LaRouche explains the 'Third Rome' matrix

The following are portions of an Aug. 11 "EIR Talks" radio interview with Lyndon LaRouche, who is a political prisoner because of the role he played in the early 1980s attempt to shift the economic and cultural matrix in the Soviet Union. He was interviewed by Mel Klenetsky.

EIR: Mr. LaRouche, you were discussing the Clinton administration's giving up, in terms of taking control of strategic and foreign policy because of its relationship with Britain and France.

LaRouche: The issue here is, focus on the balance, for example, between the Balkans and what is happening in Russia.

As my wife Helga said, and as I have discussed this with her, it makes no difference what Clinton does to attack the Serbs or not attack them militarily in former Yugoslavia; that what the United States fears will happen in Russia, will happen anyway. . . .

The United States has lost Russia, just as surely as some pro-British meddlers in the State Department and elsewhere back in the late 1940s, gave China to the communists. I don't accept the Joe McCarthy version of that, of course, but there was a very large element of truth in that, that the United States brought the communists to power by supporting British policy on that issue back in the 1940s.

The United States has bungled under George Bush—and Clinton has yet to undo that bungling. George Bush created a situation in which once the Iron Curtain had fallen, instead of opening the world to cooperation and development, and the road to durable peace, through the economic policies of George Soros and others, which the United States and others imposed upon Russia and eastern Europe, the United States has driven Russia into a mood of bitter hostility against the West again.

What is coming back in Russia, is not a communist power, but a Great Russian power—as I warned these guys under the Reagan administration back in 1983 to 1985. I repeatedly warned them: I said, you are going to see the fall of communism, but you are going to see, if you continue these kinds of policies, the danger of the return of Russian power, a thermonuclear power, in the form of a Great Russian/Third Rome government.

That is going to tend to happen anyway; it is too late to simply reverse that. We can only shape, or tend to shape, what that development is at this stage. We have thrown away our options. Bush did the most of it. But the Clinton administration, by failing to act to correct this Bush error, by tolerating the shock therapy, by tolerating George Soros, by not taking action in the Balkans, allowed the Bush program to continue, and that sent us down into this road. . . .

EIR: Mr. LaRouche, the figure of Solzhenitsyn is recently emerging in Russia. He represents a critique of the West, very knowledgeable about the West. He pushes such figures as Stolypin and Dostoevsky. Of course, you have promoted Witte, who represents a different tendency than Stolypin.

Solzhenitsyn claims that the territory of Russia includes not only Russia but Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

What is the difference between what Solzhenitsyn represents, what Stolypin represents, and your view of how Russia has to go in terms of the policies of Count Witte, and what is the significance of this in terms of the strategic breakdown you've just been describing?

LaRouche: There are two aspects to be considered, in respect to what Solzhenitsyn is saying.

First of all, Solzhenitsyn and I have been crossing paths on this since the middle of the 1980s. Solzhenitsyn once made a public statement in a meeting in Washington, stating that I was the only one advising the Reagan administration who seemed to understand the Russian situation. That was in response to my warnings that Russia was headed toward a transition through crisis from Bolshevism

A spring 1993 shift of the West's economic policy toward Russia would also have meant adopting an anti-depression strategy for the crisis-ridden western economies, and even at that late point could have created a historical singularity whose effect would have been to redirect the basic strategic course in Russia—and the West. Sadly, it did not happen, and short of some miracle, the 1989-93 window of opportunity is now closed. Therefore, we have to assume that the global strategic situation in the coming months will be deter-

mined by two fundamental, interacting processes:

- A phase-change in Russia with the emergence of a Great Russian regime, based on a Third Rome matrix, which will try to restore formal or factual domination over all the successor states of the former Soviet Union;
- Dramatic upheavals on the globalized financial derivatives markets.

The two processes are closely interconnected. The IMF shock therapy policies were "exported" to Russia by the same

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to a non-Bolshevik, Third Rome Russian empire.

Solzhenitsyn, of course, is intellectually a literary, not merely a literary but essentially a literary proponent of the Third Rome. That is, he understands the modern literature which shapes those aspects of the Russian culture which tend toward Third Rome; and that is what he is talking about when he talks about Dostoevsky, who is a prime Third Romer, and people like Stolypin.

