

Why mankind must create a community of peoples based on natural law

by Helga Zepp LaRouche

On Dec. 3, 1995, Schiller Institute founder Helga Zepp LaRouche addressed an international conference of the institute, convened in the city of Eltville, Germany. An edited transcript of her speech follows; subheads have been added.

As Lyndon LaRouche described in great detail yesterday, we are faced with the situation in which the whole world, and, as part of this whole world, in particular we here in Europe, are, very clearly, presently on a suicide course. If you look at the policies of the different governments, it is obvious that all of them, to different degrees, are unconcerned with the common good of their nations, the *bonum commune*, and that their activities, in recent decades, have switched to what one could clearly call the *malum commune*, the common evil. The governments have, to different degrees, policies which, if continued, clearly will lead to the destruction of their nations.

Neil Kinnock, the former leader of the British Labour Party and now a representative of the European Commission, just this week made a statement in which he said that the policies of the European Union are, on the one side, to uphold the possibility of enlargement to include other members, especially from the East, in it, and then, on the other side, not doing enough to make this feasible, had created the worst of both worlds. This is a typical case of British understatement, because the present policies of the European Union are indeed the worst of *all* possible worlds, and I mean this very much in the sense of Leibniz.

This is because these governments are doing the exact opposite of what the best of all worlds requires. There is no clearer symbol for this, than the Maastricht Treaty, which has created an automatic austerity mechanism which will lead inexorably to the death of all nations of Europe. If Maastricht is continued, then the conditions of Europe will degenerate into those existing before the emergence of the nation-state. In a generation or less, the population levels will drop worldwide to a couple of million people and we will have feudalism of one kind or another, and in a generation we could have a collapse of civilization—a society which would go to hell, in which every value associated with European civilization would be gone. Already now, it's not so difficult to imagine that, if things continue as they are, soon there will be no Classical music; Classical poetry will be completely

forgotten; education for everybody, a question of the past; human rights, elections, health care, the welfare social system—all these ideas can vanish. And what will be left is a reduced population of insane, crazy people, armed gangs, mafias, people just in total chaos.

Maastricht basically already has begun to be applied. It gives a supranational European government, more and more power, and, if not overturned, is forcing the national governments more and more to implement austerity, thus eliminating their power as sovereign nation-states. Eventually, you will have citizens without any representation. We are much closer to this than people think. Already now, through the Maastricht Treaty, the European governments have lost all influence on economic policy, credit policy, trade policy, and budget policy. The European Commission is not accountable to any government or parliament; it is even forbidden for this supranational bureaucracy to take advice. As we warned when this treaty was signed, Articles 104, 104a, 105a, forbid explicitly any dirigist credit-creation for anti-depression measures.

Nations disintegrate

You should note what that means: Take the case of Italy. Right now, because of the Maastricht Treaty, the government is absolutely forbidden to do anything for the economic development of the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy), where there is 15% to 20% unemployment. Fifty percent of all youth in this region are unemployed. And, according to Maastricht, the Italian government is forbidden to do anything to change that. If this continues, then the collapse of Italy as a nation as it is right now—again, this is aggressively pushed by the Lega Nord—is not a question of the distant future. This is obviously the reason why the Pope, when he gave his speech in Palermo (Sicily), made a passionate appeal to keep the unity of Italy.

How long will France last, with the present policy? Lyndon LaRouche spoke yesterday, of the hysterical denial of reality by this government. Under the pressure to conform with Maastricht, French President Jacques Chirac reversed all his election promises and is destroying his own government in implementing the policies of former Finance Minister Alain Madelin, whom he had kicked out only a couple of months ago. The French government is doing this because,



French workers are striking against the austerity demands of the Maastricht Treaty, which the French government is foolishly trying to enforce. Shown here: Striking railwaymen at a rally on Dec. 6 in Caen, France. The banner reads, "Save and develop public services."

they claim that next year the social security system of France will be bankrupt. That may be true, but if Maastricht prevails, it will be bankrupt and there will be catastrophic consequences for the entire French nation. One can say that Maastricht has become the synonym for the *malum commune*, the common evil. And it must go.

Look at other situations. Lithuania: Sure, there are still hospitals in which people can be treated, but there is no food for the patients, and if a patient does not have relatives to bring food from the village or the city, the patient has no food. In the United States: Sure, there are still operations being practiced, but instead of a hospital stay of about eight days after an operation, now people are being sent home the same day. They get good, cheap advice about how to have a relative watch over them so that no complications occur.

This all gives you a foretaste of what could happen, if we have an unprepared, unprevented monetary disintegration of the entire system in 48 to 72 hours. Nothing would work any more, and millions and millions of people would die, as a consequence. From that standpoint, the Maastricht Treaty is criminal, because it prevents governments from taking preemptive measures.

