a political decision than a judicial one. The defendant's lawyers had been pushing for it for some time. Genoud had decided to play for time. Then in the spring, in apparent coordination with Jacques Verges, the lawyer of the Nazi "Butcher of Lyon," Klaus Barbie, Genoud changed tactics and lawyers; he decided to go for the trial and to win it. The long-standing, low-key family friend, Maître Cruchon, was replaced by the star, Maître Bonnant. Genoud, who has now admitted that he choose Verges for Barbie, obviously wants to establish a parallel between his own trial in Geneva and Barbie's upcoming trial in early 1986. Though fighting on the three absurd points cited above, he obviously wants to use a financial victory as a whitewash for Nazism.

While refusing to allow this to be drawn directly into the court case, Genoud is now ready to admit that he has been and is a Nazi, and had befriended Hitler's associate, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. He has also admitted that he met with PFLP boss George Habash as well as terrorist Wadi Haddad, but claims that such meetings do not mean he is involved in terrorism. More recently, he also admitted that it was he who chose Nazi war-criminal Eichmann's lawyer, Maître Servatius, but insists that in Eichmann's and Breguet's cases, he has never been financially involved. Indeed, his 1980 and most recent 1984 tax declarations report a yearly income of 23,000 and 13,000 Swiss francs. Of these, 6,000 francs came in 1984 from his copyrights for Goebbels's work! François Genoud is legally so poor that there are no explanations for his two houses or his international travels.

However, the trial may not take the turn desired by Genoud and Maître Bonnant. Far from focusing on the mere legal issues which seem so fascinating to Swiss justice, the debate is expected to reach a bit higher. Genoud himself may contribute to it as he is expected to bring Islamic fundamentalist Ahmed Ben Bella, his decades-long protégé, as witness to testify that he had been arrested in Algiers for political and not financial reasons.

The defendants are also expected to bring forward surprise witnesses and new evidence. They may not have much chance of winning the trial on legal grounds; they have to win it politically. Superseding mere details, this trial has to become the trial of National Socialism and its survival over the last 40 years; it will have to be the trial of the role played by Nazism in international terrorism and drugs, and its shady connections with Soviet intelligence. Already in the weeks prior to the trial, international media are expecting to focus on Genoud's case. As we will expose in forthcoming articles, the focus will also reveal the important role played by François Genoud today on behalf of the Iranian Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Khomeini. After all, it is no coincidence that Genoud's daughter just married an Iranian in Lausanne, or that Khomeini's son-in-law, Sadegh Tabatabai, Iran's top arms merchant, just bought a house a few meters from Genoud's, in Pully.

British establishment steps up war on SDI

by Laurent Murawiec

At the San Francisco meeting of NATO parliamentarians on Oct. 11, former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, secretary-general of NATO's civilian bureaucracy, demanded of President Reagan that "the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] must be placed on the negotiation table at Geneva." Considering that the U.S. President has tirelessly repeated that his space defense program is not a "bargaining chip," it was a bold step for the Briton to take—and one perfectly coherent with the tireless tirades issuing from Soviet officials on the same subject.

Carrington, an architect of the "New Yalta" accord to cede global hegemony to the Soviet Union, is perhaps emboldened by the rate at which events around the world are bringing "New Yalta" to a realization.

In the same vein, Lord Carrington's successor at the Foreign Office, Geoffrey Howe, raised a few eyebrows at the Conservative Party's annual conference held in Blackpool, England during the week of Oct. 7, when he hinted that the British "independent nuclear deterrent" might after all be negotiable, as the Soviets insist, once "deep cuts in offensive weapons" have been agreed upon by the two superpowers—while Defense Minister Michael Heseltine aired a resounding "no" to the same Soviet demand. Howe also welcomed the latest Soviet propaganda offer of 50% cuts in missiles: "They need to be examined carefully on their merits. . ."

At the same time, intensive talks continue between London and Washington concerning what role Britain may play in the SDI, and agreement on a memorandum of understanding is expected within weeks, which would make Britain the first NATO country to reach such an accord. Light needs to be shed on Great Britain's real position on the matter.

Professor R. V. Jones, wartime chief of British scientific intelligence, who worked with Winston Churchill's science adviser Henry Tizard, has taken it upon himself to do so in his recently published booklet, *New Light on Star Wars*, issued by the Center for Policy Studies (CPS) in London. Jones, currently of the Center for Defense Studies of Aberdeen University in Scotland, was originally put in charge of drafting the paper by a high-powered CPS study-group convened by one of the center's founders, Sir Alfred Sherman,

EIR October 25, 1985

who played an essential role in securing the ascent of Margaret Thatcher to Tory leadership in 1975, and to the prime ministership in 1979. Jones's verdict was impatiently expected in the British policy establishment; the professor during the war had won the military-scientific "battle of the beams" against his German counterparts in the Luftwaffe.

