EXERStrategic Studies

Congress revisits the ABM treaty

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

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
There has been a recent effort by some members of the U.S. Congress, to overturn Henry A. Kissinger's celebrated 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic-Missile) treaty. That was the Pugwash Conference-inspired treaty, between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., which had been intended to outlaw strategic ballistic missile defense. Unfortunately, this present effort to overturn that treaty, is, as I shall show, as ill-conceived as the treaty itself.

That recent effort should remind us of a thoroughly muddled approach to strategic defense, which had been proposed by the Heritage Foundation's Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Daniel Graham, during the early 1980s. Graham, campaigning vigorously and widely as an enraged opponent of both *EIR*'s Lyndon LaRouche and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's Dr. Edward Teller, had based his own views on ballisticmissile defense, on the model presented in the science-fiction-inspired publication

^{1.} On June 7, Rep. David McIntosh (R-Ind.) and ten co-sponsors introduced a bill to prohibit the expenditure of funds to comply with the ABM Treaty. The premise of the bill is that since one of the signatories to the treaty, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, the treaty itself is no longer legally binding. On Aug. 5, Rep. David Vitter (R-La.) sponsored an amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State Department and the Judiciary appropriations bill, which prohibits the expenditure of funds to implement a Sept. 26, 1997 agreement among the United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan, which, Vitter said, changes the signatories to the ABM Treaty and expands its scope to disallow more missile defense systems. Vitter argued that since this agreement has not been ratified by the Senate, it has no standing in law and the Clinton Administration should be prevented from implementing it. The Senate also held hearings in April and May to examine the legal status of the ABM Treaty and its impact on arms limitation and missile defense efforts.

^{2.} Either unilaterally, or bilaterally. The treaty is officially designated "The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems." See Leo Szilard, "How to Live with the Bomb and Survive: The Possibility of a Pax Russo-Americana in the Long-Range Rocket Stage of the So-Called Atomic Stalemate," Report of the Second, Quebec, Pugwash Conference of March 2, 1958.

LaRouche addresses a conference in Washington, D.C. on his conception of strategic anti-ballistic missile defense, April 13, 1983. Shown here are pamphlets issued by the LaRouche movement. "Sputnik of the Seventies," 1977, was the first major salvo in LaRouche's campaign for beam-weapon defense.







Only Beam-Weapons
Could Bring to an End
The Kissingerian Age of
Mutual Thermonuclear Terror:

A Proposed Modern Military Policy of the United States

By Lyndon Hermyle LaRouche, Jr.

NDPC Advisory Committee New York City March 1982

The National Democratic Policy Committee's 1982 pamphlet was used by NDPC candidates for office running in the Democratic Party primaries between 1982 and 1984, in which they consistently gained 20-40% of the vote, organizing for strategic defense.

High Frontier.³ In its present form, the Congressmen's attempted revival of the spoon-bending spirit of *High Frontier*, will glean only bitterly over-ripe fruit.

Nonetheless, the present efforts to overturn the 1972 ABM treaty, pose interesting, and even extremely important questions to our memories. Where were the Congress's present sponsors of ABM on the evening of March 23, 1983, when President Ronald Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)? What did they think, then, of the attacks on SDI, during that evening and the days immediately following? What position did the Republican National Committee take on SDI for the period leading into the Federal 1984 general elections? Why was virtually the entirety of the world's press, excepting *EIR*, taken by surprise by President

When properly compared with the excellent original design for what President Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983 address defined as SDI, these recent attempts from the Miniver Cheevys of the Republican-controlled Congress, for launching an ABM program now, are, as I shall show here, worse than absurd: historically, scientifically, and strategically.

Reagan's upholding of SDI at Reykjavik, in October 1986?

I speak now from the included authority of my personal role in the original design of the proposal which led to the President's promulgation of his March 23, 1983 proposal. Today, the only standpoint from which the lessons of the SDI proposal can be competently understood, is to situate the issues, then and now, with regard to the contrast between my own initiating role in that affair, and the opposing role of the Heritage Foundation. It was the persisting, corrosive efforts of those opponents, which had, by mid-1983, substantially wrecked the original proposal, and, after that, ultimately transformed President Reagan's excellent initiative into a farce.

Then, as now, the technological crux of this issue was, and is, that, contrary to the simplistic views of Graham et al., the use of interceptor rockets, or other so-called "kinetic energy" systems, does not represent an effective means of defense against a strategic thermonuclear-ballistic-missile attack. Today, sixteen years later, the self-bankrupted economy of the U.S.A. no longer has the scientific or economic capability, which it either had, or could have developed then, of launching the kind of strategic defense option, based upon

^{3.} Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "The Psycho-Sexual Impotence of Gen. Daniel Graham, *EIR*, Oct. 13, 1983.

^{4.} While the 1984 Republican Party platform did not explicitly reject President Reagan's SDI, it downplayed the importance of the President's bold initiative, based on this author's earlier proposals and back-channel efforts. And, under the influence of people like James Baker III, Reagan himself downplayed the issue until late in his re-election campaign. Republican Party opponents of the SDI, notably the friends of Henry Kissinger, repeatedly warned President Reagan that, if he made ballistic-missile defense a campaign theme of prominence, he would risk losing the elections to Walter Mondale. Finally, on Oct. 21, 1984, in his second campaign debate with Mondale, Reagan revived the SDI theme, including his offer of joint development and deployment of a ballistic-missile defense shield with the Soviet Union.

"new physical principles," which could have been developed under the 1982-1983 version of my original proposal.

As I detailed the evidence then, so, still today, to propose an ABM defense based on "kinetic energy" interception, as General Graham's Heritage Foundation did, is either an act of consummate military-policy stupidity, a willful political fraud, or both.

The SDI, then and now

SDI, as proposed in March 23, 1983, was a policy designed for its time. As appropriate as the initiative was then, that time has passed, and there have been crucial intervening events. The dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, illustrates the distinction to be made. Since the developments of the period from the October 1987 Wall Street crash, to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and, even more so, the later onset of the global financial meltdown presently in progress, the world as a whole has entered a new phase. Meanwhile, the world of 1982-1984, has, unfortunately, bequeathed us its follies, but the lost opportunities of the early Reagan years have also, unfortunately, passed us by.

The past is the past; but, as it is with the greatest tragedies put on the Classical stage, as in the concluding scene of Shake-speare's *Hamlet*, the lessons which we should have learned from the preceding experience, are still urgent lessons, to be applied to the new, rapidly changing state of affairs today. The past is still the past, but the issue of SDI, back during the early 1980s, is also one of the keys for understanding the awesome strategic implications of a global financial melt-down now in progress. All these things considered, it falls, perhaps uniquely, to me, to show those strategic, policy-shaping connections.

With those historical distinctions, and the currently ongoing global financial meltdown taken into account, it is now past time that the relevant present members of the U.S. Congress, and others, come to, at minimum, a competent understanding of those still continuing historical and strategic issues left over from the original SDI proposal. Those members of the Congress will be incapable of such comprehension, until they have first examined the crucial points of difference between what President Reagan actually said, on March 23, 1983, and what was done in the abused name of SDI, under the post-March 23rd influence of those opponents of SDI who were rallied around both the Heritage Foundation and then-Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker.

It must therefore be emphasized, that although President Reagan's original, March 23, 1983, public announcement of SDI *included* exactly the policy for which I had campaigned since a celebrated, two-day public conference, which I convened in Washington to that purpose, in mid-February 1982, the President's announcement—which allowed for inclusion of possible alternatives to "new physical principles"—also

left a security door unlocked, through which the Heritage

That wrecking-campaign did not begin on the evening of March 23, 1983; it had begun, no later than the Summer of 1982, when former DIA chief Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Daniel Graham had surfaced his campaign, first against me, and, soon after that, also against Dr. Edward Teller. In both instances, Graham was deployed in the effort to prevent adoption of that policy which was to become, if only briefly, the SDI.

What misguided members of the Congress have lately proposed to revive, is little different from the same scientific and strategic incompetence exhibited in the Heritage Foundation's efforts to wreck President Reagan's original SDI policy. The latter's pre-March 1983 efforts had been chiefly in the form of the lying campaigns of personal defamation, by General Graham and others, against me and Edward Teller, both during the second half of 1982. The later phase of the Heritage Foundation's campaign was escalated after March 1983, with the hatred more tightly focussed against me.

Today, as then, respecting current Congressional efforts to revive ABM, and many other recent and earlier follies of our Congress, we must also see our poor Congress as a victim of maliciously orchestrated public opinion!

One of the great difficulties which prevent the U.S. from adopting competent policies these days, is the tragic influence of Walter Lippmann's cult of that witch-goddess called public opinion, especially its influence on the public behavior of incumbent and aspiring occupants of high Federal offices. Most among today's such elected officials, when confronted with the choice, would rather defend their political careers, than adopt a just decision. In that case, they tend to limit their adopted public positions, sometimes even contrary to their own private knowledge, to appeals to the sloganized prejudices of ignorant public opinion. So, they will rarely risk their careers, for the sake of truthful relevant knowledge respecting the matter at issue. The current popularity of the immoral cult of "political triangulation," illustrates my point absolutely.

Worse! Public opinion in the U.S.A. and western Europe today, is far more ignorant of reality, less able to respond to events rationally, than thirty years ago, even sixteen years ago. Indeed, as today's widespread obsession with compulsive gambling on financial markets, typifies this problem, the majority of popular opinion today is much less oriented to the principle of physical reality taken as a whole, to what used to be called "common sense," than during most of the sweep of previous U.S. history to date. If the citizens today can justly blame government for much of what they suffer, they should also blame themselves even more. Directly, or indirectly, most of the injustice and other pain suffered by the public, is the result of their own insistence on keeping expressed opinions bite-sized—or, even byte-sized—and simple, such that they ignore, often wishfully, the actual consequences which

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Foundation wrecking-crew deployed to bring in the shifts in policy which ultimately wrecked the SDI project as a whole.

That wrecking-campaign did not begin on the evening of

^{5.} See box.

From Hamlet: 'Let me speak to th' yet unknowing world'

Enter Fortinbras, with the Ambassadors with Drum, Colors, and Attendants.

Fortinbras: Where is this sight?

Horatio: What is it you would see?

If aught of woe or wonder, cease your search.

Fortinbras: This quarry cries on havoc. O proud Death,

What feast is toward in thine eternal cell That thou so many princes at a shot

So bloodily hast struck?

Ambassador: The sight is dismal;

And our affairs from England come too late.

The ears are senseless that should give us hearing

To tell him his commandment is fulfilled,

That Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead.

Where should we have our thanks?

Horatio: Not from his mouth,

Had it th' ability of life to thank you.

He never gave commandment for their death.

But since, so jump upon this bloody question,

You from the Polack wars, and you from England,

Are here arrived, give order that these bodies

High on a stage be placed to the view,

And let me speak to th' yet unknowing world

How these things came about. So shall you hear Of carnal, bloody, and unnatural acts, Of accidental judgments, casual slaughters, Of deaths put on by cunning and forced cause, And, in this upshot, purposes mistook Fall'n on th' inventors' heads. All this can I

Fortinbras: Let us haste to hear it,

And call the noblest to the audience.

Truly deliver.

For me, with sorrow I embrace my fortune.

I have some rights of memory in this kingdom,

Which now to claim my vantage doth invite me.

Horatio: Of that I shall have also cause to speak,

And from his mouth whose voice will draw on more.

But let this same be presently performed,

Even while men's minds are wild, lest more mischance

On plots and errors happen.

Fortinbras: Let four captains

Bear Hamlet like a soldier to the stage,

For he was likely, had he been put on,

To have proved most royal; and for his passage

The soldiers' music and the rite of war

Speak loudly for him.

Take up the bodies. Such a sight as this

Becomes the field, but here shows much amiss.

Go, bid the soldiers shoot.

Exeunt marching; after the which a peal of ordnance are shot off.

Finis — Act V, Scene ii

their own simple-minded, often mass-media orchestrated, popular passions are bringing upon themselves.

Typical of that kind of widespread lack of even simple common sense, is the housewife, for example, who might say, "I don't have to worry about what happens to the farmers; I get my milk from the supermarket." Until now, outside small circles of actually thinking people, prevailing popular opinion, as defined by the perverse Walter Lippmann, has rarely paused to consider even the simplest degree of truth about any important matters.

In the typical case, a foolish citizen will seek to justify his political behavior by stressing his or her personal choice of motives for the relevant action. The foolish citizens are so much in love with their own small-minded personal motives, their so-called "personal feelings," that they—especially the "baby boomer" and still younger generations—customarily ignore entirely the consequences of the policies their motives are bringing upon themselves. They give way to their wildly irrational "personal feelings," as compulsive gamblers do.

So, for reason of just such simple-minded cupidity as that,

today's fool bankrupts the farmer who produces the fool's food, just as another greedy fool slaughtered the goose which thereupon ceased to lay the golden eggs.

After conceding that that is the awful situation presented by the political behavior of most of our citizens, this nation must, nonetheless, survive. It will not survive, unless many of its citizens and elected officials are prompted to change their present ways. Happily, much of the public afflicted with that sort of populist style in ignorant opinion, could be induced to think. However, to do this, they need a good, Socratic sort of "kick start," to get their rarely-used, rusty thinking powers back into motion. Politicians who lack both the "guts" and sense of honesty required, to give the public mind that needed jolt, will usually perform no good service for our nation, certainly not under the conditions defined by the global financial meltdown currently in progress.

Therefore, today, it is one of the more typical of the tragic results of recent trends in public opinion, that the issues of SDI, and related matters, are buried under massive heaps of popular and official ignorance of history, of science in gen-

eral, and of economics and strategy in particular.

The SDI itself has become a thing of the past; but, the issues underlying the original design of that policy, are the world's leading strategic realities of today's global financial apocalypse. So, if the members of the Congress, or others, are to understand the SDI then, or the lessons we must learn from that experience for the urgent issues of today, the public official, and the citizenry more generally, must junk their present opinions, in favor of acquiring some actual knowledge of the relevant background. They must do this, even if acquiring that knowledge subjects them to an unaccustomed experience of serious thinking. They must begin to think again, in more than byte-sized chunks. If only to spite the increasing illiteracy cultivated by the usually lying mass media, and in spite of the depravity of current trends in public and higher education, our political figures and ordinary citizens need, urgently, the "kick start," to start them thinking, again.

I shall now preface this report's assessment of the U.S.'s current strategic situation, with a brief summary of the relevant essential, deeper background, on the history of nuclear-weapons policy, which must first be brought to the surface, if one is to understand the present-day outcome of the 1980s SDI experience.

What must be emphasized, in summarizing the significance of SDI as such, with respect to both the past, and the present situation, is, that, except for some broad sympathy for President Reagan's proposal to find a way to end the reign of thermonuclear "revenge weapons," the majority of the U.S. public had no understanding of any of the relevant facts. Most had little desire to correct their terrible ignorance of a matter which was, then and now, of a literally life-and-death importance for all of them. That was the political problem which so greatly burdened the effort to carry out the SDI proposal back then. That ignorance is the political problem which, disguised as a different issue, threatens to send the U.S.A. plunging into a tragic end today.