Look at other places. Already now, the International Monetary Fund policies in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe have thrown 75 million people into grinding poverty, and these are very moderate figures from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and similar official

institutions. That is about as many people as live in Germany today. In Poland, in Hungary, 8% are below the poverty level. In Romania, in Bulgaria, it is 35%. In Russia, 60%, according to the ILO, are living below the poverty level. In Moscow alone, 60,000 youth are homeless. I think that so far, and this counts only up through November, 200 people have died in the cold in Moscow, as a result of homelessness. The life expectancy in Russia has dropped to 56 years for males, which is lower than that in Pakistan.

Mounting strategic threat

This is clearly the result of the policies of Bush and Thatcher, and one should listen very carefully, when Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, in a recent op-ed in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, said that right now, as a consequence of these policies, there is a population reduction in Russia of 1 million people per year, and that only one-third of newborn babies are even half-way healthy when they are born. Now that means, that two-thirds of all newborn babies are sick. I think it makes very clear, that if the present policies are not changed, Russia is a dying nation. Lebed gave these figures, and said that during the worst years of World War II, namely, in 1941-42, the GNP in Russia collapsed 34%. But from 1992 to 1995, the GNP collapsed by 43%—worse than in the Second World War. Lebed stressed, that for a certain time, people adapt to extreme situations. But if the perspective is that their whole life will be extreme, then this will lead to

desperation and aggressivity.

Already now, we see that there are many political forces in Russia and elsewhere who blame the West. Who could blame them? The West *did* betray the East. Lebed warned, that if there were a NATO expansion under these conditions, the only answer Russia could have, would be a new military alliance, to be based again on nuclear deterrence. Others are portraying NATO as the new existential threat to Russia. It is clear how we could quickly get into a very dangerous dynamic.

There was a lot of concern in Italy, Germany, and other places in Europe, that when the Chirac government came into office and started the French nuclear tests, this was done in anticipation of dangerous developments in Russia. At a recent press conference in Madrid, French Defense Minister Hervé de Charrette told [EIR correspondent] Muriel Mirak-Weissbach, in answer to her question about the consequences of the free market economy having destroyed the East, that this was only our opinion, and that in European history there was allegedly no example of *étatisme* (statism) and dirigism leading to an improvement of the economy.

This insanity illustrates the problem. The current French government would rather prepare, in anticipation of a possible war, their own military arsenal, than change economic policy! They would rather have the entire country of France being torn apart, and pretend this crisis doesn't exist, than change the economics.

Look at what is happening with the so-called reemergence of communism in the East. As Lyn has emphasized, we are really not looking at communism in the old form. As the new Polish President, Alexander Kwasniewski, said in making the point that he was not really a communist: When he was in the government of Jaruzelski in the 1970s, there were already then very few communists in Poland, but lots of technocrats, opportunists, and liberals. This happens to be the truth, and it is all the more true today. Communism in the old form is dead. It collapsed, because of the axioms it had. But the problem was, that since the opposition to communism totally discredited itself, because it was associated with the free market economy, now, people who used to be in the power structure, old careerists, are coming to power and they are coming back.

It is the same phenomenon as in East Germany with the PDS, or in Hungary, Slovakia, Poland. Many times, these are not communists, but gangsters. The problem we have with [new German Social Democratic Party head] Oskar Lafontaine and Gregor Gysi [head of the parliamentary caucus of the PDS, which replaced the East German communist party] is not so much that they have a clear ideology. If you read the scribblings of Lafontaine, they are an eclectic mixture of praising Bertrand Russell, Kissinger, Marcuse, and various other Frankfurt School authors. The problem is, that Gysi and Lafontaine are making a power move, and they are calculating that if they have 30 to 40% in different states,

then this eventually will be sufficient to take power in all of Germany.

The problem is that the British oligarchy, right now, is playing all sides. They play the Conservative Revolution; this is still in place—the idea of total austerity, fascist dictatorships. But then, their tools, like Gingrich, don't function so well, and therefore they are building up other alternatives at the same time, such as the idea of a Fabian left based on the ideas of Russell and H.G. Wells. You have a whole emergence of the so-called New Left—Lafontaine, Gysi, Blair, Kwasniewski—who fit this profile. But, unfortunately, the British also play the nationalists in many countries, by simple doing exactly the same thing as they did during the Gulf War with the Arab world. In the case of Europe, they are using the map of Yalta and Versailles to play on nationalism and particularism, which can be equally dangerous.

