

EIR Feature

Geopolitics: the root of Bush's tantrum in November 1989

by Michael Liebig

In the days following the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, then U.S. President George Bush was in such a morose frame of mind that reporters in the White House press corps found it striking. When the subject came up, Bush stated that he was "not an emotional man." "I will not dance on the Wall," he declared.

The source of Bush's foul mood was twofold. First, the fall of the Wall and the foreseeable reunification of Germany marked the end of the Yalta system. The geopolitically based division of Germany and Europe between the superpowers was, after 45 years, coming to an end. Second, the East-West conflict between the communist Soviet empire and the West, since the end of the Second World War, had masked the geopolitical basis of the Yalta system to a great extent. The opposition between communist claims to dominion and the "western community of values" had been in the foreground.

The political class in Washington, London, Paris, and Moscow already perceived at the end of 1989 that it would no longer be politically possible to hold back revolutionary changes in Germany and eastern Europe. At the Malta summit meeting in December 1989 and in other talks between the governments of the four victorious powers of World War II, an understanding was reached to establish the principles for a new geopolitical arrangement in Europe from the ashes of the "East-West conflict." Now, geopolitics showed itself openly and undisguised. The sight was not a pretty one.

In the "serious" press of Great Britain, France, and the United States, government-inspired articles appeared, which warned that a "new pan-Germanism" (*Le Monde*) or even a "Fourth Reich" (*London Times*) threatened the European balance of power. German economic power purportedly threatened to dominate Europe just as the Panzer divisions had in the past. With their anti-German ravings, the leaks from the London Foreign Office sounded like the self-incriminating letters of the terrorist Red Army Faction. A unified Germany, it was said, might turn against the West and aspire to a "new Rapallo" accord with a post-communist



British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President George Bush worked to ensure that there would be no economic recovery among the republics that emerged from the former Soviet Union. They are shown here at the White House in August 1990.

Russia in order to achieve hegemony on the Eurasian continent. But geopolitical foresight should stop this from happening.

Axioms of geopolitics

Just what is geopolitics? Historically speaking and in international relations, geopolitics consistently assigns priority to the “objective factors” of *space* and *human masses* over the “subjective” factors of *cultural and technical development*. The standard founders of geopolitics based on this axiom are:

- Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), whose book *Political Geography*, of 1897, gave the overall theoretical foundation of geopolitics;
- Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, an American, whose book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, published in 1890, defined the role of the “ocean space” and “sea power” as the central concepts of geopolitics;
- Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947), the real founder of operational geopolitics, who presented the contrast between the Eurasian continental “Heartland” and the Anglo-American sea power’s “Insular Crescent” as the central geopolitical conflict;
- Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), for whom the rise and fall of nations and peoples are expressed in the expansion or contraction of the space ruled over by them. Haushofer exerted a strong influence over German National Socialism and the Soviet Russian brand of geopolitics.

Geopolitics postulates that geographical, climatic, and demographic factors determine the course of history. Mac-kinder says (in “The Geographical Pivot of History,” written in 1904): “We may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical causation in universal history.” He concludes, “The actual balance of political power at any given time, is, of course, the product, on the one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the competing peoples. . . . And the geographical quantities in the calculation are more measurable and more nearly constant than the human.”

Geopolitics takes off from the malthusian premise that geography, the available land surface, is unchangeable, whereas the mass of people is dynamic. Because of the objective limitation of geographical space, peoples and nations must struggle for power and dominion against each other. The possession of the limited soil and its resources must be seized, or defended, among competing peoples or nations by political or military struggle. In the words of Ratzel, “For man and his history the size of the land surface is unchangeable. The number of people grows, but the soil on which they must live and work remains always the same.” The land is “the only material cohesiveness in each people. . . . In the progress of history this bond does not tend to become looser through the progressive liberation of intellectual forces, but rather it grows with the number of people. From this also comes historically the growth of the tendency of the people

to become more tightly bonded with the soil, so to speak to take root in it. . . . Ample space confers the protection of distance to the life forms which spread out over it. . . . Therefore we see in the competition of stronger and weaker peoples, that the weaker ones are more quickly consigned to narrower spaces.”

