

Union, comes from a Danish-German Baltic family which served the Russian czar's intelligence service until the Bolshevik Revolution. His particular specialty is the Muslim community in Russia—under czarism as well as the socialist regime. Bennigsen collaborated with Zbigniew Brzezinski at Columbia University in a series of seminars on "Soviet Nationality Problems," and continually promulgated the irrationalist program of Islamic fundamentalism within the U.S. intelligence community. By persistence and through this collaboration, the "Arc of Crisis" gameplan began to take form and was later employed by Brzezinski, Carter administration.

While the Soviet agents-of-influence such as Bennigsen situated themselves to implement this policy, in Moscow and at the Soviet Oriental Studies Institute in Tashkent, the process of transforming the "Arc of Crisis" plan into a Soviet strategic capability was begun. The Central Muslim Spiritual Board had been upgraded after World War II into four Spiritual Administrations of Muslims, in 1) Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 2) Transcaucasus, Baku, and Azerbaijan, 3) European parts of the U.S.S.R. and Siberia, and 4) North Caucasus, and is the vehicle for the Soviet "Islamic Card" policy. The overseer of this policy was and is the former KGB chief of Azerbaijan and current Politburo member, Geidar Aliyev.

Aliyev, a protégé of the late former KGB chief Yuri Andropov, set up, with the help of East German and Syrian intelligence capabilities, the systematic implementation of the fundamentalist terror which is now reaching its full-blown proportions against the United States. Practically every major anti-U.S. terrorist operation can be traced to the networks established by the KGB Foreign Nationalities Division. The East German intelligence service, the Stasi, plays the essential role in operationally directing this capability. In fact, it is believed by some that the Stasi and the KGB have co-equal status—an unprecedented arrangement among the Soviet bloc intelligence services. The relationship is modeled on the development of the Abwehr-Nazi Foreign Nationalities project, set up under Division II Office VI prior to World War II. Many of these networks became part of Soviet intelligence operations during and after the war. It is into this unique constellation that Alexander Bennigsen fits.

To understand concretely how British intelligence and its foreign policy establishment, and the likes of Bennigsen, pushed this perspective into U.S. policymaking, it is necessary to point to the accompanying documents. One of the first public announcements in support of Khomeini from the Soviet Union's Muslim community came from the Imam of Baku, Sheikh ul-Islam Allakshukur Pasha-zade (a.k.a. Pashayev). After announcing his support, he stated, "I cannot see that events in Iran mean that Islam will also make new inroads in the Soviet Union. We have no need of secret societies. We work completely openly, with the authorities'

approval" (see *Documentation*). This Imam is an Aliyev protégé who is working closely with the Islamic fundamentalist networks throughout the region.

Bennigsen's pernicious effect upon U.S. strategic estimates continues today. According to one observer, "Bennigsen has had an absolutely horrendous effect on American strategic estimates [in that area of the world]. I can't tell you how many times he has traveled to Washington to testify before Senate committees and meet with people." Unless the U.S. national security establishment breaks the back of the Brzezinski, Bennigsen, and Carrington policy concerning the Mideast and the Persian Gulf, the United States is going to face a continual crisis of Islamic fundamentalist terror, prior to its eventual showdown with Moscow.

Documentation

TRANSMITTAL SLIP CONFIDENTIAL

Attached is a UK paper on the impact of Islamic fundamentalism in the USSR, circulated by the UK Delegation to members of the Political Committee.

CONFIDENTIAL

UK DELEGATION TO NATO

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE SOVIET UNION

1. During his visit to Delhi on 2-3 July Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State, was told by Mr Vajpayee, the Indian Foreign Minister, that while in Moscow last month he and Mr Desai had received strong indications that the Russians were concerned about Islamic Fundamentalism. They were worried (Vajpayee thought with reason) that the virus might spread to the Soviet Moslem population.

2. The UK view has been that the likelihood of the Soviet Moslem population being infected by the Islamic revival in Iran and elsewhere was small, principally because of the different social conditions in the USSR and the fact that Shiites account for only a small proportion of Soviet Moslems. However, the Russians, though they affect to support Khomeini, are clearly uneasy about developments in Iran, and will not have taken kindly to Iranian broadcasts in Arabic criticising the state of Islam in the USSR. The head of the Iranian broadcasting authority complained in May that the Soviet Union was jamming Iranian wave-lengths by making use of high-powered transmitters. In particular he claimed that jamming had taken place during one of Khomeini's televised speeches in Azerbaijan. If there is any truth in this it would imply an attempt to prevent Soviet Moslems in Soviet Azerbaidzhan (who are Shiites) from tuning in to the Ayatollah.