1. Nuclear-weapons policy: a summary

As I have already conceded just above, the popular ignorance on these subjects, then and now, is explainable; but explainable is not excusable. The issues which came to the surface in the 1980s Heritage Foundation and other efforts to defeat the SDI, were poorly understood even among better informed layers of the general public, but they were not new issues. There was nothing involved which a truly well-informed and intelligent citizenry could not have understood, at the price of a modest personal effort to think. Similarly, ignorance is no excuse for that strategic folly of that conceited, and false popular opinion, which has misled the world into the presently ongoing, globalized financial meltdown.

The issue of strategic defense, then and now, was never nuclear weapons as such; it was, and remains, *nuclear-weapons policy*. It is not nuclear weapons as such, which were the principal problem to be addressed by SDI. I repeat: the principal danger to be overcome, came from the adopted nuclear-weapons policy, not the mere existence of nuclear weapons as such.

Until the member of Congress, or the citizen generally, has grasped the fundamental difference between "nuclear weapons" as such, and the "nuclear weapons policy" adopted by the U.S.A. shortly after the death of President Franklin Roosevelt, neither Congressman nor ordinary citizen has any competent opinion on the current or recent strategic policyissues. Therefore, in this introductory summary portion of this report, I emphasize the crucial, rarely understood difference in practical significance, separating the terms "nuclear weapons" and "nuclear-weapons policy."

Now, still, as sixteen years ago, there could be no competently informed understanding of the strategic problems involved, unless we traced the history, not of nuclear weapons, but of nuclear-weapons policy, back to its beginning, in 1913. At that time, decades before any actual nuclear weapon existed, leading Fabian Society official, and utopian science-fiction novelist, H.G. Wells, first published his formal, nonfictional proposal to develop and use nuclear weapons. In other words, it was the chicken, "nuclear-weapons policy," not the egg, the nuclear weapon, which came first.

Then, and ever afterward, Wells based his proposal upon the already-known principle of nuclear fission, proposing as his nuclear-weapons policy, the development and future use of nuclear-fission weapons. He proposed to develop and use such weapons, as means so terrifying, that nations would submit to world government, rather than risk the horror of such war. In other words, Wells' science-fiction-based, nuclear-weapons policy, was the development, deployment, and use of such weapons, to bring world government into being.

Wells' utopian form of nuclear-weapons policy was later adopted in full by Bertrand Russell. Russell was the British author of the operation, targetting Albert Einstein's signing of a letter, which prompted the U.S. war-time crash program for developing fission weapons.⁷ People who are not familiar with those, and closely related historical facts bearing on the continuing history of that nuclear-weapons policy, have no competence in shaping strategic and related military policies of the U.S.A. today.

With the untimely death of President Franklin Roosevelt, London's financier oligarchy and London's Wall Street cronies, quickly took over President Truman. The usually duplic-


^{6.} H.G. Wells, The World Set Free (London: Macmillan, 1914).

^{7.} Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., How Bertrand Russell Became an Evil Man, Fidelio, Fall 1994. Passim. For the Spanish edition, see Como se volvio malvado Bertrand Russell (Washington, D.C.: Executive Intelligence Review, 1998).



Left to right: Bertrand Russell; H.G. Wells; the atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki, Japan, Aug. 8, 1945. "The essential objective of the original SDI proposal," writes LaRouche, "was to turn back, and then eradicate the foolish and evil nuclear-weapons policy introduced by Wells and Russell."





itous Henry A. Kissinger, exuding his usual bile, but also what was, for him, unaccustomed accuracy and frankness, later commented on this fact of the post-Roosevelt transformation in U.S. policy, in his May 10, 1982 keynote address at the British Foreign Office's Chatham House. As Kissinger reported, after the death of Roosevelt, Churchill's policies took over U.S. policy-shaping; and, Roosevelt's adherence to the patriotic tradition of the U.S.A., was rudely pushed aside.

Russell's policy for eliminating the sovereignty of all nation-states, and establishing world government through nuclear-terror weapons, was introduced to U.S. practice as President Truman's folly: the decision to drop two nuclear-fission bombs upon the civilian population of an already defeated Japan. The report, that dropping those bombs "saved a million American lives," was simply an outright lie, which was later enshrined as a myth. General MacArthur, aided by a most effective naval blockade, had already won the war; London's policy was to force the U.S.A. to hasten to drop those bombs before Japan's military reluctantly bent, under the pressures of that blockade, to the Emperor Hirohito's willful agreement, negotiated through Vatican channels, on Japan's terms of surrender.9

Until President Truman's decision to drop the U.S.'s only existing, two nuclear-fission bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were simply nuclear weapons. It was Truman's folly of August 1945, which instituted the present nuclear-weapons policy in all its evolutions, from that date to the present.

The core of my own 1979-1986 policy on strategic ballistic missile defense was that reflected in President Reagan's March 23, 1983 address. The immediate purpose, was to free the United States, and the world, from what President Reagan properly identified as the tyranny of "revenge weapons." The essential objective of the original SDI proposal, was to turn back, and then eradicate the foolish and evil nuclear-weapons policy introduced by Wells and Russell. Those of a different opinion, who thought the solution would be to control, or even eliminate nuclear weapons, rather than eradicate a bad nuclear-weapons policy, were utopian fools; these fools ignored the simple fact, that the issue was never actually nuclear weapons as such. The real target to be destroyed, was, rather, a utopian form of reigning nuclear-weapons policy.

The purpose of SDI was never some dark scheme to win war over the Soviet Union, but, after decades of enduring the nightmare of nuclear terror, to begin eradicating the causes of the danger of such war at their political root. Otherwise,

^{8.} Henry A. Kissinger, "Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy, Address in Commemoration of the Bicentenary of the Office of Foreign Secretary," May 10, 1982, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London. Excerpts are published in *EIR*, Sept. 22, 1995, p. 33.

^{9.} On the role of OSS's Max Corvo and the Vatican Secretariat of State's Office of Extraordinary Affairs, see Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "We Are at the End of an Epoch," speech to a conference in Germany on Dec. 2, 1995,

EIR, Jan. 1, 1996. See also, Paul Goldstein, "Patriot Reveals Secrets of World War II," and "In Memoriam: Max Corvo," EIR, July 22, 1994. As Niccolò Machiavelli warns, in his commentaries on the ten books of Livy, when an adversary is defeated and cornered, no competent military leader will continue the attack, as foolish President Harry Truman did.

why should the President have proposed that the U.S.A. and Soviet Union share one another's relevant new technologies?

My own intention, as aptly expressed in a public statement by Dr. Edward Teller, in late 1982, was to use these new technologies, not only to develop an effective strategic ballistic-missile defense, but also to facilitate those economic and related purposes corresponding to what Teller named "the common aims of mankind," for the benefit of the world at large.¹⁰

Those of a contrary opinion, who proposed to ban, or regulate nuclear-weapons as such, were of two types: either what are sometimes called "honest fools," who refused to think clearly; or, in the alternative, really perverse persons, of nasty utopian motives, motives of the same general type expressed by Wells' and Russell's scheme.

To the present day, very few in the general public, or the Congress, understand the profound difference between nuclear weapons and the sort of nuclear-weapons policy which has dominated U.S. strategic thinking since August 1945. Therefore, only a few are prepared to judge the importance of the SDI policy back in 1983. Those who do not see through the fraud of the Wells-Russell nuclear-weaponspolicy game, must necessarily mistake the game they are induced to play, for the reality from which the passion for "winning the game" distracts them.

So, often, these days, what appear otherwise to be mature, sane adults, are lured into the functionally insane, escapist's fantasy-life, especially when they are under sustained stress, such as the stress induced by fear of nuclear weapons. The victims of such fantasies flee from the reality they can not endure psychologically, into the supposed magic of the rules of some made-up children's game, such as nuclear-weapons policy. In the grip of that fantasy, they become unable to recognize the difference between responding appropriately to reality, and playing games controlled by minds which have been driven by their anxieties, into flights from reality.

So, from Hiroshima onward, the hegemonic Anglo-American strategic doctrine, was the Russell dogma of nuclear-weapons, as nothing other than a scheme to establish world government under joint domination by London and London's Wall Street cronies.¹¹ This was the proposal for a

"preventive nuclear war" option, against the Soviet Union, which Russell set forth publicly in the September 1946 issue of his own mouthpiece, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, a policy which Russell continued to insist he "never regretted," even many years later. In circles of leading U.S. military professionals, this British doctrine was referred to as "utopian," in contrast to that pre-1946 U.S. military doctrine of World War II army commanders typified by Douglas MacArthur, known, by contrast, as "traditionalist."

The next step toward what became Kissinger's 1972 ABM treaty, came about two years after the death of Soviet General Secretary Josef Stalin. Nikita Khrushchev, in 1955, when he had consolidated his position in power for the time being, opened a process of reconciliation of the Soviet Union with peace-loving preventive-nuclear-warrior Bertrand Russell, establishing this direct connection through four Khrushchev representatives sent to a 1955 conference of Russell's World Parliamentarians for World Government.¹² This Khrushchev-Russell connection led to the establishment of the series of Pugwash Conferences, most notably the Second Pugwash Conference, of 1958, held in Quebec, where Russell lackey Leo Szilard set forth the "Dr. Strangelove" doctrine to which "Pugwashee" Henry Kissinger, like Wall Street's McGeorge Bundy and John J. McCloy, would thereafter devote his life's work.¹³

It was Szilard's address at Quebec, which defined the policy embodied in Kissinger's 1972 ABM treaty. In short, Szilard hailed the proliferation of delivery of thermonuclear warheads by intercontinental missiles, as the potential guarantor of world government. Szilard's qualification was, that the development of effective anti-ballistic missile strategic defense must be outlawed, by agreement among the principal thermonuclear powers—i.e., the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. It was Szilard's proposal to ban


history, the massive penetration of U.S. political-intelligence institutions by the British monarchy, dates, in its present form, from the reign of President Theodore Roosevelt. Under Truman, this crew consolidated a predominant position in the post-World War II U.S. political-intelligence establishment, an influence which had already multiplied during and immediately following the 1938 launching of U.S. preparations to enter World War II on the side of Britain

^{10.} Edward Teller, speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 1982. "By cooperation with those who are willing fully to cooperate, we can improve the very horrible way of life in the Third World. We can, by using technology, create a situation where the reasons for war will diminish and keep diminishing. If our allies and we cooperate both in making a stronger defense, and bringing about the origin of real peace, the pursuit of the common aims of mankind, at least in the free part of the world, then in the end, even in the Soviet Union, where tyranny was endemic—and here I include Czarist Russia for centuries—even in that part of the world that in its history has never experienced anything like freedom, even there I think a change of thinking may occur."

^{11.} The term generally used in official circles, to identify the British monarchy's assets inside the Wall Street establishment, is "British-American-Canadian (B.A.C.)." While this phenomenon has roots in still earlier periods of

^{12.} On April 8, 1983, this author initiated a formal inquiry before the U.S. Senate into Henry Kissinger's breaches of national security. This was transmitted in a letter to Vice-President of the United States and President of the Senate George Bush, and was formally received by four Senate committees with jurisdiction over the matter: the Intelligence Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Judiciary Committee. See Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Investigations into Indicated Withholding of Information Vital to U.S. National Security by Former U.S. National Security Adviser Kissinger," *EIR*, May 3, 1983. On the Pugwash Conferences and the World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government, see L. Talionis, "The Pugwash Papers," *EIR*, June 7, 1983; and "Wells et al. in Their Own Words," *EIR*, Dec. 17, 1997.

^{13.} Szilard, op. cit. See Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Of What Is Leo Szilard Guilty?" *EIR*, July 1, 1994; *How Bertrand Russell Became an Evil Man*, op. cit.



effective strategic ballistic missile defense, which has, preponderantly, shaped the strategic doctrine of the U.S.A. and NATO, especially from the assassination of President Kennedy, up to the present time.

It was Szilard's coupling of his support for flotillas of intercontinental, thermonuclear ballistic missiles, with his proposed ban on the development of effective forms of defense against strategic ballistic-missile barrages, which demonstrates, most strikingly, the fundamental difference between nuclear weapons as such, and what has been the consistently underlying, characteristically "orbital" dynamic in the evolution of the utopian nuclear-weapons policy, and related strategic policy of the U.S.A., since August 1945, up to the present time.

After the assassination of President Kennedy, the preponderance of victory for the utopian policy, fell into the hands of Russell, the Warren Commission's John J. McCloy, Kissinger, and other "world government" and "globaloney" fanatics. This victory was accomplished during the developments from the Cuba Missiles Crisis of 1962 through the Kennedy assassination, just over a year later. With that assassination, the utopians had won out over the patriotic military and other "traditionalists." The Bundy-McNamara meatgrinder of folly, known as "the Vietnam War," then served to gut the residual moral, intellectual, and political strength of the traditionalists among the ranks of career officers.

Those traditionalists were down, but not yet out. The military tradition of Sylvanus Thayer's West Point was not to be eradicated so quickly. Despite the growing influence of the Pugwashees, their professed opponents, the traditionalists,

continued to work on designs intended to free the U.S. and the world from the utopian fantasies of Wells and Russell. That tradition, although a minority view, was still at work, when I came in, to develop a proposed solution to this strategic problem, during the second half of the 1970s.

2. How the SDI was designed

My strategic outlook, which was first broadly defined in my own mind during the closing year of my World War II military service in Asia, happened to coincide with President Franklin Roosevelt's strategic policy for a post-war world. I did not know of this policy of Roosevelt's at that time; for me, it was simply the natural American way of thinking about the part the U.S.A. should play in the post-war world.

Indeed, if one traces the remarkable intellectual development of Franklin Roosevelt, his intensive education in the legacy of the American System, during the early phases of his fight against poliomyelitis, it should not be considered astonishing, that the views of a patriotic American President and a simple soldier should coincide to the degree in which my own views and those of that war-time President did coincide at that time.

From my personal background, and my concern that the end of World War II should not lead to another general war somewhere down the line, I had come to certain broad conclusions about how the post-war world must be shaped. Thus, as I discovered later, I came to virtually the same conclusions Roosevelt had already embodied in his intended post-war

strategy: 1) Bring to an end what Roosevelt condemned as "British Eighteenth-Century methods," the Adam Smith "free trade" dogma, and replace that with our own, directly contrary, protectionist methods of the American system; 2) Eradicate Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French imperialism, and their legacies, and recognize liberated former colonies as sovereign nation-states and partners; 3) Use U.S. power and influence to make modern technology available to all among the newly liberated regions of the world. These three points of policy were the views I shared with my fellow-soldiers, and also Indian patriots, in early 1946 Calcutta.

The paradigm for my view of U.S. post-war policy, was the liberation and vigorous economic development of British India. In India, in early 1946, I found a usually less elaborated, but kindred view on such matters among a large portion of the soldiers with whom I was serving there. To round out what continues to be this crucial point of strategic analysis, still today, it is fair to say, that mine was, and is a view typical of what Kissinger, in 1982, pointed toward as what he hated: the intellectual tradition of the American Revolution, an American tradition diametrically opposite to the Churchillian tradition of the British monarchy.