These ideological axioms of geopolitics come out of the physiocrats of the eighteenth century, who defined economic wealth exclusively as the inorganic and organic bounty of the soil. Consequently the axioms of geopolitics are based on the—scientifically untenable—basic premises of Thomas Malthus’s *On Population* regarding the apparently unbridgeable discrepancy between population growth and food supplies. The consequence of this is the apparent “necessity” of population reduction. This flows into British Social Darwinism of the late nineteenth century. Only the “strongest” peoples and nations can prevail in the survival struggle of all against all over limited soil and resources.

These ideological postulates, which lie at the roots of geopolitics, are obviously the *negation* of the fundamentals of Christian European civilization. The axioms of geopolitics are *ideologically*, scientifically untenable, and morally despicable. Considering that Nazism is the general negation of Christian culture, it is no wonder that Hitler was a great admirer of Ratzel, Mackinder, and Haushofer. Hitler studied Ratzel’s major work just before he wrote *Mein Kampf*. Karl Haushofer was a member of the original nucleus of National Socialism, the Munich Thule Society, at the beginning of the 1920s. National Socialism adopted the axioms of geopolitics in its catchy slogans such as “*Kampf um Lebensraum*” (“Struggle over Living Space”) and “*Blut und Boden*” (“Blood and Soil”). Likewise, Haushofer, during the 1920s and ’30s, exerted significant influence over the communist political intelligentsia of the Soviet Union and Comintern. We need only allude here to his close relations with Richard Sorge, a key figure at the time in the Soviet intelligence service.

Obviously, the ideological axioms of geopolitics are not to be confused with economically real categories of political geography. It goes without saying that concepts like location, land area, borders, soil fertility, natural communications routes, density of settlement, ethnic-religious population mix, neighbors, and so forth, are indispensable for any strategic analysis or planning.

Mackinder makes geopolitics ‘ripe for implementation’


Acceptance of the ideological premises of geopolitics leads easily to blindness regarding its operative realization in *realpolitik*. The operational implementation of geopolitics through British foreign policy since the beginning of this century is traceable precisely to the example of Halford Mackinder. At the end of the nineteenth century, the British leadership recognized that the economic, scientific-techni-

cal, and also military basis of power of the British Empire was shriveling in comparison with the United States on the one hand, and the major nations of continental Europe (Germany, Russia, France) on the other. A roundtable was formed at the top of the British oligarchy, to which Cecil Rhodes, Lord Milner, Lord Grey, Lord Rothschild, and others belonged, which formulated a policy of “new imperialism” for the empire. To this group, sometimes called Milner’s Kindergarten, Mackinder also belonged.

The British leadership recognized that it would be futile, after the lost wars of 1776-83 and 1812-14, to go up a third time against the United States, whose population, economic power, and military strength had grown enormously. Just the strength of the American Navy excluded any solution by force. Under the motto that “if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em,” British diplomacy set about turning the United States into a partner and close ally of the British Empire. The introduction of geopolitical postulates as the ideological superstructure for the imperial power interests of Great Britain played an important role in this. Picking up from Admiral Mahan’s theories, Mackinder postulated a geopolitically based identity of interests between U.S. *naval power* and the British Empire. Geography was supposed to create, with the “insular crescent and outer continents,” an *a priori* opposition to the Eurasian heartland. If a nation or an alliance of nations were to achieve hegemony over the Eurasian continent, this would be a mortal threat to the sea power of the “World Island.” Only the combined weight of the allied sea powers could prevent a hegemonizing consolidation on the Eurasian continent.

British policy against the Eurasian great powers (Russia, Germany, and France) follows naturally from the British policy of “balance of powers” in a “Concert of Europe.” Since the 1700s, England has constantly, overtly or covertly, allied with the second or third strongest nations against the strongest power on the continent. In the self-conception of British and later Anglo-American geopolitics, the doctrine of “balance of powers” played a central role, as one can regularly glean from Henry Kissinger’s syndicated weekly columns. The leading global or regional power can only hold its position if the secondary powers can be held in a system of adversarial political and/or military competition. To put it simply, the first-rate power acts toward the second-rate powers according to the principle of “divide and conquer.”

