LaRouche's fight for strategic defense

This chronology of LaRouche's early policy statements and actions on strategic defense, documents why the Soviets were—and are—so concerned about his role.

May 31, 1977: A study commissioned by LaRouche on Soviet advances in the field of plasma physics and directed-energy technology, is published as a pamphlet entitled "Sputnik of the Seventies—The Science Behind the Soviets' Beam Weapon."

Aug. 15, 1979: LaRouche, a candidate for the 1980 Democratic presidential nomination, issues a campaign paper, "Military policy of the LaRouche administration," which says, "A LaRouche administration will have two leading points in military policy. First, commitment to the development of advanced-technology weapons able to 'kill' incoming missiles in the stratosphere; second, the establishment of universal military training—not the draft—as the means for providing the United States a pyramid of maximum in-depth war-fighting capabilities."

February 1982: LaRouche addresses an EIR conference in Washington, D.C., attended by many U.S. political and military officials, as well as representatives of foreign embassies and other agencies. The subject is the need for a beam weapon defense system. This is LaRouche's first public elaboration of his new strategic doctrine.

February 1982-April 1983: LaRouche functions as a back channel for the Reagan administration in exploratory discussions with Soviet representatives on the possibility of joint deployment of strategic defense systems. In this

role, he worked with officials of the CIA and National Security Council, during the tenure of William Clark.

March 1982: The National Democratic Policy Committee (NDPC), the LaRouche wing of the Democratic Party, releases a discussion memorandum by LaRouche, titled "Only Beam-Weapons Could Bring to an End the Kissingerian Age of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror: A Proposed Modern Military Policy of the United States." In it he writes, "There is no solution to the continued balance of thermonuclear terror which is not premised on the ability of at least one of the superpowers to destroy a proverbial 'ninety-nine and forty-four one-hundredths percent' of the incoming missiles and thermonuclear armed aircraft deployed against its national homeland.

"In principle, such an anti-missile capability now exists, in the form of what are properly termed relativistic-beam anti-missile weapons systems. We propose, we insist, that the reformed military policy of the United States be premised upon a commitment to a 'crash program' for developing and deploying such anti-missile beam-weapon systems.

"We go further. We propose that the adoption of such a high-technology answer to the thermonuclear balance of terror become the central reference-point for a comprehensive reform of United States military doctrine and organization of the Defense Department. . . .

"The military component of Washington-Moscow negotiations must include agreement to rapid development of relativistic-beam anti-missile weapons systems by both superpowers."

Fall 1982: LaRouche addresses seminars on beamweapons in Bonn, Munich, Paris, Strasbourg, Milan, Brussels, Madrid, and Stockholm. Senior West European military and political figures request briefings on beam defense by LaRouche and associates of his.

1983: The Fusion Energy Foundation, of which

nology. They wish technology, because they know they can't develop it by themselves. They know they need Western technology, but, while they want miniaturization from the United States and Japan, that does not mean that they are stupid enough to imagine that that kind of technology is going to save their economy. They know they need infrastructure, agriculture, and manufacturing. Infrastructure, agriculture, and manufacturing, as the ways of increasing the productive powers of labor through investment in capital-intensive, energy-intensive modes in technological and scientific progress.

That's what every sane force in this world knows is needed, particularly forces representing leading circles in society—those that are sane. There lies the discrepancy between

the Anglo-American view of Germany—as typified or reflected by the Richard Helms piece in the Feb. 25 "Outlook" section of the *Washington Post*—and on the other side, what seems to be emerging as a pro-German unification policy, around Gorbachov.

The SDI: my strategy for victory

On what basis can the United States and Western Europe throw off the scientific and technological progress needed to stabilize this planet, to prevent the greatest catastrophe imaginable, and how do my ideas and researches pertain to that, and why do the prevailing ideas in the Anglo-American Establishment fail to conform to that? That is, why is it that under my influence, the United States and its allies would

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LaRouche is a member of the board, publishes the book Beam Defense.

April 13, 1983: EIR conference in Washington, D.C. on "Directed Energy Beam Weapons Technologies Can End the Era of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror: The Military, Economic, and Strategic Implications of Energy Beam Weapons."

