U.N., Serbia play double game

The continuing attacks against Bihac reveal the U.N. strategy to dismember both Bosnia and Croatia. A report from Faris Nanic.

Faris Nanic, the personal delegate of President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, spoke on Dec. 10 to the Eltville, Germany conference of the International Caucus of Labor Committees and Schiller Institute. The following is edited from his remarks.

It is not easy to speak after Mrs. LaRouche. Still, I'll try to connect some of my thoughts to what has been said earlier. The experiment of this Conservative Revolution *in vivo*, the destruction of the nation-state and depopulation, has been taking place in my country for more than two and a half years.

I do not want to go into too much detail, but there have been 250,000 people killed. More than 30,000 women have been raped—raped as a weapon of the war, as psychological warfare. Over one and a half million people, driven from their homes, are now refugees all over the world—not only in Europe, but all over the world. In that context, the main problem that we are facing is not our ability to defend our selves, not our ability to establish our nation or to defend our population from extermination; the problem—the only one we are facing—is the so-called international community and the instruments such as the United Nations, as a main instrument for denying us the inalienable right to self-defense.

I will try to present you with some description of the latest dramatic events, which were closely watched all over the world: the "pocket" of Bihac in western Bosnia, which was heavily attacked by both the collaborationist quisling Serbs in Bosnia, and the Serbs in Croatia, for the first time. The rules of international law were broken when the illegal rebel authorities on the territory of one sovereign state openly attacked the regular government forces of another sovereign state; Croatia, the state from which the military attack was launched, was forbidden by the international community to act as a sovereign state. It was forbidden to exercise its sovereignty. That was the first thing: In order to prevent Croatia from exercising its sovereignty, and defending its own territory and crushing the illegal rebellion, the U.N.'s "peace mediators" used several methods.

The truth about Bihac

Let me give you a short chronology. At the beginning of July, the Bosnian government forces stationed in the Bihac "pocket" undertook an operation called Tiger Freedom '94,

by which they were able, within just a couple of days, to crush the rebellion by the Muslim leader Fikret Abdic and liberate the whole area. Abdic had been a member of the State Presidency and when he broke away, he took with him 20,000 people from the region of Velika Kladusa, which is almost on the Croatian border. But the international community first interned these 20,000 people, who fled because they were frightened. They interned them in the so-called U.N. Protection Area in Croatia, not allowing them to go anywhere else. These people were then used in the offensive, from this UNPA within Croatia, against the region of Velika Kladusa, which is north of the Bihac pocket.

Then the Serbs rejected the Contact Group's so-called peace plan, which was to divide Bosnia—51% to the federation between Bosnians and Croats and 49% to the rebel Serb authorities in Bosnia—and after the plan had been agreed to under pressure by the Bosnian government, by the Croatian government, by the Bosnians in Bosnia, by the Croatians in Bosnia, the Serbs rejected it. The Contact Group peace plan was a "take it or leave it" plan, one of whose measures was that any side which rejected it would be subjected to various measures; one was to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government, and another was to tighten the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, rump Yugoslavia, which didn't happen.

So, the side which rejected the peace plan was actually rewarded, while the side which accepted the peace plan was punished in a way, because immediately after that, the Bosnian Serb forces of Radovan Karadzic launched the heaviest offensive on the Bihac pocket. In the meantime, the French U.N. peace-keeping battalion stationed in the Bihac region was very quietly withdrawn—no media reports of its withdrawal came out. It was soon replaced by a poorly armed Bangladeshi battalion, who were not trained for winter conditions; 1,200 men with 300 rifles, and that was it.

Then the Serbs started the counterattack, which was heavy. The military goal was transparent, actually. First of all, they meant to disable the Bosnian Army 5th Corps, which is responsible for the area, which is kind of a bridgehead in the backyard of the Krajina, where the Croatian rebel Serbs were; then, by disabling the 5th Corps, the Serbs could disable the legitimate Croatian action to crush the rebellion in their own country. Second, the Serbs wanted control over

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Bosnian President Izetbegovic's representative Faris Nanic: "We have nothing else but to continue fighting, and we will do it; and with the help of our friends, with the help of God, we will win the war."

