

EIR Feature

Brzezinski's plot to sell out Europe and the SDI

by Criton Zoakos

The foreign and national security policies for which Zbigniew Brzezinski has been the public advocate during the last 12 months, have also been the effective, yet unacknowledged, policies of George Shultz's State Department and Robert McFarlane's National Security Council, though not those of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. Should Brzezinski receive his imminently expected appointment in the Reagan administration, those foreign and national security policies of Shultz, et al., which had remained semi-clandestine and unacknowledged will come to the fore and be proclaimed official American commitments. The consequences of this would be disastrous for Europe and the United States for many years to come. The Brzezinski appointment will be in context of a broader series of gestures toward the Soviets which, made prior to the November Reagan-Gorbachov summit, are meant to reassure Moscow that 1) the United States will *not* pursue Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and 2) the United States will disengage militarily from Europe and entrust the national security of West European nations to the good will of Russian military commanders.

These two points have been most vocally advocated by the Eastern Liberal Establishment, the Trilateral Commission, and, in the recent 12 months, by the Commission's former North American Director, Dr. Brzezinski.

According to persistent, authoritative reports from within the Reagan administration, the appointment of Trilateral Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, will be announced soon after Congress reconvenes in the fall. His appointment, forced upon President Reagan by a congressional vote crafted by Senate Republicans, will mark not exactly a change in the foreign and national security policies pursued by the State Department and the NSC, at the insistence of Senate Republicans, but rather an overt acknowledgement that the policies outlined in Brzezinski's public pronouncements are the official policies of the U.S. government, and have been so since approximately the beginning of the second Reagan administration!

And the appointment is meant to be read as a "signal" to Moscow.

Those whose political memories stretch all the way into the misty past of the



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A New York City demonstration by the Schiller Institute against the "decouplers" who are seeking to split Europe from the United States. On this Day of Resistance, Oct. 17, 1984, Institute supporters on three continents rallied against West Germany's fascist Green Party. While the "Green" thugs demand the ouster of the United States from Europe, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Burt, and the Trilateral Commission are promoting the same policy—and calling it "strategic thinking."

1980 presidential campaign, will recall that candidate Ronald Reagan swept the country off its feet by waging a hard-hitting campaign against the Trilateral Commission of Brzezinski and against his catastrophic policies which, among other things, had caused the destruction of the nation of Iran and the emergence of Brzezinski's favorite lunatic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

This man is now preparing to take up his post in a new "Defense Policy Board," whose creation was voted by the Senate, at the instigation of the Senate Steering Committee, in a rider attached to the 1986 defense budget. The purpose of this Board, it is reliably reported, is to temper and slow down Defense Secretary Weinberger's drive for a strong defense based on adequate arms production, and replace that with a new emphasis on what Brzezinski and the Trilateral Commission describe as "strategic thinking."

The immediate objective of this new Trilateral insertion into the government is twofold: first, to derail and soon kill President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative; second, to remove the last remnants of U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe from Russian aggression and hand over the entire western European continent to Moscow, lock, stock and barrel.

Brzezinski and the SDI

The policies which Brzezinski has publicly advocated respecting the President's Strategic Defense Initiative represent the "consensus" at both the "liberal" Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the "conservative" Heritage Foundation and Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International

Studies (CSIS), as well as the Trilateral Commission itself. Brzezinski has been a ranking spokesman for three of these institutions over the years and, in the more recent period, has become a favorite of the fourth, the Heritage Foundation. All are associated with persistent efforts to "whittle away" the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Two major published items by Brzezinski, and numerous speeches, have adequately presented his proposals on the SDI. The most recent is an article published in the July 8, 1985 issue of the *New Republic*, titled "A Star Wars Solution." The earlier one, and more interesting, was published in the *New York Times* on Jan. 27, 1985 with the title "Defense In Space Is Not Star Wars." His co-author in this earlier writing was Max Kampelman, who later was appointed to become the chief American negotiator on arms control with the Russians in Geneva, where he would have ample opportunity to put to effect what he and Brzezinski had jointly advocated.

