Bosnia when Izetbegovic arrived.

Soon thereafter, letters began to appear in Swedish newspapers—obviously not in a spontaneous way—complaining that "the LaRouche sect" was the only group in Sweden vocally organizing on behalf of Bosnia. These letters warned that the vacuum must be filled by others; otherwise, the LaRouche-associated European Labor Party could achieve considerable political influence, given the fact that many Swedes sympathize with the plight of the Bosnians. From the first week of April, one can date an intense Swedish social democratic campaign to counter, and if possible shut down, efforts of LaRouche associates in favor of solidarity with the Bosnians.

The other side of this coin, is that Schori, in his article and May 6 speech, promoted the idea of a new burst of "peace movement" and Socialist International activity, around the Bosnia issue. This, undoubtedly, was to convey the impression that the vacuum was being filled.

He boasted about his own links to the "Praxis" movement, a movement of self-professed "democratic dissidents" that grew up during the Tito era. "Praxis" operatives have been key in building up the political-psychological climate for war in former Yugoslavia. (See "The Tavistock Psychiatrists Behind the Rape of Bosnia," *EIR*, Feb. 12, 1993.)

Schori also boasted about his ties to the social democratic movements in both Slovenia (where he traveled during Easter) and Croatia (whose head, Branco Horvath, visited Stockholm recently), claiming that these movements were instrumental in shaping the proposals for U.N.-managed "protected zones" for Bosnia.

He further wrote: "For a couple of years, we have supported the political and trade union resistance against nationalism and war, developed by the Croatian-American socialist Bogdan Denitch." This is directly germane to the anti-LaRouche operation: Denitch had been a close collaborator for years of the League for Industrial Democracy's Arch Puddington, the latter the mentor of Dennis King, the number one author of slanders against LaRouche in the United States. Moreover, Schori himself collaborated with the U.S. Anti-Defamation League and communist intelligence services to spread the lies that LaRouche and his Swedish associates were responsible for Olof Palme's murder in 1986.

Among this complex of allies, Schori cited the international "peace movement." He and his British and Scandinavian co-thinkers hope to mobilize a new such movement, on the scale of the Vietnam War-era youth and student movements, against any outside military intervention to stop the Serbs, against U.S.-led moves into Bosnia, and for the United Nations. However, it is very doubtful that a mass base can now be emotionally catalyzed around such activity, since real sympathy for the Bosnian people remains strong among Swedes, and the growing Balkan refugee population, and since the U.N. has already been significantly discredited by its Serbia-appeasing policies in former Yugoslavia.

## Interview: Yves Dubois

## Alsace-Sarajevo relief convoy forces a breach

On March 1, the convoy of trucks belonging to the Coordination Alsace-Sarajevo returned with great fanfare in front of the Council of Europe headquarters in Strasbourg, France. The scene was one of joyous reunions of the truckers with their families and friends, who had followed, not without grave concern, this "mad project" of bringing solidarity from the entire region of Alsace into the heart of horror—Sarajevo. What a road was traveled in such a short time!

In November 1992, several friends got together in a café to conceive the project. On Dec. 17, 1992, the demonstration of the Coordination Alsace-Sarajevo was joined by personnel from the Council of Europe to denounce the complicity of the United Nations, institutions, and governments with the genocide taking place in Bosnia. On Jan. 17, 1993, Alsatians brought nearly 6 million francs [roughly \$1.13 million] to mayors' offices throughout Alsace in order to finance the Coordination project. Doubts and difficulties soon followed. But on Feb. 17, the trucks made their rendezvous in front of the Council of Europe, exactly two months after the demonstration—and thence departed for Sarajevo.

Catherine Brannan of the Schiller Institute, which supported the launching of the Coordination, met with Yves Dubois, editor-in-chief of the France 3 regional television and president of Coordination Alsace-Sarajevo, and provided the following interview from Strasbourg.

**Q:** Can you tell us your reflections and feelings on this "mission impossible," now that it's completed?

**Dubois:** What we hope to achieve by sending the largest convoy ever organized to Sarajevo rests on a grand idea, without any doubt "utopian" on several levels. I want to insist on the fact that in the first place, we wanted to make a demonstration "on the ground" to say that we, citizens of Europe, do not accept what is going on in Sarajevo. One hundred and forty people traveling in 64 vehicles—we were no longer content to go watch with our hands in our pockets. Therefore, we brought food and medicines, 350 tons in all. But this was only food added to the moral support. The aim

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of this operation was to make an impression on the Serbian extremists through this demonstration of a rejection of violence by so many ordinary citizens, and to force Unprofor [the U.N. Protection Forces] not to remain insensitive to such a convoy. The trip of such an important convoy was intended to serve as a dramatization, to show the unacceptable side of this situation, and to force open a breach, the first open road to Sarajevo.

