### **Fig. Feature**

# Deng Xiaoping is butchering 1 million Chinese

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The following report was filed from Taipei, Republic of China, in June.


In the wake of the massacres of students, workers, and other supporters of the democracy movement in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Nanjing, and dozens of other Chinese cities, Chinese Communist Party paramount leader Deng Xiaoping has ordered his secret police, the Wu Jing, to exterminate all opposition leaders. According to highly informed Republic of China sources in Taipei, the scope of these proscriptions is destined rapidly to reach the level of 1 million victims. These 1 million death warrants have already been issued, say the sources.

Deng had made no secret of his intent to inflict a holocaust on the critics and adversaries of his regime. Before the June 4 massacre, he had observed that "1 million victims is a small price to pay in a country as large as China." Deng's homicidal intent has been seconded by President Yang Shangkun, one of the warlords who dominate the People's Liberation Army, who has issued public calls to hunt down opposition leaders, to kill them, and not be soft in the process. Everywhere Communist bureaucrats and military leaders are being told that if 20 million lives were lost in the wars against the Japanese and against the Nationalists of the Kuomintang, then a large loss of life must be accepted today to prevent what is called the reestablishment of capitalism. In the view of R.O.C. experts, there is therefore no doubt that the Beijing leaders will now slaughter all the opposition they can get their hands on, using secret police and armed forces, as the only way that the Communist regime can hang on to power in the short and middle term.

The Tiananmen Square massacre was carefully planned in advance by party leaders, and even the estimates of 7,000 to 10,000 killed there are much too low. The bodies of those slain by the tanks and the machine guns were quickly cremated and buried in large numbers. The real death toll may never be known.

Nevertheless, the Beijing regime is already irrevocably doomed. The people will stand up and fight, and the army cannot be separated from the people. Soldiers

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A military parade in Taipei, Taiwan. Well-informed sources in Taipei are confident that the Beijing Communist regime is doomed. But they are concerned that the desperate warlords around Deng Xiaoping could launch a military adventure against Taiwan. Taiwanese forces have therefore been placed on high

have relatives. Soldiers depend upon farmers to provide food, and depend upon factory workers to provide ammunition. When the food and ammunition are gone, the people will prevail. Therefore the army cannot be used indefinitely against the people, and this means that the Communist regime is moribund.

#### **Key to world strategy**

Taipei observers stress that the Chinese situation is now the key to the international strategic situation, and the main lever for solving the world strategic problem. The main change is a change of people, and the earthshaking events in China will affect all people—black, white, yellow, in Europe, the United States, and everywhere else. Previously, the Chinese people were anti-Communist, but did not dare to show it. Whatever they were thinking, they acted under the orders of the Communists. Now they know it is the time for them to show their hatred for Communism, and they are beginning to stand up and fight. The most important thing is that the people are no longer terrified of the Communists, no matter what the odds may seem. The control mechanisms of the Chinese Communists, the most effective totalitarian controls in world history, are in the process of being smashed.

Other Taipei sources offer the following model for the struggle for power among the Beijing warlords over the short term. The order of prominence in Beijing is changing rapidly, with Deng, Yang Shangkun, and Li Peng followed by Bo Yibo, Wang Chen, and Qiao Shi in a less defined pecking order. Before Li Peng carried out the detailed work of the massacre, he was already number three in the regime behind Deng and Zhao Ziyang. If, despite all his dirty work, Li Peng

can do no better than remain as number three, he will be discontented and will start to plot. Then, two weeks after the massacre, it was reported that Qiao Shi, the official responsible for internal security (including the Wu Jing), is now first in line for the post of Communist Party General Secretary, further adding to Li Peng's discomfiture. On June 24, it was finally announced that Shanghai party chairman Jiang Zemin had been named General Secretary of the Communist Party, displacing those who had been in line for the job. This will only fuel the instability within the leadership.