June 15, 1983: EIR publishes Special Report, "The Economic Impact of Relativistic Beam Technologies."

Nov. 9, 1983: LaRouche addresses *EIR* conference in Rome on "Beam Weapons: The Strategic Implications for Western Europe." Among those in the sizeable audience are no fewer than 10 Soviet intelligence operatives. (On Nov. 15, the Soviet daily *Izvestia* publishes a broadside attacking LaRouche and the "troglodytes" sponsoring the conference.)

Similar conferences are held in Bonn and Paris, in which LaRouche outlines a new strategy for the Atlantic Alliance. The doctrine of "flexible response" must be replaced by a strategy that defends Western Europe, especially Germany, without defense equalling self-destruction. This could only be done through a European Tactical Defense Initiative (TDI) program complementing the American SDI. Besides directed-energy systems in a counter-missile and counter-air role, ground warfare had to be reshaped by new electromagnetic weaponry, including radio-frequency weapons.

March 30, 1984: LaRouche writes a "Draft memorandum of agreement between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R.," which includes an emphasis on the beam-weapon defense issue. "If both powers and their allies," he argues, "were to deploy simultaneously the 'strategic' and 'tactical' defensive systems implicit in 'new physical principles,' the abrupt shift to overwhelming advantage of the defense would raise qualitatively the threshold for general warfare."

succeed in what the Soviets think we might be able to do, or what they might think the Germans might be able to do, and why, without the kind of influence I represent, must the United States fail, catastrophically, on this point, of the relationship between science and technology on the one side, and increase in the productive powers of labor on the other side?

That goes right to the same issue as the SDI. From my standpoint, when I presented the SDI, I was presenting in part ideas which were not developed by me, but adopted by me, ideas which depended to a significant degree on demonstrations of feasibility by scientific laboratories and kindred circles in the United States and around the world. The technologies existed and were feasible.

My particular function was to show an interrelationship, between, first, a demonstration of the economic feasibility of such a program undertaking.

The fullscale SDI or the fullscale Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense, based on new physical principles, and the spill-over of the technologies employed in those defense technologies into the civilian economy, to the effect that the increase in productivity per capita, would provide a tax revenue base such that the tax revenue from that tax revenue base at current tax rates would show a profit to the United States government, for example, on the account of the SDI investment.

That is, apart from the fact that the SDI would require—this is a 1982 calculation by me—a \$200 billion approximate investment to put it in place, apart from the fact we had to make that investment, that we had to ante up that investment, of about \$200 billion before we got a big payoff, after that point, we should not increase beyond that investment in SDI in terms of net cost to the U.S. government, because at that point, as we saw in the aerospace program of the 1960s, the tax revenue base's expansion by the spillover of SDI technology into the civilian sector, would increase the tax revenue base so rapidly that the increased tax revenues, without increasing tax rates, pouring into the U.S. Treasury, would exceed the additional outlays for SDI maintenance and development, by a large margin. That was the essential economic feasibility.

The second part of the feasibility, was the relation to the strategic question. By increasing the rate of per capita output of the Western part of the world, that is, ostensibly, the part of the world under the influence of Western Christian civilization, we would have the economic means to solve the problems of the Soviet and Communist Chinese economies, which the Soviet and Communist Chinese economies could not solve internally, because of their cultural and related philosophical problems.

So, it was the strategy for victory, without war, with the included necessary means of a new deterrence, a new containment of the impulse toward war, as the means of forcing upon the world, shall we say, the economic solution, the economic road to peace. By making war unprofitable through SDI, we force the world to find a non-war solution, or at least a non-general war solution to the problems besetting it. That was the purpose of SDI.

The problem is, that the philosophy of government which opposed the SDI, which accepts and adapts to the rock-drugsex counterculture, which adapts to this usurious process, and so forth—this kind of mentality is incapable of addressing the tasks now before us.

What is needed is the mentality which was behind the development of Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense proposals in the United States and elsewhere during 1982, and that comes back to me. And that is the subject which I must address, sub-topic by sub-topic, over the coming period.