After 1871, Germany took over the leading role on the continent from France. For British balance of power diplomacy, it became “automatic,” so to speak, that Germany was the chief adversary. Thereby, British diplomacy saw itself faced with a special, new kind of danger: the sweeping industrial-technical progress, especially in transportation technology, taking place on the whole continent of Europe. The possibility arose that the three main continental powers would be able to keep their rivalries under control through economic mutual interests. The rapidly growing rail infra-



Halford Mackinder's geopolitical view of the world, as illustrated in his book Democratic Ideals and Reality. Mackinder labeled these the "natural seats of power."

structure presented totally new perspectives for the interchange of commodities on the continent. Above all, however, the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Berlin-Baghdad Railroad called into question the dominance of the British-run international seaways in world trade. The transcontinental railroads threatened the British Empire far more than the buildup of the German fleet.

The primary goal of British diplomacy before the First World War was to prevent by all means a continental convergence of interests among France, Germany, and Russia. Mackinder came up with suitable geopolitical categories for this. He divided the Eurasian space into the "Heartland" proper (Russia) and a west-central European "Rimland," which stretched over the Mediterranean into the Middle East. In this way the Balkan Peninsula emerged as the zone in which the most frequent and long-lasting tensions among Germany, Russia, and France were kindled in the decades before World War I. It is no accident that the conflicts in the Balkans became the trigger for the First World War, in which the three great powers of the continent butchered one another to pieces.

The Versailles system

Great Britain saw achieved, with the defeat of Germany in 1918, its main geopolitical goal for a new balance of power on the continent, with the simultaneous overall weakening of the continent. The Versailles system was the lawful expression of the geopolitical goals set by Great Britain:

- Germany was economically, financially, and politically in a state of deep exhaustion and isolated and paralyzed in its foreign policy;
- France was deeply hostile to Germany. It was exhaust-

ed and dependent on British good will for its ability to do business.

- Russia was completely destroyed economically, but because of the Bolshevik dictatorship, it was politically incalculable.

British diplomacy proceeded to split the continent according to geopolitical postulates by cementing an east/central/southeast European *cordon sanitaire*. In this, national self-determination rights counted less than splitting the Russian Soviet "Heartland" from Germany. The Versailles system had broken down economically and financially between 1929 and 1933. This led to Germany being economically and militarily reinforced under National Socialism. Likewise, Russia became a great power again under Stalinism. Starting in 1938, British foreign policy worked to provoke a prolonged military conflict between the two powers, in view of the continental power balance between the restrengthened Germany and Russia. The Nazi geopolitics of "Lebensraum in the East" on the one side, and Stalin's expansionism of the Soviet Russian empire on the other, fit right into this British goal.

The Yalta system

After the fall of France in 1940, Churchill asserted that, given the new situation of the alliance of the sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, the more immediate priority was to bring down Germany. By 1945 Germany was totally vanquished, but the victory had essentially been won by the United States and Stalinist Russia. Great Britain played only a secondary role by now, and its empire was getting harder and harder to hold together. Great Britain alone could no longer direct the "Concert of Europe," and

it no longer had the means to enforce the balance of powers policy on its own. However, Great Britain could induce the American leadership to carry forward the geopolitical premises of the Versailles system under the changed conditions which had been created by the Second World War, in the form of the Yalta system. The Eurasian landmass would be radically partitioned by the "Iron Curtain" cutting straight through Germany and Europe. The "Heartland" would be surrendered to the Soviet Russian empire, whereas the west-central European "Rimland" was placed under the direct control of the Anglo-American sea powers. And thus the British leadership, through its "special relationship" with the United States, held on to a decisive influence over the fate of Europe. The foreign policy establishment of the United States, from George Kennan through Henry Kissinger down to George Bush, thought in the categories of Mackinder.

