Boutros-Ghali's blueprint for U.N. world dictatorship

On July 1, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a 48-page report to the Security Council entitled "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping." The report had been mandated by an unprecedented Security Council heads of state summit in January, organized by British Prime Minister John Major. It called for strengthening the U.N.'s capacity to engage in "preventive diplomacy," and called for the secretary general to make suggestions to that end. The report, which, if implemented, would represent a drastic violation of the current U.N. Charter, purports to depict the potential role of the United Nations in the changing world context. It provides definitions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, explains what post-conflict peace-building is, and lays out a program of cooperation with regional organizations.

According to a memorandum by Prof. Francis A. Boyle, a professor of international law at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the report is a "blueprint for the new world order," which "represents a major grab for world power by the United Nations Security Council, which is in turn controlled by the United States government." "The implementation of these proposals," he warns, "would constitute an intermediate stage between the current United Nations Organization and the creation of a totalitarian world government that must be resisted by all means at our disposal."

Eliminating national sovereignty

Boutros-Ghali comes right to the point in the introduction to his report: "The improvement in relations between states East and West affords new possibilities, some already realized, to meet successfully threats to common security." "Authoritarian regimes have given way to more democratic forces," he states, referencing the success of the so-called democratization drive throughout the Third World, and not merely the Soviet Union's demise. He adds that much of the world is capitulating to the Anglo-Americans' free trade policies: "Parallel to these political changes, some states are seeking more open forms of economic policy."

This new world order, however, is threatened by "fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty" which undermine "the cohesion of states," through "brutal ethnic, social, cultural or linguistic strife." Moreover, he warns of the supposed danger of economic development: "Progress brings new risks for stability: ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, greater intrusion into the rights of individuals." To this, he adds the threats of "unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, drugs," and "massive migrations of peoples within and beyond national borders." He defines this assertion of sovereignty, ecological damage, population growth, resistance to free trade, and the like, as "sources and consequences of conflict" which "require the ceaseless attention and the highest priority of the U.N."

Boutros-Ghali states that military intervention may be required to deal with these alleged threats, because in the new world order, threats to peace are no longer defined as merely military ones. "At this moment of renewed opportunity, the efforts of the organization to build peace, stability, and security must encompass matters beyond military threats," he states. As an example of such non-military threats, he cites "a porous ozone shield" which "could pose a greater threat to an exposed population than a hostile army."

To deal with such threats, however, requires eliminating previous notions of national sovereignty. Accordingly, he proclaims, "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed." He goes on, "It is the task of leaders of states today to understand this, and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world."

Boutros-Ghali is well aware that these assertions overthrow the U.N. Charter, which, formally at least, upholds the concept of national sovereignty. Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter defines as one of the U.N.'s purposes "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Article 2, paragraph 7 reads, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

Later on, Boutros-Ghali defines sovereignty as not being the inherent right of a people, but something contingent upon good behavior as judged by the rulers of the world system. "The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states," he states, is limited by, and defined within "the estab-

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lished international system." This is the same imperialist concept of limited sovereignty which characterized the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the 1878 Congress of Berlin, and the 1919 Versailles Treaty.

Defining 'peacemaking'

With these objectives, the secretary general's report attempts to add new powers to the U.N. Security Council and Secretariat not previously mandated in its Charter. These include "peacemaking," a new concept which Boutros-Ghali deceptively defines as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter," which pertains to pacific settlements of disputes. He also redefines "peacekeeping" as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel."

Commenting on these definitions, Professor Boyle notes: "This whole concept of 'peacemaking' is bogus. It is not provided for anywhere within the terms of the United Nations Charter. The same can be said for 'peacekeeping,' though this notion was given the imprimatur of the International Court of Justice. But as originally defined, 'peacekeeping' was supposed to be purely defensive and not involve the offensive use of force."

Boyle adds that the attempt to define peacemaking as falling under Chapter 6, which pertains to measures taken to pacifically solve a dispute, is another fraud. Rather, peacekeeping falls under Chapter 6, whereas peacemaking seems to contemplate enforcement action, which would fall under Chapter 7, pertaining to the deployment of force.