After the monetary system collapses

What is the situation we confront? The monetary system will collapse, and nothing will stop it except the kind of reorganization measures we propose. The problem with Maastricht is in this context. States which stick to Maastricht cannot, by law, join with the United States in these kind of reorganization measures. With Maastricht in existence, eastern Europe has no chance and will fall back into wilderness, and many nations of eastern Europe will disappear. Maybe, at some point, there will be some feudal rule by Moscow, but also many West European nations will be thrown into chaos. The problem is, that all existing structures are doomed, and the politicians associated with these structures are really dinosaurs, prehistoric creatures who are of interest only from the standpoint of an archaeological museum.

The much more fundamental question is this: If an epoch is coming to an end, and not in the distant future, but *now*, what is called modern times is ending. The question is: What has to replace it, in order to avoid a total catastrophe?

Leibniz, in his *New Essays On Human Understanding*, made a very prophetic statement. He warned about the catastrophic consequences it would have, if British nominalism were one day to have hegemony in the world. And that is clearly the case today. Those infected by these empiricist opinions, who are following their bestial inclinations, he says, are seducing the minds of others. If they are ambitious, they can bring fire to the four corners of the world. The danger would be, that such opinions could also, step by step, get into the minds of those who govern and on whom things depend. Under those conditions, the public spirit would disappear quickly, and the rulers would make fun of those who care for their nations. In the end, they would suffer the same evil they were seeking for others, and a necessary subsequent revolution would heal the people.

I think he must have been talking approximately about

our time today. We have reached the end of this epoch, and all the axioms associated with these opinions will be swept away. But what do we need instead? A positive solution, and this has been my conviction for at least 15 years, and it becomes deeper as time goes by, can be found only if the political order is established on the basis of the order of Creation, on the laws of the universe, on the basis of a universal moral law. This universal moral law is what has been called, since Plato, natural law—resulting out of the nature of existence. How can natural law be intelligible? The idea of natural law is based on the assumption that there *is* a natural order, and that this order is intelligible, and that human beings must bring their actions into cohesion with that order.

In Classical Greece, the idea of an ontological foundation of morality, that ethics must be connected with the nature of being, was a common idea. Indeed, it is one of the pillars of modern civilization. Plato first formulated this idea. He is the father of the Classical teaching of natural law. He noted the undeniable fact, that human beings are capable of knowing the idea of the Good, which is the basis for knowing natural law.

Augustinus stated the same idea from a Christian standpoint: that God has created the universe according to a well thought-out concept, which is an order based on reason. These well thought-out laws of the creation of the world, from then on were called *lex aeterna*, eternal law. The created world, nature, is an ordered system of existences, which is developing. Man, who is part of this creation, can participate in and know this order, and recognize how he should behave in it. Insofar as man participates in the eternal law, it is called natural law.

All philosophers in the Platonic-Augustinian tradition attributed to man this ability to know the Good, deducible from natural law, and they called this ability to know it, *recta ratio* or *bona mens* or *lumen naturale* or *lumen internum*, as Leibniz called it.

But, even if there was a distortion of the natural law conception through Luther, Calvin, and Hugo Grotius, it was Hobbes, but especially John Locke, who launched a total attack on this idea. Locke really represents the watershed. From there on, there developed a whole series of epistemologies, which are no longer compatible with natural law. For Locke's empiricism, the foundation of morality and law in an ontological order is impossible, because the verification principle does not apply.

According to Locke, it is impossible to say anything meaningful about being, about essence, about existence, since being as a whole cannot be the object of experience. For this reason, one can say nothing about the natural order of existence. One cannot have any verifiable knowledge about it, and therefore there is no criterion to judge, if a human action is according to the natural order or not. This is the crux of the matter. That is essentially the entire argument

of all the different modern epistemological varieties against natural law. Nobody has come up with a more convincing argument than that.

By the same token, the argument goes, from the standpoint of presently accepted science mythologies, i.e., classroom mathematics, neither the idea of the ontological order of the universe, nor the deducible idea of a moral behavior following such an order, is determinable. Also, it is impossible to say anything definite about *the* nature of man. There is nothing universal about man; there is only the concrete individual.

The oligarchical standpoint

From an oligarchical view, the benefit of the rejection of knowable natural law is obvious. If there is no knowable common good, there is no knowable common good for society or for the community of people. Calvin was blatant enough to just declare the right to steal to be natural law, to justify his looting. But Locke's empiricism was really a much more fundamental attack on the axiomatic achievements of the Renaissance idea of the modern nation-state. The common good was no longer knowable, and obviously what you don't know, you don't have to serve.

The next step, then, was Hume and his infamous Hume's Verdict. According to Hume, from any existence, one cannot deduce obligations. Karl Rahner, who is still appreciated by certain forces in the church, in 1955 really said nothing other than that one could not deduce any binding laws out of empirical data. There is no moral obligation following out of that.

