succeeded, but also after the defeat of a Nazi Germany. . . .

"The Gestapo and the SS have done us an appreciable service in removing a selection of those who would undoubtedly have posed as 'good' Germans after the war. It is to our advantage therefore, that the purge should continue, since the killing of Germans by Germans will save us from future embarrassments of many kinds."

Serious, hard work has gone into both these books, and I can only hope that they will shortly be translated and published in both French and German. The only weakness in Miss Meehan's work is her tireless, but very tiresome, attempt to make out Ernst von Weiszäcker, father of the present, ultra-liberal Anglophile German President, as some sort of latter-day saint, the very soul of the German Resistance. I have been led to believe that such an interpretation of von Weiszäcker's life is over the top, and Miss Meehan, for once, is long on rhetoric but short on hard facts to persuade us otherwise.

All that said and done, a regret remains about people like von Trott or von Moltke, who, due to their aristocratic background, were blind to the fact that it was their refined, "sensitive" upper class friends in England, the very people to whom they flew for aid, who pushed the "liquidate" button the moment von Trott et al. walked out of the room. Von Trott might have been wise to heed the Chinese revolutionist Lin Tsiu Sen, whom he met in Berne in 1942. Lin said: "I told him the German opposition was much too passive. Revolutionaries must keep the initiative and strike at the enemy, even when it means self-sacrifice. If you can't kill Hitler, then kill Goering. If you can't kill Goering, kill Ribbentrop, lif you can't kill Ribbentrop, kill any general in the street. But Trott said, 'Germans don't kill their leaders.'"

Thirty years of Maoist despotism

by Mary Burdman

The New Emperors, Mao and Deng: A Dual Biography

by Harrison E. Salisbury Little, Brown and Co., New York, 1992 544 pages, hardbound, \$24.95

One elderly member of the Russian intelligentsia remarked recently that, as well as he knew the horrors wreaked by

Adolf Hitler's Nazi state, he often had to remind westerners that Hitler, monster that he was, was only in power a little over a decade. Could they imagine what 30 years of Josef Stalin had done to Russia and Russians?

We must ask the same question about 30 years of Mao Zedong in China.

The book by Harrison Salisbury, long-standing New York Times commentator on the Soviet Union, assembles an enormous amount of material, including many personal interviews of Chinese, which are certainly of value. But despite the detail, including a reckoning of the Great Leap Forward, which killed 30-40 million Chinese, and the Cultural Revolution, Salisbury's "human interest" journalistic style and emphasis on the personal lives of Mao Zedong and his ultimate successor, Deng Xiaoping, only touches the surface of the damage that these two have done to the culture and society of China, a nation with thousands of years of history. At the end of his book, which, oddly, is written as if Deng had already died before it was published, he cannot even speculate on what will now happen in China.

Salisbury presents a damning portrait of Mao Zedong and of the inner workings of the Communist Party itself during his rule, based on interviews with Mao's surviving private secretary Li Rui and others. Mao was as degenerate as any despot in this century. He spent much of his life after the Communists took over Beijing secluded and indulging his obsessions with re-reading the most heinous aspects of China's long history. Mao was addicted to sleeping pills, and demanded the services of a vast "harem" of young women under the delusion that this would prolong his life. His closest collaborator in unleashing the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, was a morphine addict. Yet while poring over the hundreds of books in the ancient records of China's rulers, the Annals of Twenty-four Dynasties, Mao ordered the brutal political upheavals which murdered many tens of millions of peasants, destroyed China's intelligentsia, and repeatedly wrecked its economy.

Soft on Deng

However, Salisbury is far too kind to the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping. Deng rose to power as a leader of Maoism: spreading "support" for the Communist revolution by leading peasants to mass murder their better-off neighbors and steal their land, and thus become collaborators who would be unable to break with the communists. These methods are the basis of the Communists' hold on power. Although there were attempts, especially after the Great Leap Forward fiasco, to move Mao aside, they all failed. Unlike Nikita Khrushchov, who "de-Stalinized" Russia, Deng never purged the many perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution, except for the show trial of Madame Mao and her "Gang of Four." Deng has not "de-Maoized" China. This made the 1989 massacre at Tiananmen inevitable.

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