In both instances, Brzezinski represented the view that the President's Strategic Defense Initiative should be modified to become a negotiable instrument to be used for the more effective preservation of the old doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. Such "modification" would be put to effect if the United States decided to limit the SDI program to research, toward the development of some sort of laser-based point-defense of our existing ICBM fields, and to drop all prospects for either deploying or developing the comprehensive, global, anti-missile defense the President had originally proposed on March 23, 1983. In Brzezinski's own words:

The U.S. should drop or at least de-emphasize President Reagan's idealistic hope for total nuclear defense for all our population. We should also abandon our unwillingness to consider SDI in the bargaining process. If we implement that part of the SDI program which by the mid-1990s would enable us to disrupt a Soviet first strike, we would reinforce deterrence and promote nuclear stability. That means concentrating on terminal defense and boost-point interception.

Once we establish our determination to act on the SDI, we are in a better position to strike a bargain. We can say to the Soviets that we both face essentially two choices, one mutually beneficial, the other especially costly to them, but both stabilizing. The first choice is to renegotiate the 1972 ABM treaty to permit deployment of strategic missile defense, but without either side improving its ability to carry out a first strike. Then, in return for significant reductions in SS-24s, SS-25s, SS-18s and SS-19s, the United States would not deploy its strategic defense system.

Brzezinski's axiomatic rationale for this policy is the same as that repeatedly and *ad nauseam* emphasized by Shultz's State Department: the doctrinal integrity of Mutually Assured Destruction must be preserved. A similar obsession for protecting MAD against the implicit effects of the SDI has been displayed throughout this year by Margaret Thatcher's government in Britain, by NATO Secretary

General Lord Carrington, by the French Socialist government of François Mitterrand, and by Giulio Andreotti and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the foreign ministers of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively.

In the larger scheme of things, these Western opponents of President Reagan's SDI are driven not so much by any informed hostility to the technologies of the SDI, but rather by the almost religious, almost ineradicable, cultish, commitment to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. One has to dig back in history, to the immediate postwar years, to find the source of this present, obsessive commitment to MAD among these oligarchical circles. Contrary to "systems analytical" and technical rationalizations of the MAD doctrine circulated by the RAND corporation and similar "think tanks," the ranking oligarchical strategists of those years, Lord Bertrand Russell, British Intelligence chief Arnold Toynbee, the Dulles brothers, Carl Jung, Henry Cabot Lodge, and his then-protégé McGeorge Bundy had, in the heady days of the Pugwash Conferences, formulated and opted for the doctrine of MAD as their main weapon for the eventual destruction of the legal-constitutional form of nation-state organization of human affairs.

The slogan of "One World Government," in those days, was a slyly disguised presentation of a program focused more on the destruction of existing forms of nation-state government rather than simply the construction of any coherent "One World Government." The much-touted "One World Government" would simply be the informality of

Brzezinski's 'new spirit' for post-Yalta Europe

We excerpt the key proposals advanced by Brzezinski in his winter 1984 Foreign Affairs article, "A Divided Europe: The Future of Yalta," in which the reader will identify the policy thrust behind this year's State Department's deployments in Europe:

... *First*, on the symbolic plane, it would be appropriate for the heads of the democratic West as a whole, perhaps on February 4, 1985, to clarify jointly, through a solemn declaration, the West's attitude toward the historic legacy of Yalta. In publicly repudiating that bequest—the partition of Europe—the West should underline its commitment to a restored Europe, free of extra-European control. It should stress its belief that there now exists a genuine European political identity, the heir to Europe's civilization, which is entitled to unfettered expression. It should affirm the right of every European nation to choose its

sociopolitical system in keeping with its history and tradition. It should explicitly reject and condemn Moscow's imposition on so many Europeans of a system that is culturally and politically so alien to them. Finally, by drawing attention to the positive experience of neutral Austria and Finland, it should pledge that a more authentic Europe would not entail the extension of the American sphere of influence to the European state frontiers of the Soviet Union.