But the proponents of natural law are not without their own problems. It becomes problematic, if the definition of what is the common good according to natural law does not start from the totality of mankind, but tries to define so-called non-negotiable core positions, *bona particularia*, related to marriage, family values, rights of parents, and so forth. There is nothing wrong if these values are *also* considered, but it becomes very dangerous if these are the only relevant ones, as you can see today in the Christian Right in Europe or in the CDU/CSU [the ruling Christian Democratic party] in Germany. In the United States, the Christian Right has no problem with supporting Oliver North, George Bush, and similar evil people.

The question of verification is indeed a crucial question, from which to start. Lyn, in his paper about his own discovery,¹ has made a rather remarkable statement, which I really wish would be taken up by the economists of this world to be debated, because it touches upon the absolute revolution of his work. Up until the conceptual breakthrough Lyn made in the field of physical economics, one could only have approximations in the verification of epistemological truth, so there was no way to say, with scientific precision, whether something was true or not.

But, as Lyn has demonstrated in all of his work, the experimental proof lies in the existence of man. The only

way man can know the laws of the universe is through an increase of power to command the universe. The ontological characteristic of this is creative reason. The only way it manifests itself is through those fundamental discoveries in natural science and Classical art that lead to an increase in the potential population density, which is the measurement of man's power over the universe.

That is the closest approximation of a proof there is. The truth lies in the method of discovery, not in the empirical reality. The reality lies in *the change*, as Heraclitus had already said. The fact that the cognitive processes are efficient in the physical universe, touches upon what Leibniz searched for all his life, the *characteristicum universalis*. This *characteristicum universalis* also leads to a method of how to distinguish truth from falsehood. This is crucial: How do we differentiate between knowable truth, and mere opinions? If we don't have a criterion to decide that, there is no way we can talk to each other.

If this is the end of an epoch and all the axioms of current opinion are swept away, how do we find a language by which we can communicate with each other, and how can we establish ideas, which are truthful? This is a problem every serious thinker dealt with. For example, Confucius in the fifth century B.C., in a dialogue with his student Dsi-Lu, said the following: Dsi-Lu came to Confucius and said, "The prince of We wants to talk to you. He wants to govern with your help. What should he do first?"

Confucius answered, "First, he must bring his conceptions into order." "What," said Dsi-Lu, "You are not speaking about the core of the matter." Confucius: "How cultureless you are, Dsi-Lu! An intelligent man does not speak about that of which he knows nothing. When the conceptions are not in order, the language is not in cohesion with the truth of things. When the language is not in cohesion with the truth of things, then people do not fulfill their tasks well. When people do not fulfill their tasks well, then the customs and the arts are not flourishing. When the customs and the arts are not flourishing, then the rulers will not be just. When the rulers are not just, then the population does not know what to do. Therefore, an intelligent man wants his language to be precise and clear. The intelligent man regards it as important, that everything in his language is precise and clear."

So, if we want to get rid of flawed axioms of culture, which are the reason why this society is doomed, we have to do what Plato did in his dialogues. We have to do what Socrates did—to attack the underlying assumptions, to establish reason. We have to create paradoxes. For example, like the famous sentence by Socrates: "I know (with absolute certainty), that I know nothing (with absolute certainty)."

Leibniz had the same concern. He accused the empiricists of using defective conceptions, out of which follows nothing. For example, Newton's term of an absolute empty space is such a notion out of which follows nothing, because it's not a precise idea, as compared to the idea of a *monad*, an idea

expressing already the whole of the universe, as it is.

The same concern guided the pope in his speech on the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, in which he stressed that we must find a way to discuss the future of man in an understandable language.² He said that the universal moral law which is written in the hearts of man is a kind of grammar, which the world needs, in order to begin discussing its own future. It is interesting, by the way, that the pope takes the search for freedom—which he says is one of the great powers of motion in the history of mankind and which is manifest today in every corner of the world—as a reflection of the existence of this universal moral law, and of the universal character of man.

Nikolaus of Cusa

What, therefore, could be such a grammar, with the help of which we can discuss the common future of mankind? We must find the philosophical common denominator which unites mankind, over and above all differences and apparently hardened prejudices of the different peoples against each other. Let's look at the ideas of two thinkers who were both filled with passionate love for the idea of a community of peoples.

For Nikolaus of Cusa, the community of peoples was only one aspect of the problem which he worked on the most throughout his whole life, namely the old Parmenides problem, the relation between the One and the Many. On the one side, the different peoples and nations are an expression of the multiplicity of creation, but they do have an individual character or essence, to which a transcendental representation corresponds. For Nikolaus, the peoples have as much natural and inalienable rights as do individuals.

Peoples must be respected politically, but also united together in a universal unity. This is possible, says Nikolaus, because of the *spiritus universorum*, the universal spirit which works in everything created. In the *De Docta Ignorantia*, he says that the whole, the universe, as the most complete, precedes the order of nature. So that everything can be in everything, *quod libet in quo libet*.

