

nongovernmental organizations, academic symposia, and obscure or nonexistent agents is of course patently absurd. If the U.S. military was plotting to annihilate counterpart militaries in Latin America, it would use its own assets instead of LaRouche's bizarre register of academics, diplomats, and the rest of his cast of characters. While those people no doubt have influence, they certainly do not enjoy as much as *The Plot* ascribes to them. . . .

The authors of this book compiled all the right data and then applied it to a single argument. Their logic, however, involves the assumption of a causal relationship between the intent of events and people involved. That assumption is unquestionably false. Nonetheless the book currently is commanding a growing following within the militaries of Latin America. Thus it should be studied as an insight into one of the influences on members of the armed forces within our hemisphere.

Luigi Einaudi, senior policy adviser to Secretary of State Warren Christopher; excerpts from "Security and Democracy in the Region," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1996:

There is also a panoply of problems associated with the United States. The disproportion of power between the United States and its neighbors, turned into fear by the historic use of that power to intervene militarily, has blocked clear subordination of the military instrument—the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)—to the political body (OAS). The reasoning is that, if the latter is authorized a military arm, the United States (with its disproportionate power and the votes it will control) can justify military intervention in Latin America or the Caribbean under international law. One extreme formulation of this anxiety is that, using democracy and human rights as excuses, the U.S. seeks to use OAS and IADB as mechanisms to place armed forces in Latin America under its command as enforcers of U.S. intervention.

Two other hypotheses about U.S. policy circulating within Latin American military circles are that with the Cold War over, the United States wants to abolish all national military forces in the region because it considers them obstacles to democratic enlargement and commercial expansion, and that the United States seeks to coopt Latin American militaries as police to fight the drug war outside its borders. There are two major flaws in these conspiratorial depictions of U.S. policy. The first is that these are "big lies," incorporating enough from authentic concerns emanating from Washington to give them an air of plausibility. The second is that such misunderstandings in the past prevented effective regional cooperation that could have forestalled the use of force. . . .

With the Rio Treaty in disuse and no provisions in the OAS charter for the use of force, armed peacekeeping activities will be left either to the United Nations or to unilateral action by the United States. Neither is a satisfactory embodiment of collective regional will.

Introducing racist Lawrence E. Harrison

by Gretchen Small

A simpleminded book, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind—The Latin American Case*, written by Lawrence Harrison, a 20-year veteran of the U.S. State Department's Agency for International Development (AID), and published in 1985 by Harvard University, is touted as *the* authoritative work on how Ibero-America must be fundamentally changed to become "democratic."

To hear some people talk, the book is a work of fundamental insight, a "must read" to make policy for Ibero-America. U.S. National Defense University analysts told *EIR* that Harrison's *Underdevelopment* outlines the premises of their work on Ibero-America today. Harrison presented the thesis of his book at an NDU symposium on Security in the Americas, the proceedings of which were then published in 1989 in an NDU book of the same title.

And Samuel Huntington, Harvard University's racist "clash of civilizations" theoretician told Argentina's daily *Clarín* on June 30, that his view on Ibero-America, is the same as Harrison's. That is not surprising, since Harrison wrote *Underdevelopment* under the guidance of Huntington, during a stay at Harvard. Harrison thanks Kissinger's Luigi Einaudi, also, for help in drafting the book.

Colorado's fascist former governor Richard Lamm has endorsed the book as of "immense importance" in showing "the crucial relationship between culture and progress." There was no need for the American Enterprise Institute's propagandist Michael Novak, who tries to sell Adam Smith to Catholics, to endorse the book; Harrison cites Novak's work throughout, as in agreement with him.

There is no "theory" to Harrison's book; it is raw racism, combined with a fawning admiration for the British Empire, as the selection of quotes below are sufficient to demonstrate. Readers not familiar with British historiography's "Black Legend" on Spain, can get here their first taste of this drivel. Harrison and his advocates call this "cultural determinism," a theory, they argue, which follows from the work of German turn-of-the-century sociologist Max Weber, and his book *The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism*.

