

Babookhanian: I will discuss what kind of help they can give us. We need good specialists as well as technological assistance. I will also suggest in the political sphere, that they make Armenia an issue in the presidential campaign. Bush changes his position all the time; not really, but he appears to do so. When Clinton sees Bush saying two good words on Armenia, he says three. There are 1 million Armenian-American voters. I appeal to Armenian-Americans, that they look in detail at what Bush is doing. Bush wants to pressure Armenia.

Bush's theory of the new world order is very dangerous. It is not right, when one country or one President or one government pressures other, small countries, and dictates economic and political policy.

For example, now Bush is pressuring Iraq, with his "nofly zone." I ask, why doesn't Bush pressure Azerbaijan not to bombard *our* towns? Every day in Stepanakert they kill 20 civilians—including babies and women. And there's no similar situation in Iraq. Iraq's planes are not bombarding the civilian population every day.

EIR: What do you think of Mr. LaRouche's presidential campaign?

Babookhanian: If you run for office in Armenia, you are untouchable by Armenian authorities. We have created a new country, and this is a clear principle. When one candidate cannot freely campaign, this is very far from democracy. After Mr. Kachatrian of our party came to America earlier this year and met with an assistant to a U.S. congressman about the LaRouche case, he came back and told us that in America human rights have been destroyed.

We think that it is not right that the American population is not demanding that LaRouche be freed.

Greece, Turkey crises may widen Balkan war

by Konstantin George

The instability in the Balkans has expanded beyond former Yugoslavia and the erstwhile communist countries of Bulgaria and Albania, to include the only relatively stable countries in the region, NATO members Greece and Turkey. Both countries are plunging into chaos through the emergence of parallel crises which threaten to topple the governments of Prime Minister Constantin Mitsotakis in Greece and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in Turkey.

Greece, where the state is all but financially bankrupt, has been in the throes of a series of crippling public sector strikes. Turkey, beset by economic woes, is at the brink of civil war, as the Kurdish insurrection mounts. Military coups are a real possibility in both cases. In Turkey especially, this dynamic threatens to consolidate the power of a neo-Ottoman faction which aims at restoring the empire.

As in former Yugoslavia, the disaster threatening Greece and Turkey is not simply "home grown." Turkey has been steered toward a neo-Ottoman inversion by western, primarily Anglo-American manipulation; and the upheaval in Greece is traceable to the vicious "conditionality" policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Greece plunges toward chaos

The government of Prime Minister Mitsotakis could collapse at any time and plunge Greece into its worst social-political crisis since the mid-1960s, on the eve of the April 1967 CIA-backed military takeover. Greece is bankrupt. Twisting the knife, an IMF-imposed credit embargo was imposed after Greece failed to meet IMF conditions, and the European Community refused to extend desperately needed economic aid.

The IMF vise forced Mitsotakis into the only response allowed by IMF "rules," namely, a severe austerity packet centered on drastic cuts in public workers' pensions, and the first wave of privatizations of public services, which began this summer with the Athens bus lines. The packet was submitted to parliament for approval during September, but as of Sept. 15, the crucial vote had not been held. Since May, the country has been hit by an endless strike wave in the public sector, with no vital public service left untouched. By late August, the strike wave peaked, with two general strikes in two weeks.

The strikes have been led by the communist-dominated Confederation of Trade Unions, and supported by former

Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and his radical-populist Pasok Party, the largest opposition party to the ruling New Democracy Party. The strikes seem like a replay of the 1965-66 strike wave, led then as well by the communists in alliance with Papandreou, which created chaos and ended in the 1967 coup.

The effect of the strikes on the greater Athens area, where 40% of Greece's 10 million people live, has been catastrophic. Downtown Athens in the first two weeks of September has been transformed into a battlefield between militant strikers and police. Vital public services, such as urban transit, bus and metro lines, banks, and post offices, have been shut down. Repeated strikes, begun without warning in power plants, have resulted in instant city-wide blackouts, and there have been crippling hospital strikes by doctors and nurses.

