at an accelerating rate, in the effort to bring a Soviet imitation of LaRouche's 'crash program' doctrine into effect."

This central fact is carefully papered over by Goldman, who not only does not mention LaRouche, but attempts to preserve and extend the myth of Gorbachov the reformer, by avoiding any mention of the potential military implications of Gorbachov's perestroika.

Thus Goldman ignores the Ogarkov Plan, the existence of which has been confirmed since the Berlin Wall has come down.

Goldman exhibits an obsessive hatred of the machinetool industry ("[Soviet] industry was still periodically overdosing on machine tools") which seems not to be based on any concern for its military uses, but rather on his own incompetent understanding of economics as "market forces" rather than productive forces.

But the Goldman viewpoint, typical of Milton Friedman's Chicago School, should present an even deeper concern to those *genuinely* interested in enabling the members of the Community of Independent States to build for themselves a viable economic future. Particularly wretched is his argument that the ultimate failure of perestroika, lies in the fact that Gorbachov did not imitate China's free trade zone model, which Goldman claims has created a spiraling growth rate within China, "thanks to Deng Xiaoping."

"By 1989," writes Goldman, "large numbers of pilgrims from the Soviet Union had made their way to China to see what they could learn from the Chinese economic reforms.

. . . Proposals were made to copy many of the Chinese economic reforms. And some, such as joint ventures and special economic zones, were actually adopted. However, none of them seem to have had the impact they did in China. In part that was because the bureaucracy was even more entrenched and resistant in the Soviet Union than in China, but in part the Chinese also seem more diligent."

As *EIR* has also identified, the "success" of the Chinese free trade zones depended entirely upon turning Chinese labor into slave labor. Despite that, the so-called Chinese economic miracle has turned out to be a hoax.

Goldman goes so far as to compare Gorbachov to Deng Xiaoping. Unable to explain the anomalies of Tiananmen Square and the bloody massacre at the Vilnius television tower in January 1991, sanctioned by Deng and Gorby, respectively, Goldman breezily notes that "History will treat Deng very differently from the way it would have done if he had only retired before he sent troops into Tiananmen Square. Instead, Gorbachov fell into the same trap in January 1991 when he ordered paratroops into Lithuania. . . ."

Goldman attempts to shift the focus away from these bloody actions of his two heroes, claiming everything else they did was beneficial. Isn't it a pity that these singular events have stained their reputations!

Finally, although Goldman has claimed in public to have his disagreements with Jeffrey Sachs' "shock therapy" policies, he claims in What Went Wrong that he was the first to propose "shock therapy" to the Soviets in June 1989, and that "a few months later, on January 1, 1990, many elements of this plan would be incorporated into what in Poland came to be known as the shock-therapy strategy." And later he notes that "economists such as Jeffrey Sachs in Poland, and the example of Poland's reforms" may provide "future reformers [with] a series of road maps and 'how-to' manuals to refer to."

This book should be read by Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Poles, and other eastern Europeans who still harbor any illusions about the "good will" which the West has towards them. Once they realize that their nations are slated to be "Sachsed back to the Stone Age," perhaps they will be more inclined to throw the London-Harvard-Chicago School crowd out of their countries, and to implement instead the LaRouche Productive Triangle. The sight alone of magnetically levitated trains—built with the aid of machine tools—might be enough to give Goldman a fatal fit of apoplexy.

Books Received

The Gaia Atlas of Green Economics, by Paul Elkins, Mayer Hillman, and Robert Hutchinson, Doubleday/ Anchor, New York, 1992, 191 pages, paperbound, \$16.

Showa, The Japan of Hirohito, ed. by Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard, W.W. Norton, New York, 1992, 315 pages, hardbound, \$29.95.

Different Drummers, Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany, by Michael H. Kater, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, 304 pages, hardbound, \$24.95.

The Advocates of Peace in Antebellum America, by Valerie H. Ziegler, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1992, 256 pages, hardbound, \$35.

Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace, by Charles Edmund Vetter, Pelican Publishing, Gretna, La., 1992, 347 pages, hardbound, \$25.

Sheathing the Sword: The U.N. Secretary General and the Prevention of International Conflict, by Thomas E. Boudreau, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1991, 208 pages, hardbound, \$17.95.

Triumph without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War, by U.S. News & World Report, Random House, New York, 1992, 477 pages, hardbound, \$25.

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