how is the United States going to respond to that policy configuration? What is the way that we can legitimately, without undue interference in the internal affairs of Russia, respond to the *strategic implications* of the Russian election. . . .

Here's the point. Russia can no longer tolerate the IMF conditionalities, the so-called present reform, which was put into place by Margaret Thatcher, France's President Mitterrand, and George Bush. That can no longer be tolerated, and it's going to go. After the election, it'll happen. . . .


What is clear, is that there will be a reform in Russia. But the question which is on the table now, is the question of what will be the *new form* of reform which is introduced in Russia after the elections? Under no circumstances could there be a workable reform which is a continuation of what many in Washington think is U.S. policy for Russia's economic and foreign and financial policy. *That can not work*.

Therefore, when you get people like Yavlinsky and Lebed, and so forth, meeting together, there are implications of that which bear upon the election *as such*, the election combinations, not merely for this year, but for four or so years down the line. But, what's more important here, is a shuffling behind the scenes of a regrouping of forces, to try to avoid a head-on collision of some people, while coming up with a stable, united majority of the Russian forces, who will stand behind a *new form of reform*, as opposed to the one which has been hegemonic and in practice up to this time.

That's what people have to bear in mind.



Currency Rates



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