## How NPA recruits: barangays and labor

The NPA's active and armed fighting force could not operate were it not for the NPA's penetration of Philippines society. In June 1988, the Philippines government published a report on the NPA based upon thousands of documents seized in raids on NPA installations and hideouts. A section of that report is reprinted here, showing how the NPA builds up disguised organization in the barangays (districts, villages) and labor unions:

The process of CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines) organization in the *barangays* is derived from the idea of Mao, wherein organizing cells are set up. In the labor sector, the methods are taken from the concept of Marx on dialectical materialism. In cases where there are target organizations, the cells infiltrate the said organizations. As the cells expand, members are broken up and later tasked to organize other cells in other target *barangays* and/or labor groups.

Conversely, core groups or collectives were also expanded to gradually become CPP organs within the labor group and/or barangay with its level of organization corresponding to the number of its membership. Developments in the barangay or countrysides are directed toward the organizations of the NPA components, while in the urban centers, united front building is emphasized. Political cadres are chosen from both efforts.

## 1) Barangay module

The farmers, women, and youth sectors are the principal targets of the CPP in its recruitment work and establishment and expansion of party organization in a *barangay*. . . . CPP penetration in a target *barangay* is done as follows:

First, a Semi-Legal Team (SLT) or Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda (SYP), through its Barangay Liaison Group (BLG), will conduct a class analysis and social investigation in a target barangay. The BLG, composed of contact men in a barangay, is the group approached and organized by the SLT when a barangay is targeted for CT expansion. The SLT will later establish an Organizing Group, wherein members will be subdivided into sectors, subsequently the OGF (farmers), OGW (women), and OGK (youth). Using the level of a sectoral organization as basis, "special courses" or "sectoral studies" are given to members. These courses discuss the immediate problem of a particular class sector being aroused and organized; the present enemies of the party, the roots of

the people's problems/hardships (analysis of the problems arising from the basic social conditions that affect a particular sector), and the "correct" method of struggle in order to bring about the immediate attainment of the economic and legitimate rights of the class/sector being organized. . . .

Further, potential leaders and members of OGs will form the Barrio Revolutionary Committee (BRC). BRC is the party organization in a more or less CT-affected barangay which acts as the local government and supervises all party work and activities. BRC members are considered as "militias" in the said barangay who defend the masses in the rural areas without separating themselves from daily productive work. Said elements, categorized by the CPP/NPA as "mass activists," play a main defensive role but serve as the vast reserve and support for the regular mobile force and guerrilla units. . . .

The three to six most advanced elements (most reliable and trustworthy) or the mass activists from the BRC are recruited for full-fledged membership in the party, army, or National Democratic Front in the *barangay*, who will then form the Party Branch (PB). . . Among the responsibilities are to carry out propaganda and organizational work, to muster material and moral support for the armed struggle, to recruit new party members and Red Fighters, and to collect dues of party members. . . .


## 2) Labor module

The country's labor force is currently placed at about 23 million, 20.8 million of whom are employed and 2.2 million unemployed. This is translated into an employment rate of 90.5%. However, only 10.52% or 2.2 million of the total employed workforce are organized. Registered active unions nationwide are recorded at 2,824. Because of this numerical force and its potential to seriously affect the country's economy, the CPP/NPA sees labor as one of the vanguards in its "People's Democratic Revolution" . . . The main cause waged by the insurgents in this sector is to adversely affect



Farmers and the urban labor force are primary targets for Communist Party organizing.

FIGURE 1
Growth of the CPP/NPA strength
1968-87



the country's economy to foment economic starvation or nationwide hunger, resulting in nationwide strife or unrest.

The major CPP organs directly involved in attaining these objectives are the National United Front Commission (NUFC) and the National Democratic Front (NDF). The NUFC and the NDF complement each other's efforts to raise the ideological consciousness of the labor force and forge a broad alliance of several groups against the government. The NDF's National Democratic Underground Mass Organization (NDUGMO), the Kilusang Rebolusyonaryong Manggagawa (KRM), and its influenced May First Movement (KMU) spearhead the organizational and infiltration efforts in the labor sector. . . .

CPP cadres gain influence in a particular establishment/ factory through the infiltration of the existing labor union or by the formation of its own front groups to serve as legitiamate cover for party-directed activities. Initially, the insurgents, using the Labor Cadre Team (LCT), which is similar to the Semi-Legal Team operating in the barangay, select a target. Usually, the firms chosen are those with the following characteristics: owned and controlled by monopolists/capitalists; with a large number of workers; presence of economic and political issues that arouse workers' emotions; and manned by discontented workers. This condition is considered the most ideal for infiltration. The gathering of data about the operations of a target firm is undertaken by a worker's liaison group, which also makes the initial contacts among laborers. Members of the liaison group initiate the political and organizational activities and determine the possible organization of the Propaganda-Organizing Study Struggle Team (POSST). The POSST, the first level of the underground organization in the labor sector, is composed of three to six members who have been oriented, educated, activated, and investigated. Accordingly, the POSST's task is to gather additional data about the factory while undertaking propaganda activities such as holding of classes/seminars on unionism and launching of meetings that play upon the emotional grievances of workers against capitalists or pro-management labor leaders. . . .

When the number of POSST members reaches 15-35, the KRM provisional chapter is then established through the recommendation of the Labor Cadre Team (LCT) to the CPP section committee operating in the community where the factory is located. The KRM provisional chapter is actually the increased and expanded membership of the POSST. Subsequently, the formal KRM chapter emerges when the members of the KRM provisional chapter reaches 30. The KRM chapter should be strong enough and one that could influence/control the whole labor union force in order to qualify as a KRM chapter. When there is already a KRM chapter, the factory could now be considered infiltrated where more than 25% of the workers are wittingly or unwittingly supportive of leftist trade unionism.

If two or more chapters already exist within the factory, a KRM factory chapter is organized. This chapter has control over the majority of the workers in the factory, which is now considered influenced, meaning 50% or more of the workers are knowingly or unknowingly supporting the cause of the leftists. Later, 3 to 14 members will be selected from the KRM factory chapter to form the party branch (PB) within the factory. The PB will perform the political and organizational activities of the CPP among the workers. Thereafter, members of the PB will be developed toward NDF, PPC/ACP, and NPA lines of struggle. By this time, the firm's labor union is supposed to be CPP-controlled, such that the factory operations can be totally hampered by strikes, lockouts, pickets, or slowdown of work.

TABLE 1

CPP/NPA affected barangays
(June 1988)

Region	Total barangays	Influenced	Infiltrated	Total affected
1	3,949	83 (2%)	142 (4%)	225 (6%)
2	2,660	199 (7%)	321 (12%)	520 (19%
3	2,981	289 (10%)	488 (16%)	777 (26%
NCR	1,690	3 (.2%)	3 (.2%)	6 (.4%)
4	5,039	64 (1%)	160 (3%)	233 (4%)
5	3,452	548 (16%)	661 (19%)	1,209 (35%
6	4,052	346 (9%)	781 (19%)	1,127 (28%
7	2,983	86 (3%)	326 (11%)	412 (14%
8	4,376	803 (17%)	682 (16%)	1,485 (33%
9	2,567	168 (17%)	396 (15%)	564 (22%
10	2,411	207 (9%)	565 (23%)	772 (32%
11	1,610	156 (10%)	295 (18%)	451 (28%
12	3,860	114 (3%)	164 (4%)	278 (7%)
Total	41.630	3.066 (7%)	4.993 (12%)	8.059 (19%)

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