Boyle also warns that the concept of peacekeeping has been transformed, as evidenced by Boutros-Ghali's reference to peacekeeping measures having been taken "hitherto" with the "consent of all the parties concerned." That is, he implies that universal consent might no longer be required. It is noteworthy that consent is required in measures undertaken under the authority of Chapter 6, while deployment without consent can only be done under Chapter 7. So, under the new definition, even peacekeeping troops, so-called, could be deployed for enforcement.

"Hence," Boyle concludes, "it seems that the report is trying to do away with two fundamental prerequisites that have been true for United Nations peacekeeping forces: the consent of all states involved; and only peaceful means for the resolution of the dispute as envisioned by Chapter 6."

In a later section on "sanctions and special economic problems," Boutros-Ghali further blurs the Charter's distinction between efforts to pacifically settle disputes, and the use

Boyle stresses that in this section the report claims that "peacemaking" might require the imposition of sanctions under article 41 of the Charter, even though the article is



British Prime Minister John Major arrives at Andrews Air Force Base for meetings with President Bush. Boutros-Ghali's reorganization plan was mandated by Major, at the January summit of Security Council heads of state.

contained in Chapter 7 which solely pertains to the use of force. This formulation, Boyle says, is "a bald-faced lie, distortion, and obfuscation," which, if allowed to pass, would represent a "revolutionary change" in the organization of the United Nations Charter. "The Charter is quite clear that the peaceful resolution of disputes falls under Charter 6," Boyle explains, "whereas sanctions and enforcement fall under Chapter 7, which includes article 41. Here Boutros-Ghali is trying to carve out a separate category of United Nations military action which blurs the distinction between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 action." This would allow for a new category of offensive military operations contrary to its Charter.

Beefing up Security Council powers

The subordination of sovereignty to the needs of the world order, and the creation of new categories of U.N. offensive military operations, are not the only changes demanded by the report. It also seeks to eliminate other current constraints on the Security Council in respect to its use of force.

To this end, the secretary general calls for the creation of "peace-enforcement units." These units would be "more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need extensive preparatory training within their national forces." These units are another concoction that were never contemplated in the U.N. Charter. They would serve as a rapid deployment force under the control of the secretary general and Security Council. In comments to the press at the time of the issuance of the report, Boutros-Ghali called for all U.N. member states to keep 1,000 troops in a permanent state of readiness for such deployments. The proposal was first made by French President François Mitterrand at the U.N. Security Council's heads of state summit.

What is particularly important is that the secretary general claims that these troops could be deployed under article 40 of the Charter. Professor Boyle analyzes, "It is a lie, a ruse, and a disgrace for the secretary general to be arguing that the Security Council could deploy military forces for offensive purposes under article 40. The Charter *never* contemplated this. Rather, it was assumed that the Security Council would go through articles 39, 40, and 41, *before* it got to the offensive use of military force under article 42. In other words, the secretary general is trying to allow the Security Council to authorize the offensive use of military force right from the outset of a crisis, as opposed to going through the progressive steps in articles 40 and 41."

Closely related to this innovation is Boutros-Ghali's claim that the U.N. Secretariat's Military Staff Committee be diminished to that of mere "support," even though article 47, paragraph 3 provides that the committee "shall be responsible . . . for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council." Boyle notes that this position is consistent with that taken by the U.S. government during the war against Iraq, where it made clear that it, and not the Military Staff Committee, would direct all military operations. By moving so-called peace-enforcement units out of articles 42 and 43 and into article 40, the secretary general is also attempting to bypass the oversight requirements involving the Military Staff Committee.

It is important to note here that the committee is solely staffed by representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Consequently, the effort to bypass it indicates that the Anglo-Americans intend on running offensive military operations by themselves, and consider France, Russia, and China—the other permanent members of the Security Council—as junior partners at best.