Deng will respond to all this in the following way, according to sources: First, he will move to exterminate all the leaders of the resistance. Then, he will turn his attention to the army, where there are numerous commanders who refused to obey orders issued under martial law conditions. These will also be exterminated. Then, Deng can turn his attention to those in higher places. On the one hand, Deng sees that the Yang family could command the PLA when Deng himself, despite his supposed paramount status, could not. Yang Shangkun is the vice president of the Central Military Commission. His younger brother, Yang Baibing, is the chief political commissar of the PLA. Yang's son-inlaw, Chi Haotian, is the Chief of the General Staff. Deng fears the ability of the Yang family to command the 27th Army, and the whole of the PLA in a crisis. Li Peng may also have shown "excessive" ability to control the PLA, and Li Peng is very unpopular, since it is against him that hatred over the massacre is concentrated. Therefore the final stage of Deng's purge will be to attempt to liquidate Li Peng and the warlords of the Yang family. Since this is evident to everybody, it is also evident to the intended victims, who are

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not the type of people to sit around waiting for their own demise.

Therefore, there can be no hope of stability for the P.R.C. regime. The biggest destabilization of all would be the death of Deng himself, who is now in very advanced age and who has shown signs of debilitation in his last public appearances. When the old fox (hu li) Deng departs the scene, get ready for a ruthless power struggle in the most extreme form.

#### Three alternatives

Other Taipei sources agree that the June 4 massacres have produced irreversible changes, and a totally new mainland situation. According to these sources, after June 4 there were three basic alternatives:

1) A civil war, in case PLA units actually began fighting among each other, and warlord combinations among political and military leaders were to coalesce. In addition to the armed clashes around Beijing, this possibility was seen as increased by reports appearing in the June 9 China Post that Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang had been taken under the protection of the Canton Army in southern China. Guangdong province around Canton is the area of greatest penetration of foreign capital, the least obedience to the central regime, and in some ways Zhao's natural base. But these reports remained unconfirmed, and nothing more has been heard of Zhao. Taipei sources stress that the alternative of an all-out civil war would be a tragedy for the Chinese people, with a hecatomb of human losses without precedent. At the

## Deng's thermonuclear striking force

As a result of the bloody repression ordered by the Beijing regime, one of the world's nuclear powers has just had a brush with civil war, and now faces a future of continuous upheaval. Communist China exploded a nuclear device in 1964, and detonated a thermonuclear device in 1967. The country is thought to possess about 100 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, many of which are reported to still be liquid fueled. The PLA air force includes some 100 obsolete medium bombers, and 200 obsolete light bombers. More significant is the fact that Beijing possesses two to three nuclear submarines, and that it has recently tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Most ominous, Beijing has tested and deployed several ICBMs, called Long March, which have the capacity of hitting certain points in the United States, if not the entire country.

same time, if a warlord period were to emerge, the R.O.C.'s military strength could make it the strongest of all the warlords, and thus the arbiter of the situation, which could lead in turn to the recovery of the mainland.

- 2) The takeover of the central government by a "reformist" Communist coalition of the type exemplified by Zhao Ziyang. Zhao would have been regarded as a lesser enemy. Even if he could have provided no hope in the longer term, he might have opened the tactical situation in ways advantageous to pro-democracy forces. But it now appears excluded that Zhao might prevail in Beijing, at least for the moment.
- 3) The third alternative is that of a faction committed to genocidal repression of the resistance, on the model of the Deng-Yang-Li clique. Although this combination might seem to prevail in the short to middle term, its ascendancy only guarantees a recrudescence of rebellion within two to three years, as Deng himself admits in his secret report (see box). New rebellions would be guaranteed first of all because the party and regime are utterly discredited and despised. More importantly, the engine of new upheavals would be the inability of the regime to find a way out of the worsening economic crisis which was at the root of the rebellion in the first place. It is especially predicted that the acute food shortage will deteriorate, meaning that insurrectionary ferment will spread through the urban working classes and finally among the 800 million peasants and other rural population of China. This will be impossible for secret police and even the entire army to control.

#### A carefully planned provocation

Taipei observers stress that the Tiananmen massacre was a very carefully planned provocation, minutely worked out by Deng and Li in advance. On June 2 and June 3, columns of PLA troops were sent into the Beijing city center without weapons. Deng hoped that students and workers would attack these unarmed troops, giving him film footage he could use to justify a "counterattack" on the protestors to restore order. These same troops left their weapons in unguarded buses, with Deng's hope being that the students would seize the weapons, giving him new pretexts for massacre. Instead of falling into the trap, the students turned the weapons in to the Wu Jing secret police. As a third ploy, Deng ordered other troops to abandon their vehicles and leave them unguarded. These vehicles were then burned by protestors, or by provocateurs. Deng had ordered the Wu Jing to infiltrate the students in the initial phase of the Tiananmen occupation, but many of them had been identified and expelled by the students. In the early days of June, these provocateurs made a comeback.

