not the type of people to sit around waiting for their own demise.

Therefore, there can be no hope of stability for the P.R.C. regime. The biggest destabilization of all would be the death of Deng himself, who is now in very advanced age and who has shown signs of debilitation in his last public appearances. When the old fox (hu li) Deng departs the scene, get ready for a ruthless power struggle in the most extreme form.

Three alternatives

Other Taipei sources agree that the June 4 massacres have produced irreversible changes, and a totally new mainland situation. According to these sources, after June 4 there were three basic alternatives:

1) A civil war, in case PLA units actually began fighting among each other, and warlord combinations among political and military leaders were to coalesce. In addition to the armed clashes around Beijing, this possibility was seen as increased by reports appearing in the June 9 *China Post* that Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang had been taken under the protection of the Canton Army in southern China. Guangdong province around Canton is the area of greatest penetration of foreign capital, the least obedience to the central regime, and in some ways Zhao's natural base. But these reports remained unconfirmed, and nothing more has been heard of Zhao. Taipei sources stress that the alternative of an all-out civil war would be a tragedy for the Chinese people, with a hecatomb of human losses without precedent. At the

Deng's thermonuclear striking force

As a result of the bloody repression ordered by the Beijing regime, one of the world's nuclear powers has just had a brush with civil war, and now faces a future of continuous upheaval. Communist China exploded a nuclear device in 1964, and detonated a thermonuclear device in 1967. The country is thought to possess about 100 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, many of which are reported to still be liquid fueled. The PLA air force includes some 100 obsolete medium bombers, and 200 obsolete light bombers. More significant is the fact that Beijing possesses two to three nuclear submarines, and that it has recently tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Most ominous, Beijing has tested and deployed several ICBMs, called Long March, which have the capacity of hitting certain points in the United States, if not the entire country.

same time, if a warlord period were to emerge, the R.O.C.'s military strength could make it the strongest of all the warlords, and thus the arbiter of the situation, which could lead in turn to the recovery of the mainland.

- 2) The takeover of the central government by a "reformist" Communist coalition of the type exemplified by Zhao Ziyang. Zhao would have been regarded as a lesser enemy. Even if he could have provided no hope in the longer term, he might have opened the tactical situation in ways advantageous to pro-democracy forces. But it now appears excluded that Zhao might prevail in Beijing, at least for the moment.
- 3) The third alternative is that of a faction committed to genocidal repression of the resistance, on the model of the Deng-Yang-Li clique. Although this combination might seem to prevail in the short to middle term, its ascendancy only guarantees a recrudescence of rebellion within two to three years, as Deng himself admits in his secret report (see box). New rebellions would be guaranteed first of all because the party and regime are utterly discredited and despised. More importantly, the engine of new upheavals would be the inability of the regime to find a way out of the worsening economic crisis which was at the root of the rebellion in the first place. It is especially predicted that the acute food shortage will deteriorate, meaning that insurrectionary ferment will spread through the urban working classes and finally among the 800 million peasants and other rural population of China. This will be impossible for secret police and even the entire army to control.

A carefully planned provocation

Taipei observers stress that the Tiananmen massacre was a very carefully planned provocation, minutely worked out by Deng and Li in advance. On June 2 and June 3, columns of PLA troops were sent into the Beijing city center without weapons. Deng hoped that students and workers would attack these unarmed troops, giving him film footage he could use to justify a "counterattack" on the protestors to restore order. These same troops left their weapons in unguarded buses, with Deng's hope being that the students would seize the weapons, giving him new pretexts for massacre. Instead of falling into the trap, the students turned the weapons in to the Wu Jing secret police. As a third ploy, Deng ordered other troops to abandon their vehicles and leave them unguarded. These vehicles were then burned by protestors, or by provocateurs. Deng had ordered the Wu Jing to infiltrate the students in the initial phase of the Tiananmen occupation, but many of them had been identified and expelled by the students. In the early days of June, these provocateurs made a comeback.

Deng used secret tunnels under Tiananmen Square between the Zhongnanhai party bosses' compound and the Great Hall of the People to position the troops. The troops blocked all egress except the southeast, where machine guns were posted to mow the resistance down.

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