Later, back in Boston, in early 1947, when the debate over the utopian "Baruch Plan" was raging, I adopted the view that that debate itself was a piece of folly. My personal advocacy, at that time, was, that, instead of that foolish debate over the so-called "Baruch Plan," nuclear technology must be directed to generation of power needed for the development of new nations such as the India, especially the southern regions of that subcontinent, whose rapid economic development per capita, depended exactly on the kind of high-density power-sources defined by nuclear fission. That, I stated publicly in a debate which occurred at that time. Since that time, that has been the paradigm of my proposed U.S. foreign policy on all issues.

Still later in that process, I came to learn more and more of President Roosevelt's kindred intentions. That increasingly well-informed outlook, has been the center of all my policies, since my rise to a role of some significance in political life began, about thirty-odd years ago. In the course of time, especially as my original scientific discoveries in economics shaped the post-1952 cultivation of my views on many subject-matters, this American intellectual tradition, which Kissinger hates with such ardor, ceased to be merely my adopted custom, and was remolded, with some important changes, in accord with fully worked-out proofs of principle replacing mere custom. That outlook, so remolded, is a central pivot from which I have never deviated since, and never shall.

This outlook provided the continuing foundation for the work leading into the August 1979 elaboration of my first proposal for strategic ballistic-missile defense. That proposal was incorporated as a "plank" of my campaign for the Democratic Party's 1980 Presidential nomination. That led, as the

history of this is summarily reported in earlier published locations, to the SDI.

That "plank" reflected an intersection with "traditionalist" military and scientific circles of the Americas, western Europe, and elsewhere, during the 1977-1983 interval. From them, I learned, far better, how to define the problem for which they, in turn, had so far been unable to define a solution. Our collaboration found thus a point of intersection, a point of common interest in collaboration.

The result of these discussions, as some leading European and other military professionals congratulated me: my solution had, implicitly, put the traditionalist military back into the realm of shaping genuine strategy, once again—if only, as it turned out, temporarily. My virtual, forcible removal from the scene, by the "secret government" circles of Kissinger and Bush, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, ended that earlier phase of my political life, a development which coincided, more or less exactly, with the ending of the thencurrent phase of world history.

The connection of my work to the emergence of the SDI itself, has been documented in earlier locations. I limit myself here, first, to the concept as I developed it, over the interval 1977-1983, and, second, to the lessons of that for today's strategic situation.

1977: The community of principle

For this purpose, my starting-point of reference for defining the solution to the paradox of nuclear-weapons policy, in mid-1977, was U.S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams' letter to President James Monroe, elaborating the grounds on which the government of the U.S.A. must reject British Minister Canning's proposal for a U.S.A.-U.K. alliance against Prince Metternich's Holy Alliance.

This rejected proposal had come up then, in the discussion of the possible means for exclusion of the predatory Holy Alliance powers from the Americas. The Benthamite British Foreign Office had exploited these concerns on the side of the U.S. government, in Canning's effort to lure the Monroe government into a well-crafted British strategic trap.

Adams' warning to the President had emphasized, that between the United States and the British monarchy, no community of principle existed. Adams warned, that the U.S. Navy must not degrade itself morally to the pathetic status of "an American cock-boat in the wake of a British man o'war" in the waters of Central and South America. Although the U.S. of 1823 might lack the means to enforce its policy of defending the emerging independent states of the Americas from British tyranny, it must not forswear its intent to so act at such appropriate future times it might have the material means to enforce the doctrine of shared "community of principle" on behalf of the Americas as a whole. The result of Adams' counsel was the same 1823 Monroe Doctrine later solemnized as the Rio Treaty, and, also, later, savagely betrayed in the case of the 1982 British provocation and conduct



John Quincy Adams. "My starting-point of reference for defining the solution to the paradox of nuclear-weapons policy, in mid-1977," LaRouche writes, "was U.S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams' letter to President James Monroe, elaborating the grounds on which the government of the U.S.A. must reject British Minister Canning's proposal for a U.S.A.-U.K. alliance against Prince Metternich's Holy Alliance."

of war against the U.S.A.'s Rio Treaty-partner Argentina.¹⁴

How many American citizens today are so illiterate in the history, and fundamental principles of the American War of Independence, the Federal Constitution, the War of 1812, and the repeated efforts of the British monarchy to destroy us, over the 1815-1865 interval, that they do not understand what Adams meant, when Adams wrote, that the United States and the British monarchy shared no "community of principle"? How many have graduated from secondary schools, or even university, without efficient knowledge of those foundations upon which even the competent exercise of even merely bare-

bones citizenship depends?

What U.S. lawyer is so illiterate in his craft, that he does not know the uncompromisable, axiomatic differences, between the fundamental principles of U.S. constitutional law, and British law? What American lawyer is so illiterate in his craft, such as Republican Representative Henry Hyde, that he could say such nonsense before the Senate, as to trace U.S. law to that tract in defense of feudal anarchy called the Magna Carta, 15 or argue that U.S. constitutional law has its principled roots in English Common Law, 16 or to argue that the perverted and subversive rules of a typically capricious British parliamentary coup d'état, ought to be applied to the attempted impeachment of a U.S. President?¹⁷ What must be said of those accomplices of Representative Hyde, who sought to degrade the processes of attempted impeachment, to the moral and legal standard of Jeffreys' Seventeenth-Century common whore's court?¹⁸ These distinctions are not mere technicalities

15. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-III.), Senate impeachment proceedings, Jan. 16, 1999. The barons of England stripped the King of England of the power to act in the interest of national sovereignty. The Wars of the Roses was but one of the horrors which pre-Henry VII England was to suffer, because of the effects of that law of baronial anarchy called the *Magna Carta*.

16. Hyde spoke in opposition to the U.S. constitutional principle of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," as adopted by the U.S. 1776 Declaration of Independence, from Leibniz's attack on John Locke's pro-slavery doctrine of "life, liberty, and property." This notion of "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness," is Leibniz's defense of the founding principle of the modern sovereign nation-state, the notion of the *commonwealth*, or *the general welfare*. This feature of the Preamble of the Federal Constitution, is the fundamental principle in law, on which all competent reading of the intent of the Constitution as a whole is premised.

17. As a result of the repeated counter-revolutionary insurgencies of the European landed aristocracies and financial oligarchies against the new institution of the sovereign nation-state, no durable sovereign nation-state of a truly republican form was established in western Europe, to the present date. Instead, persistently recurring republican efforts forced the ruling oligarchical power to make increasing concessions to democratization of those relics of feudalism known as parliaments. The inherent susceptibility of parliaments to legalized forms of parliamentary coups d'état, makes the existence of any parliamentary government the lawful prey of higher forces of state power acting through the permanent state bureaucracy. That is precisely the nature of what former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich proclaimed the parliamentary style of "neo-Jacobin" coup d'état, which his Conservative Revolution mob intended to use to destroy the constitutional form of the U.S. government.

18. This was the same Justice Jeffreys, lifted from notoriety in a London whore's court, to be ennobled for services to the English monarchy, as the Lord Jeffreys of the Bloody Assizes: a suitable model for Henry Hyde's performance. The most common fraud uttered in the misused name of constitutional law, in today's U.S., is the lie which asserts that the foundations of U.S. law are rooted in the doctrines of John Locke. The case of the sharp opposition between the U.S. Federal Constitution, and the perverse parody known as the Constitution of the British Foreign Office asset, the Confederate States of America (CSA), exposes the lie. The key to the CSA's constitution is pure and simple Locke, such that the contrast between the two warring systems shows most clearly, that what agrees with the one constitution could not possibly agree with the other. However, the currently ongoing "conservative revolution" in the U.S.A. is rooted, most piggishly, in a radically positivist reading of Locke, which, by its very nature, tends toward a more brutish

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^{14.} The pivotal issue of that war was Argentina's lawful claim to those Malvinas Islands which had been acknowledged territory of Argentina at the time the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was promulgated. In fact, during the War of 1812, it had been the U.S. Navy which had restored Argentina to possession of that its former territory. Britain had seized the Malvinas, in an act of piracy, during the 1830s, and had engaged in a hideous operation of "ethnic cleansing" against the inhabitants of those islands. Under the Rio treaty, as affirming the Monroe Doctrine, the Malvinas was the legitimate territory of Argentina. The issue in 1982 was, would the U.S. degrade itself to support the British monarchy in this matter? Sir Caspar Weinberger's honors at the hand of Queen Elizabeth II were, after all, in acknowledgment of such services to the British Empire as Weinberger performed in the Malvinas War.

of pedantry; these involve fundamental principles of U.S. law and morality, principles won and defended repeatedly at the price of blood and suffering of American patriots.

To understand the principles upon which I premised my design of a policy of strategic ballistic-missile defense, one must grasp first the notion of that fundamental strategic interest of the state, which is implied in Adams' reference to the notion of a community of principle. The following series of paragraphs, summarizing that notion, set the preconditions for the way in which a strategic ballistic-missile defense must be crafted in law and practice.

As I have emphasized, on the subject of community of principle, in 1977 and since, the implied fundamental strategic interest of the U.S. republic has always been, and will always be, to associate itself with a community of perfectly sovereign nation-state republics, a community of such states sharing certain specific principles of natural law in common. The characteristic feature of such a community of principle, is defined by what our Federal Constitution identifies as "the general welfare" of the people and also their posterity. This means, that the authority of the state itself can be premised upon, and conditioned by nothing other than its role as the faithful and indispensable servant of that general welfare.

This does not mean a state subject to a current majority opinion, since the state must resist any current opinion which does an unjustice either to some part of the existing population, or its posterity. Since that posterity can not vote or hold office, the state must defend the general welfare of that posterity with a degree of emphasis overcoming any contrary passing whims of a current adult majority. It is a state based, thus, on a principle of law, rather than the inherently capricious, merely democratic opinion held by even a majority among some men.

This notion of a community of principle, as based upon, and derived from the central principle of the general welfare, implies that the fundamental, long-range interest of the United States, in particular, is to establish a more or less global community, based upon cooperating, but each perfectly sovereign, individual nation-state republics. The defense of a persisting effort to create the conditions which bring such a community of principle into being, has always been, and remains, the best hope for securing the general welfare of our own nation, its population, and their posterity. That long-range objective, must be the underlying guide for defining the strategic interest of our republic under all circumstances.

Accordingly, our military and related policies must never seek to impose by force, or other overreaching means, those conditions of internal life we might desire to introduce into other nations. Instead of dictating conduct within other nations, we must always defend the preconditions which foster

form of fascist tyranny than existed under the Nazi judicial system. Hyde's pleading in the impeachment proceedings was essentially that of an ideological slave to Locke's doctrine.

the possible future emergence of a community of principle. Thus, the military and related strategic policies of our republic, must always be premised on realizing that outcome of any conflict, military or other. ¹⁹ It is consistent with the Augustinian doctrine of justified warfare, that winning the *historical outcome* of any unavoidable and justified warfare — winning the peace, not winning the war in any other sense, must always be the objective of our military policy and related strategic doctrines.

To see how this has been defined by the history of extended European civilization—since ancient pre-Classical Greece, and to understand properly why the United States, to the present day, shares no community of moral principle with the British monarchy, we must first consider, at least summarily, the history of the modern state.

The origin of the modern state

This notion of a sovereign nation-state ruled by a principle of the general welfare, did not drop from the skies. It was the outgrowth of a long struggle within extended European civilization.²⁰ From the time of the ministries of Jesus Christ and his Apostles, as typified by the work of John and Paul, this struggle was elaborated chiefly through the Christian adoption of Classical Greek culture, as the latter is typified by Plato. The Classical Greek culture is the alternative better suited to man, as Christianity defines man, than Christianity's principal adversary, the neo-Babylonian form of the pagan Roman Empire and the latter's modern legacy of so-called Romanticism. Thus, every advance in European civilization since the Roman legionnaires' murder of Archimedes of Syracuse, has been a reflection of a fresh upsurge of the Greek Classical tradition, either in its specifically Christian, such as Augustinian expression, or as expressed by the beneficial collaboration between Charlemagne and the Baghdad Caliphate of Haroun al Rashid.

The characteristic of this struggle against the neo-Babylonian legacy of pagan Rome, produced the first form of a modern sovereign nation-state, one based on the principle of the general welfare, ²¹ in the late-Fifteenth-Century reform of France under King Louis XI. This was echoed by the reign of the great reformer, Henry VII, in England, and by other echoes of the great ecumenical Council of Florence, such as the role of Isabella I of Spain in sponsoring a student of Nicholas of Cusa's circles, Christopher Columbus, in verifying a scien-

^{19.} This was Leibniz's reading of the lessons of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, in opposition to the alternate reading of that treaty-law circulating in, for example, the late-Seventeenth-Century court of Prussia's Great Elector.

^{20.} Compare my argument here, as in my relevant earlier published locations, with that of international law expert Professor von der Heydte's text on the birth of the modern nation-state: Friedrich A. Freiherr von der Heydte, *Die Geburtsstunde des souveränen Staates* (Regensburg: Druck und Verlag Josef Habbel, 1952).

^{21.} Otherwise termed a commonwealth.

tifically devised map of the world constructed by Cusa's associate Paolo Toscanelli. This new conception of the sovereign nation-state, rooted in the Greek Classical tradition and in Christianity, defines the non-trivial usage of the term "republican," a usage which harks back to memories of Solon's republican reform at Athens, and to memories of the ancient constitutions of the old Ionian city-state republics.

Although this form of the modern European state was specifically Christian in origin, its law was defined in Platonic, ecumenical terms, as Philo of Alexandria, as Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, Gottfried Leibniz, and as both Gotthold Lessing and the Orthodox Jew Moses Mendelssohn commonly defined such an ecumenical principle. In matters of law, particularities of faith must yield to the principle of Reason. Thus, on such a premise, and only such a premise of ecumenical reason, can there be a peace of faiths among peoples of differing monotheistic faiths.²² Only under the protection of a principle of ecumenical universal Reason in law, can persons of differing religious faiths live peacefully together on the same planet.

Unfortunately, with the victory of Venice over the League of Cambrai, the feudal reaction, led by Venice, nearly succeeded in turning Europe back to a form of feudalism consistent with the legacy of pagan Rome. Hence, the bestiality of the outburst of Venice-orchestrated religious wars, which dominated Europe after the defeat of the League of Cambrai. This Venice-orchestrated religious warfare, reigned as a recurring pestilence, until the wisdom of France's Henri IV was realized, belatedly, in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.

In the deadly aftermath of the assassination of France's Henri IV, and, later, during and following Venice's orchestration of what became the Thirty Years War in Central Europe, the republicans of Europe looked to the sparsely populated Americas, where, in echo of the ancient Greek colonies set up in Magna Graecia, they might build up republics whose existence would turn the tide in favor of the republican cause within Europe itself. Such currents are found in the emergence of republican currents in the Spanish Americas, as in North American colonization. Most typical of Seventeenth-Century republican colonization are the Massachusetts Bay Colony from the period prior to the accession of the bloody tyrant William of Orange, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Later, with the triumph of William of Orange's and Marlborough's faction over the English patriots, and especially after the accession of William of Orange's choice, George I, to occupy the newly constituted throne of the British monarchy, the build-up of the English-speaking colonies in North America, was accelerated to the effect leading into the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence.

