Street and London. Two of the BAC's most visible operatives, George Soros and Maurice "Hank" Greenberg, of American International Group, have also been identified as Gore boosters.

British lackeys on the Principals Committee

by Edward Spannaus

"The first Clinton administration was attacked for appointing second-raters as diplomats," wrote James Adams in the Jan. 19, 1997 *Sunday Times* of London. "The second does not want to make the same mistake."

Adams was especially pleased that Madeleine Albright was to replace Warren Christopher as Secretary of State. Albright, he said, would soon begin appointing a number of new figures into top positions: "All of them should be good news for Britain and Europe in welcome contrast to the first term, whose top diplomatic and security players at times seemed anti-British."

In fact, for President Clinton's second term, almost a whole new team came on board—including not only Albright, but Defense Secretary William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry Hugh Shelton. They make up the core of the President's foreign policy advisers, the Principals Committee, along with Vice President Al Gore and Gore's own foreign policy adviser Leon Fuerth.

This was a "coup d'état waiting to happen." The background is as follows:

From the first year of the Clinton administration, Vice President Al Gore already played what some called an unprecedented role in U.S. foreign policy. But despite his increasing prominence, Gore was kept under control as long as President Clinton was able to function as President and Commanderin-Chief. But with the sharp escalation in the assault on the Presidency in January 1998, the President was increasingly besieged, distracted, and boxed in, allowing Gore and the Principals Committee to carry out that foreign policy coup.

Already in 1994, author Elizabeth Drew noted that one sign of Gore's "extraordinary and unprecedented" foreign policy role was that his National Security Adviser, Leon Fuerth, was sitting in on Principals Committee meetings. By March 1998, the *Washington Post* observed that Gore and Fuerth enjoyed a "foreign policy influence rarely seen at the vice presidential level," and in June 1998 the *Post* described Fuerth, in his "obscurity," as "the virtual day-to-day manager of relations with Russia," as well as being "at the center of policymaking on a wide range of international issues."

An important precondition for the coup was the loose, "Baby-Boomer" structure of the National Security Council, where the NSC itself never meets, and policy deliberation takes place in the Principals Committee and the Deputies

Committee. Astoundingly, the NSC itself—consisting by law of the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense, with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as advisers—has officially met only once during the Clinton administration. The Principals Committee (the NSC minus the President) is where policy is hammered out, and then they go and say, "Mr. President, we have reached a consensus on what must be done. . . ."—presenting the President with a *fait accompli*.

This is a structure under which Gore and other British agents of influence can run wild. The key players representing BAC interests, besides Gore and Fuerth, are:

Madeleine Albright: Some intelligence specialists regard the Secretary of State as an out-and-out British agent. Her father, Josef Korbel, fled from Czechoslovakia with his family after the 1938 Munich Pact, and settled in London, where he was a member of the Czech government-in-exile. The family returned to Czechoslovakia from London after the war, only to leave again upon the Communist takeover.

Albright is a protégée of one of today's leading proponents of British geopolitics: Zbigniew Brzezinski. She was a student of Brzezinski in Russian Studies at Columbia University, and then served as his assistant on Jimmy Carter's National Security Council from 1977 to 1981.

It was Albright, more than anyone else in the administration, who created the present debacle in Yugoslavia, with her sabotage of the Rambouillet negotiations, and her belligerent threats to bomb Milosevic to the bargaining table. Albright views the military as an instrument in her diplomatic arsenal; when she was earlier advocating military intervention in Bosnia, she once demanded of former JCS Chairman Colin Powell, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about, if you can't use it?"

William Cohen and Gen. Henry Hugh Shelton: Secretary of Defense Cohen and JCS Chairman Shelton have both built their careers around British-Israeli type "special operations"—Cohen by promoting special operations during his time in the Senate, and Shelton having joined the Army as a Special Forces "Green Beret" during the Vietnam War, and advancing to become Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). SOCOM itself was created in the mid-1980s by a re-organization of the U.S. military championed by then-Senator Cohen.

In a Senate speech on the subject of special operations forces in 1986, Cohen stated:

"Israeli successes in special operations are legendary. The British too, have had marked success in this area. They have defeated Communist insurgencies in Malaya and Oman. . . . The British also demonstrated the value of special forces during the Falkland Islands campaign."

The reliance on special forces and its correlative, the belief in the invincibility of air power, are the hallmarks of the doctrine of the "new NATO" as a global police force, which Cohen and Shelton are promoting.

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