Second, and in direct connection with the renunciation of Yalta's burden, the West should simultaneously reconfirm its commitment to the Helsinki Final Act. This is absolutely essential, for otherwise the repudiation of Yalta could give the Soviets the convenient argument that the territorial integrity of Poland and of Czechoslovakia is thereby again endangered. The Helsinki agreements confirmed the durability of the existing frontiers in central and eastern Europe, and the eastern nations must be reassured on this score. At the same time, the Helsinki agreements legalized and institutionalized the notion that the West has a right to comment on the internal practices of East Euro-

running the world through the will of the world's oligarchical cliques, East and West, unencumbered either by the institutional constraints of the nation-state, or by natural law. "The very might of nuclear arsenals of the superpowers," the reasoning among oligarchical strategists went in those days, "will eventually become the very source of their impotence to act on the world arena. Nuclear arsenals of both sides;" the argument went on, "must so be organized as to make their use impossible. When the superpowers will thus be rendered impotent as a result, ironically, of their nuclear might, new political forces will be able to come into play and challenge both the superpowers and the political world of nation-states over which they preside."

"MAD" was then retailed by such spokesmen as Leo Szilard, Henry Kissinger, and others as, purportedly, the only possible means of keeping the peace in the age of nuclear weapons. "Keeping the peace," however, was the furthest thing from Lord Russell's mind; "destruction of the nation-state" is the ultimate objective of MAD.

This same objective animates Dr. Brzezinski's and his sponsors' opposition to the SDI.

The 'Iranization' of Europe

Some years before he was appointed Carter's National Security Adviser, Brzezinski aired the theory that the single most important task of diplomacy in the "nuclear age," was to "undo the legacy of the Peace of Westphalia." Few among those few Americans who read this were sufficiently versed

in history to realize that Brzezinski was overtly advocating the dissolution of the legal status of the nation-state, as it first emerged in the world arena out of the Peace of Westphalia, and its replacement with the earlier institution of imperial/sacerdotal system of law and government. He later put this perspective into practice when he dissolved the nation-state of Iran and, as National Security Adviser, replaced it with the sacerdotal regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

A similar "Iranization" of Western Europe is the concealed intent of George Shultz's policies at this time. The rubric under which Shultz is executing these policies is called the "model of the 1955 State Treaty of Vienna," and its high point so far this year was the seven-hour meeting between Shultz and then-Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Andrei Gromyko during May 13-16, 1985 in Vienna, during the festivities on the 30th anniversary of the treaty which established Austria's status as a neutral, poised between East and West, under Soviet military guarantees.

Shultz subsequently appointed one of Brzezinski's close, longtime collaborators, Richard Burt, to become U.S. ambassador to West Germany, with a mandate to work for decoupling Europe from the United States. At approximately the time of Burt's appointment, the State Department assigned another of its officials, Robert Keeley, now ambassador to Greece, to announce that the United States will work to "overturn" the "unequal, patron-client relations" with Western Europe which had been shaped over the entire post-war period.

pean governments and that respect for human rights is a general international obligation. Accordingly, the repudiation of Yalta's historic legacy should be accompanied by the reaffirmation of the West's commitment to peaceful East-West relations, to the maintainance of the existing territorial status quo, and to the indivisibility of the concepts of freedom and human rights.

Moreover, reaffirmation of the continued Western commitment to the Helsinki Final Act could help to resolve the potentially fatal European ambivalence regarding Germany. The fact is that, while the Europeans resent their historic partition, they fear almost as much a reunited Germany. Therefore, the renunciation of Yalta's legacy—the division of Europe—should be accompanied by an explicit pledge, through the reaffirmation of Helsinki's continued relevance, that the purpose of healing the East-West rift in Europe is not to dismantle any existing state but to give every European people the opportunity to participate fully in wider all-European cooperation. In that context, the division of Germany need not be undone through formal reunification but by the gradual emergence

of a much less threatening loose confederation of the existing two states.

Third, much in keeping with the spirit of these symbolic acts, Western Europe should strive to create the maximum number of opportunities for East European participation in various all-European bodies. There is today a number of such institutions both private and public. East Europeans should be encouraged quietly but systematically to increase their participation—even if initially only as observers—in such bodies as the European Parliament, as well as the myriad of more specialized technical agencies. The fostering in Eastern Europe of the European spirit, and of greater Eastern European recognition that there is more to Europe today than meets the eye, is clearly in the interest of all Europe. But a new burst of energy in this regard is much needed.