Again, later, during the middle to latter part of the Eighteenth Century, a renaissance of the republican influence in Europe was built up around the legacies of Leibniz and Bach, as typified by the collaboration of such followers of Leibniz and Bach as Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn in Germany and Austria, around the Oratorian teaching-order in France, and reflected also in the Leibniz legacy persisting inside the United Kingdom itself. This new insurgence of the Classical Greek tradition, against Eighteenth-Century Romanticism, reinvigorated the process of organizing the struggle for "civil and religious liberty" in the Americas, as also within continental Europe.²³ It was the strategic shift caused by this Classical-Greek-based renaissance in mid-Eighteenth-Century Europe, which made possible the successful struggle for independence, and the new Federal Constitution inside the U.S.A.

The related great debt of the United States to those European republicans who made the U.S. possible, is the key to proper understanding and application of what Adams defined as a "community of principle." It was my understanding of the indicated nature of these connections between the Americas and Europe, upon which I premised my 1977-1982 design for a strategic ballistic-missile defense.

The establishment of the United States as a Federal constitutional republic, has been, in and of itself, a magnificent historical exception within the modern history of the world. However, contrary to the doctrine of such influential perverts as President Theodore Roosevelt's favorite historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, this exceptional achievement was not a peculiar secretion of the biological inhabitants of the U.S.A. It was chiefly a benefit bestowed on our continent by the noblest currents of old Europe, who made it possible that Benjamin Franklin's noble enterprise might succeed. This success was promoted thus, in order to produce the new nation whose example and influence might tilt the balance in world affairs, to enable republics of this kind to supersede the feudalistic relics then ruling over the peoples of Europe. Thus, it was the best in Europe which made our achievement possible, an achievement which belongs as much to those Europeans, in particular, as it does to our nation's population.

That defines our proper destiny, and, so defines our most fundamental national self-interest. This nation is a good which has been entrusted to us. Our true identity as a nation, and therefore our truest interest, too, lies in what we as a nation must bring to the rest of the world, especially to the extended European civilization whose noblest persons made our existence possible. Our identity lies in our mission, that of acting to bring into being that community of principle for which we were created as a republic. Our self-interest as a nation, lies in that mission; and the meaning of the life of each of us, lies in what each of us gives, or fails to contribute to the

^{22.} Whether the individual professes a specifically religious faith or not, the principle of universality of Reason in the universe defines the meaning of law as implicitly monotheistic. Both polytheistic and merely customary, or ethical faiths are hostile to such a rational notion of law.

^{23.} The allusion is to Percy Shelley's thesis, in his *In Defence of Poetry* essay.

future realization of that mission.

Whenever we assemble to define a proper defense of the strategic interest of our republic, it is the comprehension of that self-interest in the success of our nation's mission, which must override every other consideration in shaping that policy, in shaping our conduct in that matter.

It was also necessary that we, applying that same principle of mission, define, clearly, the nature of not only what might appear temporarily to be immediate strategic adversaries, but also that which was and is our republic's permanent adversary, the financier-oligarchical power associated, since George I, with the present British monarchy.

Exit Clausewitz

About this same time, in 1977, as my occupation with the subject of a community of principle, I began fussing with Clausewitz's German text. I found myself increasingly displeased with his *On War*.

There is a specific defect in Clausewitz's famous, posthumously published work, relative to what we can now show, with certainty, was the actual model represented by Clausewitz's far greater predecessor, and mentor, Gerhard Scharnhorst. I soon concluded, that the famous aphorism, "War is politics continued by other means," is not only ambiguous, but, in fact, false.

This fallacy reflects, in fact, Clausewitz's circumstances, after the death of Scharnhorst, and under the mood of pessimism radiating from the post-1815 Prussian monarchy's reactionary court. Unlike that depraved Metternich admirer G.W.F. Hegel, and Hegel's lackey-like advocacy of the reactionary Carlsbad Decrees of 1819, Clausewitz shows no sign of the widespread political corruption of that time, but appears to have sought to avoid further conflict with, rather than explicitly condone the court of his ungrateful monarch. It might be said, on this point, that he became only less the former self he had been during the heroic, Classical period marked by the Prussian reformers' work of the time preceding and accompanying the Liberation Wars.

These qualifications duly considered, his posthumously published *On War* erred conspicuously and crucially, in the degree that that work implicitly allowed the military to be defined as the servant of the will of the merely given state, rather than recognizing that both the military and the highest offices of the state itself must be subordinated to certain, definite, clear principles—i.e., republican principles. These principles, typified by our President Abraham Lincoln's role in a time of great crisis of the nation, its military officer-corps, and the government itself, are themselves higher moral, higher political authority in matters of both peace and war, than any customary, accidental, or other incumbent state authority. A modern nation-state, as defined according to a principle of law—i.e., the general welfare—places that principle of natural, rather than merely positive law—higher than the state

itself. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which binds the people (e.g., "by the people") to serve the principle of the general welfare (e.g., "for the people," including all posterity), typifies that higher authority in natural law binding, delimiting the authority of any existing government.²⁴

To understand what Clausewitz's seeming ambiguity reflects as a lesson for us today, consider briefly, the experience of the German people, between Napoleon's crushing of the Prussian military forces, in 1806, at Jena-Auerstadt, and Metternich's Carlsbad Decrees of 1819.

After Jena-Auerstadt, Prussian power was humbled, crushed by Napoleon's tyranny. The poet Goethe professed his demoralization by Napoleon's victory. A few German leaders, mostly either collaborators or allies of the recently deceased Friedrich Schiller, were of a different bent: Freiherr vom Stein, Scharnhorst, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Schiller's in-law von Wolzogen, typify this. These Prussian reformers, chiefly in the orbit of Schiller's influence, crafted the war-plan which, with a significant contributing role by Clausewitz, doomed Napoleon's tyranny.²⁵ In the German Liberation Wars of 1812-1813, against Napoleon, there was a great upsurge of German volunteers, often volunteers inspired by Schiller's influence, providing the forces through which the German forces under Scharnhorst's leadership were capable of falling upon the retreating Bonaparte, and crushing him before he could reach France (and there raise a new army).

Then, during 1814-1815, Germany was betrayed at Vienna. In 1819, Schiller's writings were significantly banned by the Carlsbad Decrees. Germany's greatest statesman, Freiherr vom Stein, was sent into internal exile by a shamelessly ungrateful monarchy. Most of the leading reformers enjoyed similar expressions of the ingratitude of a wretched Prussian monarch. The Prussian reaction, reaching a peak in the wake of Metternich's Carlsbad Decrees, swept Germany with waves of embittered sense of betrayal of the German people, including betrayal by the very Prussian monarchy which had been rescued by the reformers.

Then, and there, in this Metternichean, Hegelian reaction, the seeds of that later German Conservative Revolution, leading into Hitler, were planted. Germany's soul was scarred, not fatally, but severely; the ulcerating wound then inflicted by the anti-republican, oligarchical brutishness of the British influence and Metternich's Holy Alliance, has never been fully healed.

It was not the Prussian monarchy which had saved Germany from Napoleon's tyranny; it was the Prussian reformers who saved the ungrateful monarch, despite himself. It was the republican spirit of the reformers, a spirit which the monarch

^{24.} If we had a decent Federal Court today, that Court would bind the government itself to meet that requirement in all ways pertaining to law.

^{25.} Helga Zepp-LaRouche, "Friedrich Schiller and the Liberation Wars," *EIR*, Dec. 4, 1998.

abhorred, which had given Germany the means to save itself, when lackey Hegel's adored monarchy had failed so miserably.

The lesson so typified, should warn us against tolerating the teaching of that often fatal folly, that perfidious, stoical, oligarchical, sophistical, all too Roman, so Romantic pseudoprinciple, so-called *reason of state*, lurking, a perfidy often unrecognized, among the professed students of Clausewitz's *On War*.

As the German military was to discover from its experience under Hitler, the question of the military and related strategy of the state, can not be securely defined with indifference to the political character of that state itself. So, when leaders of the German officer-corps took the foolish vacation from continuing responsibility, which left the cabal of Britain's Montagu Norman, New York's Harriman, Hjalmar Schacht, Schroeder's bank, and von Papen, free to push President Hindenburg into putting "that corporal" Hitler, whom Hindenburg personally despised, into the Chancellorship, the German military command had failed. For this, the enervating effect of "reason of state," was partially to blame. Similarly, in allowing Hitler to assassinate von Schleicher, in 1934, the German military command completed the tragically fatal mistake which led it to its own self-destruction across the battlefields of North Africa and Europe, and to Hitler's slaughter of the core of the leading patriots of Germany, with British preference for Hitler at even that late time, in the abattoir of July 1944.

Does this mean military coups should prevent such catastrophes as that? Rather, it means that those who are the shapers of both the military and other state institutions, whether in or out of government, must be always alert, to ensure that, through their combined efforts as the elders of the nation, the character of the state authority does not develop into a form which is inimicable to the ability of the nation to defend its true strategic interest competently, whether by military or other means. Unlike the German military leadership of 1933-1934, so, the Prussian reformers of 1806-1813 did act, setting thus an heroic example of true statesmanship, acting for the benefit of all European civilization, during a time of crisis of civilization, when the Prussian monarch himself had failed as monarch and man.

The issue of likely, even putatively necessary, i.e., revolutionary, coups against legal authority arises, chiefly, when the republican elders of the nation, who should have been "watching the store," fail to take those precautionary measures of policy-shaping which prevent coups, by making them strategically unnecessary. A republican military policy can work consistently only under the condition that the higher authority, the state, is itself either republican, or induced, even against its will, to act as if it were truly republican.

Those who do not ensure that the state is, at least in effect, republican in character, and in the choice of its leading offi-

cials, are not truly serious about the republic's defense. The avoidance of that moral responsibility under the sophist's pretext of "reason of state," is as foolish, and ultimately as immoral, as it is pompous. Instead, we must require, by whatever means we might find, that the state itself be self-controlled by the efficient comprehension of, and service to republican principle, just as the Preamble of the U.S. Federal Constitution makes the state itself subservient to the principle of "the general welfare." ²⁶

Conceded, that a republican military officer-corps, such as that of the great plebeian Scharnhorst, or the plebeian Lazare Carnot for France, must often endure the defense of its nation, despite a most unsuitable character of its current form of its government, or that government's incumbent chief magistrate. In such circumstances, patriots do what they must do. However, the fact that such burdens must sometimes be endured, apparently with no remedy close at hand, does not license anyone to make a principle out of the existence of such immoral incongruities.

There is a lesson to be learned on this account, even by anti-Communists, from Soviet history.

The case of V.I. Lenin's role in the Russian Revolutions of 1917, typifies a likely revolutionary, extreme situation of the same form which I have, in fact, just described. The adoption, during the last decades of the Soviet system, of the "antivoluntarist" views of Plekhanov et al., not only falsified Lenin's actual role in 1917 on crucial points, but aided, as a destructive ideology, in crippling the Soviet bureaucracy in ways which led directly to its own doom.

As matters turned out, the mid-1982 designation of Yuri Andropov as successor to the failing Leonid Brezhnev, has shown itself to have been the probable moment—the point of no return—at which the Soviet system became more or less hopelessly doomed, at which the state had lost the capability of reforming itself in the specific way its own survival required.²⁷

In effect, there were no new Lenins in place in the 1980s Soviet leadership. The comparison of the failed performances of both the failed Soviet leadership of the 1980s, the failure of leadership among certain of Germany's military leaders, in the events of 1933-1934, and Lenin's peculiar success in the unfolding process of 1917, points directly to the everlurking, potentially fatal folly of the dogma of *reason of state*.

First, then, to the case of Lenin.

^{26.} This problem is otherwise expressed as the error of substituting what is termed a body of "basic law," for a principled form of constitution such as the original U.S. Federal Constitution of 1789. The former expresses a parliamentary system's compromises, "a state with some included properties of democratic concessions." The second is a state whose law is everywhere subordinated by a single, unifying republican principle, as the Preamble of the U.S. Federal Constitution expresses this quality.

 $^{27.\,}E.g., contrary \,to \,the \, ``perestroika" \,circus \,of \,General \,Secretary \,Gorbachev.$

With the assassination of France's Jaurès, the so-called "Zimmerwald" resolution against that coming World War which Britain's Edward VII had predesigned, became effectively a dead letter. From approximately that time, Lenin, consistently, single-mindedly, and accurately, foresaw that the Czarist system's commitment to the folly of war against Germany, would produce the situation in which, for "reasons of state," every Czarist, liberal reformer, and socialist force would march toward its own political doom, in the course of the ensuing series of war-time events. That was exactly the way things turned out.

That was Lenin's precisely correct, and unique personal assessment of that vulnerable flank which that war had opened against the entirety of the then-existing political system of Russia as a whole. That case deserves to be considered as among the classic lessons of the follies of submitting to the dogma of *reason of state*, then, or as the relevant German military leaders failed in late January 1933, or, again, in the deadly events of the Summer of 1934. It was on account of submission to the fictitious principle that the already lost war could not be stopped by a unilateral sovereign decision of the state, that all of Lenin's opponents and rivals were foredoomed to fail in that situation, just as the relevant German military leaders of January 1933 and Summer 1934 failed to act according to the crucial evidence in hand.

Lenin's insistence on concentrating on the crucial flank of all his opponents and Bolshevik rivals combined, their unwillingness to break absolutely, and unconditionally, from the continuation of the war with Germany, was decisive for the outcome. Just so, the failure of the German military leaders to secure the continuation of the von Schleicher chancellorship of January 1933 with the same ruthless determination Lenin had shown in the case of war-wracked Russia, contrasts the success of the successful commander who rises above "reason of state," to the tragic failure of that otherwise capable commander who seeks the right outcome, but seeks this within the bounds of an erring formalist's confidence in the notion of reason of state. The latter fails tragically, as Shakespeare's Hamlet does, by taking submission to the customary higher, but failed authority, either in the name of custom, or whatever else, as the context within which the outcome must be situated.28

28. Failure to recognize the passion with which Lenin governed himself by his choice of the "voluntarist principle" in history, has blinded many Soviet and other analysts to both the implication of triple agent Parvus's role, and to the implicitly certain fact that Lenin knew the essential features of the roles of Parvus, Radek, and German gold Reichsmarks in Radek's pocket, in delivering Lenin back to revolutionary Russia. Lenin used those who thought they were using him, as a commander uses the peculiarities of the terrain where he chooses to engage. Parvus, whose British patronage dates from no later than London of the 1890s, was, in the proximate period, an asset of both Vickers and of the same London-directed, Saloniki-based B'nai B'rith International which, together with such figures as Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata and Vladimir Jabotinsky, launched the Young Turk coup d'état in Turkey. As such, he was laundered, by the British, into the German intelligence



V.I. Lenin's ruthless determination in war-wracked Russia "contrasts the success of the successful commander who rises above 'reason of state,' to the tragic failure of that otherwise capable commander who seeks the right outcome, but seeks this within the bounds of an erring formalist's confidence in the notion of reason of state."