Peoples and nations are elements of particularization, but their unity exists before their differentiation. And, he says, totality means universality, the unity in plurality. Concordance in the macrocosm can only exist if there is a maximum development of all microcosms. Each nation must relate to each other, like the members of a family, and wish the best development of the other. The differentiation of the unity is necessary, as a matter of fact, welcomed.

All beings, and therefore also all peoples and all nations, are supposed to develop their particularities to the maximum, but they should not do it by closing themselves off from one another but, on the contrary, by realizing this great general unity. Any progress in knowledge, any new scientific advance, accomplished by one nation, should immediately be made available to all others. Any cultural gap between them

should be immediately remedied.

In 1454, in a sermon for the Feast of Epiphany, Nikolaus gave what has been termed a tremendous eulogy of civilization. With total excitement, he called the existence of the free and mechanical art the great donation to mankind. In the fourth book of the *Idiota* dialogues, he makes an appeal for the systematic collaboration of scientists, anticipating a similar call by Leibniz.

In his experiments with the scale, he aims to found a better medicine; he develops a way to measure the specific weight of metals, to measure magnetism, to predict weather

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patterns and to measure the depths of the oceans. All of these he sees as contributing to the common good of humanity. He ends with a passionate appeal to the great leaders of the world to create scientific and technological institutions for international cooperation, so that all the discoveries are collected so that we can find many still hidden things and discover them more easily. The fact that scientists and artists of all fields exist in each nation makes it possible for them to communicate easily, he says.

He also stresses the idea of consensus and representation. The representative system, in which the representatives are obliged to represent the common good, these laws require extensive consultations, even daily, as he demands in *Concordantia Catholica*.

In the context of his U.N. speech, the pope demanded a new U.N. charter to define the rights of nations, an equivalent to the charter on human rights. While many of the conceptions in the original charter of human rights are noble, the reality of the United Nations, what they did in Bosnia, in Rwanda, and many other places around the world, has shown that they have moved totally away from the original idea. The reason the United Nations, the European Union, and similar institutions do not function, is that, from the beginning, they were not based on metaphysical convictions and contained no clear definition of the common good. For Nikolaus, this metaphysical foundation existed, and it led him to a most interesting conception, the discovery of what nowadays would be called the “biogenetic fundamental law.”

Crucial to this method is the double concept, *complicatio explicatio*. To illustrate this polarity, several examples from nature and mathematics are used by him.

In the *Docta Ignorantia*, he uses the point and the line as well as the mathematical number One. The line, the plane, and the cube unfold progressively out of the indivisible point, which includes those, not in a quantitative way, but in the highest simplicity (*complicat*). The number one unfolds out of itself the successive series of numbers. These are, therefore, already in the One in a complicative way. Concerning creation, these examples are supposed to be metaphors for God the Creator, the absolute One, Who develops out of Himself the ordered multiple manifold of created things in the universe.

In *De Coniecturis*, Nikolaus applies his conception of *complicatio-explicatio* to the inner complexity of the universe in such a way that the respective higher unit, being more potent in its being but more simple in its essence, includes the subsequent, more complex, but weaker unit as roots, so to speak, and unfolds this multiplicity out of itself. For the absolute *complicatio*, Nikolaus also uses the concept *coincidentia oppositorum* (the coincidence of opposites).

The idea of a Christian evolutionism

Nikolaus combines the idea of creation and development, into what is really the idea of a Christian evolutionism. Only that can unfold which virtually already exists, but in greater simplicity and in richer existence. What unfolds is the efficacy, the *Wirkkraft*, which proceeds from the highest, the divine, to the lower, weaker in its essence; it is a *descensus*, a descent.

The modern notion of evolution thinks in terms of an ascent, of an upward motion, the evolution of something higher out of the lower, from the more primitive to the more complete forms of life. Then, *progressio* does not mean *descensus*, but an ascending progress. So, in what sense does Nikolaus speak about a biological evolution in the modern sense?

In the first two books in the *Docta Ignorantia*, he speaks clearly about the unfolding of the divine unity into an ordered system of multitude, which he sees as the “world soul,” the unfolding of the divine spirit and as the complicative principle which orders the entire multitude of things to one unity in the universe. He sees the “world soul” as *necessitas complexionis*; everything is rolled up in a ball, a cue, which, in the course of history, unfolds in space and time.

