Kissinger still killing, ten years after Bhutto's death

by Katherine Notley

Ten years ago, on April 4, 1979, a man was hanged to death, a onetime head of state and international statesman who had been threatened by Henry Kissinger. That man was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was overthrown as prime minister of Pakistan on July 5, 1977, and subsequently convicted of murder and condemned to death. The immediate trigger for Kissinger's homicidal rage was the fact that Pakistan had signed an agreement with France to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant in 1976. Kissinger told Prime Minister Bhutto that he "would make a terrible example of Pakistan" if it did not withdraw from the agreement.

The international conspiracy to destroy Bhutto has the haunting familiarity of the more recent events around the attempts to destroy and kill Lyndon LaRouche. And like the frameup of LaRouche, as one European figure put it, such a public atrocity can only be committed against an individual, if unimaginable crimes are in the offing against whole populations. In the three years between Bhutto's overthrow and hanging, every government in South Asia fell.

The Pakistan Papers

Under death sentence, Bhutto was able to smuggle out of prison a 319-page manuscript proving the political nature of the judicial actions against him, and the international hand behind the domestic conspiracy. The document, titled *The Pakistan Papers: White Papers or White Lies*, was provided to columnist Jack Anderson, the *Financial Times*, and the *Washington Post*. They declined to make any mention of Bhutto's rebuttal or even his case, except to say that Bhutto's nuclear energy program aimed at building a Pakistani military nuclear capability. With the failure of Bhutto's Supreme Court appeal in late 1978, *EIR* was able to obtain a copy of the *Pakistan Papers* and rush an abridged version into production for international distribution.

The introduction to the document, written anonymously by a Pakistani scholar, details the background to the judicial murder. In 1976, Bhutto issued a call for elections that were to take place on March 7, 1977. An opposition party—described as a "mish-mash"—was pulled together to contest Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. This party was a coalition of centrists and Muslim fundamentalists loosely allied around a platform to impose the Prophetic Order (Nizam-i-Mustafa). On the question of program, there was no contest. Bhutto's government had ruthlessly attacked the country's vested baronies, nationalizing banks and major industries, implementing land reform, nationalized the school system and raised teachers' pay scales to meet those of civil servants, and signed the nuclear reprocessing agreement. Bhutto's PPP won the elections overwhelmingly.

Slowly at first, but with an increasingly strident tone, the opposition Pakistan National Alliance accused Bhutto's PPP of rigging the elections. Under cover of the cry for Nizam-i-Mustafa, the PNA was able to sufficiently disrupt the country's functioning that the prime minister agreed to have Saudi Arabia mediate between the parties, as the only way to reestablish public order. The negotiators were prepared to conclude the agreement on July 4, 1977; on July 5, Chief of Staff Zia declared himself Chief Martial Law Administrator, and placed the prime minister under "protective custody."

Bhutto was charged with murder and tried at Lahore High Court as the "principal accused." The ousted prime minister was convicted and sentenced to death. The Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, Maulvi Musthaq Husain, in *The State v. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* was the Chief Election Commissioner for Pakistan, and principal responsible for investigating the charges of election rigging. The investigation produced a two-volume report dealing only with polling irregularities ostensibly committed by PPP, although charges of tampering were levied by both parties. However, the document was not published until July 25, 1978, and made so widely available that its authors had it translated into Arabic for distribution overseas! The timing, Bhutto wrote, "can logically be gauged

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in the context of the hearing of my Appeal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the Death Sentence."

Lending weight to Bhutto's argument that the government White Paper was issued to bias the judgment of the Supreme Court, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote in *The Nation*:

The decision of the High Court is full of errors of fact and law. Its characterization of evidence shows its bias. There was no objective effort to determine fact. . . . The Supreme Court of Pakistan is not in an easy position. The Chief Justice was selected by General Zia. Everyone is looking for political motivation. Each justice has the rule of law in Pakistan, his professional reputation, his personal future, perhaps his own freedom and life before him in this case. . . . We should stand for life and implore with all our moral suasion a commutation of the death sentence. We should stand for justice and urge freedom, or—if the facts warrant prosecution, which I have not seen—a new and fair trial for Ali Bhutto. [Emphasis in original.]

Documentation

Kissinger's nuclear threat

In an April 28, 1977 speech to Parliament, Bhutto charged that the Pakistan National Alliance's destabilization effort was not a "desi [indigenous] conspiracy; this is an international conspiracy... a huge colossal conspiracy against the Islamic state of Pakistan." In his Pakistan Papers, Bhutto detailed how he discovered "hidden hands" guiding the actions of the PNA. Emphasis throughout is Bhutto's.

What did surprise me and what I had not foreseen, was the forces arrayed behind the Opposition. These forces began to gather from middle of December 1976. The reports on the hidden hands began to come to me in the beginning of January 1977. In that same month, [a personal friend and PPP worker] Rafi Raza had a four-and-a-half-hour interview with me. He told me that the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was coming into being, he told me who would be the President of PNA and who would be the other office bearers. He gave me the reasons for the design, the strategy and the aim. At the end of his exposition, he told me that I had three alternatives:

- a) Forget the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant and the imminent unity of the Opposition will not materialize.
 - b) Postpone the elections, or,
 - c) Face very grave consequences.

He kept emphasizing that I should not press him to reveal

his sources but that he was speaking with full knowledge of what was taking place. I asked him to make his suggestion. He advised me to forget the Reprocessing Plant. He also informed me that during the elections, the Opposition would not make an issue of the Reprocessing Plant. Only now and then they would mention nuclear power in order to hoodwink the people; hoping that the public would not know the difference between nuclear power plants and a nuclear reprocessing plant. Rafi Raza warned me that the people around me, those who were making emotional noises and advising me not to budge an inch, would not be found when the curtain fell. . . . I thanked him for the valuable information and advice. However, I told him it was too late to postpone the elections, or to drop the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant. . . . Rafi Raza said that he had no doubt that we would win the elections in a fair context, but that he had considerable doubt if we would be allowed to reap the benefits of the victory. As he would not expand, I remarked, "All right, we will lose the elections or not be allowed to eat the fruits of our victory." Looking through his thick horn-rimmed spectacles, and using his hand as a comb to straighten his side-parting and the back of his hair, ominously, Rafi Raza said: "But, Sir, I am trying to tell you that more than an election or an Office is at stake." I replied cryptically, "I got your point and you got my answer."

Before leaving . . . he asked, "Why are you doing all this? What makes you take such big chances with yourself and your family?" I told him that I was doing it to build an egalitarian society, to make my Country strong and modern, to bring happiness to people who had no idea what the word meant. I told him that tears will always be shed but I wanted less tears to be shed and less bitterly.

Later Bhutto described the 19 years he spent providing Pakistan with a full cycle nuclear capability. He also gave a name to the nuclear program's enemy: Henry Kissinger.

We were on the threshold of full nuclear capability, when I left the Government to come to this death cell. We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The Communist Powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it but that position was about to change.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State for the United States, has a brilliant mind. He told me that I should not insult the intelligence of the United States by saying that Pakistan needed the Reprocessing Plant for her energy needs. In reply, I told him that I will not insult the intelligence of the United States by discussing the energy needs of Pakistan, but in the same token, he should not insult the sovereignty and self-respect of Pakistan by discussing the plant at all. The General [Zia] got the lemon—"limbo"—from the President of France. Pakistan got the ladu. The PNA got the halva. I got the Death Sentence.

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