

mann, after being trotted up to Washington D.C., for meetings with Solarz and government officials, under the "strict supervision" of Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Eisenmann, according to the article, also put his recruits in touch with a group of wealthy Americans involved in Oliver North's Contra-funding operations, who began to channel funds to their newly-adopted Panamanian "Contras."

The involvement of the United States in Panama's destabilization is a matter of public knowledge. On June 28, Panama recalled its ambassador from Washington to protest what President Delvalle called "intolerable interference . . . in the internal affairs of Panama." On June 29, the Panamanian Legislative Assembly passed a resolution demanding that Ambassador Davis be declared *persona non grata* and tossed out of Panama. On June 30, demonstrators stoned the U.S. embassy and painted it with angry slogans. Even the Organization of American States gathered in emergency session to urge maintenance of good relations between the United States and Panama, and to protest "unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of Panama." Only the United States voted against the resolution.

How far the destabilization of Panama will go remains to be seen. What is a certainty is that the United States is a guaranteed loser, and the Soviets a sure winner.

## Sweden

# Soviet submarines spur officers' revolt

by Göran Haglund

For the first time this year, the Swedish armed forces opened fire on a Soviet submarine on July 1, coincident with a renewed officers' revolt against official downplaying of the unceasing violations of Swedish waters. A Navy anti-submarine-warfare helicopter dropped several depth charges and launched anti-submarine grenades against an intruding Soviet vessel in the inner archipelago off Töre, Sweden's northernmost deep-water port in the Gulf of Bothnia.

The periscope and part of the hull of an intruding submarine were first seen on June 28 in these militarily sensitive waters by three fishermen, at a distance of about 100 meters. The Army was alerted, and initiated a submarine chase. Pictures of the submarine were taken by military personnel, but have not been released.

Submarine nets were placed to block the exits from the narrow waters where the vessel was detected, as the reinforced army and naval forces on the scene prepared to wait for a possibly trapped Soviet submarine either to surface or, more likely, to attempt a breakout.

The only way for a submerged vessel to reach the Gulf of Bothnia from the Baltic Sea, or vice versa, to return to the Baltic Sea, is through the passage between Sweden and the Finnish Åland islands over 600 kilometers further south. As this narrow passage is strictly either Swedish or Finnish territorial waters, relevant forces were ordered to intensify their surveillance of this area, too. Yet despite these moves, no further sign of the sub has been detected since its original sighting.

## Nuclear mines?

Asked for comment on the purpose of Russian submarine incursions into Swedish waters, an experienced British officer said that Sweden—whose neutral government is signaling political softness toward Moscow—is an ideal training ground for submarine crews assigned to placing nuclear mines in enemy ports and defense facilities. The mines could then be activated by long-wave radio control.

In the event of Swedish detection of such activity, the

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Kremlin is cynically counting on the Social Democratic government's softness and isolation from the West to prevent any response beyond cautious diplomatic posturing, as the Stockholm regime prizes its "good-neighborly relations" with Moscow higher than anything else. The very threat of such nuclear mines might even, perversely, reinvigorate the Social Democratic appeasers' calls for a Baltic nuclear-free zone, a favorite "arms-control" game played by Moscow, the only Baltic nuclear power.

While this British estimation may seem harsh, it is coldly realistic. Already in 1975, a Soviet Navy captain and engineer named Y. Belyakov had written an article published in a Russian magazine, titled, "Mini Submarines Are Coming Back," in which he outlined how small vessels, difficult to detect in shallow waters, can be deployed to land sabotage teams or place mines in ports and naval facilities. Emphasizing the potential surprise effect of such operations, Belyakov—*12 years ago!*—called for developing new technologies and tactics for a number of weapons systems suited to mini-submarine warfare, including nuclear weapons.

### Officers report repeated incursions

The persistence of the Soviet violations of Sweden's territorial integrity, combined with the false perception of normalcy transmitted by the Swedish government and supreme military command, has spurred a revival of the Swedish officers' revolt, originally launched after the 1985 reelection of Olof Palme as prime minister.

"We have to assume that 10 submarines, conventional ones and mini-subs, intrude into Swedish coastal waters every day during the ice-free season," Maj. Bill Norén told the Social Democratic daily *Arbetet* on June 21. Norén is the chief of intelligence and security of the Stockholm Coastal Artillery, and his statements were not appreciated by the Defense Staff. Reached for comment, Norén told other press, he would not say anything. "I have been ordered to refer all questions to the Defense Staff. They say the right things."

But the ball had already started rolling. Norén's former boss, Col. (ret.) Lars Hansson, 1982-85 chief of the Stockholm Coastal Artillery, stated in *Svenska Dagbladet* of June 28, "I'm pleased to see somebody finally stand up and speak in a clear language." Hansson, who still has security assignments on behalf of the Swedish Defense Staff, said that his personal experience is that if 100 submarine incursions were reported as certain to the Defense Staff by the Stockholm Coastal Artillery, only 5 would be reported to the public!

"The commander-in-chief has failed in his task and role when the extent of incursions has not been made adequately clear," Hansson charged. He singled out former Defense Staff chief, Vice Adm. Bror Stefenson, for "introducing a mandarin language such that the Swedish people do not get an idea of the real extent of incursions."

After the 1982 Hors Bay incident, Hansson said, the politicians introduced a new vocabulary, in agreement with

their own needs to formulate juridically waterproof diplomatic notes to foreign powers, where plain language about how many incursions have occurred in which location was replaced by gobbledygook regarding "possible, likely, or probable foreign underwater activity."

In the Hors Bay incident, Hansson said, success was nearer than ever: "One of the mine explosions probably damaged one of the vessels. Had we been able to follow through that deployment, we might have succeeded." Hansson didn't mention that the 1982 incident, in which one sub was trapped in coastal waters, occurred just as power was transferred from the non-Socialist government back to Palme; according to sources, after a hair-raising meeting with incoming Soviet ambassador Boris Pankin, Palme intervened at a critical moment to revoke the permission to fire, long enough for the trapped submarine to escape.

Maybe alluding to that instance of political interference, Hansson next related a 1983 incident, in which a submarine was triply detected—magnetically, by sonar device, and visually—as it was passing a line of mines. But the military had no permission to fire.

Although varying salinity, water temperature, and a shallow, rocky sea floor combine to make much of the Baltic archipelago "a beautiful place to hide a submarine," in the words of a retired U.S. admiral familiar with the Hors Bay incident, Hansson's statement accurately indicates the greater problem to be the political constraints forced upon the military commanders in charge of chasing the sub. Those political constraints include inadequate funds to procure the technology required for defeating intruding submarines, and also include an explicit intention to "avoid hurting the sub," but merely bring it to the surface.

Exemplary are the words of the former commander-in-chief of the northern Norwegian forces, Lt. Gen. Tonne Huitfeldt, who called in November 1985 for Norway to sharpen its rules of engagement against unidentified submarines in Norwegian waters, and lift the restrictions on the use of homing torpedoes. The present rules make it impossible to force a submarine to the surface, and civilians cannot understand why submarine chases never seem to succeed, the NATO commander pointed out.

In a June 30 interview in *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm's Colonel Hansson stated that "information is most important now regarding the great number of submarine incursions. There are many of us who fear that they are being hushed up, that we are getting used to the way things are now, and that the information is getting so meaningless that we just accept it."

Hansson stressed that the purpose of the incursions is "military preparations for war," and that "they" want to map out defense installations "to see where to land saboteurs the day before an attack, which is to be followed by a surprise attack." Said Hansson, "Today we have a very low profile. I think that should be changed."