But, Nikolaus also describes, in *De Coniecturis*, how the creaturelikeness ascends upward into spirituality. He emphasizes that the higher species of life is already dormant in the lower. In the darkness of vegetative life there is already the hidden cognitive *spiritus intellectualis*. This reveals itself, for example, in the way the branches carry themselves and the way leaves and shells protect the foods. We find more signs of understanding among the animals, he says, whose

spirit is clearer than that of the plants, because in the senses, in the power of imagination, but especially in thinking, *ratio*, we respectively have clearer and clearer signs of the intellectual power.

Nikolaus describes how, in the history of nature, there is a process from the lowest matter, from inorganic to the organic life, up to man as the bodily and spiritual being. Consciousness, which is only fully there for men, already exists in a diffuse way in organic life. So he describes both processes as simultaneous: the coincidence of the descending and the ascending motions. Since the descent of the spirit and the ascent of the bodily are identical, *spiritum descendere est corpus ascendere*, you must think both together. On the one side, there is the successive evolution of the species, on the other side is the ontological primary original causality in God.

In a most remarkable sermon of Jan. 1, 1441, Nikolaus says that the entire history of mankind repeats itself in a condensed fashion, recapitulates itself in each individual. Therefore, the development of the human species in general obeys the same laws, as are true for the individuals—*quod libet in quo libet*—everything participates in each thing. Even in the smallest thing in the macrocosm, the universe is somehow already reflected. But it is organized in such a way that the higher forms of life, because of their superior unitybuilding power, encompass the lower ones. Man is, on the one side, *imago viva Dei*, the living image of God, but also the world in the small, because he represents the unity of the universe in its multitude and in all its physical and spiritual powers, descensive and ascensive, in himself.

Nikolaus, like Leibniz later, had this conception of the universe. All its species and kinds follow each other, like a series of numbers, and build a kind of chain from the highest spiritual being to the lowest, nearly bordering the nothing. And this represents a value scale, in which the highest species of the lower kind already coincides with the lowest species of the next higher kind. On the one side, there is therefore continuity, but on the other side, there are unbridgeable separations between the species. Without this principle—that the higher form enfolds the lower—this gap could not be bridged. The reason lies in the fact that, in the existing order of the universe, no individual can exhaust the entire wealth of being and life of its species, because each individual is only *one*, beside all the other individuals, and therefore remains behind the boundary of its species.

There is also no space between the species in which a new species could somehow sit in the middle. It is impossible that an individual could settle in-between, because the metaphysical border area is indivisible. If any individual wants to fully realize its essence and meaning, it must be more than only a being of his kind. To fulfill the potentiality of one's own kind, one has to transcend into the next higher.

Now, this is very fascinating. It is also verifiable. This metaphysical conception can be proven, because, as the con-

tinued existence of man demonstrates, the physical universe is prone to obey the cognitive processes of man. The Cusanian idea of evolution leads directly to Leibniz's idea of the *characteristicum universalis*, to understand all processes in the universe at once from the standpoint of cognition.

Locke's attack on Cusa

It is my conviction that Cusa's work already contains in it, in essence, all the ideas necessary to solve the political problems of the world. If you consider the devastating effect of John Locke in all fields of knowledge, also in natural law, it is most interesting that John Locke certainly deployed to counter Nikolaus's influence—even if he never mentions him. During his time in exile, in Holland, Locke had access to a collection of Cusa's works, just before he started to write his own *Essay on Human Understanding*. Leibniz, naturally, understood the evil principles of Hobbes and Locke and the British empiricists in general, and he countered Locke with his own *Essay on Human Understanding*, a devastating critique of Locke.

Leibniz, like Confucius, Plato, and Nikolaus before him, is very concerned about the adequacy of conceptions. And he proposes, therefore, to reduce the sensuous multitude of the content of consciousness into its simple components, and then to reassemble them in a more ordered form. He was trying to find a kind of alphabet of thoughts which was supposed to order all possible conceptions—where he again and again tried to deal with the problem of unity and multitude, the One and the Many, as the ordering principle.

He echoes Cusa's idea of a value scale of species and powers of species. This "universal characteristic" was supposed to become a kind of language in which all ideas and things would be ordered in a clear fashion, so that different nations could communicate with each other in reference to that language.

Leibniz was convinced that once the universal characteristic was elaborated, one would discover an even deeper secret about the universe. It is as if God, in giving to mankind arithmetic and algebra, only wanted to give them a shadow image of this deeper secret, he said. This touches upon the idea of *lex aeterna*, the participation of man in the eternal law through natural law, and the *lumen internum*, or that within man which enables us to understand these laws ever more precisely, and to bring ourselves in ever greater cohesion with creative reason.

Contrary to Locke and all the silly empiricists, this desire for optimal self-perfection in accordance with the laws of the universe, is the universal nature of man. So much so, that it is the human law of life. Creative reason, acting upon the universe and increasing man's power over the universe, is what Lyn has characterized as the process which functions in congruence with Riemann's series typified by the term " $(n+1)/n$ "—which implicitly corresponds to an enumerable density of discontinuities for any arbitrary selected interval of

action. That term is a metric which corresponds to a function expressing continuous increase of potential relative population density.

