Banning technology for the Third World

by Kathleen Klenetsky

One of the key underlying themes in the war hysteria over the Iraq-Kuwait conflict has been the role of advanced nations in supplying potential weapons technology to the Third World. This is evident from the hue and cry that has been raised over the allegation that Iraq developed a chemical weapons capability, from technology imported from the West. The moral of the story is supposed to be that it is inherently dangerous to give any kind of sophisticated technology to a developing country.

The whole non-proliferation issue is largely a scam. It is designed primarily to establish the basis for preventing any North-South commerce in technologies that are essential to the industrial development of the less-developed sector. The Anglo-Americans want to maintain the Third World as a source of cheap raw materials, and to prevent it from becoming a market for the capital goods of functioning economies such as Japan and Germany's.

In this regard, it was hardly fortuitous that the venue for President Bush's fatal decision to militarily intervene in the Persian Gulf was an Aspen Institute conference. Long associated with Henry Kissinger and other stars of the Anglo-American firmament, the Aspen Institute has been a major link in the "special relationship," through which American brawn has been impressed to serve the strategic aims of Britain's dessicated oligarchy.

The institute was one of the godfathers of the environmentalist movement in the United States, and some of its officials have privately boasted of its success in discrediting the American nuclear energy industry. Aspen was also instrumental in forcing through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1977, which, using the alleged threat of nuclear terrorism, made the development of desperately needed nuclear energy in the developing sector virtually impossible. Among other things, it disrupted the German plan to develop Brazil's nuclear energy capability.

Non-proliferation = non-development

Now, Aspen has taken the lead in a new orgy of "non-proliferation," this one aimed at preventing industrialized nations from helping Third World countries to develop fertilizer and petrochemical industries. It has established a task force, chaired by retired CIA deputy director Adm. Bobby Inman and Harvard's Joseph Nye, which recently produced a book entitled New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation

of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World.

It calls on the United States to impose a set of new global non-proliferation regimes, dealing with chemical, nuclear, and missile technologies. The authors give the game away when they observe: "In a number of key respects chemical proliferation differs from nuclear proliferation. First and foremost, any country with a petrochemical, pesticide, fertilizer, or pharmaceutical industry has the potential in terms of equipment, raw materials, and technical expertise to produce some chemical warfare agents. It is this daunting problem of 'dual use' technology that makes the danger of commercial misuse much more of a problem in chemical proliferation."

In other words, having the capability to produce fertilizers makes a Third World country a threat, because it could also at some point use the same technology to produce chemical weapons.

The authors call for "greater European and Japanese involvement" in curbing the spread of chemical and other technologies, and for the "crafting of a durable, effective sanctions policy" against violators of non-proliferation agreements. Some of their proposals have been incorporated into a new intelligence bill (see accompanying article), for which Inman acted as adviser.

It is not just the Aspen gang which is pushing this scenario. The Center for Security Policy, a Washington-based think tank run by the same network behind "Project Democracy" of Iran-Contra fame, is also on the case. In early September, the CSP issued a report entitled "Rabtagate: The Inside Story of German Collusion in the Libyan Chemical Warfare Program." According to a CSP press release, the report concludes that Germany's sale of technology to Iraq and Libya is "the product of an as yet unchanging, fatal willingness at the highest levels of Germany industry and officialdom to subordinate common Western security interests to narrow parochialism and greed [emphasis in original]."

The report demanded stiff sanctions against German companies that violate export control agreements. On Sept. 13, the Senate voted up two amendments, introduced by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), providing for the "imposition of sanctions on countries which use chemical or biological weapons and on corporations which assist Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya or certain other countries to obtain, develop or stockpile chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, and for other purposes."

According to a reliable source, Helms was inspired by the CSP report, and "definitely had Germany in mind." A CSP staffer admitted that the real target of the report, and of Helms's action, was German reunification.

Just days before the CSP's report was published, CSP board member Richard Perle was quoted in the *Financial Times* saying that there is a new role for CoCom (the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) in policing strategic trade between North and South.

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