PIR National

Moscow deploys Congress against the President

by Criton Zoakos

In his nationally broadcast radio statement of Aug. 16, President Reagan declared war against the U.S. House of Representatives, on grounds that the defense bill they had voted the previous day had met all the requirements of the Soviet government's bidding. A livid President Reagan identified the five specific Soviet military objectives in favor of which the House had voted, and announced to the American people, "Make no mistake: The House defense bill is a reckless assault upon the national defense of the United States."

He also pointed out that "Soviet military planners must be astonished at the blows the House delivered this week to America's national defense."

Finally, he vowed, "While it is my custom not to say whether I will veto a bill until it reaches my desk, if the defense budget arrives in anything like the present form, it will be vetoed. And national security will be the issue in 1986."

Thus, finally, the real issue of the 1986 congressional elections has formally become exactly that issue which *Executive Intelligence Review* had warned during July 1985 had to be brought forward for the electorate to decide, whether the West were to have a chance of countering the Soviet military challenge.

Following President Reagan's "declaration of war" on congressional liberals and pro-Soviet arms-control apologists, his opponents, including the Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and many Republicans of the Senate, indicated that they are ready to fight him on the defense issue at the November polls. Privately, the President announced his intention to personally campaign against anti-defense incumbents around the country. Thus, the fight has been joined.

For the liberals of both parties, it is a last ditch effort to

salvage their delusions of the long-evaporated political universe of "détente" and arms-control agreements. For the President and those close to him, this battle is the last chance for rallying this country to face up to the gravity of the Soviet military threat. For the Soviet command, pitting all of their overt, covert, direct, and indirect influences and assets in Congress against Reagan, is the only response they could compose to President Reagan's ingenious July 25 letter to General Secretary Gorbachov.

In that letter, the President formally placed on the negotiating table his generous offer to share with the Soviets our rapidly advancing Strategic Defense Initiative technology, and further proposed a joint or parallel deployment of SDI systems. The Soviet command, as of this writing, is still in a quandary as to how to respond to this offer. Their principal reaction so far has been to pull those strings of influence and call in those available political "chits" that eventually produced the Aug. 15 congressional vote, which in turn provoked the President's wrath.

Forces and moods behind the issues

Even though the President said that "national defense" will be the issue for 1986, neither he, nor the Soviets, who are watching the situation closely, believe that this alone will determine how the American people will vote in November. Many deluded congressmen may take this narrow view of the matter, and many may also believe that they can "buck" the President's authority and influence at the polls on grounds that he is a "lame duck" President. Those who proceed on such calculations are: a) completely out of touch with the "sea change" in the national mood, b) underestimate the political cunning of President Reagan, and c) are likely to be out of a job in November.

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Soviet observers of the American political process are more likely to focus their attention on how the American people are reacting to the War on Drugs and to the AIDS epidemic, and try to make their political deductions from these observations. The important elements which will determine voting patterns next November are the broad shifts in cultural and moral orientation now under way, rather than specific preferences on specific options for defense policy. Though "national defense" may be the overt, spoken issue of the campaign, the way people will vote will be determined by the less visible and mostly unspoken changes away from the liberal social agenda of permissiveness, abandon, and moral indifferentism toward the Soviet Union.

Soviet intelligence has been attempting to gauge these shifts in the American national mood both directly and indirectly, by watching closely the growing influence of the political movement associated with 1988 Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. Their estimate at present is that LaRouche, at this time, commands somewhere between 15% and 25% of Democratic voters, easily the largest single "constituency" within the Democratic Party. To such observers, the present growth of the LaRouche influence portends that in any confrontation between President Reagan and liberal Democrats, the latter would not stand much of a chance this coming November.

The Soviet Union's senior policymaking leadership, that country's "old men," know well that the era of "détente" and "the arms-control process," during which they accumulated their present formidable strategic superiority, had been made possible only because of the 1968 liberal-radical assault against the traditional labor-farmer-minorities constituencies of the Democratic party, and because of the 1972 "McGovern Reforms" in that party. The growth of the LaRouche movement into what Moscow now terms a "formidable force," threatens to undo that political arrangement, upon which "the détente process" had depended.

Hence, when Moscow decided to abandon all caution and instigate an identifiably "Made in Moscow" defense budget vote in the U.S. House of Representatives, it was taking the risk of potentially sending its congressional assets and dupes into their last "suicide mission." For Moscow, any Democratic elected politician who is committed to defending the "McGovern Reforms" of 1972 as a matter of fundamental principle, is counted as a Moscow asset or potential asset—whether or not the politician in question knows that he or she is so designated by Moscow.

The Soviets instigated the House vote of Aug. 15 because they needed it in lieu of a serious response to Reagan's offer of July 25. However, this so-instigated vote has made the "McGovern Reform" Democrats more vulnerable to the LaRouche challenge in the Democratic Party. This vote also had the effect of finally provoking President Reagan into publicly announcing on Aug. 16 what some 900 LaRouche-associated candidates have been saying since Jan. 1, namely,

that the 1986 election issue is Congress's sellout to Moscow on matters of national defense.

The Russians and their "McGovern Reform" Democratic dupes and allies could prevail in November only if a) there were no LaRouche movement to threaten to reorganize the affairs of the Democratic Party and b) if Reagan begins to be perceived as a "lame duck" President with waning ability to influence events.