Lenin's apparent stroke of strategic genius on this matter, did not occur accidentally. To understand this lesson from history, it is sufficient to examine closely the significance of Lenin's open break with Plekhanov over the issue of "voluntarism."

Although Lenin was, formally, a doctrinaire philosophical materialist in one respect, he was, at the same time, an impassioned revolutionary, a man dedicated to shaping history by introducing a perceived opportunity for revolutionary change in the axioms governing the unfolding of a lawful social process. Thus, where Plekhanov sought a revolution through what formalist social-democratic apologists defined as a lawful pulsation within a deductively defined existing system, Lenin, as the social-democrats ever afterward accused him, won by "cheating," by "breaking the rules of historicity," by changing the rules—by perpetrating the crime of "voluntarism." Lenin defined the strategic qualities of his political character, thus, in that open break with Plekhanov, Karl Kautsky, et al., approximately a decade and a half before the Bolshevik coup d'état. During the intervening years, follow-

service's employ, and so on and so forth. For Lenin, who knew the moral character of both Parvus and Radek very well, they were part of the terrain which he used for his own purposes.

ing that break with Plekhanov, Lenin forged the development of his own personality according to the principle to which he came in the course of that break.

The problem so posed, is identical to a pair of analogous similar problems, both also crucial to the issues posed by the SDI, which we shall examine summarily, below. One such, precisely analogous case, comes from physical science. A second, also fully analogous one, comes from studying of similarly contrasted views on the subject of the military principle of successful flanking operations.

On the subject of the first such analogy, we shall consider, below, the case of the kind of scientific mind which generates a validatable sort of genuine discovery of a new universal physical principle. This is paradigmatic for the "voluntarism" of which Lenin's Bolshevik and other socialist detractors accused him.

In the second analogy, we shall examine cases of the type of that military professional, who has mastered the details of Hannibal's demolition of the Roman forces at Cannae, but, who, like the Austrian commander who, commanding superior forces, followed precisely the school-book principles adduced from Cannae, and was routed by a Frederick II, commanding far weaker forces, who outflanked the Austrians twice in the same day, at Leuthen. The Austrian commander had copied the classroom lesson; Frederick, however, grasped the true principle of the flank involved.

In all three comparisons, those of a successful Lenin and the failed German military leaders, those of the creative and formalist scientist, and the creative versus formalist commander, a single principle prevails. In each of the successful cases of the anti-formalist, the relevant person is never confused about the absolute difference between the laws of the universe and the currently conventional notion of "the proper, currently approved way of doing things." The first plays by the discoverable laws of the universe; the second, the relatively psycho-sexually impotent personality, as I accused General Danny Graham — at least the Graham who had emerged from the demoralizing experience of his intelligence failure in the period preceding the celebrated Vietnam "Tet Offensive," plays by the presumably fixed, merely learned "rules of the game." Such was the implication of the gaping doctrinal flaw embedded so famously in much of the popular reading of Clausewitz's On War.

Ultimately, there is no remedy for that error of principle, other than to specify, that the present-day possibility of a secure peace, demands that the world must be made to become dominated by dedication to fostering a concert of allied sovereign nation-state republics, allowing nothing which approximates world-government, or other disguises for revived empires of the past, nothing which permits so-called supranational authorities to exert hegemonic influence in world affairs.

Wars and genuine revolutionary upheavals, tend to be the crucial breaking-points in real-life history, for precisely the

reason just identified. Sometimes, wars occur because of capricious behavior by some authority exploiting the belief of the credulous in bare *reason of state*. Better said, such cases are the exception which merely proves the rule. In general, wars and revolutions are likely to erupt when the established order, like the tragic Hamlet, either persists in failing to correct a potentially fatal flaw in the existing ordering of affairs, or where a similar state of affairs affects relations among states. At such points of crisis, some of the implied axioms of the existing ordering of affairs must either be abandoned, or obliterated in more dramatically forceful ways.

The folly of the G-7 governments, in insisting, so foolishly, on upholding, or at the least perpetuating the presently disintegrating IMF monetary and financial order, is a most extreme case of this Classically tragic type. Since the system will not bend to reality, it will be broken, crushed by the inexorable higher authority of reality itself.

At such points of crisis, the only qualified leadership is one which has the insight, and personal commitment to action, needed, to eradicate the relevant habituated notions of *reason of state*. In an extreme crisis, this change will occur for the better, or, lacking that happier outcome, it will occur very much for the worse, even the worst, as happened in Germany as a result of those who had had the means to act to prevent Hitler's consolidation of power, but who failed to do so in a timely fashion. In a time of crisis, leaders who do not think in the terms I have just described, soon become, like Hamlet, or Czar Nicholas II, no leaders at all. In the latter case, under the pressure of escalating crises, they will be toppled, one after the other, as it is said, like ten-pins.

With those political considerations as the underlying axioms adopted, the design for a suitable strategic ballistic missile defense was a matter of fitting technical criteria to a system based upon these political axioms. In such a situation, there is no solution within the bounds of established standards of conduct. One must go outside the domain of hide-bound custom, to introduce a revolutionary new principle to the situation. Such was the set of principles, including physical and other principles, upon which my design was premised. Dr. Teller's referenced remarks of late October 1982 pointed in the same direction, as did the initiative presented by President Reagan on March 23, 1983.

But, then, tragically, President Reagan, by subsequently capitulating to the pressures to repeat Hamlet's part, on a real-life stage, failed heroically, Classically, in his last great part, which he played as an actor on the stage of real history. I would not have failed in that situation. I might have been killed by the Anglo-American "secret government" establishment, for what I would have done, but I would not have failed to leave something on which my successors could have built. I would not have allowed myself to come to such a Hamlet-like, tragic end.

Had President Reagan not made those tragic compromises with the Heritage Foundation and others, the political prob-

lem which remained, would have been how to deal with the infuriated opposition which any such design would, and did provoke from a nominal ally, the British monarchy.

3. British ally, British foe

To locate the source of the continuing, 1776-1999 conflict of fundamental interest, between the United States as a republic and the British monarchy in its present neo-Venetian form, the matter must be viewed on the level of problems inhering, axiomatically, in implications of the British notion of *reason of state*. That means, a British monarchical state resting upon the type of financier oligarchy which Venice had established in the Netherlands and England, since the time of Paolo Sarpi.

Contrary to the childish babble in some circles, the currently reigning Queen of England is no mere figurehead, but the most empowered single political and financial authority on this planet today. Accordingly, history has come presently to that revolutionary state of existential crisis in world affairs, at which the world must now promptly choose an early replacement for the present global political and financial hegemony of British monarchy²⁹ and its Blair government (or some alternate means of virtual nullification of the global power of that monarchy). If not, in the alternative, the world as a whole shall be plunged soon into a form of global chaos beyond the imagination of nearly all persons living today.

The presently advanced state of the ongoing world financial crisis, has brought the world as a whole, thus, to the point, that the nations now choose, between the continuation of the presently overreaching, supranational political and financial power of the present British monarchy, and those alternate arrangements which are indispensable for the continuation of anything resembling civilized life on this planet at large.

I must warn you, that if that world, at this critical stage, prefers this Queen to some suitable alternate arrangement of international power, it will get Hitlers, or even worse. As the presently ongoing global financial meltdown proceeds, something must break; things simply can not go on this way. The rapidly onrushing break in the global financial and political situation, whichever form, wars or revolutions, it takes, will be fundamental, and, for better or worse, revolutionary.

If the world is to avoid a plunge, very soon, into a horrible new dark age, certain radical changes must be made now. In place of the presently predominant, neo-Babylonian, Romantic, utopian tyrannies of world government and Blair's and Vice-President Gore's irrationalist "globaloney," a community of principle among perfectly sovereign nation-state republics must define a new standard of law in international relations. This must be a set of relations rooted in an ecumenical principle consistent with Reason. It must be a principle

which defines each man and woman as, in both principle and practice, equally made in the image of the Creator of this universe. That is the anti-oligarchical, anti-Roman principle of Christianity upon which the entire achievement of extended European civilization has been premised, and that civilization will now survive, or become dust, as it chooses to uphold that principle now, or not.

In this required new ordering of the relations among nations, no overt or camouflaged form of imperial authority can be allowed to rule over the relations among states. No utopian, or kindred concoction of the merely positive law can be tolerated. Nothing less natural, less universal, than a principle of natural law, can be tolerated on this account. The agency to be employed for enforcement of such a law, lies in the integument of the community of principle itself. That is to say, that the international authority lies solely in the circumstance, that the members of that community have been brought to recognize the imperative of submitting themselves to that constitutional principle of deliberation, an imperative rooted in the acknowledged fundamental common interest of each and all.

Therefore, the design for such a community, must not be the form of "world government" implicit in the satanic dogma of Kissinger's proclaimed British god, Thomas Hobbes, ³⁰ or as implicit in Immanuel Kant's and G.W.F. Hegel's common and perverse notions of "negation of the negation." Instead of such mechanistic rubbish, a community of principle must be premised upon bringing forth the innate goodness within individual human nature, the same principle which Leibniz named "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." It must be the rallying of nations to recognize their absolutely positive, rather than the ever-foolish utopian's merely negative common interest in such a community of perfectly sovereign nation-state republics, and, also, in the great power for good which such a community among leading nations represents.

No authority other than that should be desired, or allowed. If the members of that community do not recognize that ecumenical principle to be in their common interest, they will not obey it, and then, in that case, terrible war is once again possible, perhaps even inevitable. If fools were to appoint a special authority as "jailer" of nations, to enforce such a principle, the "jailer" himself would be the cause of warfare, against himself if against no other.

Therefore, it is the definition of the fundamental strategic interest of our republic, to wage a continuing struggle to bring a true republican community of principle into being. From the beginning of our struggle for independence, it was implicitly

^{29.} Admittedly, the U.S.A. is the principal, if rapidly fading military power, but, usually, it is "British brains" which control "American muscle."

^{30.} E.g., Kissinger's May 10, 1982 Chatham House address.

^{31.} E.g., Immanuel Kant, "The Dialectic of Practical Reason," in *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) (Indianapolis and New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., division of Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1956 edition). The same notion of Kant's was copied by Hegel, and also turned up as the psychological dogma of Sigmund Freud.

clear from the global circumstances in which our republic came into being, that, sooner or later, such a community must emerge, as at least the dominant political-economic feature of our planet. It is upon exactly that perception, that the competent design of a strategic ballistic-missile defense depended. I relied upon that principled outlook in addressing that threat which I had recognized as the utopian's use of its nuclear-weapons policy as the pathway to imperial world government.

The essence of effective strategic defense, with or without nuclear weapons, lies in a purely political decision, the selection of some predeterminable political-economic outcome of the conflict. Even if a nation believes it has already won the military engagement, if the nation has chosen the wrong political-economic outcome, as a foolish NATO has done in the case of its recent war upon Yugoslavia, it will have lost that war to the forces of attrition which its folly has unleashed.

Thus, the design of weapons and other military means must be determined according to that notion of a preselected political outcome. It is in this purely political-economic aspect of the matter, that the relatively greatest risk of a military catastrophe lies, as is already visible in the case of the failure of the victorious parties to launch an all-inclusive economic reconstruction of the war-ruined Balkans region today. It is within those types of considerations, that the essence of the design of an effective strategic ballistic missile defense lies.

So, according to this principle of political outcome, the United States betrayed itself, perhaps even irreparably, by rallying, under those Confederacy buffs, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, to commit itself, in advance, to support the British monarchy's launching of World War I. It had better served the U.S. interest, had Germany been allowed to win that war, as it would have done but for U.S. intervention. With such a crushing defeat for the British Empire, the United States would have assumed the role of *primus inter pares* within an emerging new, global arrangement among nations. In fact, without the successful British corruption of the U.S. government, into precommitments to support Edward VII's plan for launching that war, the British would not have dared to begin that war.

However, in the case of the World War II alliance, the considerations were qualitatively different. Those circumstances of the late 1930s, left the U.S. no acceptable choice, but to accept the horribly difficult alliance with Britain for World War II.

When a nation is faced with a justified war which it must fight, or even a threat of such a war, that present conflict exists, whether one had wished it to come into being, or not. To deal with the paradoxes of this sort, as they arise from time to time, we must define the notions of "adversary" and "ally" in two perspectives: the deeper, longer-term level of principle, and the immediate level of an unavoidable historical contingency arising in the shorter term. Unless one understands the connections and differences between these two levels, the business of defining enemy and ally would sometimes appear to exclude any consideration of deeper political principles, an exclusion which may lead to even the costliest sort of consequent error.

The chosen outcome for which we prepare against the danger of war, and choice of methods and weapons to match, must flow from the conception of that connection between republican principle and choice of strategy. Sometimes, in the struggles to discover, and to secure the adoption of such excellent national strategies, the actual course taken to that purpose will lead us through complicated routes. Such as been our national experience through the century now ending.

The myth of Wallis Simpson

Such was the contradictory quality of the circumstances leading into the emergence of the perilously difficult alliance between Franklin Roosevelt's U.S.A., and Winston Churchill's British monarchy, during the period preceding and accompanying World War II. Exactly how difficult that 1938-1945 alliance was, can not be appreciated unless we first acknowledge the very ugly truth imperfectly concealed behind the diversionary excitement aroused over the matter of Edward VIII's liaison with his later bride, Wallis Simpson.³²

The crucial fact of this century's history is, that for specifically British reasons, until a time proximate to Edward VIII's abdication, the British monarchy was determined to keep the U.S.A. out of what became World War II. They had intended, on this account, to leave Britain's temporary asset, Adolf Hitler, to do pretty much as he chose—if temporarily—on the continent of Europe. The obvious intention of these heirs of Lord Palmerston's doctrine, was to pounce on a Germany hopefully to be greatly weakened by war with the Soviet Union.³³

The British monarchy foresaw, accurately, that a U.S. involvement in a second general war on the continent of Europe, would lead to a post-war situation in which the power of the U.S.A. would be vastly increased, at least relative to that of the shabby British Empire of the 1920s and 1930s, and also absolutely. The monarchy desired the mutual ruin of both Germany and the Soviet Union, above all other immediate goals, but had a most impassioned concern that this be arranged in such a manner that the British Empire would be better situated after such a war, to undertake its longer-range aim, of ending the existence of the U.S. republic, of recapturing (i.e., recolonizing) the U.S. as a de facto member of what is called today the British Commonwealth.

The British monarchical establishment as a whole could

^{32.} The comparison of the abdication of Edward VIII, to the case of the current heir-apparent's relationship to Camilla Parker-Bowles, implicitly poses the right questions about the Wallis Simpson case.

^{33.} Lord Palmerston: "Britain has no permanent allies, only permanent interests."

have had few illusions about Hitler himself. In fact, in the greater part, they had created that monster and put him into power in Germany. He was, in that degree, their *Golem*. In such matters, one must never lose sight of Lord Palmerston's principle. It was their intent, like Churchill's intent for his (and, it is plausibly said, Prime Minister Tony Blair's) beloved Benito Mussolini, to use Hitler, and, then, to use him up. The soiled role of Edward VIII was, whatever Edward's personal sentiments in the matter, a matter of playing his assigned part for the intended purpose.