As for "cultural determinism," Lyndon LaRouche, interviewed by the radio satellite broadcast "EIR Talks" on July 24, dismissed it as lunacy: "There are people who believe that if certain international institutions can induce certain government institutions 'to believe in' something, because this combination of national and governmental institutions has power, that the exertion of that power on behalf of a belief, will make

the belief come tru-u-u-u-e! You know—'wishes come true, if enough people believe in them.' That's essentially cultural determinism, of that sort. It's lunacy."

From Harrison's presentation on "The Genesis of Latin American Underdevelopment," published in the National Defense University's 1989 book, Security in the Americas:

The opposing school—to which I belong—views Latin America's condition as a consequence of traditional Hispanic culture, profoundly influencing a Latin American culture that is anti-democratic, anti-social, anti-entrepreneurial, and anti-work. This second view is referred to as "cultural determinism," with its roots to be found in Weberian theory. . . .

In Latin societies, the family largely circumscribes the area of identification and trust. . . . The limited identification with others in society is reflected in several characteristics common to Hispanic societies:

- Difficulty with the concept of compromise, contributing to . . . political vacuums that invite dictators (which the strong authoritarian bent of Hispanic culture tends to mass produce). . . .
- Nepotism and corruption. . . .
- Anti-social behavior (for example, littering, disrespect for waiting lines, disregard for punctuality). . . .

This generalization may make many uncomfortable, but it is my belief that ethical standards in the Western democracies are higher than in Latin America. . . .

Three roots of the Spanish view of work come to mind: 1) The conquistadors' goal of "getting rich quick" and returning to Spain for a life of leisure, 2) the system of slavery that reigned in Hispanic America for 300 years, and 3) Spanish-Catholic fatalism, which militates against planning, saving, and even equipment maintenance. . . .

Canadians and Americans attach more importance to work—and work harder—than Latin Americans."

From Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind—The Latin American Case:

On Religious Reform: The Calvinist concepts of "calling" and "election" force the eyes of the faithful toward the future. . . . There may well be truth in the belief of Weber and others that traditional Catholicism, with its focus on the afterlife and the crucial role of the church hierarchy and the priest, encouraged a dependency mindset among its adherents that was an obstacle to entrepreneurial activity. . . .

To design and orchestrate a coherent program of cultural change that stands a chance of working, it is necessary to identify those values and attitudes that get in the way and those that need to be introduced or strengthened. This means a process of candid national introspection that produces an agenda of goals for cultural change . . . [including] religious reform. . . .

One can disagree with some of Weber's analysis and ideas, but it seems to me apparent that Protestantism in general

and Calvinism in particular *have* played a role in the success of many industrialized nations. . . .

The traditional tension between capitalism and Catholicism . . . coupled with the powerful momentum of traditional Catholic authoritarianism, has guided a part of the recently stimulated social concern toward "liberation theology". . . .

Religious reform can be a potent agent of positive culture change. . . . I appreciate that there are numerous obstacles to religious reform, among them . . . the fact that the policies of most churches are usually determined by older people. On the other hand, culture can change without the involvement of religion—for example, attitudes about family size—and failure of religion to stay abreast or ahead of such [cultural] changes may jeopardize its influence.

Rule Britannia: My own belief is that Barbados's absorption of British culture over 300 years is the principal explanation of its success. . . . It is not just "enlightened colonialism" that is in play. It is not just the imposition by a colonial power of European institutions. . . . It is also the absorption by the colonized people of the colonial power's values and attitudes *over an extended period* that gives vitality and durability to the imported institutions. I stress "over an extended period" because the evidence (e.g., the U.S. occupations of Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic) is that brief colonial experiences make only a superficial imprint on culture and leave imposed institutions . . . which soon revert to their precolonial conditions. . . .

The Argentine . . . [is] an easily corruptible, envious person who knows shame but not guilt . . . excessively motivated by concerns about dignity and manliness . . . he has contempt for work. . . .

Argentina is *not* European; it is Spanish and Italian, and there is so much similarity between Spanish and Italian culture that there is not really much difference between Argentina and other countries of Spanish America. . . .

In its extreme form, Spanish individualism approaches misanthropy. . . .