Soviet Russian geopolitical thinking met them halfway. Even in the times of the greatest tension and confrontation, the geopolitical "rules of the game" of Yalta still prevailed. Political scientist Pyotr Gladkov from the U.S.A.-Canada Institute in Moscow is right when he says, "Elementary fairness requires that both powers [the United States and the Soviet Union] admit the fact, that they both are constantly doing everything in their power to maintain a divided and dependent Europe, or rather, Germany; that is not conjecture."

NATO's twofold character

The division of Europe, with the Anglo-American sea powers facing off against the Russian imperial bloc in the Yalta system, guaranteed the subordination of the nations of Europe to the benefit of the then-leading powers. With the nearly total elimination of Germany between 1945 and 1958, France's power continued steadily to erode. That changed under Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who of all the political leaders of the West had most clearly recognized that NATO was from the outset the strategic framework for Anglo-American hegemony over the nations of continental western Europe. In 1966, he left the integrated military organization of NATO (not the alliance itself) when the United States stoutly refused to concede a leadership role to France based on equal rights. While on the one hand, NATO was the institutionalization of the dominance of Anglo-American sea power over the west-central European Rimland, on the other hand NATO uncontestedly had a militarily restraining and deterrent effect vis-à-vis the Soviet empire. On that account, the hegemonic role of the United States in NATO cannot be equated with the imperialist-communist Soviet Union's role vis-à-vis its east-central European satellites. The internal cohesion of the Soviet empire was ruthlessly imposed by the deployment of force. It goes without saying that both the Soviet Union and the West, whether in the Cold War or during détente, constantly tried to shift the "power relations" in Europe to their own advantage. The Soviet leadership constantly

endeavored to do this by blatant and brutal methods. But in the end, Moscow always proceeded against the NATO countries in west-central Europe cautiously, gradually, and indirectly.

NATO was especially the strategic instrument for "containing" and controlling the Federal Republic of Germany. NATO's integrated command structure and the tight political consultative mechanisms were best suited for this containment of Germany. The—relative—sovereignty granted to West Germany in 1955 remained always yoked to its simultaneous enrollment in NATO. The famously infamous remark of the first NATO General Secretary Lord Ismay, who said NATO's job was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down," comes very close to the truth. The role of NATO as an instrument of control against Germany shows up in the agreement by the Soviet Union to NATO membership for unified Germany in July 1990, which was by no means a paradox, because Gorbachov saw NATO at this point no longer as a military threat to the Soviet Union, but rather as a counter-insurance, against Germany.

The strengthened role of France since de Gaulle, the economic and slow political reinvigoration of West Germany since Adenauer, and the growing weight of the European Community, did not decisively change the geopolitical structure in Europe.

The Yalta system remained intact. Only when the Anglo-American leadership determined, in the mid-1980s, that the economic and political erosion of power in the Soviet Union was increasingly calling into question the *status quo* in Europe, were attempts made to modify the Yalta order. It was not a question of totally giving up Yalta, but rather of maintaining it in a changed form. No later than 1985, talks began between the American and the Soviet governments in which the division of Germany was construed as "permeable," but still something to be maintained. There was a desire to disarm the military alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but not to question their existence. Politically, divided Europe should close ranks more tightly in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, but this should occur only gradually, and under strict superpower control.

Great Britain supported the modification of the Yalta system, as long as its basic structure were upheld. The Mitterrand regime in France had a similar position. The Malta summit meeting of Bush and Gorbachov in December 1989 was the last try to rescue at least the core structure of the Yalta system. The sweeping, revolutionary changes between 1989 and 1991 in East Germany, east-central Europe, and the Soviet Union itself thwarted the plans of the political class in London, Washington, and Paris as well as the Moscow *nomenklatura*. The attempt to modify the Yalta system shattered. But that by no means meant the end of geopolitics as the model strategic principle for Europe. Quite the contrary.

Geopolitics since 1989

The abolition of the division of Europe and Germany meant that Europe's economically drained East could link up with the economically strong central-western Europe. Out of the economic combination of the continental Heartland with the western European Rimland not only could the reconstruction of the East be accomplished relatively quickly and practically, but at the same time, proposals going in that direction, such as the "Productive Triangle" program of American statesman and economist Lyndon LaRouche, would have had a "locomotive effect" to put the world economy as a whole back on its feet.