Regarding the first of these two matters, it is known both to this news service and also to U.S. government circles, that Soviet officials are involved in numerous efforts to derail the growing LaRouche movement. Among these efforts are included informal but official representation to both State Department officials and to non-official leaders of the Liberal Establishment, demanding that "something be done" about LaRouche. Otherwise, Soviet agencies are being caught virtually every day in instigating or participating in a wide variety of "dirty tricks" against the LaRouche movement, from financial warfare to frivolous legal assaults, attempts at frameups, and so forth.

Respecting the prospects of a "lame duck" Reagan presidency: It appears that those anti-defense Democratic opponents of President Reagan who are counting on a "lame duck" effort to survive a confrontation with him, are going to wake up to a very sobering surprise: The drive to repeal the 22nd Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits third-term Presidents, is much further ahead than most observers realize. During the early months of the year, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee undertook an exhaustive feasibility study to ascertain whether it would be possible to repeal the 22nd Amendment, which eventually produced the conclusion that, with the appropriate kind of leadership from the White House, the repeal could be carried out in no more than 90 days.

After the conclusion of this study and the relevant preparations for a mass organizing drive through the Republican Party, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee submitted, in the House of Representatives, a bill to repeal the amendment. This took place on July 28, exactly three days after President Reagan sent his SDI letter to General Secretary Gorbachov.

If that amendment is eventually repealed when the new Congress comes in next January, President Reagan may or may not decide to take advantage of it for himself. He will, however, have the option of remaining open for the 1988 nomination, thus preserving his ability to dominate the proceedings of the 1988 Republican Convention. As soon as the July 28 repeal bill was submitted, both the Soviets and the congressional Democrats were forced to readjust and begin contending with the prospect of either a Reagan presidency stretching into 1992, or a Regan-determined presidency until at least that year. This is the reason why nobody has, so far, ventured to consider Mr. Reagan as a "lame duck" President, though many have been tempted to.

President Reagan's Aug. 16 radio address

My fellow Americans, when I campaigned for the Presidency in 1980, I made a solemn commitment to do all in my power to restore to our country a national defense second to none. In that election, and again in 1984, the American people, I believe, gave me a mandate to do precisely that. Today, however, that commitment—and many of the great gains we 've made together these past five years—have been placed in jeopardy by actions taken in the House of Representatives.

Let me outline for you a few of the decisions which, if permitted to stand, would pull the rug out from under our arms negotiators in Geneva and eventually imperil the national security of the United States. First, the House voted to deny the U.S. Air Force the right even to test our small antisatellite weapon called ASAT. The ASAT is designed to destroy, in the event of a conflict, Soviet military satellites that would guide Russian bombers and missiles to American targets. It is a defensive weapon, built to help protect the men and women of the U.S. armed forces at home and abroad. It's inexplicable to me how the House could deny us the right to even test this weapon, when a killer satellite weapon has long been deployed inside the Soviet Union.

Second, the House voted to halt any nuclear test larger than a single kiloton. If that vote is permitted to stand, all testing to maintain the safety, credibility, and reliability of the U.S. strategic deterrent would come to an end. Has a majority of the House forgotten history? In 1958, the United States agreed to a similar moratorium. Three years later, the Sovietsunilaterally smashed that moratorium with the largest series of nuclear tests in history. It took us almost a decade to discover what the Soviets had learned from those tests, prepared in secret, even as the United States relied upon a Soviet promise. We must not make the same mistake again.

Third, the House, by a single vote, refused to fund the chemical weapons we requested. If that vote is permitted to stand, the House will have increased the probability these dreadful weapons will one day be used. History has taught repeatedly that the best deterrent to such awful weapons is when both sides, not just one side, possess them. Hitler did not use his terrible gas weapons against the allies for a single reason: He feared retaliation by the allies with the same kind of weapon.

Fourth, the House voted to severely slash our request for the Strategic Defense Initiative. But SDI is not the only—or not only, I should say—the great hope of this country for finding a way out of the prison of mutual terror; it is an idea that helped bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table to Geneva. To gravely underfund SDI is to place in jeopardy all our hopes for arms reduction. It is to leave America indefinitely naked to missile attack, whether by accident or design. These radical cuts in SDI would permit the Soviet Union, which has been working on strategic defense for decades, to make strides at the expense of the United States.

Finally, the House voted to deny us any funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, even though SALT II was never ratified, even though the Soviet Union has violated its terms. What message is received in Moscow when a majority of the House votes to force its own country to strictly observe an expired and unratified treaty the Soviet Union has itself undercut?

Beyond this, the House voted to cut away at several of the programs that are at the heart of this nation's strategic deterrent: the land-based MX missile, the Trident submarine, and the advanced cruise missile. Soviet arms negotiators must be mystified today that U.S. legislators would give away in Washington what they have been unable to win at Geneva. Soviet military planners must be astonished at the blows the House delivered this week to America's national defense.

Finally, the House mandated that 10% of countless military contracts be awarded without competition, on the basis of a quota for certain business. And this they call military reform. It's a step in the wrong direction.

Soviet arms negotiators must be mystified today that U.S. legislators would give away in Washington what they have been unable to win at Geneva. Soviet military planners must be astonished at the blows the House delivered this week to America's national defense.

Make no mistake: The House defense bill is a reckless assault upon the national defense of the United States. It threatens our hopes for arms control and moves us back toward an era and policies which the American people emphatically rejected in the last two national elections.

While it is my custom not to say whether I will veto a bill until it reaches my desk, if the defense budget arrives in anything like the present form, it will be vetoed. And national security will be the issue in 1986.

Until next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you.