

raped at the camps or were taken from the detention centers and raped or otherwise sexually abused at other locations.

- *the targeting of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities*, and in particular their political leaders, intellectuals, and professionals.

- *the deportation of thousands of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians* from the areas of Slasenica, Prijedor, Bosanski Sarnac, Brcko, and Foca, including women, children, and elderly persons who were taken directly from their homes.

- *the shelling of civilian gatherings* in Sarajevo (1992, 1993, 1994), Srebrenica (1993), and Tuzla (1995) in order to kill, terrorize and demoralize the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations.

- *the appropriation and plunder of real and personal property* of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians.

- *the persecution of civilians*, including the systematic destruction of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat homes and businesses in order to insure that the inhabitants could not and would not return to their homes and communities.

- *the systematic damaging and/or destruction of sacred sites*, both Muslim and Roman Catholic.

B. War crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention

The acts and omissions involved are:

- the unlawful confinement of civilians in detention facilities, and outrages upon the personal dignity of the detainees

- the deliberate attacks on the civilian population
- the destruction or willful damage to religious institutions

- the extensive destruction of property
- the appropriation and plunder of public and private property

2. Sarajevo sniping campaign

Throughout the siege of Sarajevo there has been a systematic campaign of deliberate targeting of civilians by snipers of the Bosnian Serb military, and their agents. Since April 1992, a substantial number of civilians have been killed or wounded.

The deliberate attack on the civilian population is a *violation of the laws or customs of war*.

The killing and the wounding by sniper fire on these civilians is a *crime against humanity*.

3. U.N. hostages and human shields

Between 26 May 1995 and 2 June 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel under the direction and control of **Radovan Karadzic** and **Ratko Mladic** seized 284 U.N.-peacekeepers in many locations, and between 26 May and 19 June 1995, they selected certain U.N.-hostages for use as "human shields."

Radovan Karadzic and **Ratko Mladic** are charged with *violations of the laws or customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention*.

Proven: The Cali Cartel put Samper in the Presidency

by Our Special Correspondent

Colombian President Ernesto Samper Pizano, fast on his way to becoming ex-President, is having a rough time pretending that reality doesn't exist. Colombia's Prosecutor General, the state security bodies, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration have in their possession mountains of documents, and, now, key witnesses, which prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Samper was put in power thanks to the multimillion-dollar contributions which the Cali Cartel gave his 1994 electoral campaign.

Tacitly acknowledging that his campaign did, in fact, receive drug monies, Samper went on national television on July 27 to insist: "Colombians may rest assured that if any filtering of [drug] money is proven, it happened behind my back." The same day, he sent a letter to the Investigations and Accusations Commission of the House of Representatives, the only body which can judge a President, requesting that the commission obtain from the Prosecutor General's office all evidence which it might have on him, and conduct its own investigation.

Samper gave that speech because, the day before, the treasurer of his 1994 presidential campaign, Santiago Medina, had been arrested. Medina had received some 15 billion pesos (\$20 million) in cash and checks from the Cali Cartel, for Samper's campaign. Samper won the election on June 19 by a slim margin of 1%—a squeaker victory in which the cartel's "contributions" were crucial.

The Prosecutor General ordered Medina's arrest because he could not explain, in a previous interrogation, why he had received a check for 40 million pesos (\$46,000) written by a Cali Cartel front-company, nor why this check had been used to pay expenses for Samper's campaign. According to well-informed sources, however, the Prosecutor General has now documented that the campaign conducted at least 500 million pesos (\$575,000) never recorded in its official books. To Samper's dismay, Medina, caught red-handed, decided to cooperate, and on July 28, detailed to prosecutors how the drug monies were handled by the campaign, and handed over additional documentation that proved that part of the campaign's funds were kept in a secret account in Chase Manhattan Bank in New York. That account was used not only for monies from drug-traffickers, but also for funds supplied by various multinational companies which, by law,

are prohibited from giving money to finance electoral campaigns. Fernando Botero Zea, Samper's defense minister until Aug. 2, was Samper's campaign manager in 1994 and one of those who handled the secret account.

Nor did the campaign staff receive drug monies behind Samper's back. Medina told prosecutors that Samper had been a friend from way back of the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers, Miguel and Gilberto, the *jefes maximos* of the Cali Cartel, and that Medina had met twice with the Cali traffickers to request and receive money from them—on orders from Samper and Botero. On one occasion, he personally received at his house, several boxes, packed in wrapping paper, filled with cash sent by the drug-traffickers. Botero made the decisions on how the money was to be distributed.