Then, on second thoughts, the monarchy decided it dare not risk the likely outcome of a Hitler victory in the coming war. What if Hitler's victory in the east were to give him hegemony in Eurasia generally? Britain could not forget, that but for the arrival of U.S. military forces in France at a most critical moment in World War I, Germany's offensive would have assuredly effected a crushing defeat upon combined French and British forces. Thus, on second thought, the monarchy reluctantly dumped the Edward VIII stained by the all-too-apparent, pro-Hitler orientation, to seek an alliance with the hated and feared U.S.A. So, for the sake of that alliance, it discreetly buried its soiled royal pro-Hitler linen under the celebrated "the woman I love" side-show.³⁴

So, the British-American-Canadian package for World War II was pasted together. The Wehrmacht defeat of both French and British expeditionary forces, removed nearly all further hesitation, by the British establishment, for accepting, however resentfully, a dominant U.S. role in the further conduct of the war. The precaution was, as the Churchill-Roosevelt conflicts of the war-time period reflected this, that Churchill et al. intended to beat Roosevelt, after the war, through aid of Wall Street's Trojan Horse inside the U.S. bastion.

The reasons the British monarchy not only put Hitler into power in Germany, but intended, for a time, to condone Hitler's free hand in continental Europe, reflect the depth of the British monarchy's accurate sense, that the traditional republican interests of the U.S.A., and the British monarchy's own special interests, could not coexist indefinitely on the same planet: as Henry Kissinger emphasized, in his May 10, 1982 London address. No competent strategic defense of the U.S.A. could be defined without clear recognition of that continuing nature of that ultimately mortal conflict between the respective two powers. So, the principle of the two levels of conflict, in the matter of foe turned ally, and ally turned foe, exhibited itself most plainly.

Kissinger was right on one point, it was a simpering sentiment which ever suggested, that the British monarchy—or, for that matter, Henry Kissinger himself—was ever a natural ally of the United States. Throughout our existence, to the present date, the British monarchy, as a continuation of the legacy of William of Orange and the United Kingdom's George I, has always been the principal long-term threat to the existence of the U.S.A. as a constitutional Federal republic. The case of Edward VII's guilty orchestration of what became World War I,³⁵ is a perfect distillation of the unending conflict between the American patriots and the British monarchy, from the accession of George I to the present day. Only very ignorant people, or twisted personalities, could ever think differently in this matter.³⁶

For the purpose of defining a strategic defense of the most vital interest of our republic, the reason for this conflict must be clearly understood in light of the most salient features of the history of the past nearly three centuries. For our purposes here, a few crucial highlights excerpted from the coverage provided in earlier locations suffices. I point out as much as is absolutely indispensable to lay the ground for getting to the crucial points lying just ahead.

Since 1782

Look at the history of U.S.-British relations as if in a lapsed-time cinematographic imagery. Take as the starting-point, British Prime Minister Lord Shelburne's not-so-secret provisional peace-treaties of 1782, with the governments of both the U.S.A. and France, and trace the principal twists and turns in that relationship since. View this cinematographic, also kaleidoscopic image, in respect to the principal twists and turns in the relationship, since Shelburne placed his Golem, Jeremy Bentham, in charge of the British Foreign Office. Trace the ensuing process through the decades of Bentham's protégé and successor Lord Palmerston, through and beyond the point of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's shameless public adulation of Bentham's Foreign Office tradition, at Chatham House, two hundred years later, in 1982.

Shelburne, Bentham, and their successors recognized the

^{34.} The literature of Brigadier Dr. John Rawlings Rees's London Tavistock Institute records relevant references to the case of the flight of Rudolf Hess, on a mission assigned to him by Adolf Hitler personally, to contact British circles formerly associated with the pro-Hitler perspective of Edward VIII. From the Tavistock record, Churchill's reported words, "He came too late," have great verisimilitude. No one who knows the history, believes that Hess actually committed suicide—voluntarily—in Spandau Prison.

^{35.} World War I's U.S. Secretary Lansing, of "German war-guilt" fame, was nothing but an out-and-out liar. To the buzzards belong the spoils! What better than that might one expect of the notorious liberal idealist, U.S. President, and White House Ku Klux Klan buff Woodrow Wilson.

^{36.} Add to the same pattern as the cases of Edward VIII and Rudolf Hess, Hitler's holding back the German columns at Dunkirk long enough for Britain to escape abject and total defeat right then and there. When we consider the change from the von Schlieffen Plan of World War I, which the Wehrmacht devised to outflank British and French commitments to refight the preceding war, the plan had been consciously designed for the purpose of ensuring a crushing and total defeat of both the French and British forces. Hitler's holding back the divisions long enough to allow the Dunkirk evacuation, like Hermann Goering's strategically foolish shift to the bombing of London's civilian population, both express Hitler's wish to bring back the pro-Hitler, anti-U.S.A. policies of Edward VIII's mid-1930s, in preparation for Barbarossa.

new United States for what it actually was, as the creation, in North America, of a new kind of republic, which had been created by the republican forces of all Europe, and intended by them to become the flanking development which would bring to an end the subjection of Europe to the feudal legacy of the pagan Roman Empire. The British monarchy's Venicestyle establishment recognized the very existence of the United States, accurately, as a mortal sort of threat to the continuation of oligarchic control over the governments of Europe. The entire thrust of the parallel and sometimes intersecting policies of both the British monarchy and the forces associated with Habsburg Chancellors von Kaunitz and Metternich, was to destroy France, break the ties between France and the U.S.A., isolate and crush the U.S.A. itself, and demoralize and crush that vast pro-American political, scientific, and cultural networks in Europe, which had been rallied, during the 1770s, around the cause and symbol of the American War for Independence.

This meant to crush the legacies of not only Leibniz and Bach, but also of those spokesmen of the new Greek-Classical renaissance, which was centered around the circles of Gotthold Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn.

The Bentham-orchestrated Jacobin Terror in France, the insurgency of the Romantic movement fostered by Napoleon Bonaparte's tyranny, and the triumph of the temporarily allied forces of the British Empire and Holy Alliance at the close of 1815, seemed to assure London and Metternich, that the hated American Revolution and its former global influence were soon doomed. The British monarchy then felt free to put Palmerstonian skids under its former ally and rival, Metternich's Holy Alliance, and to move on to crush the American republic and its remaining influence at leisure.

According to the gloating letters of London-directed, treasonous New York banker, and Democratic Party king-maker August Belmont, the consolidation of the preparation for the London-directed insurrection of the Confederacy, under treasonous U.S. Presidents Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan, poised the dagger for the death-blow to the Union.³⁷

The Lincoln-led victory of 1865, and the 1861-1876 rise of the U.S.A. to the position of the world's most technologically advanced and powerful agro-industrial economy, was a terrible shock to London. The rallying of the national economies of Germany, Russia, Japan, and other nations, including

the patriots of Central and South America, around the model of the American System of agro-industrial development, fostered an emerging, increasingly powerful bloc of nation-states. If this continued, the emerging trends for collaboration of states emulating the American model, pointed to a mortal threat to the continued existence of the British Empire. The British called this a "geopolitical threat," as madman Zbigniew Brzezinski sees an analogous potential today. For that reason, Britain mobilized to put the actual and potential Eurasian partners of the United States at one another's throats, as Edward VII did in organizing World War I among a sick France and Edward VII's own two foolish royal nephews.

Under the leadership of Britain's Edward VII, both as Prince of Wales and later King, British forces struck. The orchestration of the Dreyfus case, the 1898 Fashoda affair in France, and the prompting of the first Sino-Japanese war, typify the preceding actions leading into London's consolidation of the position of its asset, Theodore Roosevelt, in the U.S.A., and the creation of that Entente Cordiale which was the center-piece of Edward's drive toward World War I.

Edward, his bankers (such as Cassel), and his Fabians moved chiefly along three lines: 1) Set France and Russia against Germany, to break up the threat of the trans-Eurasian economic cooperation typified by the Trans-Siberian and Berlin-Baghdad railway project; 2) Break the Emperor of Japan from the U.S.A., by aid of the 1894-1895 first Sino-Japanese War, the subsequent conquest of Korea, and the Russo-Japanese war; 3) Use a British-controlled alliance of Wall Street bankers, such as Cassel's Harriman, and offspring of the Confederacy, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and also Cassel's, Schiff's, and Warburg's creation of the Federal Reserve System with the backing of Teddy and Woody, to orchestrate that political coup d'état inside the U.S.A., all of which was enabled by the directing role by the Henry Street Settlement House's Emma Goldman in the assassination of President William McKinley.

For Edward VII and his heirs, the possibility of successfully deploying France and Russia for a coordinated assault upon Germany, depended crucially on bringing the U.S. into the British camp for this operation. Wall Street's hired thug, "trust-buster" Theodore Roosevelt, led in operations breaking up the power of those U.S. economic and political forces which were bastions of the Lincoln heritage. The long-standing relations to Alexander II and his followers in Russia, and to the scientific, Classical-cultural, and industrial forces associated with Rathenau and Siemens in Germany, were systematically savaged with leading aid from London's assets, the Confederacy buffs Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Without the arrival of U.S. troops into France, the German military would have then crushed both the French and

^{37.} For example, there is this famous extract from Belmont's letter to a Southern business associate on the eve of Southern secession: "New York, in such a catastrophe, would cut loose from the puritanical East and without linking our fortunes with our kind, but somewhat exacting Southern friends, she would open her magnificent port to the commerce of the world." As an independent city-state, New York would become to the Americas "what Venice was once on the sluggish lagoons of the small Adriatic." Quoted in David Black, *The King of Fifth Avenue: The Fortunes of August Belmont* (New York: The Dial Press, 1981), pp. 199-200. See also, Anton Chaitkin, *Treason in America: From Aaron Burr to Averell Harriman* (Washington: Executive Intelligence Review, 1999), pp. 163-259.

^{38.} As part of the same post-World War I pattern of continuing British interest, Walther Rathenau, the son of a leading U.S. collaborator, and a key figure behind the Rapallo Treaty, was assassinated.

British forces there.

Thus, U.S. power saved the British monarchy and Empire, but at the price of increasing the relative economic power of the U.S.A. to an enormous degree, even through that economic mobilization of the U.S. launched to support the British monarchy's World War I adventure. As Britain moved forward, now in the 1930s, in its orchestrating of a second general war on the European continent, it now abhorred the idea that U.S. involvement in Britain's support, again, risked a U.S. rising to even greater relative power world-wide, a humiliating prospect for the British oligarchy. Thus, the case of the abdication of Edward VIII. Thus, the extremely difficult character of the alliance between the U.S.A. and the British monarchy, during World War II. It was a most troublesomely difficult alliance, with Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt at odds at nearly every step.

Bertrand Russell's well-known expostulation of sheer British oligarchical hatred against the United States,³⁹ should be placed in the column parallel to documentation of Russell's expressed hatred of industrial society, his joining with H.G. Wells, in supporting Wells' *The Open Conspiracy*,⁴⁰ during the late 1920s, and Russell's and Wells' co-authorship of what became the utopian form of Anglo-American nuclear-weapons policy. This is to be matched with the recent documentation of the point that present British Prime Minister Tony Blair's Ramsay MacDonald-like, Bruening-like, "Third Way" ideology, is a product of Blair's emulation of the Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini.⁴¹ This hatred of what the United States represents and typifies, is the essence of the burning passions of the present British monarchy.

Never let the funny accents fool you; the British oligarchs are essentially "Oxbridge" Venetians under their skin. Their method is, accordingly, that of the mask and the stiletto, in the Venetian tradition which fastened its grip on the mentally unstable Henry VIII, the grip of Paolo Sarpi over the circles of Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, and the purely Venetian legacy of William of Orange, Lord Shelburne, Jeremy Ben-

tham, Lord Palmerston, and the present monarchy. Theirs are the methods of the Iagos of this world; they seek to conquer their intended victims by pretending to be the confidant of both, while setting both, simultaneously, into mortal combat with one another.

They took possession of a foolish President Harry Truman, by the nuclear-weapons policy which they foisted upon him, and by setting the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union against one another. They set up a political marketplace of the fools in the U.S. Congress, and could not wait until Franklin Roosevelt's body was cold, to launch a virulent campaign to defame him and seek to destroy everything he had accomplished. They did all this, on behalf of the anti-Roosevelt legacy of Winston Churchill, and in order to regain their control over world finance and politics, through playing the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union against one another, Iago style.

On one occasion, in the Balkans, London and its French stooges, played Yugoslavia's Milosevic against Germany and President Clinton. Later, the same British changed sides abruptly, using the foolish U.S. Secretary of State, the Senator Jesse Helms-sponsored, consummate boor and thug Madeleine Albright, to get the U.S.A. into a war against London's former asset Milosevic. They do this all the time. These are their habitual Venetian methods; meanwhile, foolish Americans embroil themselves in debates, over which side we shall take in a battle between two fools who have been set upon one another by typical British diplomacy. The recent folly of silly George W. Bush's difficulty in deciding which side of the Taiwan straits he should be bombing, is typical of the way in which British diplomacy conducts its briskly profitable political traffic in leading American fools.

Which side are these British diplomats really on? Never forget, that Palmerston put it frankly; they have no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Their interest is to play everyone against everyone else. American and other fools then ask themselves; "Which side are we taking?"

What are the self-esteemed, permanent interests to which Palmerston referred? British interest is simply, to control a system which dominates the world as it may suit the monarchy's pleasure to do so. Once, in the days of Shelburne's puppet Gibbon, its pleasure was to create an empire for Barings' bank and the British East India Company, a realm modelled upon the pagan Roman Empire. Now, since the end of the last century, its pleasure is a world government—e.g., "globalization"—constituted according to the pleasure of the British monarchy's financier oligarchy.

If we of the United States, accept world government, or, as it is otherwise known, "globalization," we are doomed as a nation, and that would please the British monarchy greatly.

Thus, the Churchill-Roosevelt alliance was a very difficult alliance. The alliance was understood, among the cleverest people on both sides, to have been purely temporary.

Yes, it is true. During 1982-1983, I took pains to keep the door open to the United Kingdom. I did this, not because I

^{39.} See Carol White, *The New Dark Ages Conspiracy: Britain's Plot to Destroy Civilization* (New York: The New Benjamin Franklin House Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 73-74. In *The Problem of China* (New York: The Century Company, 1922), Russell wrote: "What is Americanism? 'Clean living, clean thinking, and pep!' I think an American would reply. This means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitution for concubines (as being easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy..."

^{40.} H.G. Wells, *The Open Conspiracy: Blueprints for a World Revolution* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1928).

^{41.} See Mike Diboll, "The Duce of Downing Street: Where Mussolini Led, Blair Follows," *The Times*, Aug. 6, 1999. "Young Tony is a disciple of Il Duce," Diboll writes. "The Prime Minister has more than a whiff of Mussolini about him. . . . The two are close ideological cousins. The idea of the Third Way was Mussolini's—and he also acquired a reputation as a great war leader by occupying Albania. . . . As Blair amasses sycophantic accolades, the tragedy that was Mussolini's New Rome is being repeated as the Blairite farce in New Britain."

had become soft on the British monarchy, but simply because it was the right thing to do, morally and practically. When you are committed to defeating an adversary's enterprise, always offer him a decent way out, as Machiavelli read the books of Livy. The object is not to kill populations which happen to be one's adversaries, but, rather, to redeem them, just because they are human beings.

