with Qaddafi in Crete to find a negotiated settlement with Libya over Chad. The French President proposed a mutual withdrawal of forces which had been committed to Chad in 1983. In 1983, the Islamic Legion of Qaddafi swarmed southward from the Aouzou strip in Northern Chad down toward the Chadian capital N'jamena.

Under intense pressure from other francophone black African regimes and his own military to act, Mitterrand committed French forces to defend the capital but rejected his own military command's suggestion to bomb out the Libyan armored columns and inflict a stinging defeat on Oaddafi. He contented himself with the worst solution, of fixed military positions. Following the Crete "summit," the Libyan regime immediately broke all of its verbal agreements with Mitterrand. France withdrew its troops, Qaddafi did not. Quite the contrary, he intensified troop presence, which has now reached 6,000, and used the intervening time to build up logistics for his air force and armored troops. Most recently, renewed Libyan-backed aggression against the Chadian government of Hissene Habre forced France to redeploy its forces once again in an operation code named "Epervier." Finally, in 1985, Mitterrand appointed the architect of his rapprochement with Libya, Eric Rouleau, ambassador to Tunisia, a move which was very badly received in Tunis.

Hence, it came as no surprise that Mitterrand would veto U.S. overflight requests. No one in the U.S. government seriously thought otherwise. Gen. Vernon Walters said as much on national American television on April 17. However, the question remains as to why the Chirac government, while powerless to change such a decision, did not distance itself clearly from Mitterrand. Chirac's representatives have made

repeated public and private statements representing a fundamental shift in policies toward Northern Africa, Africa, and the United States. There are two levels of explanations to this:

The first is that the government requires a few more months to implement the new electoral laws required to shift the balance of power in the country. In effect, an open and major conflict between Mitterrand and Chirac so early in the new situation could have led to parliamentary and governmental anarchy.

The second, which in no way contradicts, but rather supplements the first explanation, is that the traditional "Arabist lobby" within the diplomatic and foreign office apparatus of Chirac's RPR party still retains much influence and has never demonstrated any eagerness to fight Libya's leadership, any more than Syria's or Iran's. Nor have they ever been close to the policies followed by President Reagan. There are thus factions within the ruling coalition itself on strategic matters.

The French hostages in Lebanon only aggravate this dilemma. In time Chirac will have to clarify his own position which has been carefully balanced over the past days. This clarification becomes all the more urgent for the premier, who is truly concerned about international terrorism.

His Giscardian allies are very strongly supporting the U.S. action. Former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing on April 16 warmly endorsed the U.S. raid (see box), as did Jean Lecanuet, president of the UDF, the other party in Chirac's majority coalition. Latest developments indicate that this shift is already occurring: Interior Minister Pasqua and Chirac intimate Toubon have both made statements in the direction of an endorsement of the U.S. action.

How to finish off Colonel Qaddafi

On March 1, 1986, *EIR*'s European bureaus published a Special Report entitled, "Moscow's Terrorist Satrapy: The case study of Qaddafi's Libya." The report is based on the conviction that the world cannot tolerate Muammar Qaddafi and his regime.

To quote from the introduction: "The present report has several interlinked purposes: to provide the general public, as well as specialists, with the data necessary to understand the Qaddafi phenomenon, and to unveil the extensive network of his protectors, in the East as well as in the West.

"The report is an indictment of the Qaddafi regime and its accomplices, and if this proves to be the last report *EIR* is obliged to publish on this case, we will have succeeded in our aims."

Contents include:

• Libya and Qaddafi today. Includes the not-so-mys-

terious biography of the colonel, a profile of resistance to him, and charts of Libya's command structure, government, and military.

- The privileged relations between Libya and Moscow. How the Libyans came to be Moscow's "pet Muslims"; the East German connection; and a chronology of Libyan-Soviet relations since 1945.
- The Nazi-Communists behind Qaddafi. Including Swiss Nazi banker François Genoud, and the "left" terror outfits of Abu Nidal and "Carlos."
- Qaddafi's European friends. Sections on France, West Germany, and Italy detail Libya's links to the separatist gangs and the Green Party, but also the pro-Libyan lobby in business and government establishments. A chart shows Western Europe reliance on Libyan oil imports.
- The case of Armand Hammer, American oil billionaire, and perhaps the oldest living Soviet agent; his massive Libyan oil holdings; his connection to Israel.

The 75-page report, already in its second printing, is available for \$100. It can be ordered by writing to: Qaddafi Report, EIR News Service, P.O. Box 17390, Washington, D.C. 20041-0390.