One particularly important consequence, in my view, of the set of values and attitudes flowing from Spanish individualism is the failure of the Spanish—and Latin American—elite to develop a sense of *noblesse oblige*. The histories of Barbados and Australia make clear, I think, that the *noblesse oblige* of the British aristocracy, doubtlessly, related to the concept of fair play, had much to do with the progressive evolution of those two societies. . . .

The slaves were beneficiaries of significant acts of English *noblesse oblige* starting early in the 18th century . . . colonial rule continued until 1966. . . . Barbados, which is far ahead not only of Haiti but also of the Dominican Republic and, by a narrower margin, Costa Rica, is much more English than African, black skin pigmentation notwithstanding.

Argentina . . . is nonetheless unmistakably in the same Hispanic-American cultural mainstream. . . . Argentina has failed to build a viable political system that could command

the allegiance of its people, and political polarization, chronic instability, and authoritarian government have taken a heavy toll on economic program. And there is evidence that authoritarianism and negative attitudes about work at all levels of society have taken a heavy toll on entrepreneurship, on creativity. . . .

Australia . . . has left Argentina far behind. . . . The political and economic evolution of Australia is so similar to that of Canada and the United States that it is difficult not to conclude that British culture has played a decisive role in all three. . . .

In the case of Latin America, we see a cultural pattern, derivative of traditional Hispanic culture, that is anti-democratic, anti-social, anti-progress, anti-entrepreneurial, and, at least among the elite, anti-work.

Colombia disintegrates, as military budget axed

by Javier Almario

To be able to maintain national unity, protect national territory, and address problems such as the drug trade, terrorism, and narco-terrorism, Colombia must have a public force—Army, Navy, Air Force, and police—of at least 600,000 troops (today there are fewer than 150,000 soldiers); it must have a military budget of at least \$3 billion (that budget today is \$860 million); and it must have a legislative framework that allows the military to respond effectively to the irregular warfare of the drug cartels and narco-terrorists (existing legislation favors the narco-guerrilla).

However, Colombia's political class, of which an estimated 75% is under the control of the drug cartels; the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and their national subsidiaries (such as the National Planning Department and Finance Ministry); and the United Nations non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are all leading the country in a contrary direction, toward the disintegration of Colombia as a sovereign nation-state. In fact, Colombia is the best example of how the policies described in *The Plot* must guarantee the defeat of a nation in its war against organized narco-terrorism.

In 1996, the approved military budget (not counting the budget of decentralized companies and institutions attached to the Defense Ministry), was approximately \$1.7 billion, although the ministry had requested a budget of \$2 billion. However, following a series of budget cuts ordered by the Central Bank, Finance Ministry, and National Planning Department, that budget was reduced to only \$860 million. For over a year, the Samper Pizano government had been promising the military an expanded budget, in hope of calming tem-

pers in the midst of the national scandal over drug money financing Samper's Presidential campaign. Samper now seeks to reduce that budget by yet another \$360 million. That is, the budget would be reduced to a mere \$500 million, which would in effect paralyze the nation's defense forces.

The cutback is even larger if one considers the fact that the tax reform promoted by the Samper government, and which went into force at the beginning of 1996, requires that all military purchases pay a value-added tax of 16%, something which had not been required previously. At the same time, additional income that the Armed Forces should have received over the past four years, stemming from a "war tax" imposed by the government on large businesses and oil companies, never reached the military. The Constitutional Court ruled that taxes for such a specific purpose as financing the war on narco-terrorism, were not permissible. The new tax reform eliminated the war tax, supposedly as an inducement to the oil multinationals to invest more heavily in Colombia, despite the fact that 50% of Colombia's troops are deployed to guard the country's oil facilities!

The wages of crime

In contrast, take a look at the budget of the enemy. According to government calculations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army

DO YOU KNOW

- that the American Revolution was fought *against* British "free trade" economics?
- that Washington and Franklin championed Big Government?
- that the Founding Fathers promoted partnership between private industry and central government?

READ

The Political Economy of the American Revolution

edited by Nancy Spannaus and Christopher White

order from the publisher:

EIR News Service
P.O. Box 17390
Washington, D.C.
20041-0390

or call
Ben Franklin Booksellers
800-453-4108

\$15.00 plus \$4.00 shipping and handling