Soviet Union

Marshal Ogarkov officially resurfaces

by Luba George

It has been confirmed by Western defense sources, both in Europe and the United States, that Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov was recently appointed to the newly created post of deputy commander-in-chief of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces. This places him as number-two, directly under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov on the Soviet National Defense Council, the highest combined civilian-military defense organization.

The development occurred shortly before a three-day top-secret Warsaw Pact Military Council meeting April 16-18 in Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia. The meeting was presided over jointly by Gorbachov and Ogarkov. The location of Minsk was not accidental, as Minsk is the Supreme Head-quarters for Ogarkov's Western Theater War Command. Ogarkov's new operational command assignment is comparable to when, in the last years of World War II, Marshal Georgi Zhukov was named deputy commander-in-chief to Josef Stalin.

Ogarkov is best known to the Western public for his role in masterminding the shootdown of a Korean Air Lines jet in September 1983, killing all aboard. His fortunes have been the subject of endless speculation by Kremlinologists, who promptly proclaimed him "demoted" when, in September of 1984, he was removed from his position as chief of staff of the Armed Forces. EIR insisted, however, that this was no demotion, but that Ogarkov's war-mobilization doctrine had been adopted by the High Command as a whole. In July 1985 he was named Warsaw Pact commander, and then commander of the Western Theater of War, confirming our analysis.

Ogarkov's current appointment signifies the end-phase of what Lyndon LaRouche has called "Plan B"—the Soviet shift to a "crash program" to develop a "Strategic Defense Initiative," with concomitant modernization of the industrial economy and strategic and theater nuclear strike forces. The appointment is the most solid proof that the Soviets have an active war plan against the West, and are now launching provocations and confrontations against the United States and its allies, as shown by the new Berlin Crisis unleashed by Moscow on May 1.

This new dimension of Soviet war mobilization policy, forecast in 1985 by *EIR*, is being acknowledged as such by increasing numbers of Western intelligence personnel. A military analyst working for a British defense ministry think

tank told *EIR* that Ogarkov's promotion means that the Soviets are concentrating on developing a space-based SDI defense system to "revolutionize" warfare. "Ogarkov," he added, "is one of those who are keen on the idea of developing new weapons based on 'new physical principles' instead of relying on increasingly obsolescent weapons technologies." The Kremlin does not care about the obsolete SS-20 missiles, and is perfectly willing to negotiate them away in a "zero option" deal, he added.

Ogarkov's restructuring

As deputy commander-in-chief of the Defense Council, Marshal Ogarkov will guide the *perestroika* (restructuring) underway in the Soviet Union, responding to the pressing requirements of military R&D. "It's not Gorbachov's *perestroika*...it's Ogarkov's *perestroika*!" exclaimed a high-ranking defense analyst in West Germany. "The entire restructuring program was engineered by Ogarkov. His first priority is not arms arsenal and military power per se... the scientific-technological base takes precedence."

There are two critical phenomena operating in the Soviet Union today: first, an acceleration of the war economy build-up, which captures the essence of Stalin's pre-war preparations of 1938-41; and second, in response to the financial crisis in the West, a push for autarchy in the Comecon bloc, analogous to Stalin's 1929 "Third Period" response to the Great Depression.

But there is a crucial difference today. The *perestroika* is being conducted so as to avoid the errors of Stalin's mobilization. Ogarkov's writings insist that the Soviet Union could never afford to repeat the errors of the last war, when it failed to invest enough in technology, failed to develop adequate logistical capabilities in depth, and failed to adequately disperse war production facilities, among other things.

Today, a quantum leap in exploiting the satellite economies is necessitated. The research and technological capabilities of Comecon countries will be forced to contribute greater input into the Soviet mobilization. War economy-related priorities have been set in the recent Soviet and East bloc "joint ventures," and cooperation agreements include development of lasers and laser technology, microelectronics, microcomputers, robotics, biotechnology, and atomic power.

Knowledgeable Western analysts point to Ogarkov's

EIR May 15, 1987 International 33

"technological chauvinism"—his intolerance of technological dependence on the West. He views the Brezhnev era of détente, in which the Soviet Union relied heavily on importing Western technology, as having eroded the U.S.S.R.'s independent technological base. It is understood that Ogarkov's perestroika will mean further purges of the Brezhnevite military-political elite.

A top Western defense source revealed that at the Minsk Warsaw Pact Military Council meeting, some military figures expressed resistance to Ogarkov's drive for innovation, demanding instead "more of the same" in military hardware, in view of the alleged "NATO threat." Ogarkov reportedly dismissed their arguments, saying that no NATO threat exists, and the Soviet Union must prioritize its investments in the SDI and related fields.

The upcoming Central Committee Plenum on economic planning, announced recently by Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, and rumored to take place in June, promises to be a watershed in the implementation of the Ogarkov war plan. Further, within about a five-week period beginning on May 28, there will be two other significant conferences. On May 28, the Warsaw Pact summit will begin in East Berlin. Then June and early July will almost definitely witness a Comecon summit, to thrash out the implementation of the Ogarkov Plan.

In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon


Modern Irregular Warfare

by Professor Friedrich August Frhr. von der Heydte

Order from:

Ben Franklin Booksellers, Inc. 27 South King St. Leesburg, VA 22075

\$9.95 plus shipping (\$1.50 for first book, \$.50 for each additional book.) Bulk rates available.



Interview: John Erickson

Soviet 'Globalists' will be beaten now

On April 28, EIR spoke to Edinburgh University Soviet expert Professor John Erickson. Erickson had just returned from a several week stay in the United States. The following are extensive excerpts from that discussion.

EIR: Certain breaking developments concerning the U.S.S.R. have caught our attention, and raised questions. For example, the strange, sudden "indefinite postponement" of the trip of West German President Richard von Weizsäcker to the U.S.S.R. What do you make of that? In what context would such a development be occurring?

Erickson: There are several of these kinds of things going on. This is one sign, of many. It certainly indicates that there are a great many problems in the Soviet Union. What you have to understand, is that there is a great deal of improvisation going on in the U.S.S.R., tactical moves on a day-to-day basis.

The problem I came across in the United States, is people always asking me: "How long will Gorbachov last?" Frankly, it doesn't matter much. Gorbachov is not irrelevant, but whatever happens to him, the process of change is permanent. Nonetheless,, there will be turbulence for a long time. Both Russia and America are operating tactically. I reached a consensus with senior people in the United States, that the Soviets have defined an 18 to 20 month period for achieving crucial aims of the *perestroika*, but one must expect things like this von Weizsäcker development. Many changes are going on. I remember very much, I was in the Soviet Union for a long time during the Khrushchov era, and I met people at a very high level, and there was literally chaos.

EIR: One critical element of all of this, in our view, is the Western financial crisis, which is unfolding very fast, toward a crash. Is this affecting Soviet planning, is this an element in some of the changes we are referencing?

Erickson: This plays a key role tactically, in the sense I said about how important tactical considerations are to the Russians, but what the effect of the financial crisis will be strategically, that is the real problem. Expect more perturbations, as a result of this.

I've always argued, that a Soviet leader has to work, at the beginning, from a standpoint of autarky. *Then*, this is followed by periods of new revolutionary activism. In the