Deng used secret tunnels under Tiananmen Square between the Zhongnanhai party bosses' compound and the Great Hall of the People to position the troops. The troops blocked all egress except the southeast, where machine guns were posted to mow the resistance down.

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## Deng calls massacre 'a pretty good experience'

The following is the text of a confidential report delivered by Red Chinese "Paramount Leader" Deng Xiaoping to a group of government and party officials in the wake of the June 4 Tienanmen massacre. These minutes of the meeting have been distributed at the provincial and army level. The text is that of a translation made by the Taipei China News from an account published in the Chineselanguage United Daily News of Taipei:

The recent student incident began as a serious turmoil and evolved into counter-revolutionary rioting. We have to deal with it with severity. Party members [who took part in the student demonstrations] must be expelled from the party and dismissed from public offices. Their domicile permits must be withdrawn, and they must be exiled so that they will be completely uprooted. Otherwise, there could be another riot in three or five years, or even in ten months. . . .

Some people say that we have no experience in handling mobs and that we over-reacted by using tanks. I say it was a pretty good experience. We have been accused of killing many innocent people in the streets. It's all right. We had given advance notice warning the people not to go to the streets. Those who were killed in the streets were counter-revolutionaries. . . .

Some people are worried that the families of the victims will make trouble. There is no need to worry. We will handle whoever starts trouble. If 1,000 families in Beijing are dealt with, no trouble will ever arise. . . .

Some people have advised me to make arrangements for my death. My answer is that I'll work for the party as long as I live. . . .

The number of people killed this time is below what we had expected. . . .  $\,$ 

There are people calling for a multiparty system. They had better forget about it. The Communist Party will hold power for a hundred years. We had considered inviting members of the democratic parties to fill some ministerial and vice ministerial posts for the sake of democracy. Now it appears that this is not necessary. . . .

There has been some international reaction to this incident. France overdid it. The response of the Soviet Union and Japan was all right. Although the Americans have

readjusted their policy, they will be back sooner or later, because China is a large piece of juicy meat. . . .

Looking back, we can see there have been three antiparty groups since 1949. The first was the "Kao-Yao" group of Kao Kang and Yao Shu-shih. The second was the "Gang of Four." The third was the Hu Yao-bang and Zhao Ziyang anti-party group. I have observed Zhao for many years. He is ambitious. If he had become chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, we old comrades would have been beheaded. . . .

Li Peng does not have to seek the advice of Yao Yilin [the deputy premier] on everything. Li Peng worked very hard this time. But he did not have to consult with me on whatever he did. He even asked me whether to knock down the statue of the so-called "Goddess of Democracy." All he had to do was pull it down. The incident [the student demonstrations] lasted more than a month. Li Peng and others concerned did not know how to handle it. I summoned Li Peng and Yang Shang-kun for a 15-minute talk, and the matter was resolved. . . .

Li Peng does not have to seek my instruction for everything. I have only 15 minutes a day to listen to briefings and will not take care of other things. I still exercise four hours daily. . . .

Those in the military who did not take a clear-cut stand [against the democracy movement] must be completely purged. Some people say they will return their party cards. That's good. If they renounce their party membership, it would save us the trouble of expelling them. . . .

I have been told that some 1 million Hong Kong residents demonstrated against us. Don't be afraid. One million people are just a drop in the bucket compared with 1 billion. By 1997 Hong Kong will still be prosperous.

The report also quotes P.R.C. President Yang Shang-kun, the chief warlord and dynastic controller of the People's Liberation Army, as interrupting Deng to add the following:

"Some people say we have a problem as a so-called 'party of crown princes' [i.e., nepotism by party officials and corruption by the children of top leaders]. Comrade Xiaoping is concerned about the charge. Someone had suggested that Deng Pu-fang [Deng's elder son] be made vice chairman of the National People's Congress. Comrade Xiaoping opposed the idea. Recently somebody proposed that Li Tieh-ying [thought to be Deng's illegitimate son] be made General Secretary of the party. Comrade Xiaoping said, 'Li is immature. Let's reconsider the matter in a couple of years.'

Deng concluded by saying: "Now the five-member work group [consisting of Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Qiao Shi and Wang Chen] will be in charge."

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