The issue is this.

The Russians are not being moved today by Stolypin or Dostoevsky. One must not read that in. Those are only symptoms, they are not causes.

The Russians are moving to a Third Rome for reasons I indicated over 10 years ago. The Russians are reacting to certain axiomatic assumptions, which most Russians accept in their bones; and they are reacting to the crisis on the basis of those assumptions. Those assumptions produce results, in terms of policies, which in the mind of the literary observer, correspond to the same kinds of thinking one can read in the diaries of Dostoevsky.

EIR: Mr. LaRouche, you have been talking about the Third Rome. What is the Third Rome, and what are these assumptions that you have been discussing?

LaRouche: Following the collapse of Charlemagne's order in Europe, which occurred as a result of what was called the New Dark Age in European history, that's covering the very late thirteenth century and up to the middle of the fourteenth century, there erupted throughout Europe a policy impulse for the creation of a new Roman Empire, because Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire had sort of taken that place.

This erupted in Russia beginning the middle of the fifteenth century. By about 1510 A.D., a Russian monk by the name of Philotheus of Pskov issued a statement like a prophecy which became the basis for the existence of the czarist government under a number of people of the sixteenth century, including Ivan Grozny, the famous Ivan the Terrible.

This has always been, as Dostoevsky, for example, celebrates it, the conception that Russia will be the third

and the last and everlasting version of a worldwide new Roman Empire. The very title of czar, which is Russian for Caesar, was adopted in the sixteenth century by the princes of Muscovy to identify this Third Rome imperialist thrust deeply embedded axiomatically in Muscovite culture, embedded in the bones of virtually every peasant in Russia while they are attached to this monarchy.

So what has happened, with the collapse of Bolshevism, the failure of Bolshevism from the Russian standpoint, the Russians go back to the axioms which existed before Bolshevism, and which shaped such Bolshevik figures as Stalin. Stalin, for example, was a combination of a Bolshevik and a Third Romer, especially so in the 1930s and 1940s, into the 1950s.

But that's what we're talking about.

The alternative is, what kind of a breakdown, and what kind of a Third Rome are you going to get? Not necessarily a Third Rome Russian Empire, but what kind of a Third Rome Russian government? Are you going to get what Solzhenitsyn represents, a sophisticated version of this kind of thing? Are you going to get an Ivan Grozny, the emergence of figures who remind us of Ivan the Terrible or Stalin in his Third Rome period? Not Bolsheviks, but Great Russians? Or are you going to get something else?

The only choice we have, as a United States or western Europe, is to contribute policy inputs which tend to cause Russians to make a rational choice of what kind of new Russia they are going to put together; and to exercise some tolerance and moderation toward peoples within the former Soviet Union, in the process.

We can do that, if we would dump George Soros and our IMF [International Monetary Fund] conditionalities and free trade, etc., policies. We could take a much more positive policy, by playing up Germany in Europe as the instrument of an international policy, to get some economic development going in all of eastern Europe, and to offer that kind of cooperation to Russia, as opposed to the kind of program which was shoved down Russian throats through Bush and Bush's—as you might say—patsy, the former dictator, Mikhail Gorbachov.

Anglo-American forces who are promoting the vast financial derivatives speculation in the West. Probably even before the end of 1993, the economic and social devastation generated to a large part by IMF shock therapy policies will reach the limits of what is endurable even for the Russian population. The economic breakdown crisis also threatens the political-administrative cohesion of the Russian Federation. Under these domestic conditions, Russia's military-security nomen-klatura is likely to move toward a new regime. I think a direct

replay of August 1991 with tanks rolling through Moscow can be ruled out. The German word Wende [meaning a sudden turn or transformation—ed.], which is used to describe the late-1989 regime changes in eastern Europe, may be more appropriate to characterize what is likely to happen soon in Moscow. Something more quiet, but probably much more efficient than August 1991 should be expected. I think that the dramatic escalation of the institutional crisis in Moscow since mid-July 1993 is the beginning phase of such a Wende.