This is why Leibniz correctly said that the world is the best of all possible worlds. Because each discovery increases the degrees of freedom and therefore furthers the *perfecto generalis* of the entire universe. For Leibniz, the result of creative discovery is the progress in all great arts and sciences, which all serve the *gloire de Dieu*, the honor of God.

Concrete progress in the sciences and the development of the beautiful arts are, for him, a service to mankind for the “common best.” His own scientific, political, and diplomatic initiatives are simply expressions of this: *Je suis toujours prêt à tourner mes pensées vers ce grand but*. “I am always ready to turn my thoughts to that great aim of mankind, that great goal.” This was the central thought of his life, he never moved away from it.

For Leibniz, the benefits of scientific progress are the realization of the *civitas Dei* [the City of God], and, as for Nikolaus before him, every concrete discovery—from the deviation of the magnetic needle and its beneficial consequences for navigation, to the comparative study of languages as the means to uncover the historical relations between the Slavic people and the rest of the European people, as well as just legislation and universal education—all these elements are important building-blocks toward the “great goal.”

A new community of nations

The desire for perfection, which Leibniz recognized as the basic tendency of our existence and which has the universal validity analogous to a law of nature, is, naturally, also the basis for a new community of nations. Therefore, any splintering off and different courses of certain nations, cultures, and ethnic groups are regarded as a departure from the *harmonia universalis* and also the mark of an *esprit sectaire*. . . . *En cela, je ne distingue ni nations ni partis*—“In this, I do not distinguish any country or party.”

This is the same idea as that of Schiller, who says every nation has the right to pursue its own interest, but that this interest can never be against those of mankind as a whole. The flourishing of arts and sciences is the proof of the desire for perfection, and, Leibniz says, the country that does this the best will be the most dear to my heart, because the whole human species will profit from it and its true richness will be improved. It is this universal harmony and mutual support among nations which characterizes humanity and differentiates it from bestiality.

Leibniz fought against the separation or isolation into different domains of life, which started to encompass all areas as a result of the Enlightenment. He was absolutely opposed to the specialization of knowledge which is so dominant in the academic world today. Against that, he posed the need for a universal all-sidedness of knowledge as an

important criterion for perfection. Nikolaus stated the same idea, he even demanded that all people should know all essential knowledge of their time in order to be able to define the necessary next step of knowledge. For Leibniz, *justitia est amor sapientis*, justice is love of science. This was the highest principle, not only for law, he said, but for all areas of life. It was this metaphysical basis of universalism oriented toward the optimal development of the “common best,” which was the foundation of his political efforts for an alliance among peoples and cultures.

When Russia became more prominent in European politics in the 17th century, Leibniz became totally fascinated with the possibilities Russia presented. For him, the emergence of this country opened up completely new options in the European political theater. He said, like a city one builds totally from scratch, it can be much better designed and be much better than one that just keeps adding on pieces. So, with Russia as the centerpiece and mediator, he proposed a gigantic plan for worldwide integration of culture, the unification of the Occident and the Orient.

Through the reports of the Jesuit missionaries, he was convinced that Chinese culture was guided by the same drive for perfection as the Christian culture of Europe. In parentheses, it was Leibniz’s enthusiastic writings which caused the China excitement of his time. Especially when he discovered in Peter the Great the kind of science-oriented monarch, approximating, at least in this respect, his own vision, he proposed the construction of the land road from Europe through Russia to China.

He wrote innumerable memos to Peter the Great elaborating how, in this way, one could take the best of what Europe had produced and that of China and improve both sides. Russia was in the middle between two cultures, with the possibilities of both but without the mistakes of past history. A true integration of East and West, an economy oriented towards the common best—the implementation of physical economy based on the idea of a science driver, to use the modern jargon.

What a vision Leibniz had at the end of the 17th century! The Academy in Berlin represented in the small what Leibniz wanted to realize in Russia in the greatest dimension: the idea of the *societas* as the model and form of organization to bring all scientists together for joint work. Just as he saw Russia as the middle between Europe and China, he saw Germany and Berlin as the middle between Western Europe and the East. In each case, he saw the same possibility of creative give and take among all cultures and nations, enabling each one to unfold all potentialities to the fullest. This is the idea of the *Concordantia Catholica* of Cusa applied to the system of states in the 17th century—concordance in the macrocosm is only possible through the maximum development of the microcosms.

