

The assessment of the threat by Northern Flank officers

Norway

Norwegian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, General Fredrik Bull-Hansen, delivered his assessment of NATO member Norway's military situation in statements issued on Jan. 27 and again on Feb. 7.

On Feb. 7, speaking at a seminar sponsored by Norway's Atlantic Committee, Gen. Bull-Hansen reported that the U.S.S.R. has drawn three main conclusions from World War II. These, he said, are:

1) Hostilities will never again be permitted to be conducted on Russian soil. Military operations will be moved rapidly and, if possible, in advance, to the enemy's territory. This is why the U.S.S.R. has established "buffer zones" in the south and west to protect the homeland. One of the roles of the Soviet navy is to maintain such a buffer zone in the Norwegian Sea.

2) The U.S.S.R. has built up a nuclear force capable of both fighting and winning a nuclear war if such a situation should arise.

3) The U.S.S.R. has built up the capacity to secure these interests already in peacetime and on a global scale. Steps were taken to realize Peter the Great's ambition to break Russia out of its position as a landlocked nation.

Drawing the conclusions from this assessment, with respect to the case of Norway, General Bull-Hansen said that a large part of the U.S.S.R.'s offensive and defensive naval forces are concentrated on the Kola Peninsula (bordering on Norway's northernmost province of Finmark; see map), the largest concentration of naval forces on earth. Two of the best available routes for moving Soviet forces onto the high seas run through either side of Norway: from the Baltic, where the U.S.S.R. has concentrated its shipbuilding and repair capacity, and from the Kola.

General Bull-Hansen concluded that this situation puts NATO member Norway in a special position, and explains why Norway must spend more for defense than do other countries. Conversely, he said, it would be to the great advantage of the U.S.S.R. if Norway were to move towards neutrality and to make reservations in its commitments to NATO. This is not speculation on my part, he said. Moscow has stated this openly.

With respect to the proposal for the creation of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone, he said, it is considerably more important to worry about where nuclear weapons will fall than were they are stationed in peacetime.

On Jan. 27, the Oslo newspaper Aftenposten published reports from an extensive interview with Gen. Bull-Hansen, entitled, "The United States and Britain Should Now Balance the Soviet Union in the Norwegian Sea." Quotes from the Aftenposten interview follow:

Understanding, but no more. That is the reaction in political circles . . . to the Commander-in-Chief's proposal for balanced anti-invasion defenses which maintain a professional standard in relation to the military threat in the years leading up to the end of the century. Within NATO, Norway is in the process of creating for itself a credibility problem in certain fields as a result of inadequate defense allocations. This was General Bull-Hansen's summary of the situation in an interview with *Aftenposten*. . . . He pointed to the importance of working to balance the Soviet naval presence in the Norwegian Sea with allied forces. Of our allies, it is the United States and Britain which could deploy forces of significance in the Norwegian Sea, he said.

"Facing the open sea to the west, as we do, with almost 3,000 kilometers of coast . . . it is a dramatic event for our security that the Soviet Union has become a major military power at sea, and that the two most important bases for the Soviet Union's offensive and defensive naval forces are to be found in our immediate environs to the north and to the south [Murmansk and Leningrad]."

[He] outlined the prospects for Norwegian military security against these "significant challenges" in a lecture to the Oslo Military Society in November last year.

. . . The Commander-in-Chief's views are as follows: The military threat to Norway is growing. But the economic situation is such that the Armed Forces find themselves at a crossroads. The budget allocations anticipated by the politicians in the 1974 and 1983 Storting [Parliament] defense reports mean that in actual fact the Armed Forces' wartime organization will be reduced in the years leading up to the end of the century. This will affect the Army in particular. It

will only be possible to modernize 6 or 7 of the 13 brigades Norway has today, to meet the combat milieu which is beginning to seem likely.

The rest of the brigades—almost half the Army—cannot be equipped with weapons and equipment which enables them to fight totally like brigades—that is, as mobile field units carrying out independent operations. . . . Almost half the Army will lose its dynamic operational function. . . .

But according to the Commander-in-Chief, there is nevertheless still an alternative to such a development. . . . Under [his] plan all branches of the Armed Forces could be modernized to a professionally defensible standard. . . . But it will cost, and spending is estimated at a 6-to-7 percent increase in the defense budget throughout the period leading up to the year 2000. . . .

On Jan. 6, Norwegian Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad responded to Gen. Bull-Hansen in a lecture before the Oslo Military Society, the same institution which the Commander-in-Chief had addressed. Aftenposten of Jan. 27 reports:

In his annual lecture . . . the defense minister presented one of the clearest and most balanced analyses of the security threat to Norway that has been heard in a long time.

“The decisive factor for us in respect to the Soviet naval buildup is not whether this buildup is determined by defen-

sive or offensive considerations, or whether it is connected with advanced operations or the protection of strategic interests in the Barents Sea or on the Kola Peninsula. However, what ought to be a crucial consideration for us is that intentions can change overnight, and that history is full of examples showing that a capacity that has been built up can be used differently than envisaged or thought likely. Norway’s incorrect assessment of German capacity, and consequently Germany’s intentions, in 1940 is a good example,” the defense minister said.