In the *geopolitical matrix*, however, such a development possibility was instinctively perceived as a nightmare. In the viewpoint of geopolitics, a Europeanwide perspective for reconstruction presented an acute *threat* to the Anglo-American sea powers. A Eurasian great economic zone would allegedly shunt the sea powers over to the global strategic sidelines. According to the absurd premises of geopolitics, France, Germany, and the former satellite states of the Soviet empire had to be *prevented* from tackling the real economic and infrastructural reconstruction of the "Eurasian economic zone." Such a great zone of economic development would mean, supposedly, a shifting of world economic weight to the disadvantage of the economically weakened United States and Great Britain—as if the United States could not constructively participate in the rebuilding of the Eurasian zone and could not itself be regenerated in real economic terms!

In London, Margaret Thatcher, Douglas Hurd, Allan Clark, Nicholas Ridley, Conor Cruise O'Brien, and others felt themselves set back into the time of Mackinder, before 1914. Something similar happened in Washington and New York. The way the geopolitical matrix of Anglo-American foreign policy burrowed into a bunker at the end of 1989 demonstrates how the geopolitical outlook turns into manifest political paranoia. Based on this *geopolitical paranoia*, Anglo-American foreign policy in 1989-92 aimed at the rejection and obstruction of the onset of the overall reconstruction of Europe.

Geopolitics versus strategy

Before we sketch below the new Anglo-American geopolitics since 1989, we need to contrast the geopolitical matrix and its categories, with a strategy which is in accordance with reason and natural law. In contrast, the postulates of geopolitics are seen even more clearly as a paranoid, ideological patchwork.

Strategy is based, in opposition to geopolitics, first of all on an estimate of the situation which draws upon intellectual-cultural, political-social, economic-technical, and only then, also political-geographical factors. From this starting point, strategy defines the setting of goals for a nation or an association of nations, for the maximal development of its spiritual

and material potential. Finally, strategy determines the way to realize this. Strategy thus includes summing up the situation, setting goals, and formulating a plan. This concept of strategy has been filled out with detailed content by LaRouche on the basis of natural law. For LaRouche, strategy which is historically practical and at the same time has enduring value for history, must derive its goals from:

- the western Christian image of man, which sees man, as the *imago viva Dei* (living image of God), as the constant "collaborator" of God in the ongoing process of creation. Society and the nation in history are committed to intellectual-material development;

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- scientific and technical progress, which is the precondition for growing potential population density per unit of area, always redefining *scarce* resources, and constantly making possible the further development of science and technology through rising material and intellectual living standards;

- the principle of a community of nations under the principles of natural law in the above-cited sense;

- the principle of republican representative constitutional government;

- the principle of national sovereignty.

LaRouche's strategic conception is strongly oriented, with respect to the question of a community of principle, to Gottfried Leibniz's natural law theory of international relations. In opposition to Thomas Hobbes, who had defined the "natural" relations of individuals as well as states toward one another as "*bellum omnium contra omnes*," ("war of all against all"), Leibniz conceptualized the self-interest of each nation in the maximum development of other nations. This "natural" self-interest is given, when the nation pushes its own material and intellectual development to the maximum. On this basis there is a community of principle, namely, maximal self and mutual development, among nations. Only

the nation which denies its own material and intellectual development, cannot enter into this community of principles. The internal weakness of one will only become relatively "strong" through the greater weakening of other states. This self-negation of one's own development is a central point of departure for geopolitics.

London's 'Fourth Reich'

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a government-inspired media campaign took off in Great Britain, the United States, and France, in which four themes continually cropped up:

- The reunification of Germany would lead to a "Fourth Reich," which would dominate all of Europe, first economically, and then politically and militarily.
- Reunified Germany would destroy the painstakingly achieved "balance of powers" in Europe and augur renewed tensions and conflicts like those before the world wars.
- Between Germany and the crisis-racked Soviet Union, an anti-western "new Rapallo" pact would be forged.
- In reunified Germany, there would be a spread of "pan-German" nationalism, racism, and finally expansionism.