What this all means in practice is this: Once a Chapter 7 Security Council resolution authorizing the potential use of military force passes, member-states would remain free to deploy and command these forces as they see fit. This is just what the United States did against Iraq, where military forces were deployed under the legal cover of the U.N., but under the political control of the U.S. government. "If actually carried out," Boyle writes, "this could give a plausible legal basis to the United States government to use its military forces offensively all over the world under a variety of pretexts and justifications. The carefully constructed and limited constraints found in the Charter on the actual use of offensive military force would effectively become a nullity."

In a related section dealing with "peacekeeping logistics," Boutros-Ghali states that a "pre-positioned stock of basic peacekeeping equipment should be established" all over the world, which would be "immediately available at the start of an operation." This would allow the United States to pre-position military equipment anywhere, and then draw on this equipment for use by rapid deployment forces only nominally controlled by the U.N. Secretariat.

Subordinating regional organizations

In parallel with its attack on national sovereignty, the report also attempts to make all independent regional organizations, such as the Arab League or the Organization of African Unity, formally subordinate to it. In a related measure, the report attempts to define NATO as a de facto arm of the U.N. Boutros-Ghali does this by overthrowing Chapter 8 of the Charter, which pertains to regional arrangements, otherwise known as regional organizations.

"In the past," Boutros-Ghali claims, "regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross-purposes" with the United Nations. Now, however, "in this new era of opportunity," such "regional arrangements can render great service." He adds, "consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus... regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations... would encourage states outside the region to act supportively."

Boutros-Ghali's misconstruction of Chapter 8 represents yet another power grab by the Security Council. Article 52, paragraph 2 of the Charter specifies that regional arrangements have first crack at regional problems, and that only once such efforts fail are these problems to be referred to the Security Council. "The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies," it reads, "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes thorough regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referencing them to the Security Council."

Commenting on this section, Boyle reports, "What the report calls for here is for regional arrangements to act at the lead of the Security Council, rather than the reverse. In other words, this would subordinate the potential for regional organizations and regional arrangements to act independently of the Security Council."

Professor Boyle warns that "under this particular type of rationale, the Security Council might attempt to take control of ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], which has not yet proclaimed itself to be a regional organization; or the CSCE [Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe], etc."

In a related maneuver, the report attempts to argue that collective self-defense pacts such as NATO, which fall under

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Chapter 7 of the Charter pertaining to military force, could be construed as also being regional arrangements, as organized under Chapter 8. This could potentially allow for joint U.N.-NATO operations in the military or political sphere not envisioned in the Charter.

Reimposing colonialism

Yet another attempt of the report is to reintroduce nineteenth-century style colonialism in the guise of "post-conflict peace-building."

To this end, Boutros-Ghali argues that in order to be truly successful, peacemaking and peacekeeping must be supplemented by "peace-building"—another newly concocted term. Peace-building is defined as "comprehensive efforts to identity and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people." The measures taken under this broad definition include: "disarming previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation."


Elsewhere in the report, he states, "peacekeeping requires civilian political officers, human rights monitors, elec-

toral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police," as much as the military.

Boutros-Ghali even implies that the U.N. has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states in order to foster what it deems to be democracy, as part of this peace-building process, even when not preceded by military conflict. "The United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. There is an obvious connection between democratic practices and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order." Under this justification, sovereign former colonies will become U.N. trusteeships.

Boutros-Ghali even hints that in the future, Third World countries will no longer have control over their natural resources.

He states: "Post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which links two or more countries in mutual beneficial undertakings, that can not only contribute to economic and social development but is so fundamental to peace. I have in mind, for example, projects that bring states together to develop agriculture, improve transportation, or utilize resources such as water or electricity."