To win, or to avoid wars: Tolerate no folly, but also perpetrate no injustice. Never make the error of adopting a vengeful policy, and never allow the impression that one might be harboring a vengeful policy, to provoke an actual or prospective adversary to harden his resistance to one's proposed change in relations. Never act as despicable rogues such as Tony Blair and Secretary Albright do. Never cease to offer an actual or prospective adversary a truly just alternative to continued conflict.

The enemy is not the population of the United Kingdom. To say the least, many among them are no worse as individuals than what we can meet at the local supermarket here in the U.S.A. itself. Many are no worse, many certainly better persons than that nasty Secretary Albright or her patron Zbigniew Brzezinski; let us keep a clear head in such matters. The enemy is that Venice-style imperial system now centered around the current British monarchy. That system is committed to destroying our republic; that system must be dismantled. That system is our republic's, and all humanity's current principal adversary on this planet. Understand, that it is wicked, or even simply foolish systems, not persons as persons, which are the enemies to be crushed. One must hope that as few actual persons as possible might get in the line of fire.

4. The principle of the flank

Since my purpose here is to address a new strategic setting, there is no need to burden this present report with a fulsome repetition of what I detailed in locations published approximately two decades ago. I have documented my 1979-1983 approach to strategic ballistic-missile defense, in earlier published works. I limit myself now to defining the principles involved, then and now, as these bear upon the tasks immediately before us here.

In my proposed design of a policy of strategic ballisticmissile defense initiative, earlier, and in addressing the new problems which confront us today, my use of the term "flank" has a distinct significance. The proper use of that term, as I shall describe my use of it here, provides the most efficient way of getting to the heart of the conceptions involved.

My use of the term "flank," respecting military and other applications, always points to the use of intellectual means in the ordering of deploying of force, other than the raw blunt power itself, to gain some meaningful kind of victory over what may even be a more powerful raw force. This may in-

clude a tactic or strategy of retreat, or either extending or concentrating one's forces, as may be suited to the circumstances and occasion. With that general restriction applied to all cases, the term may be used to designate either of two quite distinct, but nonetheless analogous and related meanings.

In its lesser sense, I would use the term as it usually points to the military, or analogous application of what might be otherwise recognized as the essence of the hunter's stalking of his prey. This meaning points to the hunter's utilizing the perceivable advantages from exploitation of both the terrain and the stalker's knowledge of the intended prey's habits and capabilities, both to outwit that prey, and to bring the relationship of hunter and prey into a relatively helpless position for the latter.

I would include certain U.S. documented tactics of World War II Japan forces in the jungles of Burma, including the use of sharpened-bamboo "panji traps," as an example of such tactics. Any "country boy" raised on a diet of successful pursuit of prey, has a more or less obvious kind of ready disposition for using, and devising flanking tactics for military applications

In the higher sense, as in the case of Hannibal's outwitting the Roman commanders at Cannae, or Frederick the Great's victory over the Austrians at Leuthen, my emphasis is upon a certain quality of superiority of the mind of one commander over that of his opponent, such as that of Soviet Marshal Zhukov over that of corporal, and supreme commander, Adolf Hitler, at Stalingrad.

This latter intellectual superiority, may include that commander's use of built-in advantages in the quality of the training of the forces commanded, especially those of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The education and training of the officer-corps according to Scharnhorst's and Moltke's known principle, referred to as Auftragstaktik, is a relevant example of such training.⁴² My use of the term may also include the commander's use of some quality inhering in relatively untrained troops, or in the way those recruits are trained, assigned, and deployed, as Lazare Carnot did during the period 1792-1794, to similar net effect. It is in that sense, of the intellectual superiority of the conception and employed principles used by one commander and his relevant subordinates, over an opponent, that the term "flank" is to be applied to my 1979-1983 design for a policy of strategic ballisticmissile defense.

For my special purposes here, this second use of the term always signifies *strategic flank*. For this application, the example of the original SDI policy, the term "strategic flank" is applied on three distinct levels, simultaneously.

^{42.} The effects of this training of the Prussian officer-corps, is to be seen in Moltke's account of the conduct of the German forces in the Franco-Prussian war against "Old Moltke." See Helmuth Graf von Moltke, *The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871* (English edition of 1907), Introduction by Michael Howard (London: Greenhill, 1992).

On the relatively simplest level, this signified the use of a principle of scientific method, in this case a Riemannian⁴³ notion of applicable physical principle, a policy of always applying physical principles *qualitatively* superior to those represented by the targets, to overwhelm *the purpose* of the strategic ballistic-missile attack as a whole (rather than individual opposing missiles, one by one). This exploited the inherent potential advantage of the defense, as Lazare Carnot and Gerhard Scharnhorst, for example, developed this principle, and as Czar Alexander I of Russia successfully adopted this advantage of the defense for the War of 1812, as proposed by von Wolzogen with the accord of the other relevant Prussian military advisors to the Czar.

On a higher level, the purpose of my design of strategic ballistic-missile defense, was to deliver a decisive political defeat to the Wells-Russell form of nuclear-weapons policy.

On the highest level, the object was to defeat the global strategic political motive, of the British monarchy, et al., which the Wells-Russell nuclear-weapons policy had been designed to serve.

All three levels were defined and elaborated according to a single principle, as I had defined this principle from the standpoint of my original, 1948-1952, contributions to Gottfried Leibniz's science of physical economy. I turn your attention, now, to the following, concise review of immediately relevant features of those combined discoveries.

The LaRouche-Riemann Method

Consider the way in which that three-fold, strategic flanking action applies as a model for addressing the implications of the world's present financial apocalypse. To understand those three, combined implications reflected in President Reagan's original SDI proposal of March 23, 1983, it should be recalled, from my sundry earlier reports published during the recent thirty years, that my original discoveries in the science of physical economy occurred in the following sequence.

The initial prompting of my work on this project, was my recognition, that Professor Norbert Wiener's "information theory" dogma was a parody of the same fundamental fallacy on which Immanuel Kant had based the entirely of his celebrated *Critiques*. On the foundation which had been provided by my adolescent formulation of my argument, ten years earlier, against such attacks on Leibniz's *Monadology*, as Kant's echoing of Voltaire, et al., I chose to take up the role of scientific and technological progress in determining the growth of physical productivity of labor in economy. This served me as the empirical standpoint of reference, for my proposed refutation of Wiener, and also the related work of John von

Neumann. For that reason, it was required, that as I had been confronted with Kant's argument years earlier, that I take into account human creativity in its more general sense, not only scientific creativity as such.

On the side of science and technology, I had emphasized, first of all, the role of technological progress in increasing mankind's power, per capita, over nature. I had included, secondly, the role of the design of proof-of-principle experiments, in providing the explicit link between the discovery of a validated universal physical principle, and the derivation of new, more powerful technologies from those physical principles. I had included emphasis on the impossibility of defining a principle of life in mechanistic terms of reference, for which purpose I had referenced, chiefly, the problems posed by Nicholas Rashevsky's definitions of mathematical biophysics. Finally, I had required a central role for the function of Classical-artistic creativity in defining those qualities of mental processes, the power of cognition expressed in terms of Classical artistic forms of metaphor, otherwise known as both the artistic and physical-scientific expressions of cognition.

The resulting conceptual fusion of physical science with Classical art, had posed the problem, which, in 1952, led me back to reconsidering the work of Riemann, his 1854 habilitation dissertation, most notably. By applying Riemann's notion of a multiply-connected manifold to my preceding discoveries, respecting the interconnection of physical and artistic principles, I transformed Riemann's notion of multiply-connected manifolds, to include both validated universal physical principles, and the validatable universal principles of composition of Classical art-forms, in both plastic and non-plastic media. In this way, I formulated the resulting method for a science of physical economy, known today as the LaRouche-Riemann method.

The following several paragraphs are technical, but the points which they identify are indispensable at this juncture.

The unique, characteristic feature of this set of discoveries, is defined as follows. The human action which generates increases in the effective net productive powers of labor, as measured in physical, rather then monetary terms, is the individual cognitive action which generates a validatable, original or replicated discovery of some universal principle. The locus of that action within the economic process as a whole is, in effect, in Riemannian terms, a change in the characteristic relative "curvature" of *economic physical-space-time* in that locality, and, implicitly, in the process as a whole.

That is the role of a realized discovery of principle, in driving the entire system into a transformation from correspondence to a Riemann type of manifold "n," into one of order "n+1." This transformation expresses an intrinsically non-linear form of action, primary for the considered system of development as a whole process. This non-linear characteristic displaces, and excludes, axiomatically, all "action at a distance" and kindred species of linearization

^{43.1.}e., the notion of the ordering of a series of successively higher Riemannian ("multiply-connected") manifolds, as defined by Riemann's celebrated 1854 habilitation dissertation: Über die hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen.

of causal relations.

As applied to physical science as such, this kind of Gauss-Riemann manifold has the characteristic features of a mathematical physics derived from the discoveries of Johannes Kepler and Gottfried Leibniz, in absolute opposition to the qualitatively inferior, intrinsically linear, anti-Kepler, anti-Leibniz, mathematical physics of a Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Leonhard Euler, Lagrange, Cauchy, Clausius, Kelvin, et al. It is therefore contrary to the inferior manner in which the putative fundamental theorem of the calculus, for example, is commonly mistaught today, as an axiomatically linear mathematics, in the generally accepted, reductionist, contemporary classroom practice, of secondary schools and universities.

At first impression, this, admittedly, may all seem to be very complicated to many readers. Nonetheless, the issues separating the intrinsically linear mathematics of today's typical classroom, from the intrinsically non-linear mathematics of any non-reductionist, competent physics, are actually so elementary in nature, that any competently educated secondary-school pupil, could fully and accurately understand the issues involved. These differences were more readily recognized, during those former times when emphasis on pedagogical-experimental laboratory methods predominated over mere formalist mathematics, in the secondary and university science curriculum.

The issues are made clearer for the layman, and others, by emphasizing the following point.

That characteristic of human behavior, which demonstrates to the physical scientist, the absolute superiority of the human species over all inferior forms of life, such as the higher apes, is the ability of the human species to generate those validatable discoveries of universal physical principle, by means of which the uniquely human form of willful increase of our species' absolute power in, and over the universe, is achieved.

Each such discovery, if realized for physical-economic and related practice, means a change in the mathematical type of Riemannian manifold which describes the gain in increase of mankind's mastery over nature. It is the action by means of which mankind generates and replicates such validatable discoveries of universal principle, whose effect is then to be recognized as the form of human action we must measure, rather than the simply physical action of the individual person as such.

The form of action to be recognized, is the role of cognition by individual persons, in generating those validatable discoveries of universal principle.⁴⁴ It is the effect of that

change, which is to be studied and measured, as an effect reflecting a change in characteristic Riemannian curvature of the affected physical process.

Such discoveries, employed to this effect, may be seen as out-flanking, functionally, qualitatively, and therefore axiomatically, the limitations inhering in the state of knowledge prior to each such discovery.

To round out this specialist's, but indispensable interpolation, note the following point.

The basis for all of my discoveries, and their applications, since 1948-1952, has been the recognition that the connection between two real phenomena observed, is never the straightline, linear connection which yesterday afternoon's financial accountant, or Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, or the fanatical fool gambling in the day-trader's bucket-shop, or Leonhard Euler, for example, wrongly presumed to be the case. Rather, the truthful representation of so-called "causal connections" lies in the efficiency of the manifest power of individual human cognition, to increase mankind's power in, and over the universe. This is the same thing as that which *Genesis* 1 identifies as man and woman each made in the image of the Creator.

When mankind proves, for example, that a certain discovered universal physical principle is valid, what has been demonstrated, is that the universe has been predesigned, in effect, in such a fashion, that the universe is compelled to obey those powers of individual cognition, the which are responsible for generating the discovery of that new principle. This shows, that there is a corresponding approximation of congruence between the way in which real cause-and-effect relations function in the real universe, and the way in which, contrary to Kant, the cognitive power of the knowable, Platonic form of synthesis of discovery of validatable principle, which is secreted by the human individual mind, has been designed by the Creator of this universe.

Once we accept the notion that the elementary expression of universal lawfulness of the universe, is expressed as regular curvature, rather the accepting the popular delusion of some people, to the effect that the straight line is the shortest distance between two points, we can begin to understand actually the universe in which we act.

The best among ancient Greeks, especially Plato, and other ancients understood this principle.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the inherently decadent culture of the ancient Roman Empire, whose Napoleonic and other legacies of Romanticism still pollute modern civilization, did not.

^{44.} It should be recognized, that, although my inclusion of universal Classical-artistic principles with universal physical principles, in defining the form of the physical-economic manifold, is unique to my discoveries, that Riemann himself was thinking in such a direction, as the first among his posthumously published "metaphysical" papers, the commentary on Herbart, indicates.

^{45.} I emphasize the evidence implicit in the construction of ancient solar-astronomical calendars, based upon normalization of observed regular angular displacement in observed celestial motion. I.e., the notion of universal law as premised upon regular curvature, rather than straight-line action. Since Kepler, and implicitly even in related ancient applications of notions of conic functions in general, the notion that universal curved action may be both regular and yet not of constant curvature.

Kepler's notion, that the universe is organized according to a form of curvature which is regular, but not constant, and Leibniz's further development of that notion, laid the basis for the notions of the Gauss-Riemann manifold. In such a manifold, as I have applied that conception for the science of physical economy, all significant action by mankind, including validatable discovery of universal physical principles, is expressed for mathematical and like imagery, as a perceived change in the characteristic curvature of elementary forms of human action. This has the form of a change in relevant choice of manifold, a change in the characteristic attributable to "choice" of economic physical space-time.

To express the characteristic of the progress of human scientific knowledge, from ancient to present times, the name for that principle of change in knowledge so generated, is known to Classicists by the name of *Reason*. That signifies, specifically, the principle of Socratic Reason.

From those fundamental considerations of modern science, we have the following.

In relatively incompetent notions of the definition of mathematical physics, for example, it is assumed that there is a deductive form of relationship between one observed sense-phenomenon, that of individual human physical action, and the second observed phenomenon, which latter apparently represents the immediate result of that observed action. The attempt to represent the connection between two such phenomena by a deductive mathematical scheme, such as accounting practice, is an intrinsically false representation of the way in which real-life, physical-economic processes actually function.

This error was, for example, the root of the intrinsic absurdity of the proposals submitted by the Heritage Foundation's General Graham. This is also the intrinsic absurdity, not coincidentally, of all of the explicitly immoral, pagan religious dogma on which the economic and social theories of the Heritage Foundation's controllers, the Mont Pelerin Society of the late Friedrich von Hayek, Professor Milton Friedman, and Britain's screechy Margaret Thatcher, are based.⁴⁶

The immediately foregoing, unavoidable interpolation now completed, the reader should find the concluding remainder of this report to be, relatively speaking, "duck soup."⁴⁷

It was on the basis of that, my own, original and continuing development of the applications of this method, combined with some of my relatively unique initial efforts at long-range physical-economic forecasting, that I was encouraged, during the late 1970s, to attack the problems of defining an effective mode for developing a strategic ballistic-missile defense.