This campaign by the "serious" press in England, France, and the United States was the public echo of a flurry of diplomacy by these nations. Between the end of 1989 and the middle of 1990, this resulted in a "geopolitical deterrence" policy against Germany and Russia. In early 1991, the American strategist (and member of the Trilateral Commission) Prof. Samuel Huntington published an article entitled "America's Changing Strategic Interests" in *Survival*, the magazine of the London Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS). Huntington wrote in part, "At the end of 1990, indeed, the principal threat to stability and the balance of power in Eurasia appeared to be the possibility of a major vacuum of power emerging in Mackinder's heartland.

". . . United Germany could attempt to use its economic power not only to dominate the European Community, but also to extend its economic hegemony and political control through central and eastern Europe. That, too, is a course which German governments—imperial, democratic, and Nazi—have followed in the past. The political integration of the European Community, if that should occur, would also bring into existence an extraordinarily powerful entity which could not help but be perceived as a major threat to American interests. . . .

"The United States is, in some respects, in the position of Britain after 1815, when the end of the Napoleonic threat created the need to produce a Concert of Europe, incorporating France, and the need to promote a continuing balance of power in Europe so that no country could again threaten British interests. In 1990, U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd pointed to the post-1815 [sic] and said that, as a result, he was reading a biography of Castlereagh. The person who should be reading that book, however, is President George

Bush," Huntington recommended emphatically.

Murder for geopolitical ends

Nineteen days after the opening of the Berlin Wall, the chief of Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, was murdered by never-identified alleged "terrorists." Herrhausen was a mighty and internationally influential economic leader, who stood for a strategy of real economic infrastructural reconstruction of eastern Europe as a cooperative East-West project. Herrhausen had turned against inflicting the monetarist policy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the economic reform process in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The "message," which was sent by the never-explained death of Herrhausen, goes straight to the central goal set by Anglo-American "geopolitical deterrence strategy": the prevention of a prospering economic zone "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

After Herrhausen's murder the political and economic leadership of Germany turned over to the IMF the shaping of the economic reform process in eastern Europe. The "shock therapy" imposed by the Anglo-Americans between 1990 and 1993, carried out via the IMF in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, has led ineluctably to a spiraling collapse of the real economy and infrastructure, to hyperinflation, and to mass poverty. To collaborate in implementing shock therapy, influential elements of the holdovers of the Soviet *nomenklatura* were called into service. Economic productivity in eastern Europe has declined since the end of the 1980s by at least 50%. The legacy of the communist economic leadership was worse than bad, but the IMF-inflicted shock therapy has made a desperate situation catastrophic.

Once again, this shows up the factor of denial of self-development. Within the Anglo-American establishment, the assumption predominates that the United States and Great Britain must concentrate at least until the year 2000 on servicing and reducing the gigantic public and private debt which grew up mainly during the 1980s. In this long "period of consolidation," there is no reckoning with an economic recovery of the real economy, which in fact is only possible if this mountain of debt is immediately frozen, in order to modernize and expand, through the creation of state-backed productive credits, the industrial-technical potential, the infrastructure, and the quality of labor power in the United States. If this does not happen, then the logic of denial of self-development takes over, and because of its own, self-imposed period of weakness, one nation must keep others from economically developing. That is why the Anglo-American establishment systematically torpedoed Europe-wide reconstruction in 1989-92.

The IMF shock therapy carried out under Anglo-American pressures is not the result of a tragic, wrong economic assessment of the situation and policy decisions that ensued from it. Behind the shock therapy stands the conscious *inten-*

tion of keeping Russia and Ukraine in a lingering condition of weakness. Geopolitics serves as a plausible basis for this economic scorched-earth policy in eastern Europe.

The situation which has thus been brought about in the East has led to a dramatic threat to the security of western Europe. Economic, social, and cultural decline and collapse are necessarily leading to a "continuation of politics by other means," namely war, civil war, or mass emigrations. This development in turn leads to a renewed and reinforced military dependency of western Europe, especially Germany, on the U.S. nuclear superpower.