the Bihac airport and the railway connecting Banja Luka, "capital" of the Bosnian Serb republic in Bosnia, and, via Bihac, Knin, the "capital" of the Croatian Serb republic in Croatia. And third, to revive the Muslim rebel Abdic and his 20,000 refugees within the UNPAs in Croatia, and impose him as a satrap who would be obedient. According to the Croatian former supreme commander, Gen. Antun Tus, the operative plan was made in three steps. First was to recapture the territories already taken by the Bosnian Army, which was mostly done within the first 15 days of the Serb offensive. Actually, the Bosnian Army still controls a reduced territory. Second, to cut off areas under Bosnian Army control, isolate them from one another, and then crush them definitively. At the same time, they intended to create a new refugee crisis in Europe, first in Croatia, to destabilize Croatia, and then, of course, here in Germany or in Austria, or in other countries that are willing to take these refugees.

Tactically, they wanted to establish the conditions internationally whereby, under United Nations protection, they would have demilitarization of the area and then they wouldn't need to fight any more, but they would solve the problem. If the Bosnian Army is disarmed, because that's what demilitarization means, since the Bosnian Army is within the protected areas, the "safe havens," no one will ever be able to disarm the Serbs.

Remember that under the Vance Plan for Croatia, the Serb militia in the UNPA had to be disarmed within a couple

of months after the cease-fire; but not a single rifle has been taken from them. Every agreement that the Croatian Army was forced to sign by the international community—even by the western diplomats, by American policymakers, and (unfortunately, Mrs. LaRouche, I have to say this), even by the German policymakers, simply forces Croatians to demilitarize huge parts of their country. This is what the plan is for Bosnia: to demilitarize the "safe havens" and to create "havens" for the Muslims all over the country, something like the Indian reservations, to create ghettos, actually.

To achieve this tactical goal, you have to have some means to do it, and that was to create the impression that the region was about to fall. Even the defense secretary of the United States, William Perry, said that the Muslims had lost the war. This was also the psychological argument by all those who claim that, not only can the Bosnian government not defend what it has already defended, but even that, should the war be prolonged, then it runs the risk of losing control over whatever small territory it controls.

So it was necessary to invent a trick to make the international actors take the decision for demilitarization in the region. After the Serbian rejection of the initiative, the decision was handed over to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic: Karadzic rejected the peace plan; you accept it. Then the French and British and, of course, the Russians will advocate the lifting or, at least, the easing of the sanctions against Serbia or rump Yugoslavia, without doing anything to punish Karadzic. So the point was: We will lift the sanctions against Serbia and then we will allow Serbia to re-supply Karadzic's forces and the Croatian rebellion. You will have disarmed Bosnia, and lifted the sanctions against Yugoslavia. And this is the aim actually, this is what they want to achieve in order to carry out a new genocide against a disarmed Bosnian people. The problem is that, in a way, both American diplomacy and also the Bosnian government were forced to take some of the steps which actually led directly to escalating the war. You know that recently the American government pulled out from enforcing the arms embargo in the Adriatic. It was a clear sign, but then the American ambassador to the U.N., Mrs. Madeleine Albright, was convinced by the British and French to delay raising the question of lifting the arms embargo, either in consultation with the Security Council or unilaterally. Mr. Clinton asked President Izetbegovic to accept this delay for six months, which he did. But when the consultations within the Security Council were initiated by Mrs. Albright, then the French said: "Oh no, we don't want anything to do with it. We don't want to hear it. It's not a deal." At the same time, the total humanitarian blockade was imposed on Bihac; out of 400 convoys, only 12 got through. People ran out of food, the people ran out of everything. So, the Bosnian Army was forced to do something.

And while the French and the British were playing the game of supporting Milosevic, the Serbian regime forced its quislings in Bosnia to accept the peace plan. How? By

promising that under the auspices of the French, British, and, of course, Russian governments, they could confederate with Serbia—which has nothing to do with the peace plan. However, the Serbs did not figure that the Bosnian Army would resist to the extent it did, and, actually, the Serb offensive failed. So now, it was necessary for the international community to give a hand to the Serbs, and [U.N. Secretary General Boutros] Boutros-Ghali launched a wide-scale new initiative to disarm all the safe havens, not only Bihac, but also Sarajevo, three enclaves in East Bosnia which are occupied by the Serbs, and Tuzla, the main industrial center, which is still producing because it is not surrounded. This industrial potential—what was left of it in Bosnia—is still working, and now they want to cut this link, too. What frightens me most right at this moment is that this initiative will be on the agenda of the new round of the diplomatic talks, right after the failure of the Serbian offensive on Bihac, and there will be strong pressure for us to accept it in order to avoid further humanitarian blackmail by the U.N.