This applies not only to the case of discoveries of validatable universal physical principles. As I have emphasized in other published locations, this also applies to validatable forms of universal principles of Classical artistic composition.

The latter are defined, uniquely, by examining the prompting of a second mind to replicate the act of discovery of a validatable discovery of a universal physical principle, as experienced previously by another mind. It is the mirroring of such a cognitive experience by the first mind, in the experiencing of the prior same discovery by a second mind, which renders the cognitive processes of the human mind cognizable. This mirroring process may be extended to the domain of social relations as such, by focussing upon the functional role of social relations in the application of a universal physical principle to the domain of physical-economic practice. Thus, directly contrary to Kant's, and other Romantics' radically, axiomatically irrationalist dogma for aesthetics, universal principles of social relations may be adduced and defined in a rational way.⁴⁸

Thus, the domain of human practice may be described in Riemannian terms as a compound manifold of *n* universal physical principles interacting according to *m* principles in the form of universal principles of Classical artistic composition. By defining the relationships within that combined manifold in task-oriented physical-economic terms of man's increase of physical power to exist, per capita, in and over the universe, the notion of universal *Reason* may be expressed in terms suited to treatment of such tasks as the three-fold mission which I assigned to strategic ballistic-missile defense.

In the present instance, we have shifted focus from the earlier mission of strategic ballistic-missile defense as such, to a related problem, defense against the global threat represented by the presently descending global financial apocalypse.

ABM then

Back during the late 1970s and early 1980s, my technical argument respecting the required design of a ballistic missile defense, was (and remains) that no system of interception relying entirely upon so-called "kinetic principles," could be designed, which would not be more costly than the supersaturating of any such defense with more assaulting objects. 49 This

^{46.} See von Hayek's exposition of the founding of the Mont Pelerin Society on the pro-satanic premises of Bernard de Mandeville's *The Fable of the Bees: Private Vices, Public Virtues*. The latter anti-moral dogma is the actual origin of the British dogma of the "Invisible Hand." It is therefore impossible to be a follower of the Mont Pelerin Society's, and Vice-President Al Gore's explicitly perverted notion of freedom, and also be a moral person.

^{47.} This remark dates the author, as having been reared in a time when the remains of yesterday evening's roast duck dinner, occasioned the cook's observation: "As easy as duck soup."

^{48.} This includes not only Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (London: Macmillan, 1931), but also the Nineteenth-Century Romantic dogma of Savigny, which dictates an hermetic separation of *Naturwissenschaft* (scientific reason) from *Geisteswissenschaft* (psychology, law, art). In other words, the irrationalist dogma of "art for art's sake."

^{49.} Such objects included not only nuclear warheads, but also diversionary objects which the defense can not distinguish efficiently from nuclear warheads.

shortfall in cost-effectiveness, was not merely of a financial, but of a physical nature. Therefore, only a strategic ballistic-missile defense based upon what the language of the 1972 ABM treaty identified as the category of "new physical principles," could provide a basis for an effective mode of strategic ballistic-missile defense.

Although my categorical prescriptions did include indications of types of "new physical principles" to be considered, I did not rely upon any such specific principle. Instead, I demanded a continuing "crash program," as that language is implied by the experience of the Manhattan Project and the best features of the "crash" program to put a man on the Moon. We must have such a "crash program" in the domain of "new physical principles" in general, a program which would be tasked to yield proof-of-principle types of experimental designs in support of principles to be considered.

Despite the fact, that this would be the only cost-effective defense, it would have the form of an enormously costly, initial capital outlay for development, unless we took efficiently into account, and exploited, the offsetting "economic spin-offs" of "crash programs" such as the Kennedy "crash program" for placing a man on the Moon.

During the 1985-1986 interval, along that line of long-range policy-planning, I extended that proposal in the form of subsuming such a "crash program" basis for developing a strategic ballistic-missile defense, under the form of a forty-year "crash" form of space-program, whose mission of orientation would be the placing of a permanent quasi-self-supporting, scientific colony on Mars, after an intervening period of developments spanning an estimated forty years. ⁵⁰ By designing the "crash program" development of strategic defense, and also such a space program, to emphasize a high rate of utilization of Earth-bound applications of technology by-products, the expenditure for the combined strategic defense and space programs would return a very large net (physical) profit to the U.S. economy, and to humanity generally.

In the past, most emphatically in the course of the development of the modern European form of sovereign nation-state, since the Fifteenth Century, this same approach has defined the essential role of the state's fostering of basic economic infrastructure, as the indispensable driver for relatively rapid rates of expansion of the per capita rates of growth of national income and productivity of affected national economies.

As a result of my discoveries in the science of physical economy, I proposed to use such exemplary cases of "crash" science-driver programs, as models of reference for the extension of what modern European civilization had done in the field of basic economic infrastructure, to a new definition of a mission-orientation for fostering high rates of growth of national economies. I proposed that national economies, and indeed the world economy, should be driven forward by mission-oriented, science-driver forms of "crash programs."

I went further, as I did in the case of both my proposed policies for strategic ballistic-missile defense, and a redefined space-exploration mission, to pin-point three categorical frontiers of science to open, this time in a coordinated way: 1) Extend the frontiers of astrophysics by aid of complexes of very-large-array "telescopes" placed at relevant distances from our electromagnetically very noisy Sun, focussing upon such included, exceptionally anomalous objects as fast-rotating binary systems and the Crab Nebula, studying the widest extremes of the spectrum;⁵¹ 2) Drive into the remote regions of microphysics, going beyond thermonuclear fusion into the domain of search for controllably exploitable features of so-called "matter/anti-matter" reactions as a new order of energy-source; 3) Truly non-linear approaches to biophysics, extended beyond the pioneering by Vernadsky et al. The work in the three extremities, must be coordinated, in such a way, that the necessary notion of universality of physical principle throughout the combined domains of astrophysics, microphysics, and biophysics, is constantly kept under scrutiny.

The fact was, during the 1970s and early 1980s, that there existed a range of target-areas within such a proposed science-driver approach, within which applicable features of the desired form of economically efficient strategic ballistic-missile defense could be defined. Rather than seek "gimmicks," as the unfortunate General Graham suggested, we required a genuine science-driver form of "crash program," on no lesser scale, but, rather, a much greater scale than the Manhattan Project. The project would more than pay for the costs of the development of the ballistic-missile defense.

If that approach had been undertaken, as President Reagan had outlined the SDI in his March 23, 1983 address, and if the Soviet Union, in particular, had accepted that offer, the world would be out of the woods, so to speak, today. The second greatest, perhaps the greatest opportunity for human-

^{50.} This involved the initial correction to the then-existing space program, of using the Sänger model of scramjet-rocket, piggy-back configuration for drastically reducing the cost of moving a pound of payload into a position in Earth-geostationary orbit. It incorporated the pioneering work of the late Krafft Ehricke, for developing automatic production facilities on the Moon, as an essential source of supply of high-weight components, both for powered space-flight between Earth- and Mars-orbit, and for the constructions which would descend from Mars-orbit to the surface of Mars. For a video summary of the 1986 proposal, see Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., *The Woman on Mars* (1988 LaRouche Democratic Presidential nomination campaign broadcast TV production).

^{51.} Both sets of targets were recommended to me first, by a leading astronomer, and second by a leading nuclear physicist. The latter pointed out a special point of interest about the already-selected choice of the Crab Nebula: the detection of concentrations of so-called cosmic-ray showers from that area. During the same period, there was a relevant proposal put to some associates at Lawrence Livermore on the indicated role of polarized thermonuclear fusion in generating the Solar System's characteristic periodic table from within a mass of material spun off, according to Kepler's principles, during an earlier, fast-spinning phase of the Sun's existence.

ity during this century, was blown away when Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov summarily rejected that offer, without even exploratory negotiations. As I warned at the time, Andropov's rejection of the offer would, implicitly, ensure the economic collapse of the Warsaw Pact system, within about five years. It happened exactly that way, as some today may recall.

Foolish U.S.A.! Foolish Soviet Union! In looking back, today, at the follies of all those who rejected President Reagan's initiative out of hand, one thinks of the fable of that fisherman, who threw away a pearl of greater price than the entire wealth of the impoverished people of his island. There have been other, comparable follies of the government and people of the U.S.A. during the recent several decades.

In thinking back, to what should be our causes for deep regrets on such accounts, must we not ask ourselves, what terrible follies in our own, habituated mental behavior, must have prompted us—whether in the U.S.A., western Europe, or the former Soviet Union, to participate in such awfully tragic missing of crucial opportunities?

Have we, since then, up to the present day, taken any significant steps which might have prevented us from repeating similarly tragic errors of political behavior in the present and future times? One must think of the way in which the plainly avoidable, global financial apocalypse of today came about, step by implicitly foreseeable step, over the course of the recent three decades.

We must ask ourselves: Does such persistingly tragic behavior not demonstrate, that our peoples, at least our leading institutions, and the majority among our populations, too, have lost their connections to the quality of moral fitness to survive? Is there still the chance, that our institutions and our people, might change their ways in time to save us from the monstrous crisis now in the process of descending upon this planet as a whole?

Does this not show, that within our leading institutions, and the majority of our own population—in other words, within ourselves, there exists a menace far worse than any mere thermonuclear weaponry? How shall we outflank that worst of all foes, the enemy within our own populations' intrinsically tragic, Hamlet-like, habituated way of thinking and acting, in even the seemingly simple matters of their intrinsically cowardly and greedy everyday personal lives?

The principle of the flank

The principle of the strategic flank might be described in various ways. Most of the relatively competent sorts of conventional ways in which professionals have described this are cumbersome ones. The cleanest, most direct way, least clouded with loose ends, is provided by the referenced LaRouche-Riemann method. Here, in this method, the strategic principles applicable to scientific, military, and political applications of the flanking principle become one and the same.

In this report thus far, I have indicated the common basis, and relevance of the latter such definitions, and that in which I believe, hopefully, will prove an adequate way. In conclusion, one task remains, the task of emphasizing that point which most people fail to grasp, essentially because they, like Shakespeare's self-doomed Hamlet, do not wish to even attempt to grasp it. The time has come in which they must find the willingness to grasp this point; their lives, and that of our nation, as our children, too, may depend upon such willingness to change.

In the customary course of things, the objective of learning new ways, is limited to discovering some more successful, but relatively fixed, habits of practice. Since such ancient Greek thinkers as Heraclitus and Plato, persons wiser than the typical, putatively well-educated citizen of today, we should have come to understand that confidence in any particular set of habits, even an excellent new one, may become a fatal error. Rather than being lured into the potential trap, of relying on learning a relatively fixed body of knowledge, the essential thing is to come to know how to develop revolutionary new qualities of knowledge, especially at the point previously established knowledge breaks down in face of reality. In short, the essential requirement for long-term survival and continuing progress, is to learn, and rely upon, constantly, an appropriate method of changing oneself, of changing, even radically, one's accustomed opinion.

In the domain of science, the willingness to confront the fact of a manifest fallacy in existing doctrine, is the essence of scientific progress, and therefore is the most fundamental definition of science itself. In other words, for the wise person, for the wise society, nothing is constant, but change. There is no viable science, but a science which changes itself accordingly, and repeatedly so. The willingness to discover a new principle, and to act under its governance, is the way strategic flanking characterizes the victories of viable science.

In military and other political affairs, the essence of the matter is to change, as Shakespeare's Hamlet fatally refused to accept the imperative of changing, even when his life and that of the kingdom of Denmark depended upon it.

Change, so conceived, signifies recognizing that a principle governing a continuing, revolutionary process of discovering and acting according to validatable new discoveries of universal principle, in both science and those matters exemplified by Classical artistic composition, is the substance of knowledge. As the cited case of Frederick the Great's victory over the Austrian commander at Leuthen illustrates the point, it is the fact that a person confidently focussed upon a principle of change, as primary, will defeat the best armed, best educated exponent of a fixed, formal body of knowledge, which constitutes the principle of the strategic flank.

That applies to the case of the original offer of the SDI. That will determine whether the present world-wide form of civilization survives the presently onrushing global financial apocalypse, or not.

For further reading

LaRouche strategic studies

The following is a selected chronological listing of mainly recent articles by Lyndon LaRouche, Jr. and associates, dealing with the SDI and related topics. See the end of this box for information on how to order.




LaRouche, "The Psycho-Sexual Impotence of Gen. Daniel Graham," *EIR*, Vol. 10, No. 40, Oct. 13, 1983. A profile of the Heritage Foundation's Danny Graham, who steered many patriots away from supporting the original conception of SDI, as authored by LaRouche and accepted by President Reagan. \$12

LaRouche, "LaRouche Tells Why Moscow Declared Him a 'Casus

Belli," "*EIR*, Vol. 20, No. 13, March 26, 1993. The real history of the SDI: an audiotaped presentation delivered by LaRouche, who was then a political prisoner, to a private seminar in Germany. \$12

LaRouche, "How Bertrand Russell Became an Evil Man," Fidelio, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1994. The author locates his fight against the one-world dictatorship of the United Nations, as the end-phase of a 600year war between the



Council of Florence and the oligarchical Venetian Party, of which Russell was the leading representative in the Twentieth Century. \$9



LaRouche, "Space: The Ultimate Money Frontier," *EIR*, Vol. 24, No. 9, Feb. 23, 1996. "Although space exploration lies as much outside the domain of military expenditure as within," LaRouche writes, "the mid-1950s 'moth-balling' of a Huntsville capability for putting a satellite into orbit, typifies the ugly reality of our Hobbesian age." \$12

LaRouche, "Now, Rid NATO of the Entente Cordiale!" *EIR*, Vol. 24, No. 27, June 28, 1996. "In net effect," LaRouche writes, "NATO has ceased to serve any vital strategic interest of the United States, and, its degenerated nature has made it, in fact, an instrument employed by forces working against our vital interests." \$12



LaRouche, "SDI: The Technical Side of 'Grand Strategy,' "*EIR*, Vo. 23, No. 29, July 19, 1996. The crucial strategic issues surrounding the 1982-83 debate on what became known as the SDI. LaRouche writes that "the making of the strategic policy of the United States, follows, still, today, the same pathway, predominantly, as did those who fumbled the issue of SDI a dozen years ago." \$12

LaRouche, "Today's Nuclear Balance of Power: The Wells of Doom," *EIR*, Vol. 24, Dec. 19, 1997. A diagnosis of the diseases spread throughout the United States by British oligarchical publicist H.G.

Wells. \$12

LaRouche, "A Swift Tour of the Pentagon: Strategy vs. 'Unscience Fiction," *EIR*, Vol. 24, No. 27, June 27, 1997. In order to understand the bankruptcy of U.S. military policy today, and to replace it with a true, civilized notion of strategy, it is necessary to go back



to the 1982-86 factional debates over the SDI. These were a reflection of the traditional controversy, between the patriotic and Tory-Anglophile currents within our conflicted nation. \$12

Michael Liebig and Jonathan Tennenbaum, "The history of LaRouche's comprehensive SDI policy," *EIR*, Vol. 25, No. 32, Aug. 14, 1998. \$12

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