What is really thought about NATO in London was openly expressed on May 15, 1992 by Thatcher: "It reassured Europe in the face of Soviet power until yesterday, and it provides similar comfort against the rise of Germany today." On May 15, 1991, then-NATO Commander in Chief Gen. John R. Galvin stated in the *Washington Post* that a comprehensive U.S. troop presence in Europe within the NATO framework is needed, because the United States "must not leave Europe to itself. . . . The first half of the twentieth century was rather bad . . . the second half not so bad. . . . The reason for that is, that we [the United States] brought about a stable Europe . . . that the United States has a formative influence on the security and future of Europe." In the same place, Gen. Robert C. Oaks, supreme commander of the U.S. air forces in Europe, said, "Even Germans have told me, that Germans are better people as long as the Americans are there. . . . I [see] the thing in historical terms." The interviewer for the *Washington Post* wrote that the accompanying press aides asked that these statements not be published, but the generals had insisted that they should be.

In April 1991, columnist Jim Hoagland, who is well known for his excellent connections in the State Department in Washington, wrote in the *International Herald Tribune*, "The United States has belatedly discovered that European unity may be too much of a good thing. . . . America does not want the accelerating drive for European unity to result in a European bloc that makes its own decisions on defense and trade policies and then presents them as a *fait accompli*. Europe for the Europeans is a great idea, up to a point. That point is reached when Europe becomes a rival rather than a partner."

War with geopolitical omens

Next we must enter into the strategic *fait accompli* of the Bush administration after 1989, with which, in a historically unique situation, between summer 1990 and spring 1991, the political and economic resources and energies of Europe, especially Germany, were waylaid and absorbed away from the pressing strategic tasks in the east of the continent: the Persian Gulf war. A cleverly engineered trap was set for Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein by the Bush administration, which had pampered him for years, into which he promptly fell

when he ordered the invasion of Kuwait. On Aug. 4, 1990, under the headline "Europe Be Warned," a revealing editorial appeared in the *International Herald Tribune*: "For Europe the invasion of Kuwait was a shock that came when a shock was needed. . . . If Europe had begun to think it could float off alone into some new untroubled world, Aug. 2 brought it brutally back to reality."

Only four months after the end of the Gulf war came the Balkan war. Of course, the war in former Yugoslavia had origins in its own internal, centuries-old conflicts. But that is only part of the truth about this war. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Serbia has been "reared" as a geopolitical counterweight by the British, French, and Russians to Germany and the Hapsburg monarchy. The ruthless domination of the Serbs over the other south Slavic peoples had been systematically promoted since 1918 in the interest of a Yugoslavia with the strongest possible geopolitical counterweight against Germany.

Precisely in this geopolitical continuity lay the attitude of the governments of London, Washington, Paris, and the Moscow *nomenklatura* in June 1991. Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, and the Thatcher and Mitterrand governments encouraged the Serbian leadership to frustrate Slovenia and Croatia's independence.

In spring 1992, the same occurred toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. For two years, the endless Carrington-Owen-Vance negotiations have offered a diplomatic cloak to Serbian aggression, in order to carry forward and widen its Greater Serbian war of conquest. Thus, the Balkan war has become a "festering wound in the body of Europe," through which the potential of western Europe to act has been profoundly paralyzed. The Balkan war, with its genocide, war crimes, and the most massive streams of refugees since the end of the Second World War, is tying up enormous political energies in Europe.

The war in former Yugoslavia demonstrates the consequences of geopolitics. Alongside the Balkan war already today we can see an eminently more dangerous "Eurasian arc of crisis" which stretches from the Baltic Sea through Moldova and the Caucasus into the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union, but especially in Russia itself, a process of Weimarization is proceeding at a sweeping pace. A sober prognosis must come to the conclusion that as a result of the geopolitics pursued by London and Washington since 1989 against the European continent, a "Thirty Years' War" under the conditions of the waning twentieth century is now a threat. This "Thirty Years' War" could lead to World War III. The exposure of the geopolitical premises of "great policy" in the West is long overdue. Thatcher and Bush are out of office. It is high time that their post-1989 geopolitical insanity should accompany them into oblivion.