The defense minister’s analysis of the security situation squares very well with the Commander-in-Chief’s view of the military threat facing Norway. Nevertheless, the political leadership reaches a conclusion completely different from his about the size of defense budgets and about how Norwegian defenses should be built up to meet this threat in the years to come. . . . The minister made it clear that spending to cover such a defense structure [as proposed by Gen. Bull-Hansen] cannot be counted on. On the contrary, defense spending will be maintained at the levels planned in the past—that is, a 3.5 percent increase in the years up to 1989. In the years leading up to the year 2000, this increase will be considerably smaller.


Sweden

Swedish Navy Commander Hans von Hofsten, leading figure in the Swedish “Officers’ Revolt” of late 1985, wrote two articles for the Stockholm paper *Dagens Nyheter* on Jan. 20 and 21. The first was entitled, “Do the Swedish People Know About This?” and the second, “The Soviet Republic of Sweden?” In his Jan. 20 article, Commander von Hofsten began by documenting the fact that Nazi Germany attacked Denmark and Norway without warning in 1940, despite the fact that these countries had declared their neutrality at the outbreak of war on the continent. Germany’s attack was based on strategic logic: It had to have these countries in order to have forward bases for the fight against England. Germany had learned two things from World War I: It had to gain supremacy at sea before undertaking a coastal invasion, and it needed Fifth Columnists, Quislings, to assist it.

“These historical events are of utmost interest for us today, since the strategic situation has many remarkable similarities with the situation 45 years ago.

“The Soviet Union has virtually all its shipyard capacity bottled up in the Baltic, and its strategic fleet is north, in Murmansk. In addition, both fleets are far from the NATO lines of supply across the Atlantic. It is strategic necessity for the Warsaw Pact to acquire forward basing for its navy and supporting aircraft. Can this be the reason why the Soviet Union has tried, and succeeded, in using diplomatic ruminations to persuade Norway to refrain from having Allied forces on its territory during peacetime?

“In Norway there are . . . pathetically small standing forces.” Sweden has no standing army. Only its Air Force



and Navy are ready for action at all times, but they have been halved in strength in the recent period.

"A surprise opening gambit by the Warsaw Pact on the Scandinavian peninsula would, for that reason, be likely to succeed. . . . There are strong grounds to assume that a major war would begin here [in the Northern Flank]. Neutrality, weakness, and general peaceability would be as little help to us as they were to Finland in 1939 and Denmark and Norway in 1940.

"The Soviet Union has close to 4,000 elite troops specially trained for sabotage and assassination in Sweden. . . . An attacker knows 'to the T' how many submarines and missile ships Sweden has, what their names are, and where they are stationed and whether they are armed. He knows exactly how many Air Force units we have of various kinds and where they are located. He knows the name of every officer on every ship and every Air Force base. . . .

"Our Air Force would be totally paralyzed without pilots. For professionally trained and equipped sabotage units, clad in Swedish uniforms, it would not be difficult to murder most of our few hundred pilots.

"If the aggressor would like to increase the certainty that the Swedish Navy's ships will be unusable, he only has to extend his hit list by a few key individuals in their crews. . . .

"Some might say that this is alarmist. But all the Soviet submarine violations are reality."

On Jan. 21, Commander von Hofsten wrote:

. . . Sweden is threatened by the power struggle that "goes on in peacetime" [as described in Sweden's Defense Committee report] between the power blocs. The word "peace" has been put in quotation marks to underline what the Committee . . . states: "The dividing line between peace and war in our immediate area can be fluid". . . . This dividing line

The 'nuclear-free zone' and the Palme Commission

Beginning with mid-1983, Sweden's Socialist Prime Minister Olof Palme became the principal international spokesman for the transformation of northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, better known as the Palme Commission, acting together with the Socialist International, has since become an aggressive organizer on behalf of the proposal.

The origin of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone idea, however, lay in Moscow and not the West.

The Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are already, de facto, free of nuclear weapons. Two of them, the Soviet puppet state of Finland and neutral Sweden, are committed not to manufacture or deploy nuclear weapons on their soil. The two members of NATO, Norway and Denmark, each decided in the 1950s to exclude foreign troops and nuclear weapons from their territory (land-areas) in peacetime. A similar situation exists in the other northerly member of NATO, Iceland.

Denmark's and Norway's policy, however, provides for the transportation of nuclear weapons into the two countries in the event of a crisis or war. A U.S. and British shield was central to the strategy.

Hence, traditionalist politicians in the area made no attempt, in 1963, to leap on the Soviet bandwagon when then-president of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, first proposed "elevating" the region's non-nuclear status to that of a de

jure nuclear-free zone, with Denmark and Norway reneging on their commitment to allow NATO nuclear weapons to be brought into their territories in case of Soviet aggression. Since a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone would not affect the status of the heavily-armed and nuclearized Soviet forces on the Kola peninsula, Kekkonen's proposal was meant to limit the defense of NATO's Northern Flank to the extraordinarily outmanned and outgunned conventional forces of the West in the area.