It would also be appropriate for the major West European nations, as well as for America, to sponsor during the Yalta year of 1985—on either private or public basis—a series of seminars and conferences on the future of
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Though Shultz, by means of these two ambassadorial appointments, announced to West European friends of the United States, that the old days of friendship, alliance, and cooperation are over, he had not yet decided to formulate positively what the "new days" are to bring. However, what the State Department had failed to do, surely for policy reasons, i.e., to stipulate what the new U.S. policy would be toward Europe, Zbigniew Brzezinski had already unofficially done with a major article published in the CFR's publication *Foreign Affairs*, right after President Reagan's reelection (see box).

Mikhail Gorbachov and some of his chief spokesmen have, increasingly since the middle of May 1985, issued unmistakable signals that they would be very much in agreement with Brzezinski's perspective, both with respect to the SDI and with respect to the future of Europe. On at least three occasions, the Soviet General Secretary stated that he would consider reductions in the numbers of his ICBMs, if the United States would drop the SDI. He also started employing Brzezinski's own terminology, e.g., "multipolar world," to convey what he wishes the West to believe about his strategic intentions, suggesting that one of those "poles" would be an Europe independent of the United States, and sharing a "common culture" with Russia.

Most telling were two radio dispatches from Helsinki, during the 10th anniversary celebrations of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Fyodor Burlatskii, writer for the KGB's *Literaturnaya*

Gazeta, proclaimed the "cultural unity of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," in an unusual repudiation of "all those" who believe Europe to consist of two parts. "Two Europes?" Burlatskii asked. "I have to admit I shudder every time I hear these words. Two social systems in Europe, that's understandable. But two Europes! What does that mean? Our European civilization has been in existence for more than 3,000 years. It is not just a geographical concept; it is a deep historical and cultural concept too. It is impossible to remove from the European his consciousness of the fact that Greek antiquity and the Italian renaissance are part of him; it is impossible to take away his truly undying love for Shakespeare and Cervantes, Balzac and Goethe, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. . . . The great, the truly historic meaning, I would say, of the Helsinki conference of 1975 lies precisely in the fact that it was a major step along the path toward overcoming the division of Europe, along the path of strengthening the security of the whole of Europe and the development of all-European cooperation."

Closer to the political point, in response to the offers made by Brzezinski's oligarchical masters, was an article by Soviet Central Committee member Vadim Zagladin, in an early August edition of the West German Social Democratic magazine *Vorwärts*. Zagladin wrote the following, almost a verbatim quote from Brzezinski:

We in the Soviet Union are convinced that Europe's contribution to the recovery of the world sit-

post-Yalta Europe. A special effort should be made to invite East Europeans to participate, on whatever basis possible, in deliberations designed to forge during that year a wider consensus on how best to undo peacefully Yalta's legacy. . . .

Fourth, and in no way in conflict with the preceding, Europe should intensify its aid to those East Europeans who are struggling actively for the political emancipation of Eastern Europe. That struggle is the necessary concomitant and at least partially also the cause of evolutionary change in Eastern Europe. Only too often do West European well-wishers of a more independent Eastern Europe look askance at those in the East who undertake more direct forms of struggle. While cultivation of East European officials enjoys a certain fashionable prestige in Western circles, tangible assistance to those resisting totalitarianism is viewed only too frequently as somehow "in the spirit of the cold war. . . ."

. . . *Fifth*, the time has come for a more fundamental rethinking of the relationship between Western security and political change in Europe as a whole. The West can

make the needed adjustment, and America—since it plays the central military role—should take the lead to that end. America is needed in Europe to deter Russia not only from military aggression but from political intimidation. That is obvious and it justifies NATO and the American military presence on the continent. But an American military presence that reduces the incentive for the Europeans to unite politically, yet simultaneously increases the incentive for the Soviets to stay put militarily in central and eastern Europe, is a military presence not guided by a subtle political-historical calculus. A more sensitive calibration of the political-military equation is needed in order to safeguard Western Europe while promoting change in the East-West relationship.

