Profile of David Kay bares intelligence ties

by Joseph Brewda

A contrived crisis surrounding a predominantly U.S.-staffed U.N. nuclear inspection team in Iraq, has set the stage for a new assault on Iraq. The drama, which was timed to hit the air-waves with President Bush's address to the U.N., revolves around efforts by International Atomic Energy Agency inspector David Kay, who is leading the IAEA inspection team in Iraq, to remove personnel records purportedly dealing with Iraq's nuclear weapons program, from an Iraqi ministry.

Typically, the U.S. media and the U.S. State Department have denounced statements by Iraq Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein on the ABC News program "Nightline," and by Iraq Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, that Kay is directing an intelligence mission. "Ridiculous," is the official response of the State Department to Aziz's charges that David Kay is a CIA agent. In fact, information in any public library shows that Kay's professional background is suggestive of the charge, even if one were to ignore the provocation now being directed by the White House.

A specialist in limiting sovereignty

With all the hubbub surrounding Kay's inspection mission to Iraq to evaluate Iraq's nuclear weapons program, one might naively assume that Kay is a physicist or nuclear engineer. He is not. His only academic degree is in "political science" from Columbia University in New York City. His specialty is the effectiveness of international organizations in imposing international regulations on nations. With such a specialization, it is not surprising that immediately following graduation in 1967, Kay found employment as an adviser to the U.S. State Department working at the U.S. mission to the U.N.

By 1972, Kay was back in the academic world at the University of Wisconsin. But he had not lessened his ties to Washington. In that year, Kay hooked up with U.N. official Maurice Strong to organize a U.N. conference on the environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden. The main purpose of that 1972 conference was to assert that "environmental concerns" supersede "national sovereignty" (see Feature, p. 32). That, and related themes dominate Kay's book, World Eco Crisis: International Organizations and Response, whose introduction was written by Strong.

In 1975, Kay left the university to work for the American Society of International Law, where he was director of "International Organization Research." In this capacity, he received a U.S. government grant to study the effectiveness of the U.N. in managing the international trade in pharmaceuticals. In 1977, Kay edited *Changing U.N. Options for the U.S.* which was published by Praeger Publishers of New York, a publishing house long exposed as a CIA front.

In 1978, Kay became a senior evaluation officer at the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco), where he was involved in the same type of studies.

In 1980, while still at Unesco, Kay received a State Department grant to study the role of international agencies in regulating food consumption, the use of nuclear materials, and in restricting the narcotics trade. In the study, Kay rants against nuclear proliferation and the inadequacy of the U.N. in preventing the diversion of nuclear weapons to those non-white countries which are not part of the nuclear club.

Spying for the IAEA

Kay is now in Iraq as a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, nominally to examine Iraq's nuclear program. The IAEA was created in 1957, for the express purpose of spreading the use of nuclear power stations around the world. That was a period when many Americans believed that the industrialization of the Third World was necessary. But times have changed. Today, the IAEA focuses on blocking the ability of Third World countries in particular from acquiring nuclear plants, or indeed, any advanced technology or scientific expertise. This is the "new world order" in its essential features.

At its recent board meeting, IAEA director Hans Blix made this policy clear when he called for a total revamping of his agency to help implement this new imperial order. Specifically, Blix:

- called for intelligence agencies worldwide to share information so that countries suspected of violating safeguard agreements could be identified and monitored;
- called for the U.N. Security Council to provide support to the IAEA for special inspections of sites deemed suspicious, as it has done with Iraq, where armed units have been deployed to assist in the inspection operations;
- asserted that recent events in Iraq show the need to change the entire inspection system. He said that rather than inspecting only those sites opened by nations that signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as had heretofore been the case, developments in Iraq show that it is essential to be able to conduct surprise inspections at any site at any time. The purpose of the intelligence gathering program is to identify such sites or materials at undeclared installations.

Naturally, neither IAEA, nor David Kay, nor George Bush, has any interest in investigating the nuclear bomb facilities of Israel.

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