Not surprisingly, the U.S.S.R. quickly espoused Kekkonen's proposal, which had in any case echoed earlier calls for the creation of European nuclear-free zones aired by Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev five years earlier. It was only through the activities of the Socialist International, and particularly the Palme Commission, that the Soviet proposal for leaving the Northern Flank defenseless began to gain currency.

According to his own testimony, convicted Soviet spy Arne Treholt was the channel used to re-program the Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone proposal, via the "Western" channel of the Palme Commission. A former top official in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Treholt was convicted of a 20-year sentence in 1985 for his activities as a Soviet agent. He is one of the highest-ranking Western politicians ever tried and convicted of such a crime. In the course of questioning following his arrest, Treholt admitted that his Soviet controller had instructed him to re-introduce into Nordic political channels the suggestion for a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone. Treholt, using his highly-placed Socialist International channels, duly did so, and reported himself pleased when Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme finally adopted the idea as his own.

is already fluid.

. . . All countries which so far in the power struggle have been deemed to be "accessible," without direct confrontation with the other power bloc, have been taken or made "allies." As soon as this has happened, bases and "advisers" have followed automatically.

In my view, the only thing a country can do to avoid becoming the victim of this constant advance of forward positions is to be judged "inaccessible." This can be achieved either through your own strength or in alliance with others. Sweden has chosen the path of its own strength. . . .

The Defense Committee has not even considered any positional advance in Sweden, apart from the case of an all-out war between the blocs. As a result, it does not draw any conclusions from the fact that it knows that the defense forces' effectiveness has been halved in the last 15 years, at the same time as the rest of the world's striking power—and mobili-

ty—has increased drastically. Should we not be discussing where the line might be drawn in the superpowers' assessment of Sweden's "accessibility". . . .

Last fall a number of colleagues and I expressed concern that people here in Sweden were not paying sufficiently serious attention to the obvious preparations for a surprise attack—preparations that have been going on and are still going on with great intensity. . . .

All my efforts are directed towards bringing the nation to an understanding that our security policy situation, in my own view and that of many other people, is much more serious than people are generally aware.

. . . The Army has not had enough money for a single new tank for the past 15 years. . . . The Air Force's new HAS series aircraft has been trimmed down to the breaking point. . . . The most acute need is to give the Navy a real chance of being able to keep coastal waters clear.

Palme and other advocates of a nuclear-free zone in the Northern Flank frequently dismiss fears about Soviet missile dispositions in the nearby Kola Peninsula, on the Baltic seaboard and in submarines in the Baltic Sea, by describing them as "a second-strike capability" to be used only if NATO started an attack on the Soviet Union. At the same time, these Soviet nuclear armaments are said to be of a range-capability too great to be used against the Nordic countries. However, a look at the facts shows this to be spurious propaganda.

By highly conservative estimates, Soviet short-range missiles—i.e., with a reach of 70 to 900 kilometers, and therefore targeted on Scandinavia—are deployed as follows on the Soviet side: on the Kola Peninsula, 17 to 20; in the Leningrad Military District, 40; in the Baltic Military District, 86; and in the Baltic Sea (Soviet part), 325, with 18 submarines that are designed to carry short-range nuclear missiles. Such missiles are also found in Poland (8), and East Germany (46). In addition, within the belt fringing the Nordic area from Kola down to the East-West German border, there are a total of over 600 artillery batteries with a nuclear capacity.

On the conventional side, estimates put the discrepancy between the Warsaw Pact and NATO at a highly conservative ten-to-one.

Soviet propaganda claims that, were a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone established, Moscow would undertake to guarantee that none of these missiles would be used against Scandinavia. Given the overwhelming strategic importance of NATO's Northern Flank for the U.S.S.R., such Soviet claims lack credibility even for the very gullible.

The Palme Commission, on which *EIR* has reported

extensively in the past, is one of a number of existing "back channels" for the laundering of Soviet policies into the West. From its founding in September of 1980, the Commission has formed part of the "New Yalta" institutions, committed to a recarving of the globe in which Western republican nation-states would be abolished. Hence its promotion of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone, of international disarmament, and—as Palme once told a gathering of the International Metalworkers Federation in Washington, shortly after the Commission's founding—of the argument that "the primary threat to peace springs from scientific research and development."

From the outset, the Palme Commission has been made up of a combination of top Soviet and Western intelligence personnel, and the New Yalta crowd in the West. Apart from Olof Palme, founding members included former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who had already played a leading role in the creation of an international "disarmament movement" through his work as an executive board member of the American Ditchley Foundation. Also included were Egon Bahr of the West German Social Democratic Party. Bahr is author of the so-called "Bahr Plan" that calls for the eventual withdrawal of Germany from NATO.

On the Soviet side, there is Georgii Arbatov, director of the U.S.A.-Canada Institute. Most notoriously, one of the Commission's founding members was GRU General Mikhail Milshtein, the GRU's specialist on U.S. military capabilities. Milshtein's inclusion in the Commission's roster generated such international outrage, that Palme was forced to drop him from the secretariat and give him the less exposed title of "technical adviser."