Samper's promises to the cartel

In one of the meetings with the traffickers, Medina presented them with a list of five points which Samper promised to carry out as President, in exchange for the money. Samper, according to Medina's sworn statement, committed himself to negotiating sentence reductions with the drug-traffickers; to backing the previous Prosecutor General, Gustavo de Greiff, a promoter of drug-legalization; and to doing everything in his power "so that this [confrontation between the state and traffickers] comes to the best possible conclusion."

Medina detailed how he received the green light to accept the monies for Samper himself, mediated through Horacio Serpa Uribe, Samper's current interior minister, then head of political debate for the campaign, and through Botero.

These explosive revelations, backed by documents in the hands of Colombian prosecutors, confirm what *EIR* has charged for 16 years: that Ernesto Samper Pizano is a spokesman for the drug-traffickers, and his goal for decades has been the legalization of narcotics. Just after Samper was elected in July 1994, *EIR's* *Feature* story, "Dope Mob Buys Colombian Presidency" (July 15, 1994), caused many Samper supporters to revile *EIR*. *EIR's* offices in Bogotá were the targets of a series of security incidents, including multiple telephone threats.

The campaign of intimidation against *EIR* in Bogotá has not ended. On Aug. 3, an individual with a Cali accent phoned the home of *EIR* correspondent Javier Almarino Almarino and said: "You all are going to pay for writing all that bulls—t."

Institutions must be defended

How did Samper's government, then, become one of the most effective ever *against* the drug trade? After Samper won the elections, the U.S. government of William Clinton let Samper know that they knew of his drug connections, but made him an offer he couldn't refuse: They were prepared to grant him "a clean slate," provided that his government took on the drug trade. Pressures were applied, such that the only way Samper could continue as President, was by going after

the Cali Cartel. Thus, it fell to Samper to dismantle the very criminal organizations which put him in office, and for whom he had worked for years.

Five of the seven kingpins of the Cali Cartel, responsible for sending 80% of the cocaine and much of the heroin consumed in the United States, are today in jail. Samper's government, squeezed between the power of the cartels and the power of the United States, allowed anti-drug forces to act, while stalling on reforming the legal system of plea-bargaining and light sentences which the cartel had bought for themselves under the previous government of President César Gaviria (now secretary general of the Organization of American States).

But inexorably, the campaign against the cartel brought to light the devastating proof of Samper's own close ties to that cartel. The evidence on Samper and his team has now overwhelmed any that hope that Samper et al. may have had that they could hang onto power, by turning on their former owners. U.S. Vice President Al Gore's July 25 praise for Samper and his defense minister, Botero, as "brave" anti-drug fighters, delivered in his keynote speech to the Defense Ministers of the Western Hemisphere, gathered in Williamsburg, Virginia for a two-day summit, proved ill-timed, as the cascade of evidence revealed in the days following has brought both men to the point of going to jail, on charges of taking drug monies.

Botero and Serpa had been prepared to take the rap for Samper, in order to save his Presidency. As of this writing, however, Botero is under investigation by the Prosecutor General's office for his handling of the parallel accounts of the Samper campaign; Samper's campaign treasurer is in jail; the Prosecutor's office is expected to request that the Supreme Court investigate Communications Minister Armando Benedetti, on charges of taking drug money; and Interior Minister Serpa is under investigation for obstruction of justice, accused of threatening Medina that he had better not implicate the President or his ministers in his statements to authorities. Serpa is also being investigated, on suspicion that the July 29 theft of the affidavit of Medina's confessions to authorities, was ordered by Serpa and Botero, while the head of the DAS (the equivalent of the FBI), Ramiro Bejarano, has been accused of illegally visiting Medina in jail, also of threatening him to keep quiet. The Prosecutor General's office has now sent copies of the evidence against the President to the Congressional Accusations Committee, for it to judge.

Events have overwhelmed the strategy of those in Washington and Bogotá who had believed that Samper should be kept in office, in order to maintain the appearance of institutional stability. As long as Samper remains in the Presidency, Colombia is de facto without a government, as the President has lost all legitimacy before the nation. Events must rapidly take another course, including the possible annulling of the drug-rigged 1994 presidential elections.