The result "proved highly embarrassing for the CPS," one of its governors commented. But it "represents fairly the consensus view in Whitehall and the Foreign Office," one of the British government's chief scientists said. Jones rejects the SDI out of hand, basing himself explicitly and entirely on the arsenal of objections culled by the anti-SDI, pro-Soviet Union of Concerned Scientists, an offshoot of the Pugwash movement, the principal East-West back channel for strategic affairs.

Without once challenging the soundness of the oft-repeated arguments one can read in both the Soviet and U.S. Eastern Establishment press against the SDI, Jones insists that "American technological enthusiasm has not always been well-founded." To him, the "SDI is of an entirely different order of difficulty from anything so far within human achievement." In direct contradiction to scientific evidence, he adds that "none of these schemes appears practicable for many years. . . . the same is true of all forms of lasers, including x-rays and particle beams." In fact, an SDI would not be possible, according to the Oracle, until the year 2050!

A Soviet plot?

But the Delphic priest has divined: The SDI is really a Soviet scheme to divert American defense spending! He writes:

"If as it seems the President was led to over-enthusiasm in his original statement by a pressure group, and the SDI does not offer prospect of a believable defense until long into the future, at best, then why are the Russians so apprehensive about it?" The answer: "The Russians are not really apprehensive at all, but by appearing to be so they may raise American enthusiasm for and confidence in SDI, so that much of the trillion dollars spent in its pursuit will be diverted away from projects which would contribute more substantially to American military potential." Additionally, the Russians might fear that the United States will launch a first strike behind the SDI shield.

It comes as no surprise that Jones addresses warm acknowledgments to Richard Garwin, the prominent American anti-SDI figure and spokesman for the Union of Concerned Scientists, whom Jones counts as "a personal friend of mine," along with Lt.-Gen. (ret.)

Since offense will always surpass defense in cost-efficiency, he asserts,

efits will not make much of a difference (!),

that the SDI is impossible, dangerous, and undesirable. He combines that with the fantastic assertion that "a ban on all anti-satellite weapons would benefit the Americans more than the Russians because of the greater dependence of the former

on satellites."

In sum, technological progress should be stopped—a standpoint fully coherent with the state of industrial decay in Britain, as a result of the government's deliberate policy of encouraging a "post-industrial" service society.

Jones's piece proved so embarrassing that the chairman of the Center for Policy Studies, Lord Hugh Thomas, included in the brochure a dissenting preface supporting the SDI. Pointing out that the United States did observe the letter of the ABM Treaty of 1972, while "all the evidence is that the Russians continued with their defensive research, including into laser defense," he reminds that the West is still militarily inferior to the Soviet Union—both points ignored by Jones. Further, Thomas observes that "the switch from offensive to defensive arrangements in the nuclear age has a moral significance that we Europeans have perhaps not always recognized.

President Reagan, Mr. Weinberger and their colleagues." Further, "The Soviet Union . . . has never accepted . . . the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. On the contrary, there have been many Soviet pronouncements suggesting that their buildup of nuclear weapons is intended less to maintain a balance than to secure an overwhelming strength from which . . . to bully neighbors and opponents into surrender."

Space defense will make a first strike virtually impossible, Lord Thomas writes, and "I do not take the economic arguments against SDI very seriously. The sums concerned . . . are likely to be compensated for a hundred times over by even minor technological consequences." In conclusion: "The West has with perfect justification since 1945 sought to defend itself by technological superiority rather than with huge conventional armaments. We should surely continue to do so."

Thomas's plea does by no means, however, represent a common viewpoint among the British policy elite. contrary, the only public voice repeatedly raising the fight for the SDI, and European participation in it, is that of the *Times*, whose Oct. 4 editorial was sharply at odds with Whitehall opinion: "Without strategic defense, we will continue to suffer from the nuclear instability caused by having no defenses, only retaliatory forces. Mr. Gorbachov is in a different position, since he has 20 years of research into strategic defense behind him." The West should display "a continuing and unambiguous determination to persist with strategic defense."

But the official policy, and the wide-ranging array of "underground" policymaking channels centered in London, are now geared toward exacting just the opposite. Lord Carrington's San Francisco statement is the first salvo in the hostile barrage that will now start, as part of the extraordinary pressure being put on President Reagan before the Geneva summit.

Mrs. Thatcher's well-known comment about Gorbachov—"I like this man—we can do business together"—is more obviously true now than ever.