3. Soviet statements on the possible effects of the Islamic revival on the Soviet Moslem population, although rare, have started to appear. According to a report in the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* of 11 June, Pachayev Allokshukur, Imam of Baku's largest mosque and vice-chairman of the spiritual administration for the Caucasus, held a press conference for foreign journalists in Baku in the presence of representatives of the Soviet MFA Press Department. Allokshukur said, inter alia:

(a) it was not the Moslems' business to interfere in regional or republic policy. There were other organs and other elected people to look after politics.

(b) Moslems in Baku did not hide their joy over what happened in Iran. They had sent a telegram of congratulations and welcomed Khomeini when he returned to Iran, and had sent another when the monarchy was overthrown.

(c) "I cannot see that events in Iran mean that Islam will also make new inroads in the Soviet Union. We work completely openly with the authorities' approval."

4. Another report broadcast recently on Moscow Radio's Swedish Service said that a journalist had asked the leader of the Kazakh Moslems whether Islam was under-going a renaissance in the USSR because of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. He had replied that there had been no drastic increase in believers, although success in neighbouring countries obviously pleased Moslems.

5. These statements indicate that the Soviet authorities wish to appear relaxed about the possibility of the Iranian and Afghan events having any serious impact among Soviet Moslems. Recent (and frequent) broadcasts stressing the freedom allegedly enjoyed by Soviet Moslems and respect on the part of the Soviet authorities for the cultural heritage of Islam (restoration of mosques, celebrations for the new Islamic century) carry the same implicit message: the spiritual and cultural demands of the Soviet Moslems are already being met, so there need be no fear of influences from abroad. A recent article in *Kommunist* (No 5, 1979) by the First Secretary of the Daghestan *obkom*, however, provides further evidence that the Soviet party authorities continue to be sensitive to the possible effects of outside influences on Soviet Moslems. Umakhanov complains that "Imperial propaganda" has latterly begun more actively to speculate on nationalist feelings and prejudices in order to set socialist nations against each other. "The ideological centres of imperialist states, emigre nationalist organisations which are in the service of the bourgeoisie, make use of the ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism for the purpose of intensifying the subversive activity against the peoples of the North Caucasus. They place no little emphasis on religion, on using it in anti-Soviet interests. Thus in its broadcasts bour-

geois radio lays stress on the religious feelings of believing Moslems." Such expressions of concern are not new (although references to Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism are rare) and were probably not provoked by events in Iran and Afghanistan.

6. All this does not take us much further and we are not inclined, for the moment, to revise our earlier judgement. Nevertheless, things can change. Although evidence on the influence of Islamic Fundamentalism on Soviet Moslems is hard to come by and difficult to interpret, we would welcome the views of other Allies.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 9/5/99 (TOON, MALCOLM) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET NATIONALITY ISSUES: FOREIGN
BROADCASTS OF KORAN READINGS
RBF: STATE 224957

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INTEREST IN CROSS-BORDER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SOVIET NATIONALITIES AND GROUPS OUTSIDE THE USSR, TWO EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO VISITED MAKHACHKALA AND BUYNASK IN DAGESTAN ASSR DURING AUGUST 25-27 REPORT THAT MUSLIM RELIGIOUS LEADERS PRIVATELY INDICATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT KORAN READINGS TRANSMITTED BY TEHRAN AND CAIRO RADIOS ARE WIDELY LISTENED TO BY THE FAITHFUL IN THEIR AREAS. THE GRAND MUFTI (PROTECT), WHO IS THE SPIRITUAL LEADER OF MUSLIMS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS, TOLD EMBOFFS IN MAKHACHKALA THAT YOU CAN HARDLY TURN ON THE RADIO WITHOUT HEARING THE KORAN BEING READ. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BROADCASTS FROM TEHRAN AND CAIRO. THE GRAND MUFTI ADDED THAT HE AND OTHERS ALSO LISTEN TO VOA'S RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING.

3. DURING A VISIT TO A MOSQUE IN BUYNASK, MUSLIM ELDERS THERE ALSO INDICATED A BELIEF THAT RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING FROM OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION IS CONTRIBUTING TO THEIR CAUSE. WHEN AN EMBOFF ASKED THE ELDERS WHETHER THEY ARE ALSO FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, THEY REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT, OF COURSE, THESE PEOPLE ARE OUR MUSLIM BROTHERS.

4. EMBOFFS WILL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY TO THE DEPARTMENT ON THEIR RECENT VISITS TO DAGESTAN AND CHECHEN-INGUSH ASSRS.
TOON