Leibniz proposed infrastructure, the construction of waterways and canals throughout Russia, a road from North

Siberia to America, and he wanted to connect the oceans in that area. All of this was the result of his idea of the development and improvement of *humanitas*, the one human species. In *Propagatio Fidei per Scientias*, "The Propagation of Faith through Science," he writes: "I will take it as my greatest honor, joy and merit, Your Great Majesty the Czar, to be able to serve in such a laudable God-pleasing work, because I am not so much interested in your fatherland or any other specific nation, but I go after the benefit of the entire human kind. Because I regard Heaven as my fatherland, and all well-meaning people as its citizens, I am much more happy to accomplish much good with the Russians than very little with the Germans, or the other Europeans. Even if I sit here in great honor, wealth and calm, this would not benefit others much because my inclination and passion is directed towards the common best."

These remarks reflect the sentence "*Justitia est amor sapientis*"—an incredible love for the development of mankind. If some nations, or some peoples, are too used up to respond, then let's concentrate on those who are open, and advance mankind in this way.

In his *Novissima Sinica*, Leibniz describes how he found some of his own basic ideas of mathematical philosophy (Dyadik) in the writings of the Emperor Fo Hi, again a proof of universal human culture uniting peoples and epochs with each other. If it just were possible to light the *lumen internum*, the internal light which is in all human beings as a talent through the *propagatio fidei per scientias* then the *res publica re literarum*, the worldwide realm of the mind will be the result.

The alternative is a new Renaissance

So, we clearly are at the end of an epoch. The writing on the wall is visible. Worldwide, Rwandas, Bosnias, Chechnyas: the rule of the mafias and armed gangs, the collapse of mankind into an even more bestial condition than present Hollywood movies portray, and they are pretty bestial already. Violence, the survival of the fittest, sexual perversion, a return to slavery and to feudalism, and worse. Do we want this? Or, do we want the outcome of the crisis to be a new epoch, a Renaissance, freed of the oligarchical flaw of the past 600 years?

We have to find an agreement among ourselves: What mankind do we wish to have? It should be obvious that an agreement concerning the final goals of mankind is the absolute necessary precondition for any durable national and international order. We must find an agreement about the image of man, the final goal of all human efforts. Do we want an image of man defined from below, as modern thinking defines him, to show his ethnological, anthropological roots, proving that man is only a higher ape, like Prince Philip? As Cusa would say, do we want *homo animalis* or *homo spiritualis*? If we think that the thought model, *complicatio explicatio*, has scientific merit, if we think that Leibniz's

ideas that there indeed exists a *characteristicum universalis*, then our future is bright. Then we agree that man is indefinitely perfectible and that every human being can become more and more heroic, that is Leibniz's term for those people who pursue the "common best" in an uncompromising, vigorous way.

I think the choice is clear. Since we are not outside the universe, but part of it, and therefore determine, at least to a certain extent, its laws, it is our determination of what should be the goal of posterity which makes the difference.

There is one other important matter. Love for humankind is not an abstract matter. If we seriously think that we can only get out of this mess together, mankind as a whole, that for the first time mankind sits in one boat—no longer can one portion live and the rest die—and that therefore we need universal thinkers like Nikolaus, Leibniz, and LaRouche, then we also have to become compassionate with each other. It is not so difficult these days to find people who are victims of the present system. They agree that the system must be changed.

But it is much more difficult to get a representative of the Ibos in Nigeria to care about the plight of the Hungarian minorities under conditions of economic breakdown in Romania. Or to get Russian patriots to understand why, without resolving the problems addressed in the Million Man March in Washington, Russia has no future. That is tough. But it has to be done.

The pope is right, we do need a new charter of the rights of nations. Bosnia has shown that. Rwanda has shown how urgent it is. But if we agree that the axioms that have led to this crisis have to go, that it was principally the Enlightenment, the evil principles of Hobbes and Locke and the like that have to go, then we have to reestablish the validity of natural law. Most important, this new charter has to state that there is a yardstick for the common good, a scientifically precise yardstick. And that yardstick is obviously the continued existence of mankind.

I want to leave you with a paradox of the *complicatio explicatio* world. If you take a composition of a great Classical composer such as Beethoven, or the poem of a great poet, such as Schiller's *Song of the Bell*, and you come to the last note or the last line and the work is finished, you know it has been completed. How do you know it is completed? Well, it is as if it would have been there all along. But the composer created the composition and, without him, it would not be there. That is the secret. But it is intelligible.

Notes

1. "On LaRouche's Discovery," by Lyndon H. LaRouche, *Fidelio*, Vol. III, No. 1., Spring 1994.
2. The full text of Pope John Paul II's Oct. 5, 1995 address to the U.N. General Assembly appeared in *EIR*, Vol. 22, No. 42, Oct. 20, 1995, with an accompanying analysis of "The Pope's Historic Intervention in America," by Helga Zepp LaRouche.