men and women, of every part of the world, are born politically equal by right, because each human being contains at birth that divine spark of creative reason, which distinguishes man above the animals, as in the image of the Creator. True Europeans in the footsteps of Leibniz and Schiller, desire nothing so much as that all men and women throughout the world secure the opportunity to realize that divine potential in each of them, to the highest possible degree. True Europeans, are neither racists nor chauvinists.

Yet, we know that we have been greatly blessed among all the modern peoples of the world, a blessing expressed for us by the heritages of St. Augustine and our Golden Renaissance. The Golden Renaissance was the revival of the Augustinian heritage, and of the heritage of Dante Alighieri, out of the ruins of the fourteenth-century collapse of our civilization. This Golden Renaissance, set into motion a cultural tradition, a culture which has imparted to our people, the greatest capability for scientific and technological progress yet seen on this planet.

This was the Golden Renaissance which King Louis XI used to create France out of the rubble left over from the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. This was Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Kepler, Colbert, Leibniz, Schiller, and the great Gauss. This was the American Revolution, and the echoes of that Revolution in Humboldt's, Stein's, and Scharnhorst's leading of the great Liberation Wars. It was from these roots that the United States mobilized itself out of a deep Depression, to create seeming economic

and logistical miracles during the last World War.

Whenever we true Europeans, draw upon the Augustinian heritage of the Golden Renaissance, we are capable of such great things as have astonished the world in the past. We have available to us, from this cultural heritage, the greatest potential for scientific and technological progress known in the world so far.

That is what the current ruling dynasty of the Soviet empire fears in us. It fears, that if we act to reawaken this cultural heritage, we shall become once again our true selves, and once again we shall astonish and inspire the world with the great works of which we are capable.

That, my friends, is our most precious military secret. Let the Soviets steal that from us, if they choose to do so. Rather, let us offer it freely to them. If they once master the



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principles of our cultural heritage, they will be transformed, and then I think we shall have little to fear from them.

In the meantime, until they come to their senses, and steal that secret from us, whenever we mobilize our potential to do so, the superior capability of our people, to assimilate scientific and technological progress, can defeat their wicked imperial schemes. The question is not what scientific secrets the Soviet empire possesses, by theft or otherwise. The question is, which, we true Europeans, or they, can turn scientific knowledge into efficient production the more rapidly? That, the Soviets know; that superiority of our people, is what the Soviets fear most greatly in us. That is the reason they are terrified by the SDI. They are not terrified that we might do harm to them; they are terrified that the SDI will prevent them from eradicating our culture.

Marshal Ogarkov prepares and waits, to launch war upon us by approximately 1988. Of course, the Soviet dynasty will not risk war against us, as long as it believes it could "Finlandize" the world without actually firing a single missile. Nonetheless, they prepare to launch war by as early as 1988, if they can conquer us in no other way.

What is our motive in this conflict? Do we wish war? The issue before us is a very simple one. The very existence of our civilization is in grave danger. Whether the Soviet empire conquers Western Europe by force of arms, or reduces Western Europe to a collection of nominally independent Soviet satrapies, through fear and corruption among politically powerful forces inside Western Europe, the ultimate result would be the same. Whether by brutal Soviet force, or by a generation or two under Soviet world-domination, the Augustinian heritage, and the heritage of the Golden Renaissance, would be eradicated from this planet.

We must defend that precious heritage at all costs. We must defend this heritage for the sake of those ancestors whose noblest purpose in living their lives would be made meaningless if this culture were destroyed. We defend this civilization, for the sake of our grandchildren, born and yet to be born. We defend this civilization, because three billion people on this planet need the precious contributions which European culture can give them, that they might discover more fully the divine potential which exists within every newborn child.

Today, the Soviets sit like vultures, over the dying remains of European and American nations. The destruction we have brought upon ourselves, especially during the past 20 years, assures the Soviet vultures that theirs is the culture of the future, and ours a worthless thing unfit to survive. The Soviet vultures wait for the feast of power, and assure themselves they will gorge their lust for power on the fallen bodies of our nations. But, persuade them by deeds, that our culture is not dead, but awakened once again, and then, as in the past, the best of Russia will visit among us, and will seek to transform the inferior culture of Russia to one cast in the mold of the European tradition.

When President Reagan spoke in Germany, he acted as a true ally. He spoke as a world-citizen as much as a patriot of his own nation. He spoke to Germany's youth, of Germany's great accomplishments of the past, and so he acted to inspire those youth to discover and to bring forth the best in themselves. We true Europeans of Europe and the Americas, need one another. We need to share the best of each of us with one another, and with our friends in Japan and in other parts of the world. Each of our nations has but one true interest, that our civilization be defended, and that the best our forefathers and we have to offer, be preserved for the advantage of every part of the human race.

Don't worry who attempts to steal what secret. Once we reawaken the heritage of the Golden Renaissance within ourselves, our capacity for profound and minor discoveries is limitless. If someone steals one of our secrets today, we shall discover a bigger one tomorrow.

Let us grasp the nature of our situation. Let us understand our desperate common interest. Let us cooperate accordingly.



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