If Europe is to emerge politically, it must assume a more direct role in its own defense. A Europe that plays a larger defense role will require a lesser, or at least a redefined, American military presence. A Europe that can defend itself more on its own is a Europe that is also politically more vital, while less challenging to the Soviet Union from a purely military point of view, than a Europe

uation could be far greater than now. . . . In order for that to happen, European policy must be organized in Europe. By this we do not mean at all that Western Europe must renounce its alliances. . . . But an alliance does not mean that the interests of Europe and its security must be sacrificed. . . . The Soviet Union is prepared for active cooperation with West Europe. It is time to bring about mutually advantageous cooperation between the European Common Market and the Comecon in economic affairs. Insofar as the European Community countries act as a "political unit," we are prepared to find a common language with them in concrete international problems as well.

Virtually all of Brzezinski's proposals in his *Foreign Affairs* article were endorsed by Zagladin. In the course of the Helsinki meetings with Shultz, the new Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevernadze, indicated that Brzezinski's prospect of negotiating away the SDI and decoupling Europe's defense from the United States would be an attitude against which Moscow would take no offense. The ball was then in Shultz's court.

The Trilateral Commission and other influential outfits of the Eastern Liberal Establishment and its "conservative" appendages, such as CSIS and the Heritage Foundation, for which Brzezinski has been selected to act as spokesman, have had numerous influential representatives inside the Reagan administration, including chief arms control negotiator Max

Kampelman, special adviser to Shultz Paul Nitze, Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, and numerous leading persons on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board associated over the years with Leo Cherne's little-noticed but highly influential International Rescue Committee network, which straddles the divide between East and West in Europe. Virtually all of these public officials, who are now mobilized on behalf of the proposals associated with Brzezinski's signed articles, had joined the Reagan administration straight from the ranks of the Committee on the Present Danger.

Despite their pre-1980 protestations about Soviet strategic supremacy, this group not only opposes any vigorous implementation of the President's SDI, but also caused the Reagan administration to spend less on the defense of the country from 1981 to 1985 than even the Carter administration had projected as necessary. This group's current objective, best exemplified by the Trilateral Commission's pronouncements on foreign policy, is to use the opportunity of the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachov summit for the purpose of formally enshrining in protocols, secret memoranda or whatever other instruments, the proposals originally presented over Brzezinski's signature in *Foreign Affairs*, specifically respecting the fate of Europe and the SDI.

The imminent appointment of Brzezinski is meant to signal to Moscow, prior to that summit, that the United States has been sufficiently "softened" internally, to acquiesce to this historical sellout.

with a large American military presence in its very center. Such a Europe would then be better able to satisfy the East European yearning for closer association without such association being tantamount to an American defeat of Russia.

But Europe must be prodded to move in that direction. Left as it is, Europe's cultural hedonism and political complacency will ensure that not much is done. Even the modest 1987 NATO commitment to a three percent per annum increase in defense expenditures was not honored by most European states. America should, therefore, initiate a longer-term process to alter the nature of its military presence in Europe gradually, while making it clear to the Europeans that the change is not an act of anger or a threat (à la Mansfield resolution) but rather the product of deliberate strategy designed to promote Europe's unity and its historic restoration. . . .

To move Europe in this direction, the United States will have to take the first steps, even perhaps unilaterally through a ten-year program of annual cuts in the level of the U.S. ground forces in Europe. But these steps should

be taken in the context of an articulated strategy that has a constructive political as well as military rationale. Its political purpose should be openly proclaimed: to create the setting for Europe's restoration and, through it, also for a more stable East-West relationship. It would also have to make clear that some American combat forces would remain in Europe, as they do in Korea, thereby ensuring immediate American engagement in the event of hostilities. . . .

. . . security and political arrangements . . . could include demilitarized or nuclear-free zones or extension of the Austrian-type neutrality to other areas, including later even to a loosely confederated Germany. It would encourage a process of change permitting the latent or frustrated West and East European impulses for the restoration of Europe gradually to surface. Eventually, it would permit Europe to emerge, and to play a major role on the Eurasian continent, along with the Soviet Union, India and China, while helping to ensure through its links with America that no single power dominates that geopolitically vital continent. . . .