Mitsotakis is gambling that popular backlash against endless inconveniences will be stronger than the strike wave. His situation, however, is very weak. His party commands only a one-vote majority in parliament and is divided over supporting him. On Sept. 9, three former Mitsotakis ministers, who have seats in parliament, issued an open letter demanding that the government back off on its pension cuts, or else face defeat in parliament. Should Mitsotakis fall, early elections will be held, with the result where *no* party can form a government, or the prospect of a Pasok-Communist coalition. Either outcome will lead to a pre-coup situation.

Turkish coalition crisis

The Turkish coalition government of Prime Minister Demirel could fall at any time, unleashing massive internal strife on top of the civil war in Turkish Kurdistan. The crisis is also not new for Turkey. The most recent precedent was the civil war conditions of the late 1970s which led to the Sept. 12, 1980 military takeover. This time around, however, a military coup would not be only a question of restoring internal stability. The leadership of the Turkish military and the disparate coalition of forces seeking to bring down the Demirel government, ranging from the Anap Opposition Party of President Turgut Özal, to the right-wing chauvinistic "Grey Wolf" pan-Turkic party of former Col. Alparslan Turkes, to the "leftist" radical nationalist-populist figure, former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, all share a common goal of promoting a revival Ottoman Empire, complete with military adventures and operations in the Near East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans.

Demirel's government rests on a coalition which he had formed with the SHP party of Erdal Inonu, son of the late Ismet Inonu, the legendary associate of Kemal Ataturk, who founded the modern Turkish nation out of the shards of the degenerate Ottoman Empire. Ismet Inonu was, after Ataturk's death, Turkey's second President during 1938-45. There is a threatened two- or even three-way split in the SHP, which has 70 seats in parliament, that could bring down the government at any time.

The coalition crisis arose out of the failure of Prime Minister Demirel to cope with the economic upheaval and, above all, his toleration of repressive policies against the Kurdish population, which have caused an escalation in the guerrilla war. This policy brought about the first fissure within the SHP, one-third of whose deputies are Kurdish. While so far maintaining parliamentary loyalty to the coalition, because of the justified fear that any post-Demirel regime would engage in far more brutal anti-Kurdish repressions, they have repeatedly denounced government policies.

Ironically, however, Demirel is charged by some with being "too soft" toward the Kurds. Yet Demirel has never really run policy toward the Kurds. All aspects of the repression and anti-guerrilla campaign have been run by the General Staff. Its policy of indiscriminate repression has placed Demirel in an impossible situation. As the scale of warfare intensifies each week, the blame for the debacle is placed on Demirel.

Demirel foolishly thought that by placating the General Staff, giving it free rein in the war in Kurdistan, he could escape becoming the victim of a coup. But, as events in late August and early September confirm, the nostalgic neo-Ottomans have decided to pull the plug on the present government.

This brings us to the split in the SHP, which will sooner or later topple Demirel. The SHP is one of the two successor parties to the Republican People's Party (CHP), which was banned, as were all the old parties, by the September 1980 military coup. In a move calculated to accelerate the fissuring of the SHP, President Özal legalized the old parties, clearly aware that once the CHP was re-legalized, a pole would exist to collect and galvanize into action the anti-Inonu forces within the SHP. That is exactly what transpired.

On Sept. 10, the CHP was re-founded with delegates drawn from the SHP and from the other CHP successor party, the anti-Demirel Party of the Democratic Left, led by former Prime Minister Ecevit, a rabid nationalist-populist opposition figure who has been demanding, in tandem with the military and the right-wing extremists such as Turkes, a tougher policy against the Kurds and a stronger Turkish military profile in the Caucasus and the Balkans. This stance taken by Ecevit is not a bluff: In 1974 when Turkey, under Ecevit, invaded Cyprus, seized 40% of the island which it holds to this day, and "ethnically cleansed" the area, expelling 200,000 Greek civilians, or nearly 45% of the total Greek Cypriot population.

At the founding congress, Ecevit front-man Deniz Baykal became the chairman of the reconstituted CHP, defeating his rival and Inonu ally Erol Tuncer. According to the Turkish press of Sept. 11, Ecevit and Baykal control at least 18 of the 70 SHP deputies. On Sept. 16, 14 SHP deputies quit the coalition. Prior to this defection, the coalition had 244 seats out of 450 in the National Assembly. Now it is hanging by a thread, with only a five-seat majority.