Report From Bonn by Rainer Apel

A salesman for Kissinger's New Yalta

The foreign minister's trip to Moscow occurred in service of the policy for a U.S. pull-out from Europe.

Lore evidence has come to the fore that the talks that German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had with Mikhail Gorbachov in Moscow on July 21, were conducted in line with ongoing Anglo-American Establishment policy for a military-strategic pull-out from Western Europe.

Before Genscher left for Moscow, he met with Paul Nitze, the former U.S. chief negotiator in Geneva, and with James Dobbins, secretary at the U.S. embassy in Bonn. He received the hint that President Reagan was about to announce a moratorium on the Strategic Defense Initiative for seven or eight years, and a linking of arms-control talks and the range of the SDI project. A few days before, news had also arrived at Genscher's foreign ministry that plans for a partial pullout of U.S. troops from Europe were back on the Senate agenda for late autumn of this year.

Equipped with this information, the German foreign minister traveled to Moscow to meet Gorbachov. In his luggage, Genscher had a whole script of German concessions to the Soviet Union—concessions not only on armaments and SDI, but also in terms of economic, technological, and political decoupling from the United States.

This became public when Genscher was on his way from Moscow to Washington, D.C., to meet Secretary of State George Shultz for a reportback session on his talks with the Soviets. While Genscher talked with Shultz, the German media were reporting on a "secret blueprint" with guidelines for a new Genscher policy toward the Soviets. The document stated that Gorbachov's offers were "the chance of the century, which one must not let go by." The document's existence was denied by the foreign ministry in Bonn, naturally.

However, when Genscher returned from the United States to Bonn. he spoke of "new forms of economic cooperation" between the Soviet Union and Germany, and revealed that Gorbachov himself had offered "joint ventures" between Soviet and German companies.

The German foreign minister went on to explain that Gorbachov's "plans for the modernization of Soviet industry" were of "special interest" to German industry, because of "the special technological capacities in Germany." More exchange of technology would, said Genscher, also "help overcome the technological partition of Europe"-meaning that the Soviet Union was to be considered a part of Europe.

The "Europe" Genscher was talking about was the same "common roof for all Europeans" which Soviet propaganda has been painting as the political future of the continent. It is the vision of a Western Europe without the political, military, and economic presence of the United States. The Soviet Union would be part of that Europe, and, being the strongest power, would control that Europe.

Genscher elaborated on the theme in a speech he gave to the German-American Chamber of Commerce in Munich on July 28. He stated that a more "self-assertive Europe" was in

the strategic interests of the Americans. He said that Americans could still learn from the Europeans that Europe was a "cultural unity grown over centuries." Genscher stated that he thought it was "not self-evident to most Americans," that also the "interests of the people in the G.D.R. [East Germany] and other Warsaw Pact countries" had to be taken into consideration.

Concerning the alliance between Europe

man foreign minister stated that "détente" rather than "concepts of the past" should dominate the strategic discussion. "It is not our interest in Europe," added Genscher, "to arms-race the other side down to its knees." And again, he endorsed the Gorbachov proposals, calling on the Reagan administration to "capitalize on the current interest of the Soviet Union." Gorbachov's most urgent interest was to reduce military expenditures, he explained.

Thus, within a week of his threehour encounter with Gorbachov in Moscow, the German foreign minister had made public his vision of a future Europe that was largely decoupled from the United \$tates.

Interestingly enough, there was no voice of protest from the U.S. State Department against Genscher's remarks. Instead, Henry Kissinger appeared to endorse Genscher's policy in a guest column written for Welt am Sonntag, Germany's second-largest Sunday tabloid, on July 27. Titled "Prospects for Peace," Kissinger's article stated: "It is quite possible that we are at the beginning of a unique chance for East-West relations." If a new effort is not made with the "new Soviet leadership . . . which is less burdened by the past," a great chance for détente would pass by-exactly what Herr Genscher had said when he returned from Moscow.