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Creating a U.N. colonial office

At the end of the report, Boutros-Ghali alludes to the reorganization of the U.N. bureaucracy, already in progress, which is intended to make it a more efficient transitional mechanism for imposing an Anglo-American empire over the world. Since his installation as secretary general, Boutros-Ghali has undertaken the most thoroughgoing reorganization of the U.N. bureaucracy ever. In February 1992, the new secretary general abruptly eliminated 14 senior posts, and restructured or eliminated 13 departments and offices. In addition to eliminating numerous positions or departments considered to be in the way, Boutros-Ghali has created a new undersecretary general posting to oversee "preventive diplomacy," and another to oversee "humanitarian affairs."

According to reports being circulated at the U.N., Boutros-Ghali is intent on eliminating some 20% of senior bureaucratic positions. At the same time, the complaint is being made that previous hiring practices had been based on political considerations and informal quotas, whereby certain posts would be given to nationals of certain continents or countries. In the future, it is said, appointments will be based solely on "merit."

This reorganization, including the hiring and firing of personnel, is being directly overseen by newly appointed Undersecretary General for Administration and Management Richard Thornburgh. Thornburgh is the former Bush administration attorney general, and the author of the doctrine that the U.S. Justice Department has the right to kidnap anyone anywhere in the world. Thornburgh has brought in the McKinsey Corp., a firm reputed to be close to the U.S. intelligence community, to aid him in this reorganization. The particular McKinsey official detailed to this task is a former Reagan administration State Department official and ambassador to Germany, Richard Burt.

The U.N. Secretariat is also in the process of upgrading and expanding a secret service, under the pretext of the need for an "early warning system" to "assess whether a threat to peace exists." This agency, now covertly housed under the Department of Political Affairs, is already receiving classified information from some member-states, according to European reports. All this, Boutros-Ghali alludes to under the notion of creating a "strong, efficient, and independent civil service."

Boutros-Ghali also reveals that he is prepared to create a U.N. diplomatic corps, presumably with diplomatic immunity, stationed in states slated for recolonization. Pleading the need for cost-efficiency, he reports: "I am taking steps to rationalize and in certain cases integrate the various programs and agencies of the United Nations within specific countries. The senior United Nations official in each country should be prepared to serve, when needed . . . as my representative on matters of particular concern." These representatives, who will coordinate U.N. operations in their assigned states, are modeled on nineteenth-century colonial Residents.

British hand behind U.N. reorganization

The reorganization of the United Nations into an organization even more capable of implementing Anglo-American imperial designs is the result of a long project. The call for this reorganization occurred in the context of the 1982 British war with Argentina, where, in many respects, the "new world order" actually began. The project is outlined in a recent book, Sheathing the Sword: The U.N. Secretary General and the Prevention of International Conflict, (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1991) by St. Johns University of Minnesota academic and U.N. insider Thomas Boudreau.

In April 1982, the Argentine government invaded the Malvinas islands, then and now ruled by Britain. The Argentines had been lured into invading a territory that they rightly claimed as their own, through promises of U.S. neutrality—just as the Iraqis were later lured into invading Kuwait. In May, the British launched a war against Argentina. As in the later conflict with Iraq, Britain rammed through U.N. Security Council resolutions favoring the British invasion, and, at the same time, crushed the diplomatic resistance of the Third World to their neocolonial exploits.

At the end of 1982, U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, who had been appointed to his post shortly before the war, issued his first annual report to the United Nations. Pérez de Cuellar professed to see a need for significantly reorganizing the U.N., in order to deal with such crises as that generated by Argentina's invasion of the Malvinas. "Something must be done, and done urgently, to strengthen our international institutions and to adopt new and imaginative approaches to the prevention and resolution of conflicts," his report said. Specifically, he called for vastly increasing the powers of the secretary general. As a basis for such an increase in powers, he cited Article 99 of the U.N. Charter, which states, "The secretary general may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

On Feb. 15, 1983, Sir Anthony Parsons, a career diplomat whose last assignment was as British ambassador to the United Nations, gave an address before Chatham House, the headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, wherein the thinking behind the secretary general's report was partially revealed. Formed by arch-imperialist Lord Cecil Rhodes, Chatham House is a main policy-shaper for Brit-

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