The British control media reports

But the problem was not only the U.N.: The problem was also the media. Right before the Serb offensive on Bihac there was no-not a single one-foreign correspondent in the region. Very interesting; they had always been there, but not then. Except one, the correspondent for the British Reuters news agency, who was on the Serb side, whose reports, of course, always cited Serb sources, giving them credibility. The Reuters wires are read all over the world, and they are considered reliable because they are Reutersnot some Bosnian agency, but Reuters—so they are reliable, they speak the truth. The only U.N. spokesmen who were allowed to make official statements on behalf of Unprofor [the U.N. Protection Forces] in Bosnia were: Tim Spicer and Thomas Hewitt in Sarajevo; Paul Risley and Sir Michael Williams in Zagreb; and Alan Roberts in Knin. All of them are of British nationality. From the very beginning of the Serb offensive, there was a constant disinformation and denial campaign by the U.N. spokesmen and U.N. sources.

Then there is the U.N.'s Colonel Lemierre, apparently a French Canadian, who was in charge in Bihac; this is also very interesting, because the Bangladeshi battalion which was stationed there after the withdrawal of the French battalion, also has a Canadian commander. This Colonel Lemierre was always negotiating with the Serbs. The mayor of Bihac, Hamdija Kabiljagic, said that only after he was very persistent for three months, did he get the map of the safe haven drawn up by the U.N. in which the city's main water supply system and the main electrical power system were excluded. When that finally came out, the U.N. said that the map would be changed, but at the same time Reuters reported that the water supply and electric supply systems were captured by the Serbs, which was not true. So there seems to be strong cooperation between the U.N. forces in the field, their commanders

in New York or Geneva, and many of the supposedly independent media and the western governments, unfortunately.

We now face the oncoming winter, and the purely diplomatic problem—there will not be any major military assaults and operations—is how to withstand the pressure from the U.N. "peace negotiators," David Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg, and others who want to disarm our country. I would like to make one more point: The U.N. forces in Bosnia—the French, British, Dutch, Turkish, Malaysian—are deployed only in the regions controlled by the Bosnian Army. There is not one single U.N. soldier deployed in the region controlled by the Bosnian rebel Serbs.

Sandbagging Croatia

After achieving the disarming of Bosnia, the only thing left for the international diplomats to do is to restrain Croatia. In the middle of the crisis, the Croatian President went to South America to play tennis with Argentina's President. He stated that openly. "What did you do today, Mr. President?" "Well, I played a game of tennis with Mr. Menem." At a time when the Croatian Parliament is strongly demanding that something be done in Bihac, because if Bihac falls, then the whole pocket will definitely fall, and then the Croatian Serb-controlled territory will link up with the Bosnian Serb-controlled territory, which is already linked with Yugoslavia, and that is the goal of the Greater Serbia project.

However that session in Parliament was forcibly shut down when the microphone and TV cameras were turned off, after the Parliament vice president, a member of the ruling party, declared, "I can't keep discipline in the chamber, so I'm shutting down the session." So, the most vital question for the survival of Croatia was interrupted. Why? Because, at the time, the Croatian government had been given a lollipop, an economic agreement with the rebel Serbs in Croatia. And they accepted it. The terms of agreement are still not generally known to the Croatian public, but from what we have heard so far, it is a disaster: Croatia will refrain from exercising its sovereignty. The U.N. will be authorized to control the trucks, the trains, all vehicles that go through the capital, Zagreb, which is not a center of Serb rebellion.

As Mr. Izetbegovic said at the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] conference in Budapest a couple of days ago, we can do nothing else but continue the fight, and we will do it. The message was given to our friends, all over the world, the message was given to you, the members of the Schiller Institute, who were among our first friends and supporters from the very beginning. But the message has been given to our enemies, who are now more obviously open than ever, unfortunately: the governments of Britain, France, and Russia. That's what we have to say, that's what we have to recognize, because that's what we have to prepare our people for. We have nothing else but to continue fighting and we will do it; and with the help of our friends, with the help of God, we will win the war.

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