## **Q:** Do you think you succeeded?

**Dubois:** We only partially succeeded. As far as the organization of such an important convoy and the direct distribution of packages to the population goes, everything went quite well. In Sarajevo, we also succeeded in saying what we had to say personally to the citizens of the capital, thanks to the press conference organized for us by the town. We explained, and this was transmitted by Bosnian television, that we were there to defend the "spirit of Sarajevo"; the city-symbol of multicultural, multireligious life, and of harmony between different components of this nation that used to live in peace.

On the other hand, we were not successful in intimidating the Serbian militias! Drunken madmen fingering their triggers. They robbed six of our trucks on behalf of the "Serbian Red Cross" as they jokingly liked to call it. On the return route, they explicitly showed their anger over our televised interventions and the fact that we had succeeded in bringing in rolls of newsprint for the only newspaper in town, Oslobodenje. [The U.N. High Commission for Refugees had been refusing to allow paper in, because it was not considered "humanitarian aid"—ed.] As for Unprofor, we did not succeed in convincing it to open the breach with us. We received absolutely no official help from it. It is clear that they had received orders to "do nothing." This has been confirmed again with what we have just seen in Srebrenica.

Q: What would be effective in bringing the barbarism in former Yugoslavia to an end, and to the foreseeable consequences it would have on the explosive situation in the countries of the former Soviet Union?

**Dubois:** What should we do? It must be understood that Sarajevo is not in ruins (contrary to what I expected). It is painfully heartbreaking to see the blackened buildings, with the inside stories burned out, but the buildings are standings. Even blackened, peppered with holes, the town is standing. And especially the people are standing in every sense of the word, although they are living on tenuous humanitarian aid. They are fighting to survive—but more than that, they are getting organized for the long term. They are letting it be known that they will not be worn down by a war of attrition. They are forcing the Serbian extremists to act out in the open by their composure. If the Serbians want to take the city, they will be forced to walk over their bodies.

I think, now, we have to act here, wherever we are in

Europe. We have to do some "lobbying." We have to put moral pressure on elected officials, on all those in decisionmaking positions, even on business leaders. At a first pass, we should think through an accounting of each of the sectors, each aspect of daily life in a city. But we have to expect a partnership over the long term. This is not a question of two weeks of emotion and then—fini. We must no longer act on the emotional spur of the moment, but rather find out how to work over the long term.

One small example will give you a sense: One member of the convoy, rather than leave his foreign exchange with his host family for the night, decided to buy several shares in the business belonging to the father of that family—we have to be thinking of expanding this type of procedure.

**Q:** How did other members of the convoy respond to their experience?

**Dubois:** There are people who participated in the convoy and who want to go back to Sarajevo with the trucks. What was possible with a large convoy, one time, would not be a second. It is clear that the Serbian extremists will never let us go a second time. As for the possibility of sending smaller convoys, this does not cohere with the original idea of the Coordination Alsace-Sarajevo. We have always said that we did not want to create one more humanitarian association.

Again, I think it's important not to simply act as a function of personal emotions. What is needed is for prestigious groups to take decisions, not of principles but of action. It can be done from Alsace. In the same manner that concrete actions concerning transportation followed the accords passed by our German and Swiss partners, we can envisage common actions with \$arajevo. The efficiency and know-how we showed in building the universal exposition at Seville . . . we should be able to mobilize to establish joint research programs with the universities in Sarajevo. The university students from Sarajevo should be able to come here and any impediment should cause an diplomatic scandal and provoke a major mobilization. The initiative of Strasbourg Mayor Catherine Trautmann makes good sense. She is attempting to mobilize the Eurocities network in favor of reconstructing Sarajevo. There are already favorable responses and it is possible they could organize a conference of mayors of major European cities in Sarajevo. That would be more important than all the foodstuffs in the world.

Q: There is much speculation about a military intervention. **Dubois:** A military intervention makes no sense unless there is a viable long-term policy which does not rely on the "partition" of Bosnia. The international and moral right of the state of Bosnia-Hercegovina is acknowledged. It is an independent state with its own borders